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Cohabitation has become increasingly widespread, yet the law refuses to recognise the 
consequences of the breakdown of such relationships. The inaction of Parliament has 
left it to the courts to distribute proprietary rights based upon the law of trusts. However, 
the focus on purely financial contributions, penalises those who are most vulnerable. 
The most problematic consequence of this is that the approach taken to cohabitation 
replicates gender inequalities which are prevalent throughout society. Attempts to 
achieve formal equality and those discourses which indicate such an approach, have 
done nothing to achieve any form of ‘real’ equality. Unmarried cohabitation serves as 
an example of the wider implications of inequality, and demonstrates the potential for 
an approach which recognises difference to change social reality both within the legal 
sphere and without.   
 
Engaging in a desk-based inquiry which analyses case law and legislative proposals 
through a socio-historical lens allows for differing approaches to equality to be 
identified. Through this process, connections are drawn between the socio-legal 
construction of women, the rhetoric of the judiciary, and the equality approach adopted 
and implemented. This piece aims to demonstrate that formal equality is flawed. The 
law’s continued focus on the concept merely replicates the gendered nature of resolving 
cohabitation disputes, thus undermining equality in practice. What is necessary is for 
difference to be recognised, adopting an approach which lies between substantive and 
formal equality. This would allow for the recognition and alleviation of the gender bias 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The perception that we have achieved gender equality has meant that the law frequently 
adopts a formal approach to equality, treating men and women the same. Despite this 
approach being admirable in theory, in practice the law’s refusal to acknowledge 
socially constructed gender differences, and the impact of childbearing/rearing has on 
women, means that pre-existing inequalities are reinforced rather than addressed. This 
thesis examines the application of substantive/formal equality within the context of the 
common intention constructive trust (CICT), and its impact on women. The equality 
approaches adopted in relation to the CICT has fluctuated throughout its application 
which makes it a significant area for further enquiry. In order to view these 
developments in context, and in order to establish the links which exist between law 
and society, the development of the constructive trust is examined within its historical 
context.  
 
In contrast to the legislation designed to promote fairness which applies to cases 
involving divorce/dissolution, there is no automatic protection for unmarried cohabiting 
couples on breakdown.1 Despite the increasing frequency of such relationships, their 
legal rights remain unsatisfactory and centred on gendered property law principles.2 In 
particular, the regime applicable in sole-ownership cases, in which the courts determine 
proprietary interest based on purely financial criteria, has historically left women 
without rights in their homes. In adopting a supposedly gender-neutral approach to 
                                                          
1 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and Civil Partnership Act 2004. That is not to say that the law 
concerning marriage/civil partnership is without critique. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to explore those issues. 
2 See [4.3],[5.7],[6.8] and [7.4]. 
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contribution, attempting to adhere to a formal notion of equality, they have instead 
promoted and replicated the inequality found within legal and societal institutions.  
 
Recent research has revealed that the UK has a “pro-equality majority”,3  with over 83% 
of people believing that there should be equality between men and women.4  Although 
progress has been made towards this aim, it is yet to be fully achieved. There have been 
a variety of methods employed in attempts to achieve equality.5 However, the primary 
focus on formal equality, treating men and women as if they were the same, has 
historically proven to be an inadequate tool in facilitating equality in practice. While 
the concept of gender equality has been embraced by law and society, inequalities 
persist because the principle of equality fails to acknowledge differences which exist in 
practice. 
 
Within the context of unmarried cohabitation, despite women’s increased entry into the 
workplace, and the appearance of equality with men, there are still those who are unable 
to make significant financial contributions to the home, and in certain circumstances, 
are unable to make any at all.6 As such, the adoption of formal equality by the courts, 
rather than promoting equality of outcome, has instead placed women in a vulnerable 
position. In treating men and women as if they were the same, whilst adopting 
masculine norms to determine contributions, the courts ignore the ways in which 
women are treated differently within society. 7  In refusing to acknowledge those 
differences which arise by virtue of sex and gender for women and those who perform 
                                                          
3 Fawcett Society., Sex Equality: State of the Nation 2016 (London: Fawcett, 2016), 2. 
4 ibid, 5. 
5 See Chapters 5-7.  
6 ibid.  
7 See Chapter 2.  
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a traditionally feminine role, the result of striving for equality instead leads to the 
perpetuation of those inequalities which already exist.8 
 
Due to the gendered implications of the application of the CICT, it is clear that this is 
an issue inherently tied up with inequality. As such, the overarching aim of this thesis 
is to demonstrate the way in which differing forms of equality have been adopted within 
the case law. Through examining the consequences this can have on the outcome of 
such cases, it is contended that the purely formal approach to equality is inherently 
flawed. The in-depth analysis of cohabitation, here, acts as a case study for the nature 
of equality within society in its entirety, and the implications of the application of 
differing forms of equality on those considered different. 
 
1.2 Methodology, Theoretical underpinnings and Definitions 
This thesis is a desk-based inquiry that examines the judgments from a selection of 
CICT cases so as to test them against differing models of equality. This is done in order 
to identify the gendered impact of the application of formal/substantive equality. The 
cases that form the basis of the case analysis have been selected as they are 
representative of the cases found within traditional Land/Property Law textbooks.9 
Such cases have been central to the development of the CICT, as without legislative 
footing, the CICT was borne of, and continues to be developed by, the common law.10 
They have also featured heavily within the academic literature surrounding the 
subject.11 The cases have not been selected on the basis of the level of the court, the 
                                                          
8 Sex here relates only to childbirth and breastfeeding: see [1.2.2]; [2.4]. 
9 See for example Dixon M., Modern Land Law (10th ed) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2018); Thompson M. & 
George M., Thompson’s Modern Land Law (6th ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2017); McFarlane B., (et al) Land 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2017); Gray K. & Gray S., Elements of Land Law (5th ed) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
10 See Chapter 4. 
11 See for example the literature drawn on in [4.3].  
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outcome of the case, or the approach adopted by the court. This selection allows for the 
case law to be viewed and analysed within the appropriate historical context, through 
an equality lens.  
 
1.2.1 Feminist Legal Theory 
This thesis is theoretically informed by feminist legal theory. It is necessary to note that 
both feminism and feminist legal theory embody a number of distinct approaches, 
perspectives and concerns “that make sweeping generalizations difficult [sic]”. 12 
However, it is possible to identify commonality between these diverse feminisms. Of 
central importance within the context of this thesis is the way in which feminist works 
provide “an analysis of women’s subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to 
change it”.13 Within a legal context, feminist legal theory focusses on “[h]ow gender 
has mattered to the development of the law and how men and women are differently 
affected by the power in law”.14  
 
Chapters 5-7 of this this thesis trace the socio-legal and economic subordination of 
women with the intention of providing insight into which approaches have lessened the 
impact of this continued subordination within the context of the CICT. The masculinity 
of the law, and its role in replicating masculine norms brings with it a number of 
concerns about the treatment of women by the law.15 This is particularly problematic 
                                                          
12 Fineman M. A., ‘Feminist Legal Theory’ (2005) 13(1) Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 
13, 13. For discussion of each of the four branches of feminist legal theory see Becker M., (et al) Feminist 
Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously (St Paul: West, 1994), 68-98. However, the distinction between 
equality/difference is the focus of this thesis: see Chapter 3.  
13 Gordon L., ‘The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of Feminism’ in Eisenstein Z. R., 
Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 
107.  
14 Chamallas M., Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003), xix. 
15 See for example Finley L., ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature 
of Legal Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886; Green K., ‘Being Here – What a Woman 
Can Say About Land Law’ in (ed) Bottomley A., Feminist Perspectives on The Foundational Subjects of 
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when supposedly neutral criteria is applied without consideration of difference.16 As a 
result of this analysis, this thesis proposes that a blended approach of sameness and 
difference is the most effective way in which to ensure gender equality within this 
context.  
 
Those who adopt a feminist legal theory perspective generally subscribe to the idea that 
the law has contributed, historically to the subordination of women, but that it has the 
potential to be reworked in order to change the way in which gender is perceived and 
the implications of such perceptions to be shifted in order for equality to progress. This 
thesis identifies the law as having contributed to the subordination of women, both 
specifically within the CICT, and within a wider legal context. It also identifies those 
instances where the law has, and could continue to be, reformed so as to alleviate the 
inequalities that it has been allowed to produce. Feminist legal theorists are “almost 
universally committed to a social constructionist stance”.17 That is, that gender/sex are 
not biologically determined, but rather are produced by culture. It is this understanding 
of gender/sex that is adopted within this thesis, which is explored in detail below. 
 
1.2.2 The ‘Woman’ Problem18 
The term ‘women’ is used within this thesis without subscribing to the view that they 
form a homogenous group. Indeed the diversity women as a ‘group’ possess in terms of 
class, race, sexuality, religion and the different treatment/experiences of women must 
be acknowledged. However, so as to analyse the patterns of gender inequality from the 
                                                          
Law (1996: London, Cavendish Publishing), 93. Lacey N., Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in 
Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 2; Smart C., Feminism and the Power of Law 
(London: Routledge, 1989). See also [2.4.5]. 
16 The issue of faux-neutrality is analysed throughout this thesis. 
17 Lacey (n15), 3.  
18 See [2.4]. 
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1960s onwards, the commonality of many women’s experiences/treatment historically 
are discussed as distinct, from that of men generally speaking, as it is women who tend 
to be the subject of institutional and societal oppression and subordination. Adopting 
MacKinnon’s approach, when speaking of the socio-legal treatment of women in this 
context is: 
“not to invoke any abstract essence or homogeneous generic or ideal type, not 
to posit anything, far less a universal anything, but to refer to this diverse and 
pervasive concrete material reality of social meanings and practices”.19  
The use of woman/women/femininity within this thesis allows for feminist concerns 
which arise from overlaps and indirect connections between women’s diverse historical 
and cultural situations to be analysed and addressed.  
 
In order to clarify this, I use the term women to denote gender as opposed to biological 
sex.  This is described by Haslanger as: 
“S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, 
legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed 
or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological 
role in reproduction”.20  
The use of woman/women to denote gender rather than biological sex developed as a 
result of the feminist need to develop terminology in order to counteract sexist 
injustices; allowing discussion of ‘women’ without giving tacit credence to biological 
determinism or essentialism. This construction of gender is directly linked with the 
Butlerian notion of performativity, that: 
                                                          
19 MacKinnon C. A, ‘From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?’ (1991) 4(13) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 13, 16. 
20 Haslanger S., ‘Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?’ (2000) 34(1) 
Noûs 31, 36 & 39. In this context S is used to refer to subject. 
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“Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of 
acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and 
‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of 
gender as something they naturally are”.21 
Given that society has a tendency to socialize individuals based on their biological sex, 
those who are socially denoted as women, whether or not they individually define as 
such are included in this definition. 22  Many of the ways in which women are 
perceived/treated as other or lesser, and which lead to a reduction in women’s ability to 
contribute are derived from how such assumptions have been enshrined within social 
institutions. 
 
What ought to be noted however, is that those who are biologically female face the 
additional ‘burden’ of the reality/expectation of childbearing, which impacts their 
ability to earn despite attempts to regulate against this in the employment sphere.23 As 
Eisenstein states “the biological definition of mother grasps only a small part of the 
meaning of motherhood in patriarchal society. Motherhood also involves the notion of 
woman as a caring, emotional, dependent being”.24 As a result, the oppression resultant 
from motherhood is both due to the fact of childbearing in and of itself, but also the way 
in which society has shaped the construction of motherhood and the gendered 
assumptions therein. As such the gendered impact of the current law regulating the 
breakdown of cohabiting relationships has clear ties with issues of inequality within 
wider society. It is only by recognising the ways in which men and women are assumed 
                                                          
21 Butler J., Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 25. 
22 See [2.4]. 
23 See Chapters 5-7 and [3.3.4]. 
24 Eisenstein Z. R., The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (London: Longman, 1981), 16. 
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to adopt different roles, and the way in which society and institutions treat them 
differently, can any form of equality of outcome be achieved.  
 
1.3 Societal Change: Cohabitation Context 
Cohabitants are the fastest growing family form in Britain having more than doubled 
over the last ten years and that growth is set to accelerate, it is one of the most marked 
changes in the formation of families in recent years.25 It has been predicted that the 
number of cohabiting couples would rise to 3.8 million by 2031.26 That report was 
published in 2006, the latest figure of 3.3 million in 2016 indicates that such the 
previous estimate may be conservative.27 Given the increasing levels of cohabiting 
couples, the inequality which results from the law in its current form has the capacity 
to impact a considerable number of individuals.  
 
Though cohabitation encompasses a wide variety of living arrangements, the focus of 
this thesis is on cohabiting ‘couples’. There is no consistent definition of cohabitation 
as it relates to unmarried couples. As the Law Commission notes:  
“in many parts of the current law, cohabitation is defined by analogy with 
marriage or civil partnership: two people who are neither married to each other 
nor civil partners but who are living together as husband and wife or as if they 
were civil partners”.28  
                                                          
25 See ONS., Statistical Bulletin: Families and Households in the UK 2016 (4 November 2016), 4; 
Douglas G., Pearce J., & Woodward H., A Failure of Trust: Resolving Property Disputes on Cohabitation 
Breakdown (Cardiff: Cardiff University, 2007), 2.  
26  Law Commission., Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown 
(Consultation Paper No 179: 2006), 2.48. 
27 ONS, (n25), 2.  
28 Law Commission, (n26), 3.4. 
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Describing cohabiting couples as those living in a marriage-like relationship can be 
critiqued as reinforcing the misunderstandings related to common law marriage and for 
ignoring the fact that many couples cohabit due to their opposition to marriage. 
However, this definition allows for the necessary degree of specify regarding those who 
have/should have rights/obligations by virtue of the nature of their relationship. 
Therefore, as regards the use of the phrase ‘cohabiting couple’ in this thesis, this phrase 
is used to specifically denote unmarried cohabiting couples who are in ‘marriage-like’ 
relationships.   
 
Cohabitation has made its transition from couples covertly ‘living in sin’ to an accepted 
family form.29 The shape of the family in Britain is continually changing, and there has 
been a considerable shift in the last 50 years. The ‘traditional’ family, inseparable from 
marriage, based on the patriarchal division of the male breadwinner and female 
homemaker is no longer the sole family norm. Yet, despite the increasing diversity in 
family form, there remains a level of continuity in the gender roles ascribed to couples 
regardless of whether or not they are accurate/appropriate.30 In addition to this, it is also 
the traditional notion of the family which the legal system repeatedly validates and 
attempts to reinforce/protect.31  
 
                                                          
29 See Chapters 5-7. The Law Commission has acknowledged the “public acceptance of cohabitation”: 
Law Commission., Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death Executive Summary (Law Com 331, 
2011), 33. Research also indicated that 67% of respondents agreed that it was “all right for a couple to 
live together without intending to get married” Barlow A., (at al) ‘Just a Piece of Paper? Marriage and 
Cohabitation’ in Park A., (et al.) (eds.) British Social Attitudes: the 18th Report (2001), table 2.2. 
30 McRae S., Changing Britain: Families and Households in the 1990s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 26 – 28. 
31 See Chapters 3, and 5-7.  
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1.4 The Consequences of Embracing ‘Equality’ 
The overarching concern which arises from the current position of cohabitants explored 
within this thesis, is that it mirrors gender inequality elsewhere in society. It provides a 
detailed examination of the way in which different forms of equality manifest within 
socio-legal structures, and the consequences of adopting a formal approach which is out 
of sync with the lived experience of women. In particular, the focus on purely financial 
contributions penalises those who are most vulnerable. This can be seen most clearly 
within the context of ‘sole-ownership’ cases.32 Sole-ownership cases are those in which 
only one party within the cohabiting relationship has contributed financially to the 
purchase price or mortgage instalments with regard to the property at the centre of the 
dispute, as this is the only form of contribution currently recognised by the law.33 The 
antiquated law under Lloyds Bank v Rosset is still arguably binding in such cases and 
even where the approach of the courts seems progressive, the capacity for progress is 
undermined by the unwillingness for the courts to continue developing the CICT 
without the consent of Parliament. 
 
The inadequacies of the law concerning the breakdown of cohabiting relationships is a 
gendered issue. Although this is discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis, it is pertinent to provide an overview of the key points which ought to be 
acknowledged. First is the uneven distribution of labour in the home.34 Although the 
socio-economic position of women has improved and the proportion of women entering 
the workplace has increased, it is still women who do the majority of unpaid labour 
                                                          
32 Identified in the law [4.2.1][4.2.3];[4.3.2] and in practice [5.7],[6.8] and [7.4].  
33 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107. 
34 See for example Crompton R. & Lyonette C., ‘Who does the Housework? The Division of Labour 
within the Home’ in Park A. (et al)., (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 24th Report (London: Sage, 2008) 
52; Breen R. & Cooke L., ‘The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour’ (2005) 21(1) 
European Sociological Review 43. 
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even in duel-earner households. Further to this, the difference in the treatment of women 
within the public/private spheres remains. What needs to be emphasised is the 
importance of the relationship between one’s placement in either sphere. It is not merely 
biological distinctions between men/women for example childbirth and breastfeeding, 
stereotypes which have become gender norms integrated into accepted discourses also 
have a role in positioning the feminine within the private sphere. As such the focus of 
this thesis is on gender and not purely biological sex. 
 
Historically, the binary construction of male and female has been continually reflected 
by the courts.35   Women were only able to secure their rights when the judiciary 
depicted them as victims, “reinforcing stereotypes of weakness”.36 It has been stated 
that the “very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms”.37 
However, that ought not to preclude us from recognising acts which have been 
gendered.  As Beresford recognises “gender is not something a person is, rather it is 
something a person does”38  a stance based in Butlerian thought. This thesis will go 
further in stating that in neglecting to recognise the difference between gendered 
behaviours, the courts, though now seemingly acting with equality in mind are in 
practice denying women proprietary rights by ignoring the inherent difference between 
masculine and feminine contributions. Emphasising difference can “reinforce a young 
woman's powerlessness by virtue of her age and gender”.39 Yet, by disregarding them 
entirely the courts are instead making women vulnerable. 
                                                          
35 A key example of this would be Eves v Eves [1975] EWCA Civ 3: see [4.3],[4.4] and [5.4.3]. 
36 Posner R., Law and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 349. 
37 Butler, (n21),1. 
38 Beresford S., ‘It’s not me, it’s you: law’s performance anxiety over gender identity and cohabitation’ 
(2012) 63(2) Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 187, 197. Emphasis original.  
39 Ewick P., ‘Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative’ (1995) 29 Law 




1.5 The Cost of Insecurity in the Home  
The current legal regime also has consequences associated with a lack of security in the 
home. Insecurity in the family home can lead to issues of homelessness and additional 
demands on emergency accommodation and both government and charitable 
housing/welfare services. This is of particular note given the continuing public concerns 
relating to housing.40 These concerns relate directly, though not exclusively, to the 
housing crisis, which is the term used to refer to a lack of suitable housing, the high 
price of property, increasing levels of homelessness, and the consequences of such an 
economic/social environment.41 The housing crisis, particularly the increased cost of 
housing and the housing shortage may have a causal connection to the increased levels 
of cohabitation in recent years.42  
 
The consequences of such insecurity are further exacerbated in circumstances where 
either minimal or no proprietary interest is found for the financially vulnerable party in 
the property concerned. The increased strain placed on Local Authorities, the welfare 
system and the charitable sector, due to the housing crisis (notwithstanding other 
                                                          
40 See YouGov., Tracker Surveys: Issues Facing Britain, 2014 and 2015 as cited in Shelter., Addressing 
Our Housing Shortage: Engaging the Silent Majority (London: Meeting Place Communications, 2015) 
in which housing has been ranked as a priority which lies above education, crime and pensions in all but 
2 of the 25 waves surveyed. 
41  See for example Neimietz K., The housing crisis: a briefing (IEA February 2016): 
<https://iea.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/IEA%20Housing%20Crisis%20Briefing%20Feb%202016.pdf> accessed 
20/01/18; Frontier Economics., Assessing the social and economic impact of affordable housing 
investment (September 2014): <www.frontier-economics.com/de/veroffentlichungen/assessing-the-
social-and-economic-impact-of-affordable-housing-investment/> accessed 20/01/2018; Osbourne H., 
Home ownership in England at lowest level in 30 years as housing crisis grows (2 August 2016): 
<www.theguardian.com/society/2016/aug/02/home-ownership-in-england-at-lowest-level-in-30-years-
as-housing-crisis-grows> accessed 20/01/18. 
42 Lord Hope notes at least within his judgment in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [2] that the 
aforementioned case is of “general public interest… as house prices rise and more people are living 
together without getting married or entering into a civil partnership” drawing together the link, though 
perhaps not causal, between the issues posed by inadequate cohabitation law, the rise in numbers of 
cohabitating couples and the housing crisis.  
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economic factors), means that those support systems in place where there is a risk of 
homelessness or an inability to obtain and/or sustain a home are under considerable 
pressure. This has serious consequences within the context of the breakdown of 
cohabiting relationships given that it is the financially vulnerable party within such 
cases that are left without interest in their homes, and as such are required to find a new 
home. This also means that such parties are, outside of their cohabiting relationships, 
more likely to require welfare assistance from the State. The risk of homelessness, or 
where some level of interest is found but the property is then sold, has consequences 
which go beyond the economic considerations noted above.    
 
The emotionality of ‘home’ and the connection between home and identity, known as 
property and personhood, plays an important role in the experience of those who lose 
their home.43 This has implications within the context of the breakdown of cohabiting 
relations given that the loss of the home has consequences tied to well-being and mental 
health both for the parties involved in the dispute and any dependants. Although this 
has not been subject to study within regard to the loss of home as a result of cohabitation 
proceedings, such impact has been measured in the context of repossession and 
displacement, and the lack of appropriate housing.44 For example, Tsai’s review of 
foreclosure and its implications on health showed that in the majority of cases 
                                                          
43See for example Radin M. J., ‘Property and Personhood’ (1981-1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957; Laster K. 
& O’Malley P., ‘Sensitive New-age Laws: The Reassertion of Emotionality in Law’ (1996) 24 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 2. 
44 Fullilove M. T., ‘Psychiatric implications of displacement: contributions from the psychology of place’ 
(1996) 153American Journal of Psychiatry 1516; Communities Scotland., The effects of social housing 
on health and wellbeing – initial findings from the SHARP study (July 2006):  
<www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1125/0086317.pdf>, 69 accessed 20/01/18;  
Shepherd’s Bush Housing Association., Housing & Health Uncovered (August 2003): 
<www.housinglin.org.uk/_library/Resources/Housing/Housing_advice/Housing__Health_U 
ncovered.pdf> accessed 20/01/18. 
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“foreclosure has adverse effects on health, mental health, and health behaviours”.45 
Notwithstanding the human cost of such loss, this also provides a secondary financial 
implication stemming from the loss of a home, and improper housing which relates to 
the NHS which has already been identified in connected with the housing crisis which 
has shown a link between inappropriate/lack of housing and negative effects on mental 
and physical health.46  
 
1.6 (In)flexible Judiciary? 
Given the lack of legislative action in relation to the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships, the need for judicial flexibility is a key consideration for the development 
of the law. The CICT has developed alongside historical shifts in legal and societal 
norms. However, it has often fell behind the standards set in other areas. The inability 
of the judiciary to keep up with social change is due in part to the difficulties associated 
with the common law being the method of ‘law making’/legal development. Due to the 
doctrine of precedent cases need to reach the highest courts, or be distinguished on the 
basis of law or fact, which is a rarity in such cases. Even once relevant cases make it to 
the higher courts, the judiciary are determined to avoid being seen to engage in ‘law 
making’ due to the adherence of the separation of powers. Evidence of such 
developments and the approaches adopted by the courts are analysed in full in Chapters 
5-7. 
 
As is discussed above, despite cohabitation law echoing the terms used within marital 
law, specifically relating to ‘fairness’ and the intentions of the parties, the lack of 
                                                          
45  Tsai A. C., ‘Home Foreclosure, Health, and Mental Health: A Systematic Review of Individual 
Aggregate, and Contextual Associations’ (2015) 10(4) PLoS ONE 1. 
46 Frontier Economics, (n41), 8. 
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flexibility afforded to the judiciary within the context of cohabitants leaves those who 
are unable to contribute to a property financially are left without adequate protection. 
The ability for judges in cases concerning the breakdown of marriage or civil 
partnerships judicial discretion used to make adjustments allows for non-financial 
contributions to be made more easily, as well as allowing more so for a consideration 
of future needs rather than past behaviour. Protection which would be beneficial for 
cohabitants, but one which requires the recognition of difference.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The key role of this research is the development of the debate surrounding gender 
equality and cohabitation. The constructive trust forms the basis of a case study which 
analyses the impact of equality/difference approaches on women, acknowledging the 
significance of the socio-legal, historical context in which these cases took place. 
Examining the CICT under an  equality/difference lens contributes to the originality of 
this thesis. That is, that in order to facilitate equality in practice, both equality and 
difference need to be recognised. In acknowledging the importance of recognising 
difference within an equality framework, and demonstrating the impact that such an 
approach can have, this thesis also lays the foundations for future work on the subject 
of inequality.  
 
There has been criticism, particularly from a feminist perspective, of the rhetoric which 
has been used within the CICT case law, particularly when speaking of women. 
Although the use of stereotypes, and at times the patronising tone adopted, is 
undesirable, it has achieved its ends - ensuring the proprietary rights of women who 
would otherwise have been denied them. The analysis of the law given in Chapter 4, 
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when taken alongside Chapters 5-7 which examine the case law in their socio-historical 
context demonstrates that in gaining equality, women in the modern cohabitation cases 
have given up their rights. In examining equality theory and its application to 
cohabitation law this thesis lays the foundations for further comparative analysis. In 
particular areas such as proprietary estoppel and mortgages would be well-fitting areas 
for examination. The equality approach considered in this thesis could have application 
beyond the scope of property law as it has the potential to be used to secure equality in 
practice through acknowledging and utilising both equality and difference. 
 
The focus adopted within this thesis, is one which has not been a substantial focus 
within existing literature. 47  That is, that the approach adopted with regard to 
cohabitation replicates gender inequalities which are prevalent throughout society. 
Attempts to achieve formal equality and the rhetoric which indicates such an approach, 
have done nothing to achieve any form of ‘real’ equality. Cohabitation serves as an 
example of the wider implications of inequality, and demonstrates the potential for 
approach which recognises a middle way between equality and difference to invoke 
change within the legal sphere and without.   
 
There has been considerable debate concerning equality, in both principle and practice. 
This thesis examines the weaknesses involved in the application of formal equality 
within the context of cohabitation. It is essential to note that the interaction between law 
and society requires that even where using cohabitation as a case study in order to show 
the implications of the misapplication of the principle of equality, that it is seen within 
a wider context. In examining the historical development of women’s rights within the 
                                                          
47 The existing literature is predominantly examined within [3.3]. 
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public and private spheres, both public and private, and the case law within that same 
period, a fuller understanding of the intricate web of interactions which determine how 
equality needs to be adapted to fit with social practice can be developed. In particular, 
the fact that is has been the dominant approach adopted by the legal system, formal 
equality fails those who need an equality based approach to be adopted the most. In 
examining equality as a concept, Chapter 3 identifies the differing forms of equality 
which have prevailed within academic sphere and attempts to reconcile the problems 
which have been identified where a substantive difference based approach is adopted.  
 
Overall, this piece aims to demonstrate that formal equality is flawed. The law’s 
continued focus on the concept a futile exercise, merely replicates the gendered nature 
of resolving cohabitation disputes while purportedly striving to secure it. What is 
necessary is for difference to be recognised, incorporating substantive equality into 
judicial discourse in order to overcome legal obstacles and societal discourses which 
currently prevent equality from being realised. This allows for the reality of 
relationships, the nature of contributions and the failings of the current approach to 
inform legal decisions, and that this would benefit those who are currently excluded 
from the protection of the law.  
  
The following chapter examines the construction of society as a series of dichotomies 
which underpin the construction of equality and difference as an incompatible pairing.  
Chapter 3 provides the necessary analysis of equality and difference and in particular 
how the differing formulations of equality and difference impact women. Chapter 4 
provides a detailed explanation and analysis of the legal history of the common law 
constructive trust and the law as it stands, introducing a number of the critiques which 
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have been waged against the legal regime. Chapters 5 to 7 examine the socio-legal 
history of cohabitation in England and Wales from the 1960s onwards, with a particular 
focus on the position of women. This is done within 20year frames, each of which 
mirrors a particular form of equality, set alongside a detailed analysis of the case law. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions which have arisen out of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 - Liberal Theory: Illiberal Outcomes 
2.1 Introduction   
This chapter seeks to establish the theoretical framework on which the subsequent 
chapters are based. It begins with an account of the development of the public/private 
dichotomy and individualism. These form two central barriers to the attainment of 
demonstrable equality in practice. The public/private dichotomy is one of a number of 
homologous distinctions which constitute the liberal approach to thinking about the 
social world which gives rise to a number of additional bifurcated categories.1 This 
chapter focusses on nature/culture, male/female and sex/gender which taken alongside 
the substantive/formal equality approach discussed in the following chapter, makes it 
clear that the liberal framework on which socio-legal structures and discourses have 
been built is imbued with inequality.2   
 
The chapter continues with an in-depth critique of the implications of the 
aforementioned dichotomies in practice. This provides evidence to the effect that 
though “dualism between public and private spheres...[which] has been identified as a 
key feature of Western, liberal thought”,3  is also one of the primary methods through 
which gender inequality is maintained. When combined with a construction of 
individualism which denies women ‘identity’ within the liberal construction of society, 
those who are viewed as different are without access to the formal universal right to 
equality as applicable to the public realm.  
                                                          
1 Kennedy D., ‘The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1349, 1349. 
2 Equality is a thread which runs throughout this chapter as the liberal formulation of society has given 
rise to the conceptualisation of equality applied in practice. However, the full analysis of equality is 
located in Chapter 3. 
3  Chinkin C., ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’ (1999) 10(2) European Journal of 




2.1.1 Historical Foundations 
Separate spheres ideology can be traced back to the Aristotelian distinction between the 
public polis and private oikos. 4  However, the modern understanding of the 
public/private divide, and the liberal principles derived from it stem from Lockean 
social contract theory which forms the basis of this chapter. During the C16/17th, the 
encroaching powers of the monarchy, and later the state, reinforced the necessity of the 
distinct public/private realms from a liberal perspective.5 This section of the chapter 
will detail the theoretical development of the division, providing the necessary insight 
into the construction of individuals and society. This informs the later in-depth analysis 
of the public/private distinction and the additional dichotomies which have stemmed 
from this division.6  
 
Social Contract Theory 
In the Second Treatise, Locke utilises the “mythical story of social contract theory”7 to 
support his conception of the limited state, underpinned by the public/private divide. 
This ‘story’ depicted man’s movement from the state of nature, to civil society governed 
by the state. The state of nature was defined by independent freedom and equality, in 
which the first society was formed between man and woman.8 As developing social 
                                                          
4 Nevett L. C., House and Society in the Ancient Greek World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 7. The Oikos equating to the home/family, the private realm. The Polis being the community/state 
constructed of free individuals, the public sphere. For more on the emergence of the spheres: see Burger 
T., & Lawrence F., (trans) Habermas J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991); Roy J., ‘Polis and Oikos in 
Classical Athens’ (1999) 46(1) Greece & Rome 1. 
5  See Horwitz M. J., ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ [1982] 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1423, 1423. 
6 This analysis forming the basis of Chapter 3. 
7 Romany C., ‘State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public Private Distinction 
in International Human Rights Law’ in Cook R. J., (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and 
International Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 91.  
8 Known as conjugal society, which also included children and servants. Laslett P., (ed) Locke J., Two 
Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, 77.  
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connections expanded to create a common society, man’s relationship with the law of 
nature was destabilized resulting in possible conflict.9 As a result, the ‘rational’ society 
consented to the formation of a civil government, thus making the transition into 
civil/political society.10  
 
With the development of the state, the distinction between paternal and political power 
emerged. In its public role, the state acts as the neutral adjudicator in order to avoid the 
issues arising from individual bias when ‘judging one’s own case’. Individuals 
relinquished some of their natural rights, securing the state’s role in the “preservation 
of property”,11 passing law, punishing breaches of the law, and settling disputes. In 
contrast the family/domestic realm were constructed as paradigmatically private, and 
free from the intervention of the state. This avoided undermining the freedom and 
equality of all men in the state of nature, providing a subjective ‘space’ in which 
individualism could flourish.12 
 
The domestic sphere was seen as a place of little conflict, thus negating the need for 
state intervention. Where “different understandings… [or] different wills” arose 
between man and wife as joint heads of the household, the power to make the final 
decision resided in the “abler and stronger”13 husband. These restrictions placed on the 
                                                          
9 Arising as a result of the introduction of commerce, an expanding population and the scarcity of goods. 
Dienstag J.F., Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 58–9.  
10 Laslett P., (n8), 13. Rationality is discussed in detail in [2.1.2].  
11 ibid, 123-6. It should be noted that for Locke property included life, liberty and estates. The rights 
which were relinquished were done so on the basis that the state ought to act to the benefit of civil society, 
which would be undermined were individuals still able to apply the law of nature as they saw fit, imbued 
with individual bias as noted above. The ‘neutrality’ of the state as an adjudicator and otherwise is a 
thread which runs throughout this chapter but is addressed specifically in [2.5.5].  
12 ibid, 122. See also [2.1.2].   
13 ibid, 82. See [2.4.5] on the gendered construction of the domestic sphere in Locke’s theory. It is also 
considered in Chapter Four and can be identified in Chapters 5-7.   
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state sought to prevent the use of arbitrary power. Instead they were to act “for the good 
of the people” 14  in the public domain and their intervention into the private was 
perceived as “dangerous and unnatural”.15 Such restrictions were seen to negate the 
capacity for tyrannous rule which patriarchalism facilitated.16 The domestic realm was 
subject to paternal (patriarchal) rule, and political/civil society were regulated by 
political power of the state, thus forming the foundations for the modern distinction 
between public/private.    
 
The Public/Private ‘Revolution’ 
The societal shift caused by the industrial revolution saw the Lockean public/private 
divide re-posed as market/home, which simultaneously glorified and devalued the 
latter.17 The rise of capitalism led to the emergence of the conflated “economic man”18 
and the cult of domesticity. This reworked the division “to suit the interest of a ruling, 
property owning male elite”.19 The home was to be supported by wives and mothers in 
order that the husband could actively (and successfully) participate within the market.20 
However, the depiction of “imprisoned white, middle-class women in the spatially 
                                                          
14 ibid, 135. 
15 Horwitz (n5), 1426.  
16 Locke’s Two Treatises was written to counter the support for the absolutist monarchy espoused in 
Filmerian patriarchalism which supported the unrestrained power of the state and the inequality which 
resulted from it: Filmer R., Patriarcha; or the Natural Power of Kings (1680), as discussed 
in Sommerville J. P., (ed) Filmer: ‘Patriarcha’ and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 1-68.  
17 Olsen F. E., ‘The Family and the Market: a Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96 Harvard 
Law Review 1497, 1497 & 1499. 
18 Jennings A., ‘Public or Private? Institutional Economics and Feminism’, in Ferber M., & Nelson J. A., 
(eds) Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 122. 
19 Rose N., ‘Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family’ (1987) 14(1) Critical Legal 
Studies 61, 64. It can be argued that under the Lockean construction of individualism discussed below, 
that the way in which the division served the interests of property owning men had foundations in prior 
formulations. 
20 See for example Hunt M., ‘Wife Beating, Domesticity and Women’s Independence in Eighteenth 
Century London’ (1992) 4 Gender and History 10, 27. 
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distinct private arena of their homes”,21 has never been a wholly accurate depiction of 
women, or the private sphere. Separate spheres ideology was prescriptive rather than 
descriptive of the lived reality of the majority of women, though that is not to say that 
it was without consequence.   
 
The association between sex/gender roles and the separation of the spheres was 
crystallised in terms of the modern understanding of the public/private divide in this 
period supressing women for the sake of maintaining the male market.22 As a result,  
“the proper course of action for a wife was for her to minimize her connection 
to the world outside the nuclear family and devote herself entirely to creating a 
supportive home”.23 
Women’s biological capacity to bear children, and their natural capacity for nurture was 
used to legitimise their placement in the private sphere. The public/private distinction 
has, alongside other liberal principles served to reinforce the differences between men 
and women, while maintaining a guise of neutrality.24 The construction of the home at 
this time, as a “haven in a heartless world”25 secured the notion of the family home as 
a site of non-intervention, obscuring the links between work and home which remains 
a source of concern from various feminist perspectives.  
 
                                                          
21 Gardiner P., ‘Housing and Gender: Beyond the Public/Private Dichotomy’ in Dandekar H. C., Shelter, 
Women and Development: First and Third World Perspectives (Michigan: George Wahr, 1993), 66. 
22 O’Donovan K., Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1985), 11; Freeman M., 
‘Towards a Critical Theory of Family Law’ (1985) 38 Current Legal Problems 153, 153. 
23 Hunt, (n20), 26. 
24 Linking to both biological determinism: see [2.3.2],[2.4] and gender inequality as discussed in Chapter 
3. The way in which this has had an impact in practice is examined in the Chapters 5-7. 




2.1.2 Individualism  
Individualism is a principle feature of liberal theory which is underpinned by autonomy, 
and rationality. 26  Autonomy has traditionally been tied to the notion of the self-
sufficient conception of the individual and the capacity for individuals to make and act 
on their own decisions.27 Historically those who lacked reason or were economically 
dependent on others were excluded from participating in the public realm, and thus were 
deemed unequal.28 Women formed part of this group, rendering the neutral, universal 
construction of the individual misleading and idealistic.29  
 
Individualism “denies difference by positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unit, not 
defined by or in need of anything or anyone other than itself”. 30  Individuals are 
“abstracted” 31  from their individual characteristics and circumstances and deemed 
deserving of political and legal equality on the basis of this ‘sameness’. 32   This 
‘sameness’ is premised on the rationality and autonomy of individuals, and has thus 
proved problematic for those traditionally excluded from the public sphere by virtue of 
their inability to meet this criteria. 33  Whilst founding equality on the basis of an 
                                                          
26 Which has implications for gender equality as discussed in considerable detail in the Chapter Four as 
such it will only be discussed here summarily in order for the links to liberal theory and the current 
equality/difference debate to be properly established within the context of the public/private divide and 
individualism. 
27 On Autonomy: see [2.5.3].   
28 Minnow M., Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 124.  
29 And with it the notion of universal equality as discussed in Chapter 3.  
30 Young I.M., ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference’ (1986) 12(1) Social Theory and 
Practice 1, 7. Individualism stems from Locke’s social contract theory, and was crystallised in the 
C18/19th when the division was reposed as home/market. 
31 Bacchi C., Same Difference: Feminism and Sexual Difference (London: Allen & Unwin, 1990), xv. 
32 Universal individualism underpins formal equality and it is often used as a justification for gender 
inequality within both spheres: see generally O’Donovan K. & Szyszczak E., Equality and Sex 
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Formal equality and the gendered implications of 
its application is discussed in theory within Chapter 3 and can be seen in practice within Chapters 5-7. 
33 Rationality having been traditionally associated with men. 
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individualism which denies difference is theoretically possible, when applied it acts to 
oppress those designated as ‘other’.34  
 
The hierarchical gendered nature of the dichotomy drawn between public/private, and 
the historical exclusion of women from the public sphere, rendering them non-
individuals, has made the unequal status of women an inevitable consequence of classic 
liberal theory.35 The division works to “obscure… the subjection of women to men 
within an apparently universal, egalitarian, and individualist order”.36 It is a deceptive 
tool which seeks to reinforce women’s inferior position in the private realm and support 
the natural exclusion of women from the public. Despite individualism being presented 
as universal, the “criteria governing civil society are actually those associated with the 
liberal conception of the male individual, a conception which is presented as that of the 
individual”. 37  If individualism “is freedom from the dependence on the wills of 
others”,38 then it is the antithesis of women’s historical experience and traditionally 
appropriate role, the dependent wife and mother.39 
 
2.2 Public/Private 
The public/private division can be categorised in a number of distinct, yet interrelated 
ways. At the most simplistic level public/private have been viewed as distinct, opposing 
                                                          
34 The distinction between theories of sameness and the application of these neutral principles in practice 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. It is also seen in practice within Chapters 5-7. 
35 On the gendered nature of the dichotomy: see [2.4.5]. The classic liberal construction of individualism 
can still be seen have an impact on the position of women in the public and private spheres as discussed 
in Chapters 3, 5-7.  
36  Pateman C., ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’ in Phillips A., Feminism and 
Equality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 157. 
37 Pateman C., The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1989), 122. 
38 MacPherson C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 
263.  
39 Women’s position in society, particularly the ways in which they have been rendered dependent on 
men is analysed in detail in Chapters 5-7. 
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pairs, using one to define the other, that which is public is not private and vice 
versa.40  However, it becomes increasingly clear that it is a “binary opposition that is 
used to subsume a wide range of other important distinctions and that attempts…to 
dichotomize the social universe in a comprehensive and sharply demarcated way”.41 
This demarcation is used as an organising principle which supposedly requires that an 
individual’s presence in one sphere, precludes their presence in the other, which has 
been exposed as a gendered divide.  
 
2.2.1 All-encompassing Public/Quintessentially Private Home 
The distinction between paternal and political power is generally conceptualised as the 
distinction between the private domestic sphere of the family and home, and the public 
sphere being made up of all of that which is not ‘domestic’. It embodies all “matters 
that concern the nation at large – law, economy and politics… and operates on rules that 
are laid down by mutual consent of ‘all’ people”.42 This includes the market, civil 
society, politics and the state. In contrast, the family is the paragon of the private sphere 
and provides a site free from the regulation/intervention of the state.43  
 
2.2.2 Society and the State 
The second key distinction between public/private derived from liberal theory is that 
between the state, and individuals within civil society. Within this context, society and 
the individual are both seen as private when contrasted with the public state. Civil 
                                                          
40 See Blunt A., & Robyn Dowling R., Home (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006), 27. 
41 Weintraub J., ‘The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction’ in Weintraub J., & Kumar K., 
(eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1. 
42 Simon-Kumar R., ‘Negotiating Emancipation’ (2004) 6(3) Journal of Politics 485, 488 
43 Lacey N., ‘Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy’ (1993) 20(1) Journal 
of Law and Society 93, 94.  
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society, though in itself private, also contains the domestic realm under this 
construction. Here, the domestic is a location in which natural subordination is placed 
in contrast to the civil realm of free individualism, which has clear links with the 
distinction drawn between the domestic and civil society in Locke’s construction of the 
spheres.  The positioning of both civil society and the domestic as private arises from 
the centrality of the notion that “the role of the state should be strictly limited, with the 
market governing relations other than family relations in civil society”.44  
 
2.2.3 Civil society, Public or Private? 
Civil society, despite forming part of the public under the first construction, is 
questionably private in the latter. In traditional liberal thought, the nature of civil society 
is constructed as “sphere of private interest, private enterprise and private 
individuals”.45 It is the space in which individuals can access their rights without undue 
interference from the state. However, the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the 
domestic within civil society has made it a site of contention. As Pateman notes, “civil 
society is divided into two spheres, but attention is directed to one sphere only… public 
sphere of civil freedom. The other private, sphere is not seen as politically relevant”.46 
As such, the private realm of individuals within civil society is contrasted with the 
apolitical domestic realm, which is ‘truly’ private. The gendered construction of the 
spheres, has meant that civil society performs a dual function. It is private in contrast to 
the public state, as is necessary in order to secure the conditions necessary for 
                                                          
44 ibid. This concept has underpinned the market individualism which was particularly popular in the 
1970/80s under Thatcher: see Chapters 5-7. 
45 Pateman, The Disorder of Women (n37), 122. 
46 Pateman C., The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 3-4. 
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individualism to flourish, but remains public for those trapped in the private domain of 
the home. It is the masculine public in contrast to the feminine private.47  
 
2.3 Culture/Nature  
Underpinning the discussion of the gendered construction of the public/private 
dichotomy is the distinction drawn between culture/nature which underlies the issue of 
biological determinism which attempts to justify the subordination of women as a 
natural consequence of womanhood. This determinism can be identified in Locke’s 
positioning of women as inferior to their husband in the private sphere, and their 
exclusion from the public. Within the nature/culture dichotomy, 
“culture becomes identified with as the creation and the world of men because 
women’s biology and bodies place them closer to nature than men… women 
and the domestic sphere thus appear inferior to the cultural sphere and male 
activities, and women are seen as necessarily subordinate to men”.48 
This section provides an overview of the central elements of the nature/culture divide 
so as to illuminate the links between public/private and male/female as developed in the 
section that follows. 
 
In placing culture in a hierarchically superior position to nature, and associating women 
and the private realm as closer to ‘mother nature’ the historic justification of women’s 
natural subordination can be properly examined. As Ortner states, “since it is always 
culture’s project to subsume and transcend nature, if woman is a part of nature, then 
culture would find it ‘natural’ to subordinate… her”. 49  The construction of 
                                                          
47 The gendered nature of the spheres is analysed in detail at [2.4.5].  
48 Pateman, The Disorder of Women (n37), 125. 
49 Ortner S. B., ‘Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?’ (1972) 1(2) Feminist Studies 5, 9. 
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public/private, culture/nature and male/female forms a complex web of hierarchical 
oppositions which serve to maintain women’s subordination in multifarious ways. The 
central justification for positioning women closer to nature results from their role in 
reproduction: birth and breast feeding necessitated their role as nurturer. Despite the 
development of formula milk, the availability of contraception, and increased control 
over when/whether to have children, the historical gender norms present prior to this 
persist.50  The socially constructed notion of motherhood is too powerful a tool of 
oppression to be given up by those in power, performed for so long by those who are 
not, that it seems natural and beyond challenge.51  
 
2.3.1 Biological Determinism 
Biological determinism has formed the traditional explanation and justification for the 
almost universal subordination of women.52 The definition of biological determinism 
holds that 
“there is something genetically inherent in the males of the species that makes 
them the naturally dominant sex; that ‘something’ is lacking in females, and, as 
a result, women are not only naturally subordinate but, in general, quite satisfied 
with their position”.53 
From this perspective, the subordinate status of women and their placement in the 
private sphere, stems from their innate femininity, linked to their biological 
                                                          
50 As can be seen in Chapters 5-7.  
51 It is for this reason that maternity has become a central element of the equality/difference debate as 
explored in Chapter 3.  
52 Biological determinism is an essentialist theory which relies on the shared biology of all women to 
provide an explanation (and even to support) the oppression of all women. 
53  Ortner, (n49), 9. This association made between women and ‘lack’ is discussed in depth within 
psychoanalytic theory: see for example Gallagher C., (Trans) The Seminar or Jacques Lacan: Book VI: 
Desire and its Interpretation, 1958-1959 (London: Karnac, 2002). For an overview of feminism and 
psychoanalysis: see Brennan T., (ed) Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1993). 
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categorisation as female.54 However, this view of sex/gender fails to account for the role 
of context and culture in identity formation.55  
 
Women’s biological difference has been used to explain the oppression of women, 
which in fact stems from societal structures, discourse and policy; promulgated by and 
for the benefit of the male elite. It is the “unequal power relations [between men and 
women which have] turned biological differences into socially constructed, substantive 
gender inequalities”. 56  The association between biological determinism and 
‘difference’ has meant that the recognition of the latter has proved problematic, 
particularly from a liberal feminist perspective which has in turn impacted gender 
equality.57 
  
There is strong opposition to the idea that there is a ‘female’ experience. The 
homogeneity of ‘woman’ is problematic as it ignores he many intersecting elements of 
difference which contribute to an individual’s identity. “Yet, it is also true that there 
exist certain practices most women recognise and all kinds of women report”.58 A 
rejection of biological determinism acknowledges that the biological explanations for 
social roles and the domination which these have facilitated and protected is socially 
constructed. As Ortner notes, that is not to say that  
                                                          
54 The distinction drawn between sex and gender: see [2.4] and [1.2]. The subordination of women by 
virtue of their nature has clear links to the positioning of women in the private sphere in Lockean liberal 
theory (both in its classic formulation and as it developed within the industrial revolution): see [2.1],[2.2].  
55 Such an account considers gender and sex as inextricably linked, presenting women as a homogenous 
group, uninformed by context, culture, class, race. This is discussed in additional detail in [2.4.1]  
56 Sarvasy W., ‘Beyond the Difference versus Equality Debate: Post-suffrage Feminism, Citizenship, and 
The Quest for a Feminist Welfare State’ (1992) 17(2) Signs 329, 330. It is this socially constructed notion 
of gender which is adopted in this thesis, as discussed in [1.2.2].  
57 The critique of the difference approach is discussed in detail Chapter 3. 




“biological facts are irrelevant, nor that women and men are not different; but it 
is to say that these facts and differences only take on significance of 
superior/inferior within the framework of culturally defined value systems”.59  
The impact which biology has on women’s status and treatment in society, due to the 
way it has been constructed and reified by socio-legal structures/discourses needs to be 
recognised and adequately addressed.60  
 
2.4 Male/Female and Gender/Sex 
Pateman argues that “the claim that the separation of the private and the public follows 
inevitably from the natural characteristics of the sexes” ought to be rejected.61 The 
essentialist biological determinism which conflates sex and gender has given rise to the 
perception that gender inequality is natural and private and as such outside the scope of 
the power of the state to resolve. In reality, the boundaries which define sex, gender and 
sexuality shift are subject to change, but have traditionally formed the “primary way of 
signifying power”.62 This section of the chapter examines the ways in which the binary 
presentation of both gender and sex interacts with the public/private, nature/culture 
distinctions, beginning with a brief explanation of terms.63 
 
                                                          
59 Ortner, (n49), 9. This issue is linked to the equality/difference debate which forms the basis of the 
Chapter Four.  
60 See Sayers J., Biological Politics: Feminist and Anti-feminist Perspectives (London: Tavistock, 1982), 
124 in particular in relation to the need for feminist analysis in particular to acknowledge biological 
differences.  
61 Pateman The Disorder of Women (n37), 121.  
62 Scott J., ‘Gender: A useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (1986) American Historical Review 1053, 
1067. Regarding the ways in which gender/sex/sexuality have shifted over time and within different 
contexts: see Halberstam J. J., In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New 
York: New York University, 2005)  
63 A full description of the way in which gender/sex are used within the context of this thesis is established 
in [1.2]. However, it is pertinent here to set out in brief the definitions used, given that the way in which 




2.4.1 Gender as a Social Construct 
Historically the term gender has been used to distinguish between masculine/feminine 
traits associated with biological males/females respectively. 64  The “gender=sex” 
equation, presenting biological sex as the determinant of gender, has formed the 
foundation for the social construction of specific traits attributed to either men or 
women.65 The basic distinction between sex and gender is as follows: 
“‘Sex’ is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and 
female: the visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative 
function. ‘Gender’ however is a matter of culture: it refers to the social 
classification into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’”.66  
Gender consists of the socially constructed ‘traits’ which have, through social and 
familial structures and discourses, become associated with men/women. “Gender is not 
something a person is, rather it is something a person does”.67 Understanding sex and 
gender in this way avoids the inevitability of inequality which results from an 
essentialist perspective. It holds that the historical placement of women in the private 
sphere has been due to the way in which society and the state have constructed women’s 
role and characteristics as incompatible with the public sphere of life. 68  It is the 
construction of women’s gender, and not as a result of their femininity and biological 
                                                          
64 The use of male/female, gender/sex and such are discussed within [1.2], [2.3], [2.4]. See also Marecek, 
J., ‘Crawford M., & Popp D., On the Construction of Gender, Sex, and Sexualities’ in Eagly A. H. (et al) 
(eds)., The Psychology of Gender (New York: Guilford Press, 2004), 192–216. 
65 Mitchell W., ‘Deconstructing Gender, Sex, and Sexuality as Applied to Identity’ (2002) 62(4) The 
Humanist 40, 40. 
66 Oakley A., Sex, Gender and Society (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1985), 16. 
67 Beresford S., ‘It's Not Me it's You: Law's Performance Anxiety Over Gender Identity in Cohabitation 
Cases’ (2012) 63(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 187, 197. Adopting a Butlerian stance.  
68  As seen as a result of biological determinism and the association of the liberal individual with 
autonomy and rationality: see [2.3], [2.1.2]. 
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capacity to bear children, which has been used in order to maintain women’s position 
in the private.69  
 
2.4.2 Gender as Binary 
Gender has traditionally been constructed as binary, men and women, who are presented 
as hierarchical opposites.70 Treating gender as a dichotomy has been “an emergent 
feature of social situations: both as a result of and a rationale for various social 
arrangements, and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of 
society”.71 The way in which the state and society constructs gender, maintaining the 
position of women as lesser has clear implications for equality.72  
 
Firestone identifies the “origin of dualism… in biology itself – procreation”73  this 
natural, biological difference is seen as the foundation for gender-based inequality. Yet, 
as Pateman states, “biology, in itself, is neither oppressive nor liberating… [it becomes] 
a source of subjection…. For women only because it has meaning within specific social 
relationships”.74 For example, women’s biological capacity to carry and nurse a child 
does not cause inequality, nor does it necessitate their placement in the private realm, 
                                                          
69 As discussed in relation to biological determinism [2.3.1], acknowledging that gender is socially 
constructed does not require the rejection of any biological difference – particularly relating to pregnancy. 
See also Strauss D. A., ‘Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination’ (1992) 41 DePaul Law Review 
1007, 1011. This is a notion which has also been accepted from a feminist perspective (though not 
universally): see for example Okin S. M, Justice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books: New York. 1989), 
6-7; The societal perception and treatment of women regarding their ‘appropriate’ roles/behaviours and 
their capacity to give birth is examined in context Chapters 5-7.  
70 I acknowledge that there are also considerable issues relating to treating sex and gender as binary 
dichotomies, given the ways in which it has been treated as synonymous with gender and the way in 
which it precludes those who are intersex, or identify as transgender or non-binary/gender-fluid: see for 
example Fausto-Sterling A., Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000). However, the focus of this thesis required an in-depth examination of the 
gender dichotomy given its social construction and implications which does not afford sufficient space 
to discuss both in detail.  
71 West C., & Zimmerman D. H., ‘Doing Gender’ (1987) 1(2) Gender and Society 125, 126.  
72 As examined Chapters 5-7 
73 Firestone S., The Dialectic of Sex (New York: Bantam Books,1972), 8.   
74 Pateman The Disorder of Women (n37), 126. 
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but the societal associations drawn from this are what proves to be problematic. It is 
those “values associated with maternity that have made motherhood one of the primary 
sources of women’s oppression”.75 Maternity has become an excuse for the differing 
treatment of men and women, which though presenting as natural, is again, a product 
of societal construction.76 
 
The “presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic 
relation of gender to sex, whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it”.77 
It assists in reifying the essentialist construction of sex and gender which treats gender 
as the social expression of biological sex, presenting the two as inherently connected. 
However, as gender has been used as an organising principle within society, it is 
necessary within this thesis, despite disagreeing with the legitimacy of the binary, to 
examine and discuss gender as a dichotomy. 
 
2.4.3 Gender and Difference 
The way in which gender is constructed as binary rests on the notion of difference. This 
difference has formed the basis of significant critique, particularly relating to equality.78 
Given that gender is socially constructed, the differences that the dichotomy entails are 
also socially constructed. As Lorber points out: 
                                                          
75 Guerrina R., ‘Equality, Difference and Motherhood: the case for a feminist analysis of equal rights and 
maternity legislation’ (2001) 10(1) Journal of Gender Studies 33, 36. 
76 See Chapters 3, 5-7 of this thesis for a more in-depth exploration of the issue of maternity and how it 
has contributed to gender inequality.  
77 Butler J., Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 6.  
78 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
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“it does not matter what men and women actually do; it does not even matter if 
they do exactly the same thing. The social institution of gender insists only that 
what they do is perceived as different”.79  
The necessity of difference has been utilised in order to legitimate the natural inequality 
between men and women, and forms the foundation for positioning women in the home. 
Gender has been used as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on 
perceived differences between the sexes, and… a primary way of signifying 
relationships of power”,80 it is the way in which power has become both gendered and 
institutionalised which draws together the connection between the public/private, 
male/female. 
 
Despite the fictionality of a dichotomy of universally male or female traits, the impact 
that it has had is significant. 
“As a process, gender creates the social differences that define ‘woman’ and 
‘man’… As a structure, gender divides work in the home and in economic 
production, legitimates those in authority, and organises sexuality and emotional 
life”.81 
Gender, in both of these conceptions entails the suppression of similarities for social 
purposes by social means.82 It is a tool used by the powerful, to create a social order 
which maintains their position. Even if theoretically men and women are the same, 
notwithstanding those differences associated with maternity, simply categorising an 
                                                          
79 Lorber J., Paradoxes of Gender (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 26. 
80 Scott, (n62), 1067. 
81 Lorber (n79), 32-4. 
82 Rubin G., ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘political economy of sex’’ in Reiter R., (ed) Toward 
an Anthropology of Women (New York: Monthly Review Press,1975), 179. 
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individual as a woman or ‘girling’ a child has implications.83 If we are described as 
male/female, masculine/feminine, then we perform this role/those who interact with us 
do so based on this supposition. For example, motherhood, despite being a biological 
rather than gender difference, is often applied to all women, regardless of their 
individual intentions concerning the decision to have children.84 This stemmed from the 
inherent masculinity of the liberal, patriarchal society which, though slowly declining, 
still maintains male dominance and perpetuates the construction of women as 
other/lesser.  
 
2.4.4 Deconstructing the Dichotomy 
One of the suggestions for overcoming the issues related to the causal relationship 
between gender and sex has been to deconstruct the relationship between the terms.85 
The deconstruction of the relationship between gender and sex is desirable. However, 
deconstruction alone is not sufficient to rectify the issue of gender inequality. If gender 
and sex are to be taken as distinct, the implications of the public/private dichotomy 
remain unresolved.  
 
The process of deconstruction is not instantaneous, and the gendered dichotomy has 
been ingrained into social and legal and structures. “Although sex roles are dynamic, 
they have become institutionalized... and thus difficult to change[sic]”.86 Those who 
ascribe to a feminine role, regardless of their biological sex, remain subject to those 
                                                          
83 Drawing on Butler’s notion of gender performativity: see Butler J., Bodies that Matter (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
84 An example of this in the context of employment can be seen in [5.2]. 
85 See Whitworth S., Feminism and International Relations: towards a political economy of gender in 
interstate institutions (London: Macmillan, 1994), 20-1 as an example of a proponent of such a 
perspective.  
86 Lusk F.B., Sex Roles and Personal Awareness (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1978), 20. 
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norms associated with women; they continue to be excluded from the masculine public, 
and rendered invisible due to their placement in the private sphere. Those who are 
women by virtue of their sex and gender, then find themselves in a position of additional 
disadvantage, if they choose to have children.87 What needs to be resolved is the way in 
which societal structures interact with gender which reinforce the position of women as 
subordinate.  
 
2.4.5 Male as Public and Female as Private 
The public/private division “mystifies” those processes by which women are 
persistently oppressed and has an integral role in “controlling women in their roles as 
wives and mothers”. 88  The way in which society/the family reinforce hierarchical 
patriarchal gender norms has, within the context of liberal theory, reinforced powerful 
position of men in the public and private.89 The characterisation of the C18th/C19th 
‘domestic woman’ epitomising the “the natural association between women and the 
private sphere, domesticity and leisure”,90 has made them seem unfit for life in the 
masculine public sphere. 
 
The public/private dichotomy and its gendered connotations is as Thornton notes, a  
                                                          
87 The disadvantage referred to here is specific to the consequences that such a position has in relation to 
their ability to contribute financially to the family home. The implications of maternity on the position of 
women in society is examined in detail within Chapters 5-7.  
88 See for example Rose, (n19), 61, 65 & 66. An in-depth examination of the impact of the gendered 
construction of the spheres can be found at [2.5].  
89 See Hess B. B., ‘Beyond Dichotomy: Drawing Distinctions and Embracing Differences’ (1990) 5(1) 
Sociological Forum 75. 




“conventional creation which serves a significant ideological purpose… a 
malleable political mechanism which can be effectively utilized to safeguard 
dominant interests under the guise of seeming neutrality and naturalness”.91  
The construction of a masculine public, which excludes women on the basis of their 
natural femininity has been used by the state, and by individual men to justify 
inequality.92 The place of women within the private sphere of the home is made to seem 
natural, a result of their biological maternity, and a fitting choice to stay and nurture 
their children is made thereafter. Such a perspective neglects the limitations placed on 
autonomy through gender norms and state intervention, and contributes to the 
perception that sex and gender are linked.93 
 
2.5 Impact/Critique of the Convergence of Dichotomies 
The following section focusses on the central critiques waged against the dichotomies 
outlined above. The central thread which runs through this critique is that the 
public/private dichotomy, and the associated liberal principles are gendered. The 
masculine construction of law and society as set out in this section forms the basis for 
the discussion of equality and difference in the subsequent chapter, and contributes to 
the theoretical framework which informs historical and case analysis in Chapters 5-7.  
 
2.5.1 Contrast between theory and the law in practice 
Despite the traditional conception of the liberal state as ‘limited’, the law, as one of the 
primary methods through which the state interacts with society, increasingly encroaches 
                                                          
91 Thornton M., ‘The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered and Discriminatory’ (1991) 18(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 448, 450-1. 
92 The way in which these divisions have informed the equality/difference debate is discussed in detail 
within Chapter 3.  
93 Autonomy is discussed at [2.5.3].  
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in the private domain. As a result, “gender, sexuality and family life are not in reality 
‘private’ but operate as arenas of intervention and management on the part of the 
state”.94 The theoretical public/private divide is rendered illusory on examining the law 
in practice.95  
 
Though there are instances which warrant state intervention, the transgression of the 
state across this boundary is not without critique. As Thornton notes,  
“Law is not only a powerful mechanism of social control by the state, but it is 
also a powerful conduit for the transmission and reproduction of the dominant 
ideology. Accordingly, law has been used to maintain a rigid line of demarcation 
between the two analytically distinct spheres of public and private”.96 
The gendered, hierarchical construction of public/private has meant that the law, far 
from performing the role of neutral arbiter, has instead had a role in replicating the 
construction of the private as feminine and the public as masculine, to the detriment of 
women.97 The central method through with this is done is by upholding the principle of 
non-intervention. 
 
2.5.2 Fictional Non-intervention and the Family  
The free market and the private family are traditionally sites of non-intervention.98 
During the C19th the  
                                                          
94 Murphy K., ‘Feminism and Political History’ (2010) 56(1) Australian Journal of Politics and History 
21, 31. 
95 As can be identified in Chapters 5-7. 
96 Thornton M., ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Illusion or Reality?’  (1989) Australian Journal of Law and 
Society 5, 5.  
97 As examined in detail in Chapters 5-7. 
98 Stemming from liberal theory as crystallised within the C18/19th discussed at [2.5.3]. The family rather 
than the market forms the primary focus of this thesis.  
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“family… and state… were perceived as largely independent of one another. 
The metaphor of separation captured an ethic or ideology of family privacy in 
which state intervention was the exception”.99 
However, it would be inaccurate to consider that the family has, in recent history, not 
been subject to state intervention. The state continues to intervene in domestic matters 
in numerous ways. These can be categorised as overt interventions such as legislation 
relating to marriage, divorce, custody, and covert methods of regulating the family such 
as through the tax and welfare systems.100 An examination of state intervention within 
the private sphere demonstrates that “economic, administrative, and political – state 
institutions have a crucial and often deliberate impact on the conduct of family life”.101  
 
Despite reinforcing the notion that the regulation of the private sphere is beyond its 
powers, the state 
“has nevertheless been instrumental in shaping it and reinforcing the favoured 
family form through such governmental policies… which operate to encourage 
the continued dependency of women”.102 
On examination, it becomes clear that the construction of the domestic sphere as entirely 
free from state intervention is a mere fiction.103 However, the ideological division is 
still often employed as a way by which the state simultaneously can shape the family, 
and avoid accruing responsibility for those negative acts which occur in the private 
sphere. A critique of both the “façade of privacy and free choice” needs to be engaged 
                                                          
99 Fineman M. A., ‘What Place for Family Privacy?’ (1999) 67 George Washington Law Review 1207, 
1207. The C18th and early C19th is considered the period in which the public/private divide was 
crystallised: see [2.1.1]. 
100 The ways in which the state has interfered with the family is discussed below [2.5.3], but can also be 
seen in practice within Chapters 5-7.  
101  Lacey N., Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1998), 74. Emphasis added. 
102 Thornton, (n96), 6.  
103 See [2.5.4]. 
46 
 
in, in order to “reveal the hidden mechanisms of control and to expose the interests 
served”.104 
 
2.5.3 Autonomy and Intervention 
The public/private dichotomy is constructed as necessary for individual privacy, 
underpinned by the central liberal principles of autonomy and state neutrality. 
Maintaining a private realm which allows individuals to fulfil their wants and needs free 
from the control or influence of the state secures privacy. State intrusions into the 
private are perceived as a limitation on privacy, restricting autonomy and therefore 
undermining individualism which would be inherently anti-liberal.105  However, the 
extent to which a private sphere free from regulation is desirable is questionable.106  
 
Despite the theoretical issues which arise from the “paradox of individual autonomy 
and democratic society”,107 such limitations have been accepted in the pursuit of the 
common good/the public will. 108  Therefore, this section focuses on the additional 
limitations placed on women’s autonomy, the non-neutrality of the state, and its power 
to divine the line between public/private and therefore the limits of its own 
intervention.109 When such issues are combined with covert state action it becomes 
difficult to ensure that the state remains accountable, and obscures the gender inequality 
it legitimises.110 
                                                          
104 Rose, (n19), 72. 
105 This sort of argument has been invoked in reaction to proposals for granting cohabitants some form 
of legislative protection. See Chapter 1 and [7.4].  
106  The dangers inherent in the construction of the domestic sphere as beyond the scope of state 
intervention is explored below [2.5.3].  
107 Brants C. H., ‘The State and the Nations Bedrooms’ in Aldridge P., & Brants C. H., Personal 
Autonomy, The Private Sphere and Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 120.  
108 The acceptance of such limitations can be seen in Locke’s Social Contract as discussed above [2.1].  
109 The limitations placed on women’s autonomy are discussed in detail below [2.5.3].  





Autonomy can be understood as relating to individual choice or self-government, which 
requires minimal intervention by the state. Within traditional liberal theory autonomy 
is individualistic and bound-up with rationality, resulting in the exclusion of women. 
McLean describes the line drawn between autonomy/intervention as follows: 
“Private issues are those which should be essentially free from state control; 
public ones attract legitimate state interest. The right to have autonomous 
decisions respected, supported by the developing sphere of privacy, is the mark 
of a mature society, and serves to maximise the potential for human liberty”.111 
Despite the theoretical existence of this ‘line’ providing a private space without state 
intervention, so as to secure autonomy, there are countless examples of the state 
intervening into private matters. 112  This calls into question the legitimacy of the 
existence of a private sphere free from intervention and the purported autonomous 
action within this realm.  
 
The Mythology of (Feminine) Autonomy 
The centrality of the autonomous individual in liberal theory ignores way in which 
“every hour of every day, choices are implicitly made for us, by both private and public 
institutions”. 113  As has been seen above there are already limitations placed on 
autonomy as a result of state intervention into the private.  However, as a result of 
gender norms/socialization the choices of those who are not traditionally associated 
                                                          
111 McLean S. A. M., Autonomy, Consent and the Law (London: Routledge, 2010), 2. 
112 Rhode D. L., ‘Feminist Critical Theories’ (1990) 42(3) Stanford Law Review 617, 628. Examples of 
which are identified in [2.5.4], and Chapters 5-7. 
113 Sunstein C.R., Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014), 130.  
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with the rational autonomous individual, namely women, are further limited.114 This 
section goes on to analyse the ways in which women’s autonomy has been additionally 
restricted.  
 
The individualised notion of autonomy results from the liberal notion of ‘rational’ 
masculine individualism. The socialisation of women/girls and the gender norms 
associated with the feminine have developed in a way which constructs them as 
‘different’ from the idealised independent, male individual. 115  From a liberal 
perspective, autonomy was developed with little consideration of the “attributes of 
human subjects, such as emotional or relational interdependence and strong gender 
related socialization that bear heavily on the lives of women”.116 Modern society’s 
construction of autonomy has, imbedded within it, these masculine stereotypes. The 
“self-sufficient, independent and self-reliant” 117  individual or family is seen to be 
autonomous, and this autonomy is given social and political value.  
 
Autonomy is treated as the antithesis of dependency. Women’s dependency has 
historically derived from their reliance on their husband’s participation in the public 
sphere in order to obtain goods and resources due to their placement in the private as a 
caregiver preventing them from attaining them for themselves. 118  This economic 
                                                          
114 See Meyers D., Self, Society and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 
152-5. Regarding the liberal construction of the individual: see [2.1.2].  
115 The implications of the categorisation of women as different is explored in Chapter 3 and can be 
identified in practice in Chapters 5-7. 
116 Abrams K., ‘From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self Direction’ (1999) 40(3) 
William and Mary Law Review 805, 818.  
117 Code L., What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and The Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 67. The social and political value given to the self-sufficient family can be 
identified in the protections that such families are then afforded. The free market individualism favoured 
by the Conservative party in the 1970/80s is a key example of such an approach in a modern context. 
This is examined in full in Chapters 5-7.  
118 See for example Fineman M. A., The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: The New 
Press, 2004). See also Friedman M., ‘Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women’ in MacKenzie C. & 
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dependency within heteronormative role-specific marriages has meant the 
independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency of both individuals (men in the public 
sphere) and families once seemed like a realistic prospect. “Myths about independence 
and self-sufficiency were able to flourish and perpetuate themselves because 
dependency was hidden”.119 The dependency of women on their husbands for financial 
support, and in turn male dependence on women for unpaid labour and care was 
restricted to the private realm of the family, and so, rendered invisible. 
 
This myth continued for a considerable time, as the public/private dichotomy supported 
the notion “that women’s needs must be met either through the market or within the 
family”.120 The idealised self-sufficient breadwinner/housewife family form positioned 
women firmly within the home in order to support the autonomy of their husbands, and 
the family. In constructing women’s lives based on relationships (as wife and mother), 
their own individualism and autonomy was forfeited. The historical concerns raised in 
opposition to women’s movement into the public, were based on the notion that “desire 
for personal autonomy, especially among women, [if fulfilled] would threaten family 
stability”.121 
 
The gender role(s) ascribed to women, and the socio-political pressure(s) relating to 
their position as mothers and wives has limited women’s individual autonomy for the 
sake of the family. The state’s manipulation of the tax/welfare/legal system to support 
                                                          
Stoljar N., (eds) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) which discusses self-sufficiency in relation to finance and care.  
119 Fineman M.A., ‘Contract and Care’ (2001) 76(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1403, 1423. 
120 Slim B., Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21.  
121 Pleck E., Domestic Tyranny: The Making of American Social Policy Against Family Violence from 
Colonial Times to the Present (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 9. Similar arguments were 
waged against women attempting to move more securely into the public domain or participate as equals 
particularly relating to maternity leave and pay, and equal pay. See Chapters 5-7. 
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traditional gender roles has worked to increase the expense (socially and financially) of 
choosing otherwise.122 As a result,  
“much of what women appear to do freely is chosen in very limiting 
circumstances, where there are few choices left to us. Even where the 
circumstances present many choices, it is often the case that our knowledge, our 
ability to judge, and our desires have been so distorted and manipulated by social 
influences as to make a mockery of the idea that we choose freely”.123 
This has led to claims that women are incentivised through social structures to further 
their own oppression.124 The state’s capacity to maintain the guise of free choice whilst 
manipulating the range/perception of such choices continues to limit women’s 
autonomy. 
 
The Silencing of Women 
Feminist constructions of autonomy often focus on “assuring women choice or decision 
in circumstances that are free from coercion and manipulation, rather than in the sense 
of aspiring to self-sufficiency”.125 However, the capacity to utilise autonomy to its full 
potential hinges on the capacity for one’s voice to be heard. Despite the fact that the 
“ideal” of “the silent woman”126 has fallen away, the limitations placed on ‘women’s 
voices’ remains. Male dominance (and violence) in the private home, and the 
                                                          
122 As seen in action within Chapters 5-7.  
123  Wendell S., ‘Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility’ in Bushnell D.E., (ed) 
“Nagging” Questions: Feminist Ethics in Everyday Life (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 43. 
124 See Cudd A.E., ‘Oppression by Choice’ (1994) 25 Journal of Social Philosophy 22. That is not to say 
that women are incapable of autonomy, but rather that, historically and to some extent still, the 
socialisation and socio-political circumstances act to purposefully limit their ability to utilise it, as distinct 
from the ‘natural’ position of women as inferior as regards rationality within liberal theory as discussed 
above [2.5.3]. 
125 Note that this is not to say that self-sufficiency is inherently anti-feminist but rather that it should not 
be the sole marker of success; O’Connor J. S. (et al) (eds)., States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism 
and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 54. 
126 Hon A., ‘Rethinking Virginity’ in Heuer G., (ed) Sexual Revolutions: Psychoanalysis, History and the 
Father (London: Routledge, 2011), 239. 
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masculinity of the public state/law have had the effect of limiting women’s ability to 
speak.  
 
Limitations on women’s power by virtue of the public/private dualism has significantly 
contributed to the silencing of women. As MacKinnon states, “when you are powerless, 
you don’t just speak differently. A lot, you don’t speak. Your speech is not just 
differently articulated, it is silenced. Eliminated, gone”.127 Not only is this problematic 
in the context of personal relationships, which have the capacity to make women 
vulnerable, but it also has implications in the public sphere.128  
 
The real and symbolic silencing of women’s voices has a considerable history, and the 
feminist movement has traditionally focussed on ensuring that women were heard 
within the public domain. The placement of women in the private sphere “excluded 
them from education, from reading, writing and speaking the public tongue of 
politics”,129 and legitimised the restrictions placed on their participation in politics and 
law. The attainment of suffrage ensured that women could ‘speak’ by virtue of their 
vote, attempting to dismantle the central formal limitation placed on women’s political 
voice.130 Despite the contributions of the feminist movement(s) towards facilitating 
women’s speech, it is questionable as to how much the masculine state was willing to 
                                                          
127  MacKinnon C. A., Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 39.  
128 This vulnerability relates to instances of violence as discussed in [2.5.4], but also to the capacity to 
secure property rights through express agreements as discussed at [4.3.1], and further demonstrated in 
Chapters 5-7.  
129 Luke C., ‘Women in the Academy: The Politics of Speech and Silence’ (1994) 15(2) British Journal 
of Sociology of Education 211, 213-4. Such limits on participation included the inability to vote, practice 
law or run to be an MP. 
130 The importance of securing places for women to speak continued on into the second wave, in which 
consciousness raising groups and protest ensured a platform for women’s speech. This is examined in 
detail in Chapters 5-7.  
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listen, “democracy depend[s] on voice-having a voice and also the resonance that makes 
it possible to speak and be heard… without resonance, voice recedes into silence”.131 
 
The Language Problem 
In order for women’s voices to be heard, first they must ‘speak’ the same language as 
men, and second the speaker must be seen as having a valuable voice. One of the key 
concerns relating to voice and gender equality has centred on the fictional neutrality of 
language, which has led to proposals for “developing woman focussed discourses and 
even creating an entirely new language”.132 In particular, the language of the law is 
perceived to have been formed for and by men, rendering the feminine ‘other’. “As the 
men of law have defined law in their own image, law has excluded or marginalized the 
voices and meanings of these ‘others’”.133 As a result, the law has not traditionally 
spoken to or for women, which when combined with the restrictions placed on women’s 
education and participation in law and politics has secured the masculinity of the 
state.134 
 
The adversarial system of law/politics and institutional sexism continue to act as a 
barrier to women’s full participation, and the incorporation of their voice with that of 
the state. Participatory democracy has been said to silence the voices of disadvantaged 
groups, through the dominance of those in power within such institutions. 135  The 
increasing number of women within the law and politics has the capacity to shift this 
                                                          
131 Gilligan C., The Birth of Pleasure (London: Vintage Books, 2003), 232. 
132 Pauwels A., ‘Inclusive Language is Good Business’ in Holmes J., (ed) Gendered Speech in Social 
Context (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000), 140. 
133 Finley L. M., ‘Breaking Women 's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal 
Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886, 892. 
134 The restrictions placed on women’s education and participation have been discussed above in this 
section.  
135 See for example: Gutmann A., Liberal Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 191-
202; Simon-Kumar, (n42), 485.  
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balance. However, “even where women have a formal right to speak, informal norms 
often impose pressures to speak in a style and language that are culturally masculine”.136 
What needs to be questioned is whether the necessary adoption of masculine speech in 
the public realm reduces the capacity for ‘women’s issues’ to be addressed?137  
 
Not only does the masculinity of the language need to be challenged, but the value of 
‘women’s voice’ needs to be acknowledged. In addition to the historical construction 
of the silent woman, the basic linguistic ‘categorisation’ of man/woman has assisted in 
the presentation of women as other.138 The ‘woman’ label, embodies and reinforces 
women’s difference based on their sex, and the gendered assumptions which flow from 
this categorisation.139 The use of ‘man’ as the neutral universal label for all persons 
reflects the division of public/private and the notion of the universal individual as 
masculine, devaluing women and the value attached to their voices.  
 
Rather than devaluing ‘women’s voice’ based on this difference, instead the value of 
‘women’s voice’ can be found in this difference.140 Gilligan puts forward the notion that 
“men and women speak different languages, [which] they assume are the same, using 
similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships”.141 This 
has proved particularly problematic in a legal context given that the law has itself been 
                                                          
136 Jaggar A. M., ‘Sex Equality as Parity of Voice’ (1998) 9 Contemporary Legal Issues 179, 187.  
137 There is some evidence from a feminist perspective that the inclusion of a feminist voice within 
judgments has the capacity to change the outcome of cases: see Hunter R. (et al) (eds)., Feminist 
Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2010).  
138 This idealised view of women is discussed above [2.5.3].  
139 See for example Pauwels A., Women Changing Language (London: Longmans, 1998), 50.  
140 That is not to say that ‘women’s voice’ will always be different, but rather that difference ought not 
to form the basis of their exclusion from contributing to the language of the public sphere and that those 
differences which are deemed from/represented by women’s voices has a valuable role in unsettling the 
masculinity of the public sphere.  
141 Gilligan C., In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 173. 
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shaped by masculine norms and language.142 When relying on the law to invoke their 
voice, women have often been left with little support. What needs to be sought is the 
“parity of effective voice… that women's speech should have equal weight or authority 
with men’s”.143 This entails not only that women have a voice, but that that voice is 
listened to.  
 
Overt/Covert State Intervention 
The illegitimate status of overt state intervention into the family/private sphere has 
declined with the growth of the welfare state.144  Such intervention is premised on 
consent, even implied consent through mediums such as voting or market interaction 
are seen as sufficient.145 However, the state “operates increasingly through indirect 
symbolic controls - by radiating messages rather than imposing physical coercion”.146 
Covert state action lacks the implied consent which the more explicit forms of 
intervention can be considered to have.147 Where individuals act in the “shadow of the 
                                                          
142 Bottomley A., ‘From Mrs Burns to Mrs Oxley: do co-habiting women (still) need marriage law?’ 
(2006) 14(2) Feminist Legal Studies 181, 196. See also Bottomley A., ‘Self and Subjectivities: Languages 
of Claim in Property Law’ (1993) 20(1) Journal of Law and Society 56 which discusses the way in which 
silence is gendered within the context of cohabitation case law. The way in which this has been 
problematic in the context of cohabitation case law has been identified in Chapter 4 and is also identifiable 
in the examination of the case law in Chapters 5-7.  
143 Jaggar, Sex Equality as Parity of Voice (n136), 188. 
144 Locke’s distinction between paternal and political power, and the distinctly private nature of the family 
as the source for the traditional concept of non-intervention which precludes intervention into the private 
sphere. However, discussed in [2.5.4], the strict adherence to non-intervention has proved problematic in 
practice, particularly in relation to child welfare and domestic violence and as such a more flexible 
reading of the term has since been adopted.  
145 There are of course further limits placed on the state for example the separation of powers, the rule of 
law and international/national legislation.  
146 Galanter M., ‘Law Abounding: Legalisation around the North Atlantic’ (1992) 55(1) Modern Law 
Review 1, 24. 
147 Under Pateman’s reading of Locke’s social contract however, such consent having been extracted 
from all men (excluding women from the original contract and instead placing them under the power of 
their husbands through the sexual contract) it could be said that women have never consented to state’s 
role as constructed in liberal theory. See Pateman, The Sexual Contract (n46).  Perhaps women’s ability 
to vote/engage in politics and the market could be said to give this implied consent. 
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law”, 148  their ‘freely made’ choices are restricted, placing a limit on individual 
autonomy. 
 
Designating something as public is about making it “accessible to debate, reflection, 
action and moral political transformation”.149 However the covert methods often used 
by the state to intervene in the family prevents social scrutiny and input from being 
properly executed. The underlying issue with the division between public/private is that 
the division is decided by the state itself. For example, despite the designation of the 
family in the private sphere, it remains subject to the decision of the state as to whether 
it is the appropriate family ‘form’ to warrant protection.150  As “the governance of 
citizens through the family may now have achieved unprecedented heights”151 the state 
is provided with a system of indirect control of the family, through which they can 
implement their own motives. Motives which have historically strived to bind women 
to the private sphere for the benefit of men as economic actors who are allowed to 
maintain a superior position in both realms.152 Such covert intervention allows the state 
to shape the form of ‘appropriate’ families/behaviours and exclude others while 
preserving the facade of non-intervention.153  
 
                                                          
148 See Kornhauser L., ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale Law 
Journal 950. 
149 Benhabib S., ‘Models of Public Space: H. Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jurgen Habermas’ in 
Landes J. (ed.) Feminism, the Public and the Private (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press 
1988), 91.  
150 Regarding form over function see: [4.3.3]. 
151 Sclater S. D., Divorce: A Psychological Study (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 17 & 185.  
152 The struggle to maintain this divide in modern history can be seen in Chapters 5-7. 
153 Key examples are the ways in which the institution of marriage has been supported not only by 
legislation, but political discourses, policy and the tax/welfare system, and the decisions made in relation 
to the provision of childcare which have attempted to position women in the home. This is examined in 
full in Chapters 5-7.  
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2.5.4 Protection of Privacy 
The notion of a private realm in which individuals are free to act autonomously without 
intervention from others or the state has meant that the private realm and autonomy are 
treated as inextricably connected.154 However, “there can be no ‘private’ sphere that 
should presumptively be beyond the reach of policy and politics”,155 meaning that the 
distinction must serve some other purpose. Much like the shifting definitions given to 
private/public, the state can be seen to manipulate the scope of privacy. The line which 
is drawn by the state as to what it can or should intervene in continues to redefine what, 
if anything, remains truly private and without the influence of the state.  The public/ 
private distinction “functions more as a form of political rhetoric used to justify 
particular results”,156 a tool which lies at the hands of the state to manipulate as they see 
fit. 
 
The Danger of Privacy 
The public/private dichotomy stems from an idealised view of the home as “a private 
place, a refuge from society, where relationships can flourish untrammelled by public 
interference”.157 The value of privacy depends on the construction of the home as a 
place of safety and equality.158 In practice however, privacy has been secured for the 
benefit of men, to allow their individualistic autonomy to flourish, to the detriment of 
women. The designation of the home as a private domain, and the non-interference this 
                                                          
154 The value of privacy in securing individualism has formed one of the central tenets of liberalism as 
discussed above [2.5.3].  
155 Mnookin R. H., ‘The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation’ 
[1982] 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1429, 1438. The way in which the private domain 
has been covertly interfered with, which undermines this distinction, is discussed above [2.5.2] [2.5.3].  
156 Klare K., ‘The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law’ (1982) 130(6) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1358, 1361. 
157 O’Donovan, (n22), 107. Stemming from Locke’s construction of the divide [2.2].  
158 A claim which has been contested in feminist literature: see for example Okin S. M, Justice, Gender 
and the Family (Basic Books: New York. 1989), 116-7. 
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requires has facilitated the “right of men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women one at a 
time”.159  As a result, privacy has become tool used to render the subjection of women 
invisible. Without true neutrality, privacy assists in maintaining the patriarchal 
dominion of a husband over his wife, and allows his abuses of this power to go 
unrectified. The family as a self-regulating unit has, historically been a place of 
oppression and violence for women, leading to the claim that “the family is not private 
for women”.160 
 
Historically the legal system and law enforcement have maintained the boundary 
between the public and private domain. Violence in the home was “protected as part of 
the private sphere of family life protected as part of the private sphere of family life… 
concepts of privacy permit, encourage, and reinforce violence against women”. 161 
Privacy has traditionally been placed in a position of priority, above that of protection, 
reflecting the gendered hierarchy of the public/private divide.162 The private is thus a 
realm of freedom for men, and violence and oppression for women and “by not 
intervening, the state is complicit in this violence”.163  The inaction of the state in such 
instances “reveals the limitations and deficiencies of the liberal insistence on separate 
public and private domains”.164  
                                                          
159 MacKinnon C. A., ‘Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology’ in Garfield L., & Patricia Hennessey P., 
(eds) Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 
53. 
160 Walby S., ‘Is Citizenship Gendered?’ (1994) 28(2) Sociology 379, 383; A similar argument is raised 
by MacKinnon C. A., Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University press: 
1989), 191 
161 Schneider E. M., Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 87.  
162 Police reluctance to interfere in domestic violence incidents has been well documented: see for 
example Bourlet A., Police Intervention in Marital Violence (Milton Keynes: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 9. 
163 Bailey K. D., ‘Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, "The Personal Is Political," and the Criminal 
Justice System’ (2010) 100(4) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1255, 1261. 
164  Barnett H., Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (London: Cavendish, 1998), 74. The public 




The protection of privacy remains imbued with the traditional liberal fear that “not only 
society via its social mores but also the government would invade every field and sphere 
of life, exploiting its powers to coerce the individual”. 165  The principle of non-
intervention is presented as a barrier from the encroachment of the state. As time has 
progressed, the “‘protection’ of women [has] served as a premise for redefining the 
relation between the private”166 as the state has slowly moved into the previously hidden 
family domain. Thus revalidating the notion that strict adherence to the public/private 
divide for the sake of privacy ignores the ways in which the state’s intervention has 
proved to be beneficial to women.  
 
The Necessity of Regulation 
The welfare state has been invoked as a necessary exception to the traditional liberal 
principle of non-intervention. This is premised on “the need to produce a citizenry 
competent to meet the economic and other needs of the community”.167 Supporting 
those in need is seen as a way of maintaining such a citizenry.168 In order to avoid 
concerns relating to the limitations placed on autonomy by virtue of this regulation, the 
traditional masculine conception of autonomy needs to be reformulated. In this way 
state intervention can, rather than impeding autonomy, be permitted to intervene in 
order to secure the autonomy of those individuals who may otherwise be denied it. 
These persons tend to be, as seen above, women and in particular caregivers. Through 
                                                          
165 Cohen-Almagor R., ‘Between Autonomy and State Regulation’ (2012) 87 Philosophy 557, 559. 
166 Hennessy R., & Mohan R., ‘The Construction of Woman in Three Popular Texts of Empire: Toward 
a Critique of Materialist Feminism’ in Hennessy R., & Ingraham C., (eds) Materialist Feminism: A 
Reader in Class, Difference, and Women’s Lives (London: Routledge, 1997), 202. 
167 Eekelaar J., ‘Self-Restraint: Social Norms, Individualism and the Family’ (2012) 13(1) Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 75, 87. The discourse surrounding “supporting families” is analysed in Chapters 5-7, 
and can be seen developing throughout the period examined within this thesis. 
168 This is primarily focussed on the welfare of children.  
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providing for example parental leave, flexible working and state subsidised nurseries, 
the unrecognised burden on women which limits their autonomy and participation in 
the public sphere can be reduced and even eliminated.169 
 
Though there have been clear benefits to regulation and intervention in this context, the 
provision of welfare to those in need for example, it also provides a tool fit for political 
manipulation. This can be identified in the numerous examples of the governments 
manipulation of the welfare and tax systems to support a construction of the family in 
which women should maintain their position in the private, providing free labour and 
raising children in order to support the economic role of men in the public.170  
 
The Personal is Political  
One of the key issues from a feminist perspective is that the separation of the spheres is 
also a gendered/sexual division. This is underpinned by the natural role and 
characteristics embodied by women, a result of which is that women’s proper place is 
in the home, raising and maintaining the family. Although the gendered public/private 
dichotomy is fictitious, the reification of the division through its adoption by political, 
legal and societal institutions proves problematic.  
 
The feminist ‘slogan’, the “personal is political” encapsulates the central critique waged 
against the public/private divide. The phrase signified the opposition to the construction 
                                                          
169 See for example: Cudd A., Analysing Oppression (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 228; 
Okin, Gender, Justice, and the Family (n158), 175. The extent to which this is successful of course 
depends on the scope and nature of the provisions put forward, and the intentions of the government in 
power in implementing them. Such policies have been put into place, and their impact is considered in 
detail within Chapters 5-7.  
170 This is examined in full within Chapters 5-7.  
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of the private as outside the scope of politics and the law.171 For feminists, there were a 
number of ways in which the personal was indeed political. First, the domination and 
subordination of women is not restricted purely to women’s private lives.172 Further, 
the ways in which interactions between men and women are not only social, but 
institutionalised relationships, subject to power imbalance make them an appropriate 
subject for socio-legal and political analysis.173  
 
The phrase also signified the mutually constitutive, interconnected nature of the 
dichotomy, undermining the traditional conception of two opposing spheres. Revealing 
the way in which   
“Public opportunities shape private choices just as private burdens constrain 
public participation. Women’s unequal responsibilities in the home limit options 
in the world outside it. Reduced earning capacity in the market also correlates 
with reduced power and increased obligations in the family”.174 
Those who have traditionally transgressed the gendered barrier between public/private, 
such as working-class women exemplify the ways in which the maintenance of 
patriarchal values can still be identified within the public realm made up of equal 
individuals. Women in the public sphere were not (and arguably still are not) 
viewed/treated as equal.175 Despite such women entering the public domain, they were 
still measured against the “masculine model of the ‘individual’”.176 
 
                                                          
171 See for example O'Donovan, (n22), 11-12. 
172 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (n160), 193-4. 
173 Jaggar A. M., Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), 101.  
174 Rhode D. L., ‘Feminism and the State’ (1994) 107 Harvard Law Review 1181, 1187. 
175 This can be identified in the history of occupational segregation, the devaluation of ‘women’s work’ 
and numerous other factors as examined within Chapters 5-7. 
176 Pateman, The Sexual Contract (n46), 224. 
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The division of women’s labour in the private and men’s labour in the public has 
contributed significantly to the dependency of women.177 The feminisation of largely 
unpaid and unrecognised labour in the home, supports the economic role of men in the 
private. As Okin states 
“Only when men share equally in such tasks as housework and child-rearing 
will they come to be valued equally with those ‘masculine’ tasks which society 
presently acknowledges to be productive and rewards with money… there will 
be no such thing as ‘women’s work’”.178 
The undervalued position of women in the home has created both practical and 
psychological barriers which have prevented women’s full participation in the public 
realm, barriers which the state has had a role in constructing and maintaining.179  
 
Overall, intervention into the domestic remains a contentious concept, and one which 
cannot be easily reconciled with liberal theory. There are circumstances in which 
intrusion by the state is deemed necessary, yet, there are considerable examples in which 
the state can be seen to manipulate the division to serve its own purposes. 180 
Constructing systems in a way which encourages women’s ‘traditional’ caring role, and 
presents the public realm as having little or no appeal to women has been the typical 
result of such manipulation. The state has repeatedly helped shape women as 
dependents rather than autonomous individuals, and maintaining their ‘natural’ place in 
the private sphere.181 
                                                          
177 A theme which runs throughout Chapters 5-7.  
178 Okin S.M., Women in Western Political Thought (London: Virago, 1980), 269-7. 
179 Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family (n158), 111.  
180 Contrast the need for intervention in cases of for example, domestic violence: see [2.5.4], with those 
policies which trap women within the home through using the tax and welfare systems as discussed in 
relation to covert state action. Examples of such systems and their impact and application over time are 
examined in full within the Chapters 5-7. 




2.5.5 Neutral State and Neutral Laws 
When considering the value of privacy versus intervention, restricting analysis to the 
nature of the home alone is insufficient. The character of the state and the law it 
produces also needs to be examined. If the state is neutral, intervention in the private, 
in limited circumstances and under appropriate checks and balances, then there ought 
to be little prospect of the Lockean fear of the tyrannical state being realised. However, 
the state having formed the archetypal example of ‘the public’ within the liberal theory 
has meant that it is imbued with, and replicates masculine norms.  
 
As MacKinnon notes, “every quality that distinguishes man from woman is already 
compensated in society’s organisation and values, so that it implicitly defines the 
standards it neutrally applies”.182  It is clear that the law has often been used as a 
mechanism which supports male authority in the private realm and maintains the norm 
of the masculine individual in the public sphere.183  As such, even when the state acts 
in a way which is gender-neutral,  espousing the equality of all individuals, in refusing 
to intervene in private matters, where traditionally all differences manifest, it merely 
replicates structural inequalities.184 
 
The construction of the neutral state, is a fallacy, “the state is male in the feminist sense. 
The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women”.185 The masculine 
                                                          
182 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (n160), 224. 
183 As is demonstrated in Chapters 5-7.  
184 This is analysed in full in Chapter 3 and can also be seen in practice within Chapters 5-7.  
185 MacKinnon C.A., ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence’ 
(1983) 8 Signs 635, 644. 
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construction of the state both reflects and replicates the dominant masculinity in society. 
The placement of women in the private sphere, free from intervention 
“has isolated the female world from the legal order sends a message to the rest 
of society. It devalues women and their functions and says that women are not 
important enough to merit legal regulation”.186 
The law, as a manifestation of state power has historically maintained the division 
between public and private, “male social dominance perpetuates itself by setting up 
legal structures that fail to remedy the social sources of gender inequality”. 187 
Therefore, legitimately securing women’s position as lesser.  
 
Despite the many ways in which the law has replicated societal inequalities through the 
application of neutral and objective terms, there are examples of legal intervention 
preventing inequalities from persisting, particularly where substantive approach has 
been adopted.188 Despite the fact that neither the state nor the law have traditionally 
been positioned as  
“a defender of women…  the state can, and does, set rules or provide services 
that can protect the weakest… Individual households offer much more arbitrary 
and unreliable protections, especially for the weakest”.189 
As such, though the state is a patriarchal institution which seeks to protect male 
interests, when it does see fit to intervene, the danger it poses is significantly less than 
if the private were to be left entirely unregulated.  
                                                          
186 Schneider (n161), 89.   
187 Ward C V., ‘The Radical Feminist Defence of Individualism’ (1995) 89(3) Northwestern University 
Law Review 871, 875. 
188 Such a perspective can be identified within some of the legislation examined within the Chapters 5-7, 
and especially within the cohabitation judgments of Lord Denning. Chapter 3 also demonstrates the way 
in which neutrality and equality are not synonymous. 
189 Armstrong P., ‘Restructuring Public and Private: Women’s Paid and Unpaid Work’ in Boyd S., (ed) 
Challenging the Public/private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of 




State Defined Division  
Despite being presented as the distinction between public and private 
“non-intervention is a socially constructed, historically variable and inevitably 
political decision. The state defines as private those areas of life into which is 
will not intervene, and then, paradoxically, uses this privacy as the justification 
for its non-intervention”.190 
Where the state draws this line, it simultaneously obscures the division. The ability for 
the state to shift the boundary between public/private at will makes it unclear what, if 
anything, is truly private.  The commitment to the family as private has been a central 
pillar in the liberal state in theory and espoused in practice, but never truly realised.  
 
The malleability of the categories public/private, intervention/non-intervention, has 
made it increasingly difficult to conclusively define any element of society as truly 
private. Whether the nature of the family is such that it requires, or ought to be free 
from, intervention is a central argument which has arisen out of conflict 
“between those demanding that private conduct meet publicly-set standards and 
those asserting that the essential virtue of the family as a social institution is its 
private character which must be defended against public intrusion”.191 
Despite upholding the principle of non-intervention, the state has in practice persistently 
intervened with both positive and negative outcomes.192  
 
                                                          
190 Rose (n19), 64.  
191 Dingwall R. W. J. & Eekelaar J. M., ‘Families and the State: An Historical Perspective on the Public 
Regulation of Private Conduct’ (1988) 10 Law and Policy 341, 341. This ‘clash’ can be identified 
throughout Chapters 5-7.  
192 See [2.5.3] for examples of this, instances of the implications of intervention/non-intervention are also 
explored in additional detail in Chapters 5-7.  
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Though the private sphere is defined as a space free from intervention, this has been 
consistently undermined through both covert and overt state action. This has been 
particularly problematic in instances where “the state defines and reinforces specific 
roles and a particular hierarchy within the family, [as] these policies are often 
considered non-intervention”. 193  Non-intervention is however a form of regulation in 
itself. 194 Those instances in which the state refuses to intervene have often been based 
on family form, revalidating the traditional heteronormative marriage-centric family 
model. 195  For example, the unwillingness of the state to intervene with regard to 
unmarried cohabitation, reflects the reluctance to validate it as a family form. 196 
Instances of regulation and non-regulation are both imbued with meaning “not 
legislating contains a value judgment just as legislating does. Law cannot be neutral; 
non-intervention is as potent an ideology as regulation”.197 
 
The value of maintaining the privacy of domestic sphere is dependent on the perception 
of the family. Is it the idealised family of classic liberalism, or is it a place of 
“oppression, raw will and authority, violence and brutality, where the powerful 
economically and sexually subordinate and exploit the powerless”? 198  History has 
proved the latter to be more accurate.199 Whether this justifies unrestrained intervention 
is another matter. Some degree of intervention is necessary if we adopt the view that 
                                                          
193 Olsen F. E., ‘The Myth of State Intervention in the Family’ (1985) 18 University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform 835, 846. As has been identified above in relation to covert action – this can be identified 
with changes to tax/welfare/childcare which seek to position women in the home, financially dependent 
on their partner. See Chapters 5-7 for examples of such policies.  
194 Dewar J., ‘Family, Law and Theory’ (1996) 16(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 725, 732.  
195 Which in turn reinforces the inequality which results from such a model. The reluctance to validate 
other family forms also reinforces the inequalities between family forms. The form/function distinction 
is at [4.3.3] and can be identified in Chapters 5-7.  
196 The various discourses surrounding this are examined in Chapters 5-7.  
197 O’Donovan, (n22), 184.  
198 Minow M., ‘Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe’ (1985) 18(4) University of 
Michigan Law 933, 948, 
199 As identified above in relation to violence in the home, and can also be identified in Chapters 3, 5-7.  
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“all people are citizens with rights, and no association which they can form with one 
another can violate these rights”.200 If all persons are of equal worth, then the state must 
intervene to protect those made vulnerable by virtue of their relationships with others.201  
 
As a result of the on-going conflict between pro and anti-intervention arguments, the 
state is currently seen as having struck a balance between the two. “The state is 
perceived as having a role only in the case of family default”,202 where there is violence 
or an inability to provide financially. The adoption of this approach is categorised as 
the “protective intervention argument”. 203  However, the degree to which ‘state 
assistance’ has been historically stigmatised particularly in relation to welfare/non-
traditional family forms questions the extent to which this is intended to provide genuine 
assistance, or a warning against ‘individual decisions’ which led to scrounger-status.204   
 
2.5.6 The (In)compatibility between Paternalism and Liberalism  
The acts of intervention/regulation by the state in the UK can be categorised as 
paternalistic, an approach epitomised by coercive intervention. 205  Paternalism is 
generally seen as embodying “the claim that it is legitimate for private and public 
institutions to attempt to influence people's behaviour [sic]”.206 Due to the perception 
that it places limitations on autonomy, such an approach has been traditionally 
                                                          
200 George R., Ideas and Debates in Family Law (Oxford: Hart 2012), 17. 
201 Egdell-Page O., ‘The Concept of Family Law: Understanding the Relationship Between Law and 
Families’ (2015) 3 North East Law Review 68, 73. However, such an approach can be seen to contrast 
the equality of treatment approach which has stemmed from liberal ideology as examined in Chapter 3.  
202 Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy? (n99), 1209.  
203 Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family (n193), 835. 
204 The stigma attached to non-traditional families, and those who rely on the welfare state is discussed 
in detail in Chapters 5-7.  
205 See Valdés E.G., ‘On Justifying Legal Paternalism’ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 173. This draws clear links 
to both the overt and covert actions of the state as discussed in [2.5.3]. 
206 Sunstein C. R., &Thaler R. H., ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70(4) The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1159, 1162. 
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perceived as antiliberal. 207  This section discusses the dangers and merits of a 
paternalistic approach and the development of a libertarian paternalistic approach. 
 
Paternalism is frequently cast in a negative light, given that it is presented as the 
“usurpation of decision making, either by preventing people from doing what they have 
decided or by interfering with the way in which they arrive at their decisions”.208 This 
may create the perception that state intervention requires the limitation of the options 
available to individuals and families. However, there are also examples of the state 
instead providing incentives in order to encourage certain decisions/behaviours, for 
example those relating to the Married Couples Tax Allowance.209   
 
There is the danger that adopting a paternalistic stance may 
“create a ‘nanny state’, invading the autonomy of the individuals concerned and 
potentially infantilizing them? Or, yet worse, by legitimizing a paternalistic 
government, are we actually creating a potentially tyrannical state, justifying its 
intervention in every aspect of our lives”.210  
The ‘nanny state’ has provided a derogatory term by which Britain has been and still is 
described, and the potential for tyranny mentioned above typifies the traditional liberal 
fear of the state.211 Despite the longstanding critiques of paternalism, particularly from 
                                                          
207 As can be seen in Locke’s Two Treaties as discussed above; Alexander E., (ed) On Liberty John 
Stewart Mill (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999), 52; Kant I., On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in 
Theory, but It Wont’t Work in Practice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974) 58-59; 
See also Sunstein and Thaler (n206), 1160 summarising the opposing views of libertarians/paternalists.  
208 Dworkin G., The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
123. 
209 That is not to say that providing incentives has positive implications – but rather that limiting options 
is not the only method through which the state can influence behaviour. The use of the Married Couples 
Tax allowance as a method of promoting certain forms of behaviour is discussed at [6.2.9].  
210  Le Grand J., & New B., Government Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 1.  
211 Recent critiques come in the form of the Nanny State Index which in 2017, Britain was scored as the 
second worse ‘nanny states’ in Europe: http://nannystateindex.org/united-kingdom-2017. The survey 
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a traditional liberal perspective, there are ways in which it can prove beneficial, and 
indeed be reconciled with liberal ideals.  
 
Libertarian paternalism differs from the traditional liberal view of paternalism, insisting 
that “that there are ways in which the state can intervene within ‘harm to self’ issues… 
without necessarily compromising personal freedom”.212  From this perspective, the 
essential way in which autonomy and privacy are both purportedly secured is through 
choice and ensuring that the government does not impose significant costs, either 
financially or socially on those who ‘choose’ to defer from their preferred ‘option(s)’.213  
 
The legitimacy of paternalistic state action is said to focus on “disclosure [which] itself 
promotes autonomy, by allowing individuals to make informed decisions about their 
own ends”.214 However, the notion of informed consent in this context is undermined 
in two significant ways. First, through gender socialisation/norms relating to 
autonomy.215  Secondly the persistence of covert state action and limitations placed on 
the ‘options’ made available by the state, also determine the extent to which there is any 
real consent by citizens to the action of the state.216  
 
                                                          
focussed on issues such as smoking, drinking and food consumption but it is nevertheless insightful as to 
the extent to which particular states are willing to intervene into the choices made by individuals.  
212 Whitehead M. (et al)., ‘Geography, libertarian paternalism and neuro-politics in the UK’ (2012) 178(4) 
The Geographical Journal 302, 303. 
213 Sunstein, (n113), 138. Britain has however, historically imposed such costs: see Chapters 5-7 for 
examples of such policies. The notion of choice here also has implications on those whose autonomy has 
already been limited: see [2.5.2] and [2.1.2] in relation to gendered autonomy and individualism.  
214 ibid. Much like those arguments raised in defence of state intervention at [2.5.4]. 
215 As discussed at [2.5.3].  
216 Both the restrictions placed on autonomy and covert state action are discussed in detail at [2.5.3], 
examples of which can be identified within Chapters 5-7.  
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 Libertarian paternalism, which is now frequently invoked in UK politics has become 
commonly referred to as ‘nudge theory’.217 The Conservatives in particular have gained 
an interest in nudge theory particularly since the 2010 coalition.218 Despite its popularity 
with the state, it has been met with scepticism by the media as demonstrated in the 
headline “Nudge nudge, say no more. Brits' minds will be controlled without us 
knowing it”.219 This epitomises the residual fear concerning paternalism, that the lack 
of public knowledge about the purpose which lies behind policy/legal change which 
impacts their decision-making process, decreases the autonomy of the individual and 
increases the power of the state.  
 
In the context of public health, “nudge tactics” are seen as less controversial and tend 
to have been more clearly communicated. Yet, they still remain subject to scathing 
critique. For example, Spence, writing for The Independent surmised that: 
 “State intervention in these matters shows that those in government consider 
themselves better than others. Regulation of ‘sin’ products are for our ‘own 
good’. This betrays a supreme arrogance: contempt for ordinary people’s 
autonomy. ‘People need to be told’ comes the refrain. ‘They need to be 
educated’”.220 
                                                          
217 On the increasing use of libertarian paternalistic techniques in the UK: see Whitehead, (n212). 
218 The term “nudge theory” is derived from Thaler R., & Sunstein C., Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). See generally Dorey P. (et 
al)., From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party 1997-2010 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2011), 76. Some examples of nudge theory/libertarian paternalism can also be identified in Chapters 5-
7.  
219 Dunt I., Nudge Nudge, Say No More. Brits' minds will be controlled without us knowing it (The 
Guardian 5 Feb 2014): <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/05/nudge-say-no-more-
behavioural-insights-team> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
220 Spence B., Brexit was supposed to be about taking back control – but the UK has one of the most 
interfering nanny states in Europe (The Independent May 10 2017): 
<www.independent.co.uk/voices/nanny-state-index-state-interference-smoking-drinking-junk-food-
a7727571.html> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
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However, those ‘nudges’ which impact the decisions relating to families, such as the 
aforementioned Married Couples Tax Allowance to increase the incentives to marry 
rather than cohabit, or the cuts made to nursery care and maternity pay in the 1980’s the 
state’s true motivation, to encourage mothers to remain in the home, is left 
unexpressed.221 
 
Having considered the dangers women may face in an unregulated private realm, 
alongside the benefits which arise from privacy it accepted that,  
“there are spheres of activity within a ‘private’ realm where there should be a 
strong presumption against paternalistic government regulation, and individuals 
should be free to decide for themselves what to do. The disagreement is over 
which activities belong in the public and private spheres”.222 
It is at this stage that it must be re-emphasised that it is the state that draws the line 
which ‘divides’ public/private.223 The way in which the state has been formed for and 
by men has meant that the parameters of privacy have typically been constructed in a 
way which supports masculine dominance in both the home and the public sphere. As 
a result, the divide remains a tool which can be manipulated by the state under a guise 
of neutrality, reinforced by the supposed distaste for intervention, all while intervening 
when and where they see fit. 
 
2.5.7 Public/Private in the modern Era  
The extent to which the ‘division’ of the spheres is still present/relevant within the 
C20th/21st is often questioned given the increased presence of women within the public 
                                                          
221 These examples are discussed in full in Chapters 5-7. They serve to demonstrate the ways in which 
women have been encouraged to remain in the private sphere, reinforcing the public/private dichotomy.  
222 Mnookin, (n155), 1440.  
223 As discussed at [2.5.5]. 
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sphere, particularly in relation to the workplace.224 Yet, despite notable improvements 
in the their position it is clear that “women have entered the public sphere, but not on 
equal terms”.225 The subordination of women has been simultaneously reinforced and 
disguised by the bifurcation of societal life into the public and private spheres.  
 
The denial of the interconnectedness of the spheres has made it appear as though by 
obtaining a place within the public sphere, those inequalities which resulted from their 
position in the private sphere would be erased. However, as Gal states  
“public and private will have different specific definitions in different historical 
periods and social formations. But once a dichotomy is established, the semiotic 
logic forms a scaffolding… [which] can be made lasting and coercive, fixing 
and forcing such distinctions, binding social actors through arrangements such 
as legal regulation”.226  
As such, despite women now having the ability to reside in either sphere, the gendered 
public/private dichotomy remains intact and continues to influence the value attributed 
to the activities and identities of individuals placed in either sphere. 
 
 Maintaining a successful career in the masculine public sphere of work, is often 
presented as an alternative to a successful private life for women, due to the construction 
of the two spheres as incompatible. Even where there has been a shift towards the “do 
it all” culture, this has not signalled freedom for women. The implications of the 
gendered nature of appropriate roles has meant that without this shift being mirrored by 
men, women are doomed to an eternal ‘double shift’. The continued oppression of 
                                                          
224 The historical shift in the position of women is examined in detail in Chapters 5-7.  
225 Walby (n160), 94. 
226 Gal S., ‘A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction’ (2002) 13(1) Differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies 77, 85. 
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women within both spheres, as outsider in the public and in her natural position within 
the private, is testament to “the power of norms to outlive the economic circumstances 
from which they sprang”.227  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the liberal principles and dichotomies which have influenced 
socio-legal structures and behaviours. The masculine, hierarchical construction of 
public/private has contributed significantly to the oppression of women, and fed the 
perception that difference equates to lesser. Further, it has demonstrated the means by 
which women’s oppression has been naturalised and disguised by the state under the 
guise of neutrality by virtue of the gendered formulation of purportedly distinct realms.  
 
The series of dichotomies which have been discussed in this chapter are clearly 
identifiable in practice in the historical and case analysis within Chapters 5-7. These 
distinctions have provided the philosophical underpinnings of the formal/substantive, 
equality/difference debate which is developed in the following chapter. When taken 
together, it becomes clear that the liberal construction of society, reliant on a series of 
strict dichotomies, which only the state has a legitimate role in manipulating, underpins 
the historical oppression of women and the persistence of gender inequality.
                                                          
227 Iversen T. & Rosenbluth F., Women, Work and Politics (London: Yale University Press, 2010), 163. 
Chapter 3 - Equality and Difference 
“Equality as a principle – never as a practice – has been an 
essential part of the political ideology of all democratic capitalist 
societies since their inception”.1 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the validity of the principle and practice of equality as a method 
of securing the equal position and status of women in law and society.2 The pursuit of 
gender equality has been central to the feminist movement(s), and is upheld as the mark 
of a successful liberal state. Despite this, the formal construction of equality has, in 
practice, worked to secure the unequal position of many women. The focus of this 
chapter is on the theoretical underpinnings and consequences of the application of 
equality. This informs the case studies in Chapters 5-7 which explore the way in which 
a substantive approach to equality, which recognises difference, has proved a more 
useful tool for women when seeking to obtain proprietary rights.3 
 
Building on the theoretical examination of liberalism and liberal structures in the 
previous chapter, this chapter engages in an in-depth analysis of the term equality, in 
both its substantive and formal constructions. Through this examination it emerges that 
equality forms a further dichotomy, that between sameness/difference. 4 When read 
alongside the historical context explored in Chapters 5-7 it becomes increasingly clear 
                                                          
1 Mitchell J., ‘Women and Equality’ in Phillips A., Feminism and Equality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987), 27. 
2 The reference made here to equality in practice is built upon further in Chapters 5-7 which bring together 
an examination of women’s position in society from the 1960s onwards with an analysis of the relevant 
case law relating to unmarried cohabitants.  
3 This can be seen in particular in the judgments of Lord Denning, predominantly examined in Chapter 
5. 
4 This additional dichotomy is influenced and intersected by those dichotomies discussed in Chapter 2, 
and the liberal roots of equality explains the historical dominance of the formal ‘sameness’ approach to 
equality in the UKs socio-legal structures.  
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that the equality/difference dichotomy has proved particularly problematic for women. 
On one hand women have historically denied difference in order to secure formal 
equality with men, and on the other if they seek substantive equality for gendered issues, 
they have to acknowledge difference without falling into the trap of essentialism. This 
has meant that “from women’s point of view equality is a double-edged sword”.5 The 
dichotomisation of equality/difference is presented as a choice rather than a compatible 
combination which raises an additional issue in relation to the pursuit of equality of 
difference.  
 
The way in which liberal dichotomies have constructed a gendered, hierarchical society, 
based on a masculine individualism, has problematised the application of formal 
equality. The adoption of a form of equality based on fictitious neutrality which treats 
all people as if they had the same qualities and opportunities, does not result in equality 
in practice but merely upholds the principle.  In order to secure real equality in practice, 
rather than allowing ideologies distracted by debates surrounding difference to persist, 
it needs to be acknowledged that “equality is not an abstract principle but a social 
phenomenon”.6 As such, what ought to be recognised is the way in which equality 
interacts with a society derived from gendered, hierarchical, liberal dichotomies, rather 
continuing to rely on an idealised view of how society ought to be.     
 
As a result of the dissatisfaction which arises from a purely formal approach to equality, 
and the problematic nature of the construction of equality/difference as a dichotomy, 
this chapter considers two of the proposed middle ways between equality and 
                                                          
5 Parvikko T., ‘Conceptions of Gender Equality: Similarity and Difference’ in Meehan E., Equality, 
Politics and Gender (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 37. 




difference. One of which is proposed by MacKinnon and the other involves the 
deconstruction of a series of dichotomies.7 The adoption of a ‘middle way’ would allow 
for a conception of equality in difference to be adopted in practice, which has the 
capacity to adapt to the needs of specific individuals/contexts. This would in turn 
facilitate the balance between flexibility required both within a social and legal context 
to deal with the constantly shifting position of those traditionally viewed as forming the 
lesser half of binary pairings. 
 
3.2 Forms of Equality 
3.2.1 Formal Equality: Equality of ‘Sameness’ 
Formal equality or equality of sameness, commonly referred to as equality under the 
law, is a central tenet of classic liberalism.8 Historically, calls for formal equality have 
had a considerable role in securing a number of legal and political rights for women. 
Despite the benefits which have arisen due to formal equality, on examining the position 
of women within society, it becomes increasingly evident that adherence to formal 
equality alone is insufficient to realise equality in practice.9 Due to the exclusion of 
private matters from consideration and the emphasis on sameness, formal equality fails 
to address the substantive causes of women’s inequality in the public domain. This 
section details the nature of formal equality, and begins to identify some of the 
weaknesses drawn on in more detail later in this chapter, in particular those relating to 
the gendered nature of citizenship and the faux-neutrality of formal equality.  
 
                                                          
7 This includes those dichotomies discussed in Chapter 2 and equality/difference.  
8 As a result it is premised on the liberal principles and construction of the individual as discussed at 
[2.1.2]. 
9 Such an examination is provided in Chapters 5-7. 
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Formal equality can be encapsulated in the notion that “like be treated alike… the idea 
that women are not fundamentally different from men”. 10  This is reliant on the 
construction of the public sphere as a realm of gender-neutral free and equal 
individuals.11 Despite the centrality of sameness to the construction of individuals and 
the treatment they ought to receive under this formulation of equality, there is 
recognition of some differences from a liberal perspective. From this perspective, there 
are two central elements to the liberal individual which can be summarised as follows: 
 “first, that people are importantly the same, and therefore deserve an equal 
opportunity to choose and direct their lives; and second, that people are also 
importantly different, which means that, given an equal chance to choose, their 
actual choices will vary”.12  
In this way, the universal, rational individuals are considered to be the ‘same’, and 
therefore treated as such, and observable differences are said to result from free, 
autonomous choice.13  
 
Formal equality, premised on the sameness of individuals is presented as the foundation 
of equal treatment, and those differences which are accepted are posed as the source of 
inequality. It is from this position that difference and inequality have been assimilated. 
This has led to the assertion that liberal theory, and as a result formal equality, denies 
that there are differences between individuals. However, “liberalism begins and ends 
with the eradicable particularity, and hence diversity of individuals [in which they] 
                                                          
10Meehan E. & Seventiysen S., ‘Problems in Principles and Policies’ in Meehan E., Equality, Politics 
and Gender (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 3. 
11 Derived from the Lockean construction of the public sphere/universal individualism: see [2.1][2.4.5]. 
12 Ward C. V., ‘On Difference and Equality’ 3(1) 1997 Legal Theory 65, 68. 
13 As discussed at [2.1], women have not traditionally formed part of this ‘rational’ group of individuals 
due to their difference being founded in nature. As the above indicates, having derived from liberal 
theory, formal equality is also subject to those critiques pertaining to the gendered nature of the 
public/private dichotomies and universal individualism: see generally Chapter 2.  
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emphasise differentiation not from the other but from every other”.14 Despite centrality 
of difference/diversity to the liberal individual, within the context of equality, difference 
is made invisible. Presenting differences as resulting from autonomous choice or due to 
natural difference, it is rendered irrelevant due to its placement in the private sphere, 
the concept of difference becomes one in which the state should not intervene.15  
 
The sameness approach has meant that women who are perceived to act like men are 
entitled to equal treatment as men, while those who do not are legitimately treated 
differently. “Formal equality has actually hurt many women”16  and the illusion which 
a formal account of equality creates, despite in some contexts benefitting women, can 
be dangerous for those in a caregiving or homemaker role. Where masculinity is the 
norm, formal equality is merely androcentrism posing as neutrality.  
 
Influenced by traditional Liberal theory, under the formal approach “equal rights are 
awarded solely on the basis of one's identification as a member of the human species 
and, as such, are determined by our ‘sameness’ - our humanity and are not determined 
by our differences”.17 However, although this would be an accurate baseline for the 
treatment of individuals, the application of neutral principles in facilitating a sameness 
approach ignores the impact which differences, both biological and socially constructed 
between men and women, have on their treatment by, and position in society.18 As 
                                                          
14 Jensen P. G., ‘Introduction’ in Jensen P. G., (ed) Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking the Woman 
Question for Liberal Democracy (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 5. Original emphasis.  
15 See generally Chapter 2 on the public/private dichotomy and autonomy/intervention.  
16 Becker M., ‘Prince Charming: Abstract Equality’  (1987) Supreme Court Review 201, 214. This is due 
to the fact that such activities have traditionally been categorised as feminine and belonging to the private 
sphere. 
17 Hauserman N., ‘Sexual Equality: An Essay on the Importance of Recognizing Difference’ (1983) 7 
ALSA Forum 251, 254. 
18 The difference in the treatment and position of women is explored in detail in Chapters 5-7, which also 
demonstrates the ways in which the application of seemingly neutral principles has proved problematic 
in practice.  
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established in the previous chapter of this thesis, the masculinity of the public realm, in 
which formal equality is applicable, has meant that this formulation of equality was 
created by men, for men. The principle of formal equality is difficult to critique. 
However, its application which denies those both socially constructed and biological 
differences, fails to produce equality for those who do not fit the traditional masculine 
construction of the individual. The contradictory denial of difference from this 
perspective forms one of the central critiques of the adoption of a formal perspective.19  
 
3.2.2 Substantive Equality: Equality of ‘Difference’ 
“Sexual difference is probably the issue in our time which could be our 
‘salvation’ if we thought it through”.20 
 
Substantive equality, or equality of difference arose out of the dissatisfaction with 
formal equality. As such, it acts as both a distinct formulation of equality, and a critique 
of the liberal equality of sameness. Although substantive equality addresses some of the 
difficulties which arise from an application of purely formal equality it is also subject 
to significant critique. This section provides an overview of substantive equality which 
is developed later in this chapter.  This leads to the conclusion that despite the 
difficulties which arise from the differences approach, they can be overcome and that 
the substantive approach is preferable from a purely formal approach. 
 
                                                          
19 Such an approach can be identified in the strict Rosset approach discussed at [4.2],[4.3.2],[6.8] in which 
the same, neutral rule – in sum express agreement or financial contribution equates to beneficial 
ownership, though seemingly promoting equality of sameness has failed to impact men and women in 
the same way, to the detriment of women.  
20 Burke C., & Gilligan C., (trans) Irigaray L., An Ethics of Sexual Difference (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 5. 
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The substantive approach is “able to deal with relations between individuals in different 
original positions”.21 This requires a recognition of the mythology of the universal 
individual, and the negative impact that the gendered divisions stemming from liberal 
theory has had on women, which has traditionally been attributed to difference.22 This 
recognition has a two-fold effect. First, it counters the historical opposition to difference 
as the source of inequality, instead positioning the liberal construction of society and 
citizenship/identity, and the reluctance to recognise difference as central to the 
continuation of gender inequality. Second, it acknowledges that the application of 
neutral principles under a strictly procedural approach cannot result in equality of 
outcome where society has been arranged within hierarchical, oppositional spheres.23 
 
The recognition of difference risks “affirming the perspective that has been forced on 
women”.24 However, unlike its predecessor, biological determinism, the recognition of 
difference here is not used to legitimise the oppression of women, but rather seeks to 
rectify it.25 That is, the substantive approach focusses on the way in which difference 
has been constructed by society, and attempts to alleviate the negative consequences of 
that difference. 26  The substantive approach acknowledges that “equality is not a 
synonym for similarity”,27 despite formalists presenting it as such. Recognising the 
fictional dichotomy constructed between equality and difference in this way allows for 
                                                          
21 Parvikko, (n5), 48. In contrast to the formal approach as discussed above.  
22 See Chapter 2 regarding universal individualism and the issues which have stemmed from the liberal 
dichotomies. This can also be identified in practice within Chapters 5-7.  
23 See Chapter 2. 
24Baer J., Our Lives Before the Law: Constructing a Feminist Jurisprudence (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 9.  
25 On biological determinism: see [2.3.1]. That is not to say that there does not exist a difference based 
school of thought which is premised on biological deterministic thinking in which men and women are 
deemed ‘naturally different’. However, here the focus is on those difference approaches which are 
compatible with the social constructionist notion of gender. 
26 This notion is developed in [3.3]. Biological difference, particularly pertaining to maternity is discussed 
at [4.3.4]. Both of which can also be identified in Chapters 5-7.  
27 Parvikko, (n5), 41. 
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a formulation of equality which recognises and is able to react to difference to be 
established, avoiding the trappings of masculine neutrality suffered by the formal 
approach.  
 
From this perspective, it becomes clear that formal equality alone is an insufficient tool 
to provide equality to those who do not reflect the traditional characteristics exemplified 
by the universal individual. Rather, equality is “realizable only by recognizing when it 
is appropriate to do so, that there are differences between men and women [sic]”.28 The 
substantive approach to equality takes account of the biological and socially constructed 
differences between men and women. Accepting such differences seeks to eradicate 
those negative connotations which have derived from the polarisation of difference and 
equality, resultant from the liberal dichotomisation of society. This simultaneously 
facilitates a recognition of the way in which the public/private spheres are mutually 
reinforcing, that one’s position in the private sphere has the capacity to impact their 
position in the public sphere.29   
 
3.3 Equality in Theory and Practice, A Critique 
Having outlined the central forms of equality, this section provides an overview of the 
critiques which have been raised in relation to both formal and substantive formulations 
of equality. This leads to the conclusion that a purely formal approach is limited in scope 
and suffers many of the critiques raised in relation to the liberal construction of society 
and the individual as discussed in the previous chapter. However, the benefits derived 
from the adoption of an approach which recognises difference under a substantive 
equality regime is also rife with problems. The range of issues discussed are then 
                                                          
28Meehan & Seventiysen, (n10), 3. 
29 This is of course typified in the feminist ‘slogan’ “the personal is political” as explored in Chapter 3.  
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brought together with a discussion of alternative approaches to equality, and the 
endorsement of a middle way between equality and difference.  
 
3.3.1 Equality and the Law  
The neutrality and objectivity associated with the application of formal equality, has 
secured its dominance within the legal regime as identifiable in the principles of stare 
decisis, precedent and the rule of law.30 In the UK historically the primary concern has 
been the consistent application of the law. However, under such an approach there is no 
guarantee of a positive outcome.31 A claim to equal treatment can be satisfied by both 
levelling down (depriving the compared parties of the benefit concerned), or by 
levelling up (conferring the benefit on both parties involved).32 As it is satisfied by both 
improving or worsening the position of individuals, formal equality “proceeds from an 
abstracted and objectified analysis of equality that ignores the lived experience of 
inequality”.33 This raises questions as to  whether the pursuit of such equality is of any 
value to those it is supposed to protect. The outcome of the application of neutral 
principles is not considered relevant in the application of formal equality.  
 
                                                          
30 It ought to be noted that these principles do not form an exhaustive list of the ways in which formal 
equality has been embraced by the legal system. Central to this thesis as discussed at [4.2],[4.3.2],[6.8] 
is the Rosset approach. 
31 Echoing the moral neutrality of the rule of law, particularly as exemplified by Raz’s knife analogy: 
Raz J., The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225-
6.  
32 Barnard C., & Hepple B., ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59(3) Cambridge Law Journal 562, 563. 
33 Brake D. L., ‘When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Levelling Down in Equality 
Law’ (2004) 46(2) William & Mary Law Review 513, 516. Although the prospect of levelling down 
remains a possibility, the political implications of such an approach means that it is infrequently invoked. 
However, there have been examples: see Balgobin v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1987] I.R.L.R. 
402, EAT and Stewart v. Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd. [1994] I.R.L.R. 440, EAT by way of 
levelling down in the context of sexual harassment. 
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The direct discrimination legislation of the 1970s, and within the Equality Act 2010 
provide specific examples of equal treatment legislation in the UK.34 One of the central 
issues concerning direct discrimination, as an element of formal equality in practice is 
the requirement of a comparator, which has historically proved problematic for women 
due to occupational segregation and legislative loopholes exploited by employers.35 
This demonstrates the way in which formally neutral rules can, when played out in a 
gendered society, replicate inequality. That is not to say that formal equality has not 
benefitted those considered ‘other’, for example it was on this basis that women gained 
the right to vote and the right to equal pay. However, the latter serves as an example of 
the way in which formal rights do not go far enough in addressing the substantive causes 
of inequality.36 
 
Despite the natural appeal, and historical affiliation between the law and formal equality, 
there are increasingly instances in which a substantive approach has been adopted due 
to the inability for the formal approach to adequately deal with difference. This has 
particularly been invoked in relation to group characteristics, and can be seen within the 
context of indirect discrimination. 37  Indirect discrimination can be invoked when 
supposedly neutral provisions have an adverse impact upon a particular group of 
individuals, thus acknowledging that neutrality and ‘sameness’ do not always result in 
equality. 38  Maternity provisions provide an additional example of substantive 
                                                          
34 Equal Pay Act 1970, hereafter EPA; SDA 1975, hereafter SDA; Equality Act 2010, hereafter EqA are 
examined in Chapters 5-7 in detail.  
35  EqA 2010 s1(4) EPA s23, s71 does allow for the use of a hypothetical comparator in limited 
circumstances, this is also examined in detail in the Chapters 5-7.   
36 As discussed in Chapter 7, particularly [7.2] despite numerous legislative acts aimed at alleviating the 
gender pay gap, it persists.  
37 The issues in relation to equality and group characteristics is discussed in detail below: see [3.3.2]. 
38 Equality Act 2010, s19, Although the inability to raise claims as a group within this context has proved 
problematic in that it only addresses the effects on an individual rather than dismantling the structural 
inequality which gave rise to the issue and has the potential to impact others within such a ‘group’. 
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legislation in action. However, given the centrality of pregnancy and motherhood to the 
difference debate, this is discussed in detail below.39  
 
Overall, within a legal context equality based in neutrality remains desirable in principle. 
Yet, the implications of such an approach are, in practice , inherently biased and in many 
cases, replicate existing inequalities. The masculinity of neutrality, particularly in the 
context of the public sphere where male performance is the norm has meant that the 
application of neutral rules often acts to the detriment of women.40 This has arisen due 
to the construction of social institutions as inherently masculine and embodying 
patriarchal values, from which the law has not escaped. The central flaw in the formal 
approach remains tied to its reluctance to acknowledge difference, relying on the 
construction of the neutral individual, and the preclusion of groups that this 
individualism entails. The notion of the neutral individual and the problems which arise 
from a disregard of groups is examined below.41 
 
3.3.2 Identity and Citizenship  
Having stemmed from the liberal construction of the individual, the application of 
formal equality has been formulated as legal and political equality, limited to the public 
sphere. A distinction can be drawn between the implications of equality within the home 
for example, relating to unpaid labour, and paid labour within the public sphere. In the 
latter instance, in entering the public domain, and performing as men, women have 
                                                          
39 The development of UK maternity law and its implications for gender equality is considered in its 
historical context in Chapters 5-7, particularly [5.3], [6.4], [7.2]. 
40 As can be seen in relation to the formal approach adopted in relation to sole-ownership cases under 
Rosset [6.8]. When viewed within the socio-legal context provided in Chapters 5-7 the ‘neutral’ financial 
criteria relied on in the majority of sole-ownership cases is further problematised by the additional 
inequalities faced by women. 
41 See [3.3.2]. 
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gradually obtained formal equality guaranteed by the state, in that they are treated in 
the same way as men.42 In contrast the domestic sphere is presented as a site of non-
intervention and has been traditionally affiliated with the feminine. Non-intervention 
through seeking to prevent state interference in the private domain undermining the 
choices made by individuals, has also ensured that inequalities in the private sphere are 
left without address.43  
 
As a result, identity and citizenship have formed a central part of the discussion of 
equality. The liberal attachment to fictitious universal individualism, underpinned by 
the public/private dichotomy has formed the basis of citizenship and identity, and 
consequently, access to equality.44  This has had two central implications. First, it has 
contributed to the masculinised form of citizenship which is presented as 
neutral/universal. Second, the individualism central to the liberal model of citizenship 
excludes any notion of equality based in group identity. The following section will go 
on to discuss the issues which arise as a result of the adoption of a formal approach to 
equality. Particular emphasis is placed on “the idea that citizenship is the same for all” 
has led to the “requirement that all citizens be the same”.45 This has in turn reinforced 
the rejection of the recognition of difference in the public sphere. It also explores the 
alternatives offered by a substantive approach. 
 
                                                          
42 However, it must be noted that this notion of equality can be seen to be undermined, given that women 
are still paid less than their male counterparts, despite legislation existing, attempting to prevent just that 
as is discussed in full within Chapters 5-7. Regarding the masculinity of female performance: see [1.2.2] 
and [2.4]. 
43 See generally Chapter 2 for the ways in which the state has otherwise undermined the notion of non-
intervention and the critique of ‘choice’/autonomy.  
44 See the Chapter 2 in relation to universal individualism and the impact of the public/private and 
associated dichotomies. There is also some discussion of identity and citizenship in that chapter.  




Citizenship often refers to the “status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
with which the status is endowed”. 46  This formulation can be seen to include the 
political/legal construction of citizenship which gives rise to the rights and obligations 
attributed to a society of equal individuals. However, citizenship extends further than 
status, it also includes “participation, representation and access to power”.47 Despite the 
neutral construction of citizenship status/practice, social, political and legal restraints 
placed on women continue to prevent them from “fulfilling the full potential” of 
citizenship status and as a result, their equal position in society.48   
 
The classic formulation of citizenship, stemming from the liberal construction of the 
individual and bifurcated society conferred citizenship status upon men as the head of 
the household (husband or father) to act as “representatives of a family” rendering 
women “indirect citizens”.49 The traditional masculine construction of citizenship status 
was justified on the basis of women’s supposed lack of rationality, their positioning 
within the private sphere and the faux-universal individual.50 As a result, despite the 
purportedly universality of citizenship, it meant no more than membership of what 
                                                          
46 Marshall T. H., Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1950), 28-9. 
47 Gouws A., ‘Beyond equality and difference: the politics of women's citizenship’ (1999) 15(40) Agenda 
54, 54. 
48 Lister R., ‘Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis’ (1997) 57 Feminist Review 28, 36. Much of this 
has hinged on the construction of women’s identity as mother/wife as can be seen in the Chapters 5-7, 
and also links to the participation of women in the public sphere and autonomy/voice as discussed at 
[2.5.3] [2.4]. 
49 Vogel U., ‘Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?’ in Vogel U. & Moran M., (eds) Frontiers of Citizenship 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991), 58. This has led to claims that marriage is the source of 
inequality between men and women: see Sarvasy W., ‘Beyond the Difference versus Equality Policy 
Debate: Postsuffrage Feminism, Citizenship, and the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State’ (1992) 17(2) 
Signs 329. Regarding the role of the liberal construction of the individual in excluding women from full 
citizenship status: see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
50 See [2.1.2]. 
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Pateman would term the “fraternity… the brotherhood of men”51 in civil society/ the 
public sphere, from which women were excluded. As discussed previously, men’s 
ability to engage fully within the public sphere has hinged on the positioning of women 
within the private sphere.52   
 
Under this model, “women can only become citizens effectively if they actively 
participate in formal political activity”.53 The natural placement of women within the 
private sphere due to their capacity to give birth, sacrificing their own citizenship for 
the sake of their children and their economically independent breadwinning husband 
has formed the foundation of women’s exclusion from the status of individual, and 
consequently forfeiting their access to equality.54 As a result, women’s identity has been 
defined by their role or relationships, as wife/mother often being subsumed into the 
category of ‘family’ when such issues are raised in the public.55 By virtue of their ability 
to transverse the public/private divide without consequence, the masculine categories 
of father and husband have not had the same effect. 
 
Despite having ‘moved’ into the public sphere and attained formal citizenship status, 
many of the inequalities suffered by women remain inadequately addressed. This is due 
                                                          
51 Pateman C., The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 78. See also Fraser N., 
‘What’s Critical about Critical Theory: The Case of Habermas and Gender’ in Okin S. M. & Mansbridge J., 
(eds) Feminism (Aldershot: Elgar Publishing House, 1994), 87 on the impact of women’s position in the 
private sphere and citizenship. This is also examined in Chapters 2, 5-7.  
52 See Chapter 2 in relation to the historical ‘placement’ of women in the private sphere and the way in 
which this facilitated male access to the public sphere. Attempts to maintain the gendered divide between 
for example home and work can still be identified in modern politics – though this is most evident in the 
childcare/maternity politics of the Conservative party in the 1970s as discussed in Chapter 5, particularly 
[5.3]. 
53 Prokhovnik R., ‘Public and Private Citizenship: From Gender Invisibility to Feminist Inclusiveness’ 
(1998) 60 Feminist Review 84, 85.  
54 In a similar vein, autonomy as related to citizenship is also seen as having been forfeited – as discussed 
at [2.5.3]. 
55 Women’s loss of identity can be seen in concrete terms with the historical practice of revoking women’s 
separate legal identity upon marriage.  
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to their inability to fully access the political/legal system and their unequal status and 
underrepresentation in these systems, which maintain their masculine formulation. 
Liberal individualism’s focus on form over substance in relation to citizenship status 
has proved problematic for women in particular in that it leads to a failure to address 
the issues which prevent full access to power/rights, thus perpetuating their unequal 
status.56  
 
The masculinity of citizenship, hidden under the guise of neutrality has entailed the 
denial of difference within the public sphere.57 When entering the public sphere those 
who embody or perform difference are told “to get what we have, be like us”.58 Meaning 
that masculine performance and the denial of difference has formed an essential pre-
requisite for the attainment of rights. The construction of citizenship and universal 
equality on the neutral citizen has meant that inequalities have been legitimised as either 
arising through the choices of autonomous beings or by virtue of natural differences 
which have no place within the public sphere.59 As a result, “in law, this has made the 
problem of sexual difference all but invisible”60 particularly under a formal approach 
which seeks to maintain the faux-neutrality of a liberal society without addressing the 
issues which maintain and in some cases replicate inequality. 
 
                                                          
56 On the issue of liberal individualism as it related to form over substance in relation to groups: see Fraser 
E. & Lacey N., The Politics of Community (New York: Wheatsheaf, 1993). The promotion of form over 
substance has been a running theme in many of the issues identified in the literature surrounding family 
form/substance as discussed in Chapter 4 and identifiable in Chapters 5-7. 
57 Given that citizenship has been premised on sameness, as discussed in the Chapter 2, particularly 
[2.1.1], in turn equality is founded on the sameness of such individuals. 
58 MacKinnon C.A., Women’s Lives. Men’s Laws (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 49. In a 
similar vein: see Montin K., (trans) Irigaray L., Thinking the Difference (London: Athlone Press, 1994), 
75. As demonstrated in the examination of women’s employment throughout Chapters 5-7. 
59 All of which stems from the gendered liberal public/private dichotomy and the construction of the 
universal individual as discussed in the Chapter 2, particularly [2.4.5] and [2.1.2]. 




Individuals and Communities 
In addition to the masculine faux-neutrality of the universal citizen, the liberal 
construction of citizenship has also precluded the recognition of group identity. The 
sameness of individuals was seen to necessitate the abstraction of individuals from 
group characteristics and interests.61 Further, the individualism attributed to the liberal 
individual, which focusses on self-sufficiency, rationality and autonomy, legitimised 
women’s exclusion from the public sphere and full citizenship. As such, liberalism 
formulated a notion of citizenship which both created numerous excluded groups and 
simultaneously refused to acknowledge them as groups. This section discusses the 
benefits and critiques associated with the notion of group identity which is contrasted 
with liberal individualism. 
 
The incomplete citizen status of women is reliant on the historical construction of 
women’s identity and their placement within the private sphere. In seeking full 
acknowledgement of women as citizens there arises a “tension – between needing to act 
as women and needing an identity not overdetermined by our gender”.62 The issues 
related to treating/discussing women as a ‘group’ have been discussed in detail 
elsewhere.63 However, given that the individualistic approach derived from liberalism 
has been shown to work to the significant disadvantage of those who do not fit the 
traditional model of the liberal citizen, which includes women as a ‘group’ it is 
necessary to discuss this issue as it relates to equality.64  
                                                          
61 See Bacchi C., Same Difference: Feminism and Sexual Difference (London: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 
xv. For a more in-depth discussion of individualism: see [2.1.2].  
62 Snitow A., ‘Pages from a Gender Diary: Basic Divisions in Feminism’ (1989) Dissent 205, 205. 
63 See [1.2.2]. 
64  For an overview of the construction of the liberal individual: see [2.1.2]. See also Taylor D., 
‘Citizenship and social policy’ (1989) 26 Critical Social Policy 19, 29 on “the failure of citizenship rights 
vested in liberal democratic institutions to meet the needs of women and racialised groups and the socially 




The central challenge to the liberal construction of the individual/citizenship has come 
from a communitarian perspective.65 Such an approach holds that persons should be 
seen as communities rather than isolated individuals, as to remove them from their 
social context ignores the sociability inherent in human nature and the value of 
communities.66 The notion of the atomistic individual is not a true reflection of the way 
in which society is arranged, it “fail[s]… to give appropriate value to social identity”67 
or any notion of group identity, maintaining the fiction of the universal individual. 
Rejecting the notion of community/groups in favour of the mythological individual 
makes liberalism difficult to reconcile with issues which have an uneven impact on 
specific ‘groups’ of individuals, for example women.68  
  
The recognition of groups allows for those who have traditionally been excluded from 
the category of the universal individual by virtue of their difference “to effectively 
coordinate our behavior with another… we need shared cultural systems for 
categorizing [sic]”.69 Categorising a collective of individuals as a group, allows for 
structural inequalities to be more easily identified, in a way which individual-centred 
issues of equality fails to do.70 It brings with it the opportunity to organise political 
movements, to speak as a collective against the dominant ideology, to raise the issue of 
                                                          
65 For examples of communitarian work: see MacIntyre A., Whose Justice? Which rationality? (London: 
Duckworth, 1988) and Sandel, M. J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
66 On this point: see Caney S., ‘Liberalism and Communitarianism: a Misconceived Debate’ (1992) 40(2) 
Political Studies 273, 273. 
67  Akhtar S., ‘Liberal recognition for identity? Only for particularized ones’ (2011) 10(1) Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 66, 67.  
68 Eisenstein Z. R., The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York: Longman, 1981), 191. 
69 Ridgeway C., Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 54.   
70 Young I. M., ‘Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice’ (2001) 9(1) The Journal 
of Political Philosophy 1, 2.  
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different treatment in the pursuit of an equality which has been structured around a 
sameness that does not reflect reality.  In “subsuming women into a general “human” 
identity, we lose the specificity of female diversity and women’s experiences”71  and 
with that, the opportunity to inform and transform society at large.  
 
Despite the role which acknowledging the relevance/reality of community and groups 
within the context of the realisation and formation of identity, it is not without its issues. 
As Fredman notes, from a liberal perspective  
“the chief mischief of discrimination is that a person is subjected to detriment 
because she is attributed with stereotypical qualities based on a denigratory 
notion of her group membership. Respect for the individual requires that she be 
treated on her individual merits and regardless of her group membership”.72 
From this position groups are seen to detract from the ‘sameness’ of all persons, giving 
rise to stereotypes which are damaging to the individual.73 It is portrayed as a method 
of illuminating “difference [which] is both the product of, and guarantor of, the 
continued subordination of powerless groups”.74 However, this does not recognise that 
a number of gendered stereotypes arose due to the hierarchical dichotomies within 
liberal theory.75 It is from this perspective that, for example, the housewife/breadwinner 
model of the family derives. To counter this, it ought to be acknowledged that it is not 
the membership of a group, or the acknowledgement of difference which is problematic, 
                                                          
71 Scott J. W., ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for 
Feminism’ (1988) 14(1) Feminist Studies 32, 45-6. Note within this quote the recognition of women’s 
diversity within the ‘category’ of women.  
72 Fredman S., ‘Equality: A New Generation’ (2001) 30(2) Industrial Law Journal 145, 154 
73 However, Chapters 5-7 examine the way in which stereotypes have been employed to both the benefit 
and detriment of women.   
74 Ward, (n12), 78. 
75 As discussed in Chapter 2. The modern history of the development of this model is traced through 
Chapters 5-7.  
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but rather it is the way in which difference has been constructed as the lesser half of the 
incompatible equality and difference dichotomy.76 
 
The concept of group identity has proved problematic from a number of perspectives. 
For Phillips, the construction of for example ‘women’ as a group entails the  
“attribution of certain characteristics to everyone subsumed within a particular 
category… [which] naturalise or reify what may be socially created or 
constructed… [and] presume[s] a homogenised and unified group”.77  
Such an understanding gives rise to the idea that to speak of women as a ‘group’ risks 
essentialism. This has clear links with biological determinism and gender stereotyping 
which have proven problematic when speaking of ‘women’.78 It is for this reason that 
despite the benefits derived from community and group identity, the way in which 
groups are thought about needs to be reconceived.  
 
Identity ‘formed’ from group status needs to be distanced from the categorisation of 
persons by some shared attribute(s). A preferable formulation of what constitutes a 
social group is: 
“an affinity with other persons by which they identify with one another, and by 
which other people identify them. A person's particular sense of history, 
understanding of social relations and personal possibilities”.79 
                                                          
76 A position which gives weight to those who endorse a deconstruction of said dichotomy: see [3.5.2]. 
77 Phillips A., ‘What’s Wrong with Essentialism?’ 11(1) Distinktion 47, 52. 
78 As discussed in Chapter 2.  
79 Young I. M., ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ (1989) 
99(2) Ethics 250, 259. A similar notion is also adopted by MacKinnon C. A., ‘From Practice to Theory, 
or what is a White Woman Anyway?’ (1991) 4(13) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 13, 16 who states 
that “comprised of all its variations, the group women can be seen to have a collective social history of 
disempowerment, exploitation and subordination extending to the present”. 
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From this perspective, identity is not defined by the characteristics or attributes of an 
individual, which has the capacity to be deemed essentialist, but it is instead relational. 
Adopting such a construction of identity allows for it to be distanced from stereotypical 
characteristics without excluding them from consideration entirely. Minow discusses 
the displacement of difference into the “relationship or matrix”80 which creates it, rather 
than the individual in order to distance the implications of difference being that an 
individual is unequal, rather it is societies construction or treatment of them which 
renders them so.  
 
This difference in turn must be understood as “plural and relational rather than 
oppositional”81 in order for what appears to be a homogenous group to allow for the 
diversity of individuals. Such a view is then compatible with the social constructionist 
view of gender.82 This makes it reasonable “to suggest that ‘women’ don’t exist – while 
maintaining a politics of ‘as if they existed’ – since the world behaves as if they 
unambiguously did”.83 Thus allowing the benefits derived from the construction of 
women as a group to distance itself from an essentialist and homogenous understanding 
of women as naturally different from men and as such, unequal.  
 
Neither a purely individualistic, or group based conception of identity provides an 
entirely satisfactory outcome. Instead what needs to be conceived is a notion of 
citizenship which reconciles universalism and difference. The way in which group and 
individual identity are presented as oppositional, as if accepting one necessarily 
                                                          
80 Minow M., ‘Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education’ (1985) 
48(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 157, 206. 
81 Lister R., Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (London: MacMillian, 2003), 115.  
82 As discussed in [1.2] and in [2.3], [2.4].  




excludes the other, merely acts as a way of silencing the voices of those conceived as 
other. Group and individual identity are compatible, so long as the individual is allowed 
to maintain its diversity rather than being reduced to ‘sameness’ and they need to both 
be accepted and considered in order for society to accept and respond to difference, and 
achieve equality.   
 
3.3.3 The Dilemma of Difference84 
Despite the benefits which arise from a substantive approach to equality acknowledging 
the biological and socially constructed differences between men and women, it is not a 
concept without critique. Embracing difference has been a source of concern, due to the 
way in which “differences can… be exaggerated, manipulated, and used 
opportunistically to coerce conformism and excuse corruption”. 85  Historically, 
difference has been “translated into evidence of female deficiency”,86 in positioning 
masculinity/the male as the norm, anything which detracts from this is as other, lesser. 
This has been used, for example, as a justification for ‘women’s work’ being distinct 
from that of men, based on notion of natural attributes which make them naturally more 
suited to, what is coincidentally then, less valued than that performed by men.87  
 
                                                          
84 The subtitle for this section is drawn from Minow’s "difference dilemma". She posits that ignoring 
difference in the case of subordinated groups "leaves in place a faulty neutrality," but also recognising 
that placing too much emphasis on difference can result in amplifying the notion of deviance attributed 
to such groups. "Both focusing on and ignoring difference risk recreating it. This is the dilemma of 
difference”: Minow, ‘Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference’ (n80), 160. 
85 Alcoff L. M., Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
5-6. 
86 Greene S., ‘Biological Determinism: Persisting Problems for the Psychology of Women’ (2004) 14(3) 
Feminism and Psychology 431, 434. For a discussion of biological determinism and the oppositional 
construction of male/female dichotomy: see Chapter 2. 
87 The ‘lived reality’ of the devaluation of women’s work is discussed in full within Chapters 5-7.  
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Despite the modern liberal feminist critique of difference, its foundations can be found 
in one of the most famous historical proponents of women’s rights, Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Her approach to equality can be encapsulated in the statement below: 
“Let woman share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man… speaking 
of women at large, their first duty is to themselves as rational creatures, and next, 
in point of importance, as citizens, is that which includes so many, of a 
mother”.88 
Here Wollstonecraft recognises the compatibility between equality and difference. The 
difficulties, at least in terms of the antithetic interpretations of these terms within 
Western Society generally is described by Pateman as the “Wollstonecraft dilemma”.89 
This phrase expresses the difficulties which have arisen due to the polarised conception 
of equality/difference, presenting difference is the antithesis of equality. As such, to 
demand that women are equal to, but different from, men seems a logical fallacy. 
However, this encapsulates my central argument, that the recognition of difference is 
precisely what is needed in order to facilitate gender equality in practice. What is needed 
is not an argument as to the philosophical or ideological construction(s) of equality, but 
rather the implications of its application in practice.  
 
Although accepting and utilising difference is far from uncontroversial, an adoption of 
substantive equality is the lesser of two evils. The formulation of substantive equality 
discussed here “rests on a social conception of individuality, which includes both 
women and men as biologically differentiated but not unequal creatures”. 90  The 
                                                          
88 Wollstonecraft M., Vindication of the Rights of Woman (New York: Norton, 1975), 145.  
89  Pateman C., ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's 
Citizenship’ in Bock G., & James S., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and 
Female Subjectivity, (London: Routledge, 1992), 20. 
90Pateman C., Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in Phillips A., Feminism and Equality 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 122. 
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problem lies not in difference itself, either in terms of sex or gender; but rather, it arises 
as a result of the implications of difference as constructed and replicated by societal 
structures. Societal structures which reinforce the perception that women, and the roles 
designated as feminine are lesser. To deny difference would merely allow for those 
inequalities, which are reinforced by the patriarchal application of formal equality to 
persist given that a “formal conception of equality... even if embedded in a substantive 
right... does not address the underlying... hierarchy which gives rise to inequalities in 
the first place”.91  
 
The driving force behind equality should not be mere principle, but on the implications 
of equality in practice. Within Fredman’s conception of substantive equality she 
focusses on four dimensions which equality should seek to achieve, it should be: 
redistributive, ensure recognition, be transformative and participative. 92  This 
recognition should not only be related to the difference of individuals, but the role of 
social and political institutions in shaping the consequence of this difference in order 
for systemic inequalities to be addressed through redistribution, leading to the 
transformation sought.  
 
Difference as the Antithesis of Equality? 
For those seeking equality, acknowledging difference has proved problematic from 
three distinct, but interrelated reasons. First, difference has a marked history through its 
associations with biological determinism and essentialism, which is also particularly 
                                                          
91 Albertyn. C. (et al)., ‘Introduction: Elusive Equalities - Sex, Gender and Women’ (2014) International 
Journal of the Law in Context 421, 422.  
92 Fredman S., ‘The Potential Limits of an Equal Rights Paradigm in Addressing Poverty’ (2011) 22 
Stellenbosch Law Review 566, 577. 
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relevant in relation to motherhood as discussed in detail below.93 Secondly, difference 
has historically had negative connotations and consequences for those labelled as other. 
Finally, and most crucially, difference has been constructed as the antithesis of equality, 
forming an additional dichotomy to those discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Difference has been used to legitimate discrimination against women rendering it “the 
handmaiden of male domination”.94 It has excluded women from full citizenship by 
constructing sexual difference as political difference.95 Groups who have been labelled 
as different or other are tainted with “deviance, stigma, and inequality”.96 As such, the 
manipulation of difference, and its affiliation with biological determinism, has 
reinforced the binary construction of gender which sits in opposition with a number of 
feminist perspectives.97 This resulting in the inescapable inequality tied to the natural 
difference between men and women which presents the latter as lesser. As such from an 
equality perspective, difference has been a tool of the patriarchy. Such a history presents 
a challenge when attempting to demonstrate the utility of difference as a method of 
improving the position of women.  
 
Despite this, difference has also proved invaluable for feminists, as Scott states 
“Feminists cannot give up ‘difference’; it has been our most creative analytic tool”.98 It 
has allowed for those socially constructed differences between men and women to be 
challenged, for the gender-neutrality of individualism, society and the state to be 
                                                          
93 In particular [2.3], [2.4]. 
94 Fraser N., Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Poststructuralist’ Condition (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 100.  
95 Pateman The Sexual Contract (n51), 6. See also the discussion of citizenship above.  
96 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference’ (n79), 273. For examples of this in practice: see the treatment 
of ‘deviant’ women in Chapters 5-7. 
97 Segal L., Is the Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism (London: Virago, 
1987), xii. 
98 Scott, (n71), 44. 
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discredited, for ‘women’s issues’ to be heard. The reformulation of difference been 
central to the feminist movement(s) for a considerable time.99 Under such a formulation 
“difference now comes to mean not otherness, exclusive oppression, but specificity, 
variation, heterogeneity”,100  it accepts and celebrates the diversity of women, and seeks 
to secure equality through the recognition of difference rather than sameness.  
 
The equality/difference debate has resulted from an oversimplification of terms which 
has constructed a “false but extremely persistent dichotomy”.101  The way in which 
difference has been constructed as the (lesser) opposite to equality arising from the 
liberal construction of equality as sameness, reliant on universal individualism which 
defines identity as sameness. In reality “the opposite of equality is inequality… the 
antithesis of difference in most usages is sameness or identity”.102  
 
Presenting equality and difference as dichotomous is considerably more dangerous than 
it may appear at first instance, it requires that a choice is to be made between the two. 
This precludes a conception of equality in practice which relies on the recognition of 
difference, in favour of a theoretical equality which simultaneously reproduces and fails 
to recognise difference. The normification of masculinity within society means that 
women “must either base their claims on assertions of sameness with men or assert their 
differences by abandoning claims to rights”103 neither of which produces a satisfactory 
                                                          
99 As touched upon above in relation to the Wollstonecraft Dilemma and identifiable in Chapters 5-7. 
100 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (n45), 171. 
101 Kimball M. M., Feminist Visions of Gender Similarities and Differences (London: Haworth Press, 
1995), 175. 
102 Scott, (n71), 44. 
103  Hirschmann N. J., ‘Difference as an Occasion for Rights: A Feminist Rethinking of Rights, 
Liberalism, and Difference’ in Hekman S (ed)., Feminism, Identity and Difference (Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 30. The normification of masculinity having stemmed from the gendered liberal public/private 
dichotomy as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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outcome. “The ‘choice’ between equality and difference is a false choice”104 which 
reflects the fictious dichotomies on which it has been constructed.  
 
The equality/difference dichotomy has in the same way as public/private, nature/culture 
and male/female have within liberal theory, been presented as both oppositional and 
hierarchical. “Western culture has proven to be incapable of thinking not-the-same 
without assigning one of the terms a positive value and the other, a negative”. 105  
Private, nature, female and difference all fall to the bottom of these dichotomised 
hierarchies. As Gedalof notes, 
“the privileging of sameness over difference results, not in the production of 
universal values, but rather in the effective universalizing of the particular 
interests and perspectives of dominant groups”.106 
As a result, difference has been used to distinguish between those who are deserving of 
equality by virtue of their sameness, and a result it must be denied or distinguished from 
its negative foundations so that equality and difference can co-exist. 
 
Striking a balance between equality and difference recognises that “while ‘assumed 
differences’ should be carefully scrutinized to expose any underlying prejudices, ‘real 
differences’ must be accommodated”. 107  Ignoring difference, for the sake of 
maintaining a flawed notion of equality based on an impossible utopian reading of 
society, perpetuates the subordination of the feminine and maintains the power of the 
                                                          
104  Longo P., ‘Revisiting the Equality/Difference Debate: Redefining Citizenship for the New 
Millennium’ (2001) 5(3) Citizenship Studies 269, 270. 
105 Eisenstein H., & Jardine A., The Future of Difference (New Jersey: Rutgers, 1985), xxv. 
106 Gedalof I., ‘Sameness and Difference in Government Equality Talk’ (2013) 36(1) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 117, 120. 
107 Minow M., ‘Making all the Difference: Three Lessons in Equality, Neutrality, and Tolerance’ (1989) 
39(1) DePaul Law Review 1, 4.  
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masculine. Recognising difference in this way allows for equality and difference to be 
reconciled in a way which reflects the social reality to which it is applied. 
 
The binary construction of equality and difference acts as a barrier to the attainment of 
equality in practice for those who have traditionally been denied full citizenship due to 
their real or perceived difference. Given that “women cannot be identical to men in all 
respects, we cannot expect to be equal to them. The only alternative… is to refuse to 
oppose equality to difference”, the dichotomy needs to be deconstructed. 108  True 
equality, requires the recognition of both differences and similarities depending on 
differing relationships and circumstances. Such an approach more adequately reflects 
individuals interactions with society. As a result, what is required is a denial of the 
opposition drawn between equality and difference, instead embracing a form of 
“equality in difference”.109 
 
3.3.4 Difference: Pregnancy and Motherhood 
Motherhood and maternity provide an ideal standpoint from which to examine equality 
in practice given that “only women have the capacity to become pregnant, give birth 
and suckle their infants is the mark of ‘difference’ par excellence”. 110  This is a 
difference which is acknowledged within both schools of equality, and as such the 
different impact of the application of each can be examined. Given that the UK approach 
to maternity is substantive, in that it provides women with maternity leave and pay as a 
‘special’ right, the formal approach adopted within the US will be used as a point of 
comparison.  
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In order for a discussion of motherhood to avoid the issues of biological determinism 
and essentialism, while acknowledging “the uniquely female experiences of pregnancy 
and motherhood”111  mothering needs to become distinguished from pregnancy. Rich 
for example, denotes “two meanings of motherhood... the potential relationship of any 
woman to her powers of reproduction and to children; and the institution, which aims 
at ensuring that that potential and all women shall remain under male control”.112 It is 
motherhood the institution, as a social construct, rather than the biological capacity for 
women to bear children which has contributed most considerably to their oppression.  
 
The construction of women as mother has contributed significantly to the positioning 
of women as lesser. The gendered role of mother has been portrayed as the natural 
consequence of her ability to become pregnant and nurse a child. This has in turn been 
used to justify the oppression of women. As Williams points out,  
“Pregnancy’s centrality to human reproduction, and hence to women's 
traditional role, has made it the basis for rules which express and reinforce old 
ideologies about women's proper place. The tangible, physical nature and high 
visibility of pregnancy have made such rules seem natural and appropriate”.113 
Much like other gendered traits and behaviours, women’s mothering is considered to 
have arisen from their difference, in this case the capacity to carry and nurse a child. 
“Social representations of motherhood have been traditionally used as a source of, as 
                                                          
111 Bowman C. G., ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession’ (1998) 67(2) 
Fordham Law Review 249, 252 
112 Rich A., Of Woman Born: Motherhood as experience and institution (New York: Norton, 1976), xv. 
See also Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination’ (n89), 20-21 relating to the political nature of 
women’s pregnancy.  
113 Williams W. W., ‘Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate’ 
(1984-1985) 13 Review of Law & Social Change 325, 358. See also Parshley H. M., (ed & trans) 
DeBeauvoir S., The Second Sex (London: Vintage, 1971), 64 who describes women’s biological capacity 
to bear children as the “key to the whole mystery” of women’s inequality. 
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well as an excuse, for the gendered division of labour”. 114  The construction of 
motherhood as the natural consequence of pregnancy, rather than acknowledging the 
societal construction of the role works to legitimise the subordination of women. 
 
A formal approach to maternity 
The adoption of a formal approach maternity raises a number of issues as a result of the 
liberal philosophy which underlies it. Individualism proves particularly problematic as 
it is “based on a counterfactual assumption… that it is possible to ignore an individual’s 
sex”. 115  The purported gender-neutrality of the public sphere and the refusal to 
acknowledge difference, either biological or socially constructed, between men and 
women becomes difficult to justify in the context of pregnancy. The historical 
placement of women, and therefore birth and childrearing in the private sphere allowed 
for the acknowledgement of women’s difference without offending the universal 
individualism within the public realm. However, as women’s position in the public 
sphere was formally secured, and the trend of women leaving the workplace as they 
married declined, pregnancy became a public issue.116  
 
The formal approach adopted by the law “‘runs out’ when it encounters ‘real’ 
difference, and only becomes available if and when the difference is analogized to some 
experience men can have too”.117 Given that pregnancy and breastfeeding are exclusive 
                                                          
114 Birke, L. Women, Feminism and Biology: The Feminist Challenge (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1986), 
49-50. The impact that this has had upon women’s position is examined in Chapters 5-7. Within the 
context of cohabitation cases, the positioning of women in the home and the gendered construction of 
motherhood is one of the contributing factors to women’s inability to contribute equally or in some cases 
at all to the acquisition of property as required under the current legal regime: see Chapter 4 in relation 
to the relevant the legal principles. 
115 Becker, (n16), 209. 
116 The development of women’s position in the public sphere with reference to maternity/motherhood is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 5-7.  
117 Littleton C. A., ‘Reconstructing Sexual Equality’ (1987) 75(4) California Law Review 1279, 1306. 
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to those who are biologically female, the inability to identify a similarly situated male 
comparator is problematic. To resolve this a number of states in the US have classified 
pregnancy as a ‘temporary disability’, giving a pregnant woman the same rights as a 
‘temporarily disabled’ man.118 Despite giving pregnant women some rights, such an 
approach does not adequately deal with the consequences of pregnancy.  
 
The reluctance to treat pregnancy as a unique female experience and acknowledge not 
only the physicality of the act but also the gendered construction of motherhood 
maintains the problematic position of pregnancy within the masculinized institutions 
which constitute the public sphere. The central issue which arises when taking a formal 
approach to maternity and pregnancy is that “man is never viewed as ‘not pregnant’, so 
pregnancy must be constructed as women’s ‘difference’ and not man’s lacking… in this 
usage, being ‘different’ is the same as being unequal”.119 Again positioning women as 
naturally unequal, and maintaining the masculine construction of neutrality. 
 
The prevalence of masculine norms in the public sphere continues to contribute to the 
inability of a formal approach to adapt to the diversity of workers which the 
employment sphere now contains. Legislative regimes which refuse to recognise the 
specificity of pregnancy, through the provision of maternity pay/leave, the central issue 
continues to be the masculine construction of the ideal worker. An individual “who 
works full force and full time, uninterrupted for thirty years straight-that is, someone 
                                                          
118 Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978 this is the way in which a significantly limited ‘maternity leave’ 
is invoked in the US. See also Fredman S., Women and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 179-
224.  
119 Eisenstein Z. R., The Female Body and the Law (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), 79. 
In such a case, the application of formal equality results in the same neutral rule being applied, with 
unequal outcomes to the detriment of those who are deemed different: see Bartlett K. T. & Rhode D. L., 
Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary (4th ed) (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), 151. 
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supported by a flow of family work from a spouse, which most women never 
receive”.120 It continues to reflect the traditional separate spheres ideology, and the 
gendered assumptions which underlie it. 
 
The substantive approach to Maternity 
In order to alleviate the inequalities which result from maternity/motherhood to be 
addressed, the biological/socially constructed differences between men and women 
need to be acknowledged. Within the UK, the legislation concerning maternity pay and 
leave provides women with rights which acknowledge the specificity of the 
experience.121 One for which there is no suitable comparison. The adoption of such an 
approach recognises that “uniqueness is a ‘trap’ only in terms of an analysis… which 
assumes that maleness is the norm”,122 in removing gender-neutrality from pregnancy, 
women have secured substantial rights in comparison to those derived from the formal 
approach in the US.123 
 
Despite the benefits derived from the adoption of a substantive approach, pregnancy in 
the public sphere, continues to impact the position of women.124 The current provisions, 
despite being a marked improvement from those under a formal approach, do not go so 
far as to alleviate the gap in earnings or distinguish pregnancy from mothering.125 From 
                                                          
120 Williams J. C., ‘Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and Work 
Thirty Years After the PDA’ (2009) 21(79) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 79, 79. 
121 For an overview of how Maternity legislation has developed in the UK, and the current scheme: see 
[5.3], [6.4], [7.2]. 
122 Scales A., ‘Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1981) 56 Industrial Law Journal 375, 435.  
123 The Maternity legislation, and its development is discussed in full within Chapters 5-7. 
124 See [7.2] for up to date statistics and discussion in relation to the position of pregnant women in the 
employment sphere. 
125 The central example within this thesis is related to lower earning capacity influencing both power 
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the discussion related to the US, it is clear that there is a need to recognise the distinct 
nature of pregnancy as a biological difference. However, this alone is insufficient to 
alleviate the inequalities which result from pregnancy. What needs to be recognised are 
the gendered societal implications of motherhood which are considerably more 
constraining than the act of childbearing. Under the substantive approach in the UK, it 
is the feminisation of child care which then restricts a woman's ability to return to work, 
notwithstanding those issues which surround the act itself.  
 
Whether under a formal or substantive approach, maternity legislation risks “promoting 
the same values upon which it is based”.126 Having derived from liberal theory, those 
values have positioned women, childbearing and rearing in the private sphere. As 
mothering and maternity have become more visible in the public sphere, it has become 
increasingly necessary to adopt a form of equality which is adequately suited to 
addressing not only those issues which arise in the public sphere, but being able to 
recognise and address those located in the private. As such, in order to alleviate the 
inequality which women as mothers (or as assumed mothers to be) face in the public 
sphere, those issues which arise in the private sphere also require redress. 
 
The contention that if men were to participate more fully within the private sphere in 
terms of unpaid work, specifically, childcare, “does not... deny the natural biological 
fact that women, not men, bear children; it does deny the patriarchal assertion that this 
natural fact entails that only women can rear children”.127 However, it does recognise 
that until the introduction of shared parental leave, and paternity leave, the designation 
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of maternity leave as an exclusively female benefit assisted in the replication of the 
societal role of motherhood rather than contributing to its deconstruction or placing 
women on the same footing as men.128 The lack of ‘take up’ of such schemes now that 
they are in place reflects the way in which gender roles have been entrenched into 
society, so that even when action is taken to attempt to deconstruct them, the societal 
shift will not be instantaneous.  
 
The way in which mothering has been constructed as distinct from ‘parenting’ has 
impacted on the approach taken towards maternity provisions. It needs to be 
acknowledged that, “there are moments when it makes sense for mothers to demand 
consideration for their social role, and contexts within which motherhood is irrelevant 
to women’s behaviour”.129 Pregnancy needs to be considered as an exclusively female 
act or risk a formal approach which has persistently proved itself inadequate at best, and 
detrimental at its worst.130 However, motherhood as an institution needs to be addressed 
in a way which both supports those who choose that role, but also avoids replicating the 
feminisation of child rearing. “The priorities of patriarchy are to keep the choices 
limited for women so that their role as mothers remains primary”,131 meaning that 
adequately addressing the gendered construction of motherhood in a system which has 
strived to maintain it presents significant difficulties. 
 
3.4 Women in the Public Sphere 
Despite the modernisation of the approach taken to equality, there are two underlying 
assertions, that ought to be made explicit, which are testament to the persistence of the 
                                                          
128 This is discussed in detail within Chapters 5-7. 
129 Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference’ (n71), 47. 
130 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference’ (n79), 269. 
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treatment of women as lesser than men. First, the historical treatment of women, in 
terms of legal and political rights, and within the home, are still maintained in many 
areas through the reluctance to recognise difference, either biological or socially 
constructed as relevant. Second, those areas in which progress can be identified, for 
example, within employment law, have not gone far enough in addressing the factors 
which contribute to inequality in the public sphere which are deemed to be private.  
 
Liberal individualism remains bound to formal equality which requires that like is 
treated alike. What is problematic here, is that this is usually applied to the public sphere. 
Due to the traditional dominance of men in this sphere, equality becomes a concept 
tainted by androcentrism, which works to maintain patriarchal power relations.  Much 
like the formal equality, the principle is admirable, but the reality within which the 
principle becomes practice undermines its purpose. Overall, it is clear that “the 
ostensible individualism and egalitarianism of liberal theory obscure the patriarchal 
reality of a social structure of inequality and the domination of women by men”132  both 
in the historical exclusion of women from the status of individual, and from the 
opposition to difference which it has supported, and from the multifarious issues which 
spill from the dichotomous, gendered, hierarchical construction of the social spheres.  
 
The combination of neutral individualism and the series of dichotomies within which 
society is constructed “pretends we can be equal in the public sphere when our 
differences are overwhelming in the private… it offers equality with one hand and takes 
it away with the other”.133 Despite the general acceptance that women are now to be 
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considered individuals rather than the property of their fathers, husbands and sons, the 
social implications and norms which derive from this tradition remains. As Bacchi states,  
“we need to expose the lie behind the public/private conceptualisation so that 
both men and women can achieve a better balance in their lives between the 
demands and rewards of paid labour, and the demands and rewards of home-
life”.134  
The divide between public/private needs to be degendered and delegitimised so that it 
is no longer seen as either natural or necessary. This would allow for individuals to be 
free from the constraints placed on them by virtue of both their ‘assignment’ into either 
sphere and the expectations which are associated with them due to their gender.  
 
The ‘choice’ between one sphere of life or another, between work or mothering need 
not be gendered, hierarchical, nor does it need to be determinative of their access to 
equality.135 Rather than viewing women as abstracted individuals, what ought to be 
pursued is a formulation of equality which allows for the recognition of women as a 
group for the goal of “equality of effect” rather than “equal treatment”.136 However, 
even now the threat of a demand by women for individual rights is that “it offers a threat 
to the fabric of interdependence on which men’s rights depend”.137  
 
3.5 Beyond Equality and Difference, A Third Way? 
There have been suggestions that calls for equality should be abandoned. Flax for 
example, proposes that due to the dichotomy drawn between equality and difference, 
                                                          
134 Bacchi, ‘Same Difference’ (n61), 126. 
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equality cannot be distanced from the masculine universal individual to recognise 
women’s difference. She proposes that “because justice at least leaves space for a 
consideration of differences, it seems to me to be a more potentially useful concept than 
equality”.138 However, the difference approach embodied within substantive equality 
makes much the same claim. What is needed is not a rejection of equality or difference, 
but a middle way between the two.139 This section provides an overview of two distinct 
approaches/methods of conceiving a form of equality which is compatible with 
difference. 
 
3.5.1 The Inequality Approach 
One distinct formulation of a middle way between equality and difference is the “the 
differences approach” or the inequality approach, put forward by MacKinnon. This 
approach was established in part as a critique of formal equality.  The central proposition 
is that there are circumstances in which the law should have the capacity to depart from 
a formal regime where there is a difference between the sexes which justifies their 
different treatment.140 The differences approach works on the premise that there is a 
theory of “special rights”141 for the judiciary to use, where a woman exhibits a real 
difference, which would otherwise have negative implications. Those differences can 
be as a result of biology (solely in relation to childbirth), or socially constructed, where 
such differences negatively impact the position of an individual.  
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The inequality approach is subject to the central critiques raised in relation to 
substantive equality. Namely, that recognising difference risks at best patronising 
women, and at worst it could be seen to replicate the oppression of women.142 However, 
MacKinnon addresses this concern through the inclusion of the precursor that, for 
separate standards for men/women to be used, they must not “integrally contribute… to 
the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender status”.143 It 
is here proposed that in order to avoid reinforcing gender stereotypes through 
acknowledging difference, is that the distinct treatment is not premised on an 
individual’s sex or gender.144 To put this into context, a man who takes on the role as 
primary caregiver after the birth of their child would have the same rights as a woman 
in the same position.145 Distancing the act of childcare away from the gender/sex of the 
individual who performs the act, it is the act which affords an individual different 
treatment.  
 
When considering the merit of such a proposal it is necessary to emphasise the need for 
flexibility in judicial interpretation.146 For example, the production of a definitive list 
of ‘differences’ would be to secure the ‘difference’ of an individual within one 
social/political/historical framework. This would not recognise the changing nature of 
identity and how such identity is perceived within society.147 “Equality is a process 
                                                          
142 As discussed in detail above in [3.2.2].  
143 MacKinnon, ‘Sexual Harassment’ (n140), 117. 
144 That is with the sole exception of the act of childbirth. 
145  Notwithstanding the necessary medical leave afforded to women recovering from the act of 
childbearing. We see some of this with the provisions in relation to paternity leave, discussed Chapters 
5-7.  
146 The merits of judicial flexibility in the context of cohabitation (though not without some controversy) 
are examined in Chapters 5-7.  
147 This shift is examined in Chapters 5-7.  
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which requires the continual re-examination of the treatment we accord to people”.148 
As such it would be necessary to allow for considerable flexibility and reflexivity with 
the application of such an approach in practice.  
 
MacKinnon’s approach, can to some extent be identified in the approach adopted by 
Lord Denning, as examined in Chapters 5-7.  Despite often falling into the ‘stereotype’ 
trap, the merits of such an approach in practice can also be identified.149 The flexibility 
that this approach would afford the judiciary, if properly enacted, would allow for 
individuals to be treated equally, depending on their circumstances – whether these arise 
biologically from their sex, or from their gender role. Thus utilising difference in order 
to facilitate equality.  
 
3.5.2 Deconstructing Dichotomies  
The central issue with regard to analysing equality is the way in which it has been 
categorised as the superior element of the equality/difference dichotomy. The 
oppositional construction of equality/difference prevents the realisation of an approach 
to gender equality which acknowledges the ways in which law, politics and society 
impact the position of women in relation to men.150 This is further complicated when 
viewed in relation to the additional dichotomies which have also been engrained within 
                                                          
148 Minow ‘Making all the Difference’ (n107), 5-6. 
149 The Denning approach to equality can be considered substantive, or an equality in difference approach 
– this can be seen in practice within his judgments in [5.7], where the formal/substantive approach of the 
courts in cohabitation cases is also examined.  
150 In relation to the fictitious ‘choice’ between equality or difference: see [3.3.3] above. Note that this 
has become a major theme in feminist writing: see Barrett M., & Phillips A., (eds) Destabilizing Theory: 
Contemporary Feminist Debates (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 8. See also [1.2] for an overview of 
Butlers work which is generally used concerning the socially constructed nature of gender, the instability 
of identity, and performativity, but which can also be considered as giving weight to the notion that 
binaries in language and materiality both need to be the subject of deconstruction: Butler J., Bodies that 
Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 91.  
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society.151 The interaction between these dichotomies has had a considerable role in 
simultaneously disguising and replicating gender inequality. The 
deconstruction/transcendence of these dichotomies has been put forward as a solution 
to the persistence of gender inequality which results from the continuation of binary 
social categorisations.152 
 
It is essential at this stage to note that deconstruction does not entail the destruction of 
both elements of a dichotomy. Nor does it involve reworking the binary so that one 
element prevails at the expense of the other. Rather, it a process which 
“challenges dichotomous, oppositional thinking, thus exposing the practices and 
structures that establish, legislate, and maintain oppressive systems of 
hierarchy… dismantling binary thought, destabilizing traditional meaning 
structures”.153  
Much of the previous chapter focussed on the contradictions that arise when considering 
the construction of male/female and public/private as oppositional and hierarchical.154 
Revealing the ways in which these dualisms are not naturally hierarchical, but are 
presented as such in order to obscure the socially constructed oppression of women.155 
A result of which has been than women’s difference, in contrast to men’s sameness, has 
justified their unequal status. This can be attributed to the way in which “the primary or 
                                                          
151 This refers to those dichotomies discussed in the Chapter 2. 
152 See for example Klare K., ‘The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law’ (1982) 130(6) University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1358, 1578. Similar arguments have also been put forward regarding the 
Gender/Sex Dichotomy as seen in [2.4]. 
153 Mumby D. K., & Putnam L. L., ‘The Politics of Emotion: A Feminist Reading of Bounded Rationality’ 
(1992) 17(3) The Academy of Management Review 465, 468. 
154 See Chapter 2. 
155 This can in itself be described as deconstruction. Also note Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality’ (n71), 38 
who describes the way in which deconstructing dichotomies reveals that they are “not natural but 
constructed oppositions, constructed for particular purposes in particular contexts” 
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dominant term derives its privilege from a curtailment or suppression of its opposite”,156 
men and masculinity is persistently placed in the dominant side of the binary. This 
inequality has been vested in women through biological deterministic thinking and 
socially constructed gendered dichotomies, rather than, as is revealed through 
deconstructive examination, resulting from a form of innate, natural difference.157  
 
The poststructuralist adoption of deconstruction works as a “destabilizing strategy” 
through which the fictitious nature of dichotomies can be exposed and reformulated.158 
The legitimacy of hierarchical binaries can be undermined through the deconstructive 
process by demonstrating their “arbitrary, social, and political character”. 159  The 
interrelated nature of the liberal dichotomies which collectively contribute to gender 
inequality, necessitates the deconstruction of each of these categories, so that equality 
in practice can be achieved.160 The following section provides an overview of this 
deconstructive process as it relates to gender/sex and public/private, and 
equality/difference. This draws together the dichotomies which have been discussed 
within the previous chapter in order to demonstrate the way in which they collectively 
contribute to the continuation of gender inequality.  
 
                                                          
156 Gross E., Derrida, Irigaray, and Deconstruction: Left- wright, Intervention (Sydney: Australia, 1986), 
73, discussing Derrida J., Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
157 See [2.3], [2.4] regarding biological determinism, liberal dichotomies and social construction. 
158 Fletcher J. K., Disappearing Acts: Gender, Power and Relational Practice at Work (London: MIT 
Press, 2001), 23. Note that this reformulation does not entail a reversal of the elements which make up a 
dichotomy, for example displacing male dominance for female. 
159 Nicholson L. & Seidman S., (eds) Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 125. See also Rose N., ‘Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, 
Power and the Family’ (1987) 14(1) Critical Legal Studies 61, 66 who describes the way in which the 
falsity of such dichotomies can be demonstrated by the function in which it serves in society, in other 
words, their masculine bias. 
160 The hierarchical binaries discussed here relate to those dichotomies discussed in Chapter 2 and the 
equality/difference dichotomy discussed in [3.3]. 
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The deconstruction of gender resolves a number of issues which have arisen as a result 
of both the sex/gender and male/female dichotomy. From a deconstructive perspective 
there is seen to be no “coherent, self-evident or natural”161 subject. However, this does 
not preclude us from speaking of ‘women’.162 Instead it acknowledges that despite 
speaking of ‘women’, this forms a contested category. From this perspective, women 
are those in the lesser position in a dominant binary category which is used and 
recognised within society, which has no natural source. Their similarity is not based on 
biological difference or gender stereotypes, but rather by the way in which they are 
treated by society, as lesser. 163  Thus providing a balance between the need to 
acknowledge women as a group, without leading to essentialist thinking drawn from 
biological determinism.164 This allows for “the biological particularity of the female 
body [to be recognised] without endorsing the historical contingencies of its engendered 
form”, 165   allowing for the inequalities which arise as a result of pregnancy and 
maternity.  
 
Deconstruction has further implications regarding intersectionality. “Deconstructive 
strategies could enable us to chart more accurately the multiple determinants that figure 
in any individual's social position and (relative) power and oppress”.166 This allows for 
the recognition of not only the differences between men and women but for the 
                                                          
161 Elam D., Feminism and Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 1994), 32.  
162 See for example Cornell D., The Philosophy of the Limit (London: Routledge, 1992) on the importance 
of deconstructing the masculine subject; Butler J., Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) on the difficulties of ‘defining’ women; Young, ‘Polity and Group 
Difference’ (n79) concerning the notion of relational identity as discussed at [3.3.2]  above. Similar issues 
are also discussed in Chapter 1. 
163 That is not to say that there will not be some cross-over between gender stereotypes, biological 
difference and the way in which society treats women – but it does not require reinforcing such 
differences as the source of the lesser treatment of women.  
164 Williams J. C., ‘Deconstructing Gender’ (1989) 87(4) Michigan Law Review 797, 840. As Williams 
states “the deconstruction of gender allows us to protect them by reference to their social roles instead of 
their genitals”. 
165 Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law (n119), 4. 
166 Poovey M., ‘Feminism and Deconstruction’ (1988) 14(1) Feminist Studies 51, 58. 
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diversity/differences between women to be acknowledged. Therefore, other factors 
which have traditionally positioned an individual as ‘lesser’ for example wealth, race, 
sexuality to be recognised and considered in any attempt to alleviate inequality in 
practice.  
 
When considering deconstruction within the context of the public/private dichotomy, 
the central aim is to dissolve the division which has been drawn between the two 
spheres. The distinctions traditionally drawn between them “denies the symbiotic 
dependency between the two… the traditional location of women within the later 
[meaning the private sphere which] renders them largely invisible in public life”.167 
This has positioned women and ‘women’s issues’ in the private, contributing to the 
perception and treatment of women as lesser. It has neglected the complex web of 
interactions which occur between actors in each sphere, presenting two independent 
gendered spheres. In recognising that those acts performed in one sphere will inevitably 
affect the other, this would break down some of the barriers faced in relation to women's 
issues.168 In addition, undermining the division between the public/private dichotomy 
would further undermine the gendered construction of each sphere, which has 
persistently reinforced women’s inequality.  
  
Questioning the boundaries of public/private and their oppositional and hierarchical 
construction erodes the barrier which has been forged between them. The dissolution of 
this division allows for it to be viewed as “a continuum rather than a rigid 
                                                          
167  Chinkin C., ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’ (1999) 10(2) European Journal of 
International Law 387, 389.  
168 See for example the concerns expressed in Milkman R., ‘Women's History and the Sears Case’ (1986) 
12(2) Feminist Studies 375, 394-5 “We ignore the political dimensions of the equality-versus-difference 
debate at our peril, especially in a period of conservative resurgence like the present”.  
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dichotomy”.169 The liberal dichotomies which underpin the social, political and legal 
structures of modern society which continue to replicate inequality begin to be 
undermined. Embracing deconstruction “as a means of exposing the structurally 
embedded power relations that inhere in the deepest tissue of our daily lives, 
deconstruction is also a method of reinventing the world”.170 Thus, the very foundations 
of the numerous dichotomies which have positioned women as lesser are called into 
question. Such an approach seeks not only the resolution of those issues which arise due 
to inequality, but allows for the causal factors of systemic, social and institutionalised 
inequality to be identified and addressed.  
 
The masculinity of the public realm, and the position of men as superior has been 
maintained through the male/female, public/private dichotomies. The construction of 
equality/difference, reflecting the aforementioned gendered dichotomies has reinforced 
the legitimacy of the male norm. This has meant that even where seemingly neutral 
principles are put forward, they frequently reflect the androcentric structures from 
which they are formed. 171  As a result, the sameness embodied by the ‘equality’ 
approach seeking to treat individuals in the same way, adopting neutrality ignores the 
bias which has been engrained into society. In deconstructing the principle and practice 
of equality, it becomes clear that it is insufficient to achieve real gender equality. From 
this perspective, the focus of equality ought to be “the elimination of individual 
                                                          
169 Walby S., ‘From Public to Private Patriarchy: The Periodisation of British History’ (1990) 13(1) 
Women’s Studies International Forum 91, 94. 
170 Clark M. J., ‘Deconstruction, Feminism, and Law: Cornell and MacKinnon on Female Subjectivity 
and Resistance’ (2005) 12(107) Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 107, 108. 
171 This faux neutrality is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. It has also been examined in a legal context in 
which “deconstructing the language of the law reveals that the primary subject of the law is male”: Barnett 
H., Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (London: Cavendish, 1998), 70. 
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disadvantage that results from distinctions made on the basis of sex, gender and/or 
sexual differences; it does not involve ignoring or eliminating differences”.172  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the way in which equality has developed based on liberal 
principles and dichotomies. As a result of the societal divisions explored in the previous 
chapter, as reflected in the division constructed between equality/difference, women 
have been categorised as both different from, and lesser to, men. Despite the gendered 
structure of society, formal equality is premised on the concept of a universal 
individualism, which seeks to treat all people as the same without regard for the 
differences in their identity and circumstances. Within this context, a formal approach 
fails to give rise to equality in practice, which makes it an ineffective tool for women.  
 
A substantive approach allows for the recognition of difference, and avoids the 
numerous criticisms which arise from attempting to construct an equality of sameness 
which is compatible with both liberal theory and social reality. However, it brings with 
it a history marked with biological determinism and essentialism, and when used 
without a recognition of the socially constructed nature of gender and the public/private 
dichotomy, it risks replicating the position that it seeks to eradicate. Despite the fact that 
the substantive approach recognises the way in which society is imbued with 
inequalities as a result of the liberal dichotomisation of the masculine public/feminine 
private, it still must work within this framework.   
 
Having examined the possible implications of both forms of equality, it has become 
                                                          
172 Nash K., ‘Human rights for women: an argument for ‘deconstructive equality’’ (2002) 31(1) Economy 
and Society 414, 422 
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clear that “neither an equality nor a difference approach will ever be a satisfactory one 
given that they both work within parameters of debate constructed according to 
patriarchal norms”.173 Within a society formed around and for masculine dominance, 
the point of comparison will always be based on male norms, meaning that  
“Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all 
things. Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our 
correspondence with man… Gender-neutrality is thus simply the male standard”. 
174 
As Pateman states, the sameness approach works to “obscure the patriarchal reality of 
a social structure of inequality and the domination of women by men”. 175 
Acknowledging difference can and has been beneficial in some circumstances, and is 
certainly preferable to the formal approach, within this construction of society. However, 
recognising difference still risks the classification of other. 
  
It is clear that although women have achieved formal equality in terms of status, in 
practice inequality between genders permeates society, and these social norms are 
perpetuated by the treatment of women before the law. Both perspectives can be 
critiqued, yet it is the substantive approach which holds significantly more promise 
where gender equality is sought given that  
“formal equality cannot be the basis for implementing the kinds of changes that 
must be made if the status of women and men is to be equalized… the limited 
changes effected by formal equality will often hurt many women, especially 
                                                          
173 Squires J., Gender in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 123. 
174  MacKinnon C. A., Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987); MacKinnon C.A., ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’ (1991) 100 Yale 
Law Review 1281, 34. 
175 Pateman, The Disorder of Women (n132), 120. 
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ordinary mothers and wives [sic]”.176  
This is especially so given the traditional positioning of women in the private sphere 
and the way in which formal equality has not permeated its way into societal views or 
institutional constructs. It is not a foundation upon which a rigid formulation of equality 
can achieve its purported ends because it refuses to reflect the reality of an unequal 
society. The final failing, and the most fatal flaw of the formal approach to equality, is 
that it fails to take account of the difference both in terms of social treatment and 
expectations of women. 
 
The nature of equality goes further than an attempt to increase women's rights as a 
feminist principle or even as a signifier of a modern, western democracy, but it runs to 
the core of the foundations of our legal system itself. However, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, the affiliation between liberalism, formal equality and the law ironically 
undermines its own intentions.  The law is presented as if it were there to prevent against 
inequality. Yet, in its formal approach it denies the impact of a dichotomised society. As 
Mitchell states “the law... enshrines the principles of freedom and equality – so long as 
you don't look at the particular unequal conditions of the people who are subjected to 
it”.177  When adopting a substantive approach it only reconciles inequalities on an 
individual basis, and has frequently acted to replicate the stereotypes associated with 
women.  
 
Until the inequality inherent in a society based on liberal ideals is fully understood, the 
law can only make piecemeal contributions, through an adoption of substantive equality, 
toward some manifestation of equality. Although the adoption of a ‘middle way’ 
                                                          
176 Becker, ‘Prince Charming’ (n16), 224. 
177 Mitchell, (n1), 29. 
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between equality and difference, such as that proposed by MacKinnon, would go some 
way in resolving issues on a case by case basis, the systemic sexism remains 
unchallenged if it is purely left to the law to resolve. 178  As such, a process of 
deconstruction which allows for the reformulation of the societal dichotomies discussed 
within the chapter needs to be embarked upon, allowing for difference to be distanced 
from the negative connotations it has historically been imbued with, and for the 
interactions between public and private to be recognised and revaluated. Allowing for 
equality in difference to be adopted not only as a principle, but in practice.  
 
There is no one simplistic approach to equality/difference which will alleviate gender 
inequality, and it would be improper for this thesis to ‘propose’ one.179 The notion that 
there is no rule which would lead to equality does not smack of pessimism but rather it 
is an “acknowledgment that the search for the rule that may do justice to the case – 
justice to the case of women – is necessarily endless”. 180  When considering the 
implication of equality in difference in practice (whether through deconstruction or an 
alternative approach) what ought to be noted is the need for judicial flexibility. After 
examining the current CICT regime in Chapter 4, Chapters 5-7 seek to examine this 
point through an analysis of the case law and surrounding socio-legal context. Taken 
together, this analysis demonstrates that 
“A juridical approach based on substantive equality can be more effective in 
eradicating discrimination than one based on formal equality, because the 
former addresses the inequality implicitly in hierarchical societies with 
historical disadvantages, and seeks to eliminate that inequality”.181 
                                                          
178 The ‘middle way’ proposed by MacKinnon is examined above in [3.5.1].  
179 Indeed, it is not within the scope of this thesis to propose such a solution.  
180 Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction (n161), 108. 
181 Haynes D. F., (ed) Deconstructing the Reconstruction (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 124. 
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Affording the judiciary adequate flexibility alleviates those inequalities which arise 
from a purely formal approach where the circumstances require it. The analysis which 
follows builds on the theoretical analysis of equality contained within this chapter. Thus, 
providing an overview of the ways in which the judiciary has had a role in attempting 




Chapter 4 - Cohabitation: The Common Intention Constructive Trust 
4.1 Introduction  
This Chapter examines the law relating to the breakdown of cohabiting relationships, 
specifically the common intention constructive trust (CICT).1 This provides the legal 
backdrop from which the following chapters are developed. It is within the context of 
the case law surrounding cohabitation that the application of equality or difference 
approaches are identified later in this thesis. In order to analyse the impact of each 
approach, it is necessary to situate the judgments within the proper legal framework and 
have an understanding of the criticisms which have arisen as a result of their use in 
practice.  
 
This chapter will first give an overview of the CICT which is used to determine and 
quantify beneficial interest in the family home on the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships. This provides the relevant legal framework for the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. The issues which have arisen as a result of the application of the CICT, as 
identified in the existing literature, are then examined. This is broadly framed within 
two themes. The first focusses on the way the law fails to adequately address the issues 
faced by former cohabitants due to the conflict between the legal regime applied on 
breakdown, and the nature of cohabiting relationships. The second discusses the way in 
which the focus on direct financial contributions is inherently gendered and therefore 
has had a disproportionately negative impact on women’s attempts to assert interest in 
their homes. 2  This itself arises from the courts’ misconceived attempt to apply 
                                                          
1 Hereafter CICT. 
2 This having been compounded by the gender inequality within society as exemplified in Chapters 5-7 
and considered from a theoretical perspective Chapters 2 and 3.   
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procedurally neutral principles to a situation characterised, not by the equality of former 
cohabitants, but by gender difference and inequality.3 
 
The final section of this chapter examines the theoretical issues which impact the 
application of the law. This focusses specifically on the contrast between procedural 
property and remedial family law approaches and attempts to uncover the development 
and current principles utilised by the courts in this regard. This forms an additional 
critique of the CICT and provides insight into the issues which underlie the application 
of procedurally neutral principles in non-neutral contexts, which is expanded on later in 
this thesis.4 
 
4.2 The Legal Regime 
On the breakdown of a cohabiting relationship, one of the central questions which arises 
is in relation to the parties’ rights in the family home.5 The lack of a legislative regime 
concerning the distribution of property on the breakdown of unmarried cohabiting 
relationships has meant that such couples must rely on the “antiquated and unwieldy 
law of trusts”.6 It is the purpose of the following section of this chapter to provide an 
outline of the current regime before embarking on an overview of the central critiques 
made against it.  
 
                                                          
3 As explored in additional detail in Chapters 5-7. 
4 See Chapters 5-7. 
5 The focus within this thesis being on ownership and the determination of beneficial interest rather than 
for example the right to occupy under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s14 or 
the Family Law Act 1996, Part IV. 
6 HL Deb 12 December 2014, Vol 757, Col 2069. 
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The starting point of the examination of proprietary interest begins with an attempt to 
identify an express trust.7 However, the ‘agreements’ made between cohabiting couples 
with regard to the family home, where they are present at all, are often insufficient to 
satisfy the necessary formality requirements. 8   In the absence of an express trust, 
claimants must rely on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel or an implied trust.9 The 
most frequently invoked of these methods within the context of ‘family property’ is the 
CICT, and as such it forms the basis of this thesis.  
 
The constructive trust “is not capable of precise definition and is continually 
developing”.10 However, the purpose of the CICT is more easily identified. It seeks to 
establish whether there is beneficial joint tenancy, and if so how the beneficial interest 
in the property is to be divided. This is generally categorised as a two-stage process 
involving acquisition and quantification the approach which is taken to these steps is 
distinct depending on whether the case involves sole or joint legal ownership, as will be 
examined below.  
 
Prior to the formulation of the CICT under Lloyds Bank v Rosset for sole-ownership 
cases, and Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott for jointly owned property, two distinct 
                                                          
7 Such a declaration is seen to be decisive Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106. 
8 Law of Property Act 1925, s53(1)(b) an express trust must be signed and in writing. Even the “clearest 
oral agreement” will not suffice: Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 129.  
9 Implied trusts consisting of both the CICT and resulting trust. However, post Stack v Dowden [2007] 
UKHL 17 [31] and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [25] resulting trusts have been deemed inapplicable 
in relation to family property. For the debate on differences between resulting and constructive trusts and 
proprietary estoppel: see Hayton D., ‘Equitable Rights of Cohabitees’ (1990) Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 370; Ferguson P., ‘Constructive Trusts – A Note of Caution’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 
114. 
10 See McGhee P., Snell’s Equity (30th ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999), para 9-38; for an in-depth 
analysis of the way in which the CICT has been used and developed over time: see Chapters 5-7, 
particularly [5.7],[6.8] and [7.4]. 
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approaches to the constructive trust can be identified.11 The classic formulation can be 
identified in Gissing v Gissing and Pettitt v Pettitt, in which common intention as to the 
ownership of the property and detrimental reliance on such an intention would be 
deemed sufficient to grant equitable interest to the non-owning party discoverable 
through the acts or expressions of the parties.12 The second consists of those cases that 
were decided based on considerations of fairness and justice such as Eves v Eves and 
Grant v Edwards, also known as the ‘excuse’ cases.13 Rosset sought to clarify the law 
given the history of conflicting and at times contradictory outcomes which had arisen 
due to the range of approaches adopted by the courts prior, though the extent to which 




In sole-ownership cases the acquisition stage requires that the claimant must first 
“surmount the hurdle of showing that she had any beneficial interest at all, before 
showing exactly what that interest was”.15 In order to ascertain whether there is shared 
beneficial interest in the property, the starting point is legal ownership as “equity 
follows the law”.16 In sole-ownership cases only one party has legal interest in the 
property, the presumption is that the beneficial interest is vested only in that individual. 
                                                          
11 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 hereafter Rosset; Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 hereafter 
Stack; Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 hereafter Jones; For a full analysis of the development of the 
case law in context: see Chapters 5-7, particularly [5.7],[6.8] and [7.4]. 
12 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 hereafter Pettitt; Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 hereafter Gissing. 
Note that these acts were limited to indirect/direct financial contributions, though this was given a wider 
interpretation than Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107. 
13 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 hereafter Eves; Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 hereafter Grant; the 
‘excuse’ cases are discussed in additional detail in [4.3.1]. 
14 See [4.2.1];[4.3]. 
15 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [61] discussing the position of sole owners with reference to Oxley 
v Hiscock [2004] EWCA 546. 




To establish whether the shares in equity ought to reflect the legal ownership the court 
searches for the parties’ common intention as to joint-ownership. 
 
Common Intention  
Acquisition under the Rosset regime encompasses two categories, the first being express 
common intention, and the second being inferred common intention. In claims based on 
express common intention the task of the court is to find “some agreement, arrangement 
or understanding”17 between the parties as to their ownership, which is then sufficient 
grounds to move onto the question of quantification. The second category uses 
‘referable’ conduct from which an implied common intention may be inferred by the 
court, this has proved considerably more problematic to satisfy. Attempting to 
circumscribe the ambit of those contributions which had previously been allowed to 
prevail under the ‘excuse’ cases noted above, Lord Bridge formulated referable conduct 
as: 
“direct contributions to the purchase price… whether initially or by payment of 
mortgage instalments, will readily justify the inference necessary to the creation 
of a constructive trust… it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less 
will do”.18  
This strict financial approach which rendered non-financial and indirect contributions 
null has since been extended to include indirect payments towards the mortgage.19  
 
                                                          
17 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 133; Within Rosset Lord Bridge organises the cases of Eves v 
Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 into this category. Note that the absence 
of ‘common’ intention in these cases has formed the basis for considerable critique: see [4.3.1]. 
18 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 132. 
19 Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 FLR 970, and obiter in Curley v Parkes [2004] EWCA Civ 1515. It must be 
noted that whether the strict financial approach is still binding in cases involving sole-owners having seen 
arguments counter to this in joint-ownership cases Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53; Stack v Dowden 
[2007] UKHL 17; Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53. However, until a sole-ownership case reaches the 




Common intention alone is insufficient to satisfy the court that the non-legal owner has 
a beneficial interest in the home. Claimants must also demonstrate that they “acted to 
his or her detriment” or “significantly altered his position in reliance on the 
agreement”.20 Often, financial contributions perform “a dual role in establishing the 
common intention and providing the detrimental reliance”,21 which frequently means 
that little discussion is had as to detrimental reliance specifically. Where it has been 
discussed detrimental reliance has been both broadly and restrictively interpreted. 
Under the broad approach detrimental reliance consisted of “any act done by [the 
claimant]... to her detriment relating to the joint lives of the parties”.22 Under the more 
restrictive approach in the absence of financial contributions the courts have been 
unwilling to consider other acts as sufficient evidence of detrimental reliance.23  
 
Detrimental reliance, like common intention, is most easily satisfied by financial 
contributions or where there is also the presence of financial contributions. It excludes 
those acts which are considered to be performed out of love and affection, “ordinary 
domestic tasks… [are] the sort of things which are done for the benefit of the family 
without altering the title to the property”.24 Those acts are usually those acts performed 
by women, deemed feminine and therefore ‘worthless’.25 They must be actions which 
                                                          
20 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 132. 
21 Law Commission., Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (Law Com 278, 2002), 2.70. 
22 Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638, 657. This has included home improvements: Eves v Eves [1975] 1 
WLR 1338; contributions towards household expenses: Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638; and the support 
of a partner’s business: Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127. 
23 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317 in which the lack of financial contributions led to the court finding no 
common intention and no detrimental reliance.  
24 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317, 331. See also: James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 and Thomson 
v Humphrey [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch).  
25 This is discussed in detail Chapters 5-7.  
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can be seen as embarked on in reliance of the fact that they have interest in the home.26 
Despite the distain expressed regarding legal owners “taking advantage” of the claimant 
“in a way that is unconscionable, inequitable or unjust”,27 this not led to the extension 
of ‘relevant’ contributions to those with are non-financial. 
 
Quantification  
In sole-ownership cases, quantification will depend on whether the acquisition was 
based on express agreement or inferred common intention. Where there has been some 
express agreement, the quantification will match that agreement, unless this is contested 
by one of the parties. If it has been inferred, which is the more likely situation, then the 
parties conduct relevant factor in the quantification of shares.  
 
In both sole and joint-ownership cases, the CICT affords additional flexibility with 
regard to the quantification of shares, in that the court is not bound by the percentage 
each party has contributed towards the purchase of the property.28  In the context of the 
CICT the court are to  
 “undertake a survey of the whole course of dealing between the parties … That 
scrutiny will not confine itself to the limited range of acts of direct contribution 
of the sort that are needed to found a beneficial interest in the first place”.29  
                                                          
26 Such an approach has been critiqued as gender biased and unreflective of the reality of relationships as 
discussed below [4.3.2]. 
27 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 114. 
28 Contrasting the position under the application of a resulting trust: see for example Re Densham [1975] 
3 All ER 726.  
29 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733 at 745. Also seen later in Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA 
546. which has influenced the perspective adopted with regard to joint-ownership cases in Stack v 
Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53. 
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This approach allows for actions which under the acquisition stage would be deemed 




In joint-ownership cases, where both parties have legal interest, but there is no 
declaration of trust relating to beneficial ownership, the parties’ beneficial interest is 
deemed to also be held jointly. Legal interest in land can only be held as a joint-tenancy, 
as such “conveyance into joint names indicates both legal and beneficial joint-tenancy, 
unless and until the contrary is proved”.31 As the issue of acquisition is easily evidenced, 
the central questions in relation to joint-ownership become whether the parties intended 
their beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests, and if so how the 
interest is to be quantified.32 
 
Rebutting the Presumption & Quantification 
Quantification involves the parties rebutting the presumption that equity follows the 
law, which is a “heavy burden” 33  only to be displaced in “very unusual” 34 
circumstances. The burden can be displaced in two different instances. First, if there is 
evidence as to the fact the parties’ common intention was different at the time the 
property was purchased. Second, if there is evidence as to the fact that it was different 
                                                          
30 However, the hurdle that must be overcome with regard to acquisition is generally only satisfied 
through financial contributions and this is often the most influential element in determining the division 
of shares in sole-ownership cases: see [4.3.2]. 
31  Joint-tenancy refers to joint-ownership of the whole property that without specific shares being 
attributable to either party; Law of Property Act 1925, s1(6); Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [58]. 
32 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [66]. 
33 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [33] affirmed in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [60]. 
34 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [68] affirmed in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [60]. 
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post-acquisition. 35  ‘Evidence’ in such cases refers to “what the parties actually 
intended, to be deduced objectively from their words and their actions”.36 Financial 
contributions are relevant, but not decisive in determining the size of the respective 
shares. Lady Hale in Stack outlined a considerable list of other factors from which the 
common intention of the parties might be inferred which includes but is not limited to  
“the nature of the parties’ relationship; whether they had children …how the 
parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; 
how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household 
expenses”.37 
In arriving at a decision in such cases, “context is everything”38 and each case turns on 
its own facts, allowing for a more flexible approach than that applicable to the sole-
ownership regime. 
 
In those circumstances where the parties ‘actual’ intentions cannot be deduced from 
their words or conduct “each is entitled to the share which the court considers fair 
having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property”.39 
The court bases this on “what their intentions as reasonable and just people would have 
been had they thought about it at the time”.40 Under this formulation of the CICT, the 
court has the capacity to impute rather than infer the common intention of the parties.41 
This is limited to the quantification stage of proceedings, and only in circumstances in 
                                                          
35 This is considered an ambulatory constructive trust introduced in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 
[62]. 
36 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [46]. 
37 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
38 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
39 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA 546 [69] as approved in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [61] and 
Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [32]. 
40 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [47]. 
41 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [126] describes the difference as follows: “imputation involves 




which “it is impossible to divine a common intention as to the proportions in which they 
are to be shared”,42 and is deduced by reference to what is fair having regard to the 
whole course of dealings as discussed above. Despite the flexibility this seems to afford 
the court, it has not gone so far as to allow the court to impose a result purely based on 
considerations of fairness.43 
  
4.2.3 Two regimes? 
As has been outlined above, there has for some significant time been two different 
regimes for cohabiting couples depending on whether the legal interest is held jointly 
or by one party. Due to this distinction, it had been hoped that the Supreme Court would 
“make clear that constructive trusts of family homes are governed by a single regime, 
dispelling any impression that different rules apply to ‘joint-names’ and ‘single-name’ 
cases”.44 The obiter in Stack emphasised the need for a “consistency of approach” with 
regard to sole/joint cases.45 In response, in Jones the Court stressed that “there is of 
course a single regime: the law of trusts” the only distinction being that sole legal 
ownership and joint legal ownership would lead to sole/joint equitable ownership as a 
starting point respectively.46  
 
A number of sole-ownership cases post-Jones, have been decided based on principles 
derived from the joint-ownership regime.47 One example of this would be Geary v 
                                                          
42 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 5 [31]; see [2.3.1] on the controversy resulting from the inclusion of 
imputed intention. 
43 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 5 [46]. 
44Gardner S. & Davidson K., ‘The Future of Stack v Dowden’ (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 13, 15. 
45 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [4]. 
46 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [16]; The starting point referring to the burden: see [4.2.2].  
47 For an overview of the approach of the courts to CICT cases post-Jones: see Sloan B., ‘Keeping up 
With the Jones Case: Establishing Constructive Trusts in ‘Sole Legal Owner’ Scenarios’ (2015) 35(2) 
Legal Studies 226. 
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Rankine.48 Geary involved a commercial property which had been purchased with funds 
provided exclusively by Mr Rankine, which was also registered in his sole-name. His 
partner (romantic and commercial) Ms Geary worked within the business for which she 
received no remuneration. The central question was whether there was a common 
intention that the property be held jointly, particularly given that they both lived and 
worked in the property, and the unpaid contributions Ms Geary had made. Following 
the principles developed in Jones, the court considered that there was no such common 
intention at the time of the purchase, nor had one developed. As a result Ms Geary was 
deemed to have no interest in the property. The application of Jones over Rosset in cases 
such as Geary may seem to give weight to the hope expressed by Dixon that “it is 
difficult to see a return to the Rosset approach now that the genie is out of the bottle”.49 
However  
“Geary ought not to be overstated… no Rosset argument was advanced… [and] 
being such an easy case, the result would inevitably have remained the same on 
either the Kernott or Rosset tests”.50 
As such, despite the ‘clarification’ in Jones, and repetition that the “law has moved on”51 
since Rosset, until a sole-ownership case reaches the Supreme Court, this obiter remains 
merely persuasive and the two separate regimes remain intact. 
 
                                                          
48 Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555. 
49 Dixon M., ‘Editor’s notebook: the still not ended, never-ending story’[2012] 76 Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 83, 84; Similar comments have also been raised in Lees K., ‘Geary v Rankine: money 
isn't everything’ (2012) 5 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 412, 421. Note that despite some sole cases 
applying Jones/Stack, the approach of the courts has been inconsistent: see Sloan, (n47). 
50 Lees, (n 49), 418. It was stated in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [126] “the inferences drawn… 
may be very different” in sole/joint-ownership cases indicating some differences in application. 




The CICT has been deemed a “Frankenstein doctrine”52  of judicial invention, and 
significant criticisms have been waged against it. In order to give an overview of the 
existing literature, as well as demonstrating the capacity for the equality in difference 
approach to impact on vulnerable cohabitants, two of the central critiques are discussed. 
The first of which can broadly be categorised relating to the ways in which the law does 
not adequately reflect the lived reality of cohabitants. The second focusses on the 
unfairness which results from a gendered system focussed on financial contributions. It 
concludes with a summation of the reasons underpinning the lack of legislative 
intervention, despite the fact that “for more than a generation ... the law regulating the 
proprietary rights of those living in non-marital relationships… [has been] 
unsatisfactory”.53 
 
4.3.1 Reality vs Law 
Communication: contemplating breakdown 
Communication is significant in determining the existence/quantification of shares in a 
number of ways as discussed above.54 Despite underpinning the legal framework, this 
does not sit well with the reality of relationships. In their study, Douglas et al found that  
“at the very time that they were making the decision to live together, couples 
could not simultaneously envisage anything going wrong with their 
relationships and instinctively did not want to ‘plan for failure’”.55 
                                                          
52  Rotherham C., ‘The Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitees: The Case for Reform’ (2004) 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 268, 272. 
53 ibid, 268. 
54 In particular: see [4.2] in relation to the reliance on the “actual intention”/“agreement” between the 
parties in relation to quantification in sole and joint-ownership cases, and in relation to acquisition in 
express common intention sole-ownership cases.  
55 Douglas G. (et al)., ‘Cohabitants, Property and the Law: A Study of Injustice’ (2009) 72(1) Modern 
Law Review 24, 39.  
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The focus on express discussions as the most reliable method through which to obtain 
proprietary rights is at odds with the nature of cohabiting relationships. In reality, 
couples are often reluctant to discuss ownership, seeing it as “unromantic” given that 
the “sub-text is that the relationship may well fail”.56 It is premised on the flawed notion 
that people act “sensibly”57 or “rationally” 58 when they are in a relationship, and that 
on this basis they would make clear their proprietary interests. It also relies on the parties’ 
recollection which introduces evidentiary issues as the parties will often “reinterpret the 
past in self-exculpatory or vengeful terms”59 making accurately divining the parties 
‘actual’ intentions problematic. 
 
 Familial trust is a central element in the formation of relationships and underpins one 
of the reasons why either formal or informal expressions as to the existence and/or 
quantification of shares will often be absent. The courts have recognised the way in 
which  
“when people… agree to share their lives in joint homes they do so on a basis 
of mutual trust and in the expectation that their relationship will endure… There 
will inevitably be numerous couples, married or unmarried, who have no 
discussion about ownership and who, perhaps advisedly, make no agreement 
about it”.60  
                                                          
56 Lower M., ‘The Constructive Trust: From Common Intention to Relationship?’ [2011] Conveyancer 
and Property Lawyer 515, 515. 
57  Barlow A. & Duncan S., ‘Supporting Families? New Labour’s Communitarianism and the 
‘‘Rationality Mistake’’’ (2000) 22(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 22, 23. 
58 ibid, 129. This lack of rationality is also linked to the issues of autonomy discussed below and [2.5.3] 
and can be identified in the case law [5.7],[6.8] and [7.4]. The way in which this does not fit with the 
reality has also been recognised by the Law Commission in 2002 and 2007: Law Commission, Sharing 
Homes (n21), 2.112, 14.14, 1.17; Law Commission., Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of 
Relationship Breakdown (Law Com 307, 2007), 2.54-7. 
59 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [67]; Similar comments were raised in: Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 
1486 (Ch) [18] in which the judge described the relationship between the parties as “a perfect breeding 
ground for differences of perception and bona fide differences of recollection and emphasis”.  
60 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 746. See also Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [61]. 
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However, this has not been a sufficient basis from which to depart from the centrality 
which communication has within the CICT. Despite acknowledging the unrealistic 
reliance on “cold legal question[s]”61  in such cases the courts are yet to realise the full 
implications of familial trust negating the need for communication regarding assets, at 
least in the minds of many cohabiting couples.  
 
‘Common’ Intention  
The legitimacy of ‘common’ intention and detrimental reliance as determinative of the 
intention of cohabiting couples towards their home has been questioned on a number of 
fronts. As has been seen above, the question of ownership and the quantification of 
shares is often left unexpressed, rendering common intention  
“The most persistent red herring… which not surprisingly, since the parties are 
unlikely to have reached any agreement as to the disposition of the property, is 
rarely to be found”.62 
However, even where the intention is ‘expressed’ whether this can be considered 
‘common’ between the parties is less clear, particularly in relation to the ‘excuse’ cases 
as examined below.63 This raises the question as to whether there is any truth to the 
‘fiction’ of common intention, which has been subject to additional criticism given the 
inclusion of imputation in joint-ownership cases post-Stack/Jones.64   
 
                                                          
61 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 901, quoting Gissing v Gissing [1969] 2 Ch. 85, 93.  
62 Glover N. & Todd P., ‘The Myth of Common Intention’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 325, 328. 
63 See [4.3.1]. 




“The object of the search is a common intention;  
that is, an intention common to both parties”.65 
Within the ‘excuse’ cases, the identification of ‘common’ intention by the courts is often 
only identifiable in one party and the detriment suffered by that party is used to support 
that finding. In Eves and Grant excuses made by their partners as to why they could not 
acquire the property jointly were considered ‘express’ agreements, and consequently 
the courts ‘found’ interest in the homes for the female claimants.66 Despite ‘agreement’ 
being identified in such cases, “it is surely converting the intention of one party – albeit 
on the facts the innocent one – into an agreement”67 rather than identifying a common 
intention in the true meaning of the words.  
 
In these cases, there is no true common intention, but rather a fictional common 
intention has been covertly imputed by the judiciary in order to facilitate a just result 
where it would otherwise have been absent. Despite the way in which this “inventive 
approach to the facts…” allows the court to “discover a common intention when in truth 
none exists”68 it can be argued that in cases involving deception, the primacy of legal 
principles and certainty should be secondary to an outcome which facilitates fairness. 
 
                                                          
65 Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555 [21]. 
66 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 affirmed in Lloyds Bank v Rosset 
[1991] 1 AC 107, 133. Contrast with Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404 distinguished the 
aforementioned cases due to the lack of ‘positive assertions’ drawn from the excuse used in that case. 
67 Clarke P., ‘The Family Home: Intention and Agreement’ [1992] Family Law 72, 72. As acknowledged 
by the judiciary in Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 746 and Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 
AC 107, 127-128. 
68 Gardner S., ‘Rethinking Family Property’ (1993) Law Quarterly Review 263, 265. Similar arguments 
in relation to fair results taking primacy over maintaining formal principles are raised in Chapter 3 and 
can be identified predominantly within Denning’s approach: see [5.7.3]. 
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Imputing ‘Common’ Intention  
Allowing the court to impute common intention serves as a prime example of the way 
in which the judiciary have been able to present ‘fictional’ common intention as if it 
were fact. Imputing intention has been said to be “difficult, subjective and uncertain”.69 
The subjective element of imputation brings with it fears of unfettered judicial 
discretion turned judicial activism. However, its limited application and persistence of 
the courts to ensure that imputation did not equate to rulings based purely on fairness 
and the focus on objectivity means that this would be an undue criticism here.70 Yet the 
flexibility that the capacity for imputing shares does mean that the outcome of such 
cases will be “predictably unpredictable”,71 continuing the trend of uncertainty within 
cohabitation decisions. 
 
Although imputation in this context is restricted to circumstances in which there is no 
common intention as to the precise shares in which the property is held, it has allowed 
for the courts to engage in “an entirely fictional exercise to somehow fill the missing 
gaps”.72 This adds to the fictional elements which combine to create the CICT.73 The 
case of Aspden serves as an example of imputation within the context of the CICT.74 
The property concerned, a farm, was registered in Mr Aspden’s sole name. Later the 
barn was transferred to Ms Elvy, and work was undertaken to convert said barn into a 
                                                          
69 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [127]. 
70 A fear which has been heeded by the judiciary: “Judicial fears focusing on the usurpation of the proper 
function of Parliament and the uncertainty associated with the adoption of principles which rest purely 
on doing justice in individual cases has led to a marked reluctance by the English courts to engage in 
radical creativity”: Pawlowski M., ‘Is Equity Past the Age of Childbearing?’ (2016) 22(8) Trusts & 
Trustees 892, 897. The emphasis that imputation could not lead to the judiciary deciding matters purely 
on the notion of fairness was made clear in  Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [51]. 
71  Lee J., ‘And the waters began to subside: imputing intention under Jones v Kernott’ (2012) 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 421, 428. 
72 Pawlowski M., ‘Imputing Beneficial Shares in the Family Home’ (2016) 22(4) Trusts & Trustees 377, 
381.  
73 Here referring to ‘common’ intention and detrimental reliance: see [4.2]. 
74 Aspden v Elvy [2012] EWHC 1387 (Ch), hereafter Aspden. 
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dwelling house. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the work undertaken to 
do so was a joint enterprise and the extent to which each party contributed to the costs 
of the conversion. In the absence of express common intention regarding the 
quantification of shares, the judge had to impute a common intention based on the 
“whole course of dealings” between the couple. As indicated above, there was a 
considerable lack of clarity as to the financial/non-financial contributions made by the 
parties. As a result the judge considered the determination of shares (25/75) “somewhat 
arbitrary” adding that it was “the best” he could “do with the available material”.75 This 
goes some way in demonstrating the way in which to speak of the “common intention 
constructive trust may be misleading”.76  
 
 ‘Common’ Intention and Detrimental Reliance 
Significant confusion has arisen as a result of the way in which detrimental reliance is 
often indistinguishable from common intention. Where there is express common 
intention, detrimental reliance is identified from financial contribution or other acts; 
where common intention is inferred then the conduct from which this inference is drawn 
is simultaneously considered to be evidence of detrimental reliance. 77  On such a 
construction the distinction between detrimental reliance and common intention seems 
insignificant. Conflating the two central elements of the CICT allows for common 
intention to be found where it is entirely absent in those cases where common intention 
is discovered through inference rather than on the basis of an express agreement giving 
                                                          
75 Aspden v Elvy [2012] EWHC 1387 (Ch) [128]. 
76 Lee, (n71), 428. Despite the critiques waged against imputation, there have equally been calls for it to 
be extended to the acquisition stage/sole-ownership cases – Pawlowski, ‘Imputing Beneficial Shares in 
the Family Home’ (n72), 382; Tattershall M., ‘Stack v Dowden: Imputing an Intention’ (2008) Family 
Law 249, 250. 
77 Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638, 646-7.  
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further support to the notion of fictional common intention.78 However, the fact that 
detriment is more easily proved as a result of direct financial contributions is of little 
comfort to women given that the case law demonstrates that women are less likely/able 
to contribute in such a way.79 
 
There is a considerable lack of clarity as to which detrimental actions will be sufficient 
to demonstrate reliance on the ‘common’ intention of the parties. The inconsistent 
approach of the courts concerning such acts “leaves room for arbitrary results and 
‘palm-tree’ justice”.80 This is further complicated by the fact that in those judgments 
where the “equally fictitious”81  elements of the CICT are considered, little if any 
distinction is made between their discussions of detrimental reliance and common 
intention.  
 
Gendered Detrimental Reliance 
Those instances in which detrimental reliance can be identified within the judicial 
analysis have frequently invoked criticism, particularly from a feminist perspective as 
such judgments rely on the “use of the stereotype as a norm”. 82  The notion that 
detrimental reliance consists of  “conduct on which the woman could not reasonably 
have been expected to embark unless she was to have an interest in the house”,83 has 
                                                          
78 Express cases being the rarer form of the two cases. Liew Y. K., ‘The Secondary-Rights Approach to 
the Common Intention Constructive Trust’ (2015) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 210, 216. 
79 For an analysis of women’s capacity to contribute and examples of those cases in which women have 
been unable (financially or due to societal norms) to contribute to property: see Chapters 5-7. 
80 Halliwell M., ‘Equity as Injustice: The Cohabitant’s Case’ (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 
500, 507. 
81 Riniker U., ‘The Fiction of Common Intention and Detriment’ (1998) 62 Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 202, 208. 
82 Lawson A., ‘The things we do for love: detrimental reliance in the family home’ (1996) Legal Studies 
218, 226; the use of stereotypes has been and remains controversial. However, stereotypes have 
frequently been invoked in order to establish difference, allowing for the judges in such cases to avoid 
the injustice resultant from a strict application of the law. A detailed analysis of this concept can be 
identified in theory in Chapter 3 particularly [3.2.2], and in practice in Chapters 5-7, particularly [5.7.3]. 
83 Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638, 648. 
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led to the emergence of two distinct scenarios. The first encompasses those situations 
in which the usually female claimant performs acts which can be considered “the most 
natural thing in the world for a wife”.84 In such circumstances the claimant will not be 
determined to have suffered any detriment. The second involves those cases in which 
the claimant “did much more than most women would do”,85 which would then be 
considered detrimental reliance. 
 
This distinction relies on the judiciary making normative, stereotypical assumptions 
about the ‘natural’ behaviour of women. The fact that women’s behaviour is generally 
considered to derive from “love and affection”86 rather than the intention to acquire 
rights presents an additional hurdle for those claimants. It also fails to recognise that 
when in a relationship, cohabitants’ “prime motivation is usually the well-being of their 
relationship rather than the legal consequences of their actions”.87  
 
In this context “the decisions of the courts display the tenacious hold of 'separate 
spheres' ideology” 88  in which women’s domestic contributions no matter how 
substantial are deemed insufficient. Yet work which would otherwise be compensated 
and/or performed by a man, such as working a cement mixer or making improvements 
that required wielding a 14lb sledgehammer are seen as worthy of recompense. 89 
                                                          
84 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 131. 
85 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 519; a sentiment also identified in Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 
1340 with the inclusion of the statement “more than many wives” though the use of such discourses have 
been used to benefit women as examined in Chapters 5-7.  
86 Lawson, (n82), 219. 
87 Barlow A. & Lind C., ‘A Matter of Trust: The Allocation of Rights in the Family Home’ (1999) 19 
Legal Studies 468, 473.  
88 Flynn L. & Lawson A., ‘Gender, Sexuality and the Doctrine of Detrimental Reliance’ (1995) 3(1) 
Feminist Legal Studies 105, 117.   
89 This can be seen to reflect the undervaluation of women’s work both in the home and in the public 
sphere as demonstrated Chapters 5-7. The theoretical underpinnings for this situation are explored in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Despite claims that detrimental reliance is decided on the basis of an objective analysis 
of the parties behaviour, this objectivity is clearly tainted with gendered assumptions 
which replicate the stereotypes about women’s appropriate role. Further to this, such 
assumptions often do not reflect the parties’ perceptions of their behaviour, adding 
additional weight to the notion that the law fails to adequately reflect the reality of 
cohabiting couples’ relationships.  
 
Fictional Framework 
The above analysis demonstrates that the current legal framework is “entirely dependent 
upon the use of fictions to achieve… at best only partial justice”.90 Both detrimental 
reliance and common intention, despite forming central elements of the CICT can be 
undermined in a number of ways. Detrimental reliance is both fictitious and gendered 
and is often subsumed within common intention making its role in proceedings 
questionable. Its absence from the judicial analysis in both Stack and Jones raises the 
question as to whether detrimental reliance can now be considered a non-essential 
element of the CICT.91  
 
Common intention is “neither a necessary nor sufficient explanation for the present 
law”.92 It is unnecessary in relation to those ‘excuse’ cases, in which the absence of 
common intention is transformed into an express agreement “in spite of rather than 
because of the intentions of the parties”.93 It is equally unnecessary in that, albeit in 
                                                          
90 Lawson, (n82), 231. 
91 However, detrimental reliance has elsewhere been deemed “essential” within excuse cases such as 
Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404 [77]. However, it ought to be noted that this was a sole-
ownership case and therefore this may indicate that it remains necessary within this context.  
92 Eekelaar J., ‘A Woman’s Place – A Conflict Between Law and Social Values’ (1987) Conveyancer & 
Property Lawyer 93, 95. 
93 Harpum C., ‘Adjusting Property Rights Between Unmarried Cohabitees’ 2(2) OJLS 1982 277, 282. 
See also Halliwell, (n80), 503. 
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limited circumstances, it is “invented by the judge” 94  through imputation. It is 
insufficient in that common intention is often insufficient unless it is evidenced through 
detrimental reliance, categories which often subsume one another which is particularly 
problematic in sole-ownership cases which do not feature any direct financial 
contributions.  
 
Continuing to base decisions in this area on common intention means that individuals 
rights become  
“dependent upon their expressed common intention, about a matter they will not 
usually have thought it necessary to consider, is unrealistic and the cause of 
frequent and sometimes severe injustice”.95 
On the other hand, allowing the fictitious form of common intention to persist provides 
the courts with a tool with which they can “attempt to do justice”, however without a 
sufficient framework to support such an approach, this will undoubtedly continue to 
lead to “largely arbitrary”96  and uncertain results.  
 
4.3.2 The Focus on Financial Contributions 
The emphasis placed on direct financial contributions in relation to acquisition under 
Rosset, and the continued centrality of monetary contributions at the quantification 
stage under Stack/Jones has formed one of the most substantial critiques waged against 
the CICT.97 This critique can be categorised as falling into several inter-connected 
categories. First is that it diminishes the value of feminine contributions in favour of a 
                                                          
94 Gardner, ‘Rethinking Family Property’ (n68), 264. 
95 Lawson, (n82), 218.  
96 Riniker, (n81), 207. 




masculine money-centric approach which has contributed to the continuation of the 
devaluation of ‘women’s work’.98 Second is that the seemingly gender-neutral approach 
has, and continues to have a disproportionate impact on women. 99  Finally, the 
masculine financial focus is an ill-fitting reflection of the way in which cohabiting 
couples view their relationships with one another and their property, and the realities of 
money management.100  
 
‘Worthless’ Contributions 
The case of Burns v Burns, is most frequently invoked to portray the risks associated 
with the constructive trust.101 Valarie Burns is presented as the personification of the 
unfairness which results from the cohabitation regime as a woman who “walked away 
from a 20-year relationship with nothing”.102 She was unable to assert any interest in 
the shared family home despite having “worked just as hard as the man… maintaining 
the family in the sense of keeping the house, giving birth to and looking after and 
helping to bring up the children”,103 and having contributed to household expenses. In 
absence of an express agreement, the lack of direct financial contributions, per the 
requirements in Gissing and Pettitt rendered these contributions worthless.104 
 
                                                          
98 Reflecting the way in which women’s work has been undervalued within the home and in the realm of 
employment as identified in Chapters 5-7. The theoretical underpinnings of which are discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
99 The ways in which inequality persists under the guise of neutrality can be identified throughout Chapter 
4. See also [4.3.3]. The reasons for this disproportionate impact, for example due to the gender pay gap 
and the sexual division of labour are identified in practice in Chapters 5-7.  
100 Adding further weight to those arguments raised previously in this chapter as to the relationship 
between law and reality in this area: see [4.3.1]. 
101 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317 indeed as Watkins D., ‘Recovering the Lost Human Stories of Law: 
Finding Mrs Burns’ (2013) 7(1) Law and Humanities 68, 74 notes, the Burns scenario has become 
somewhat of a “stock story”. For a full analysis of this case within this thesis: see [6.8.1].  
102 Greer S., ‘Back to the Bad Old Days?’ (2008) 158 New Law Journal 174, 179.  
103 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317, 345.  
104 Note that the requirements in Gissing/Pettitt as restated in Burns mirror those under Rosset as currently 
applied in sole-ownership cases.  
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Burns demonstrates the way in which the focus on direct financial contributions 
“prejudices economically weaker cohabitants and has led to allegations of inherent 
gender bias against female partners”.105 The accusations of gender bias stem from the 
tendency for women to be the primary caregiver, the sexual division of labour and the 
economic inequality of women in society.106 Undervalued ‘women’s work’ within and 
outside the home has been “denied proper recognition by a legal system in which money 
and rights have been inextricably linked”.107 In continuing to place value purely on 
direct financial contributions and refusing to recognise feminine contributions the legal 
regime both perpetuates and “reflects the stereotypes of the male as breadwinner”108 but 
does not reflect the way in which cohabiting couples view such contributions. 
 
An approach which considers financial contributions from men and women in the same 
way can be claimed to be gender-neutral, the case law has demonstrated that in practice, 
this has had a disproportionate impact on women. 109  The neutrality and uniform 
application of the law which underpins the focus on financial contributions is in practice 
gendered, and has done little to ensure clarity.110 Such claims of neutrality fail to take 
account of the sexual division of labour and the economic inequality which persists 
between men and women which impacts their ability to contribute to property.111 When 
                                                          
105 Conway H., & Girard P., ‘"No Place Like Home": The Search for a Legal Framework for Cohabitants 
and the Family Home in Canada and Britain’ (2004) 30 Queen’s Law Journal 715, 747. The property law 
and trusts framework has generally been critiques for being gendered: see O’Donovan K., Sexual 
Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985) and [4.3.3] in this chapter below.  
106 The case law and position of women in society in relation to socio-legal and economic inequality are 
examined in detail in Chapter 5-7.  
107 Riniker, (n81), 209. The links between money and rights within a property law context has formed 
one of the central arguments in favour of moving to a family law approach: see [4.2.3]. 
108 Rotherham C., Proprietary Remedies in Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 231. 
109  See Wong S., ‘Constructive trusts over the family home: lessons to be learned from other 
commonwealth jurisdictions?’ (1998) 18(3) Legal Studies 369, 374;  
Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n58) has also 
acknowledged that the current law “fail[s] the primary-carer cohabitant”, 4.22. As demonstrated in: 
[5.7],[6.8],[7.4].  
110 This also links to the masculinity of neutrality which runs through Chapter 2 and 3. 
111 Examined Chapters 5-7. 
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combined with the way in which women’s work is ‘naturalised’ by the judiciary and the 
gendered norms and socio-legal restrictions placed on women’s ability to contribute 
financially, the CICT replicates dominance of men in the home and the market.112  
 
Where even the most minimal direct financial contribution can be identified, a 
significant share of the property can be found in favour of the claimant.113 In such 
circumstances, non-financial contributions are not deemed entirely irrelevant, they are 
instead limited to the determination of shares.114 In the absence of express agreement 
or financial contribution at the acquisition stage, non-financial contributions are an 
insufficient basis for acquiring rights in the home, making acquisition a considerable 
hurdle for those in a Burns-type scenario.  
 
Domestic Work and Commercial Value 
The lack of economic value attributed to ‘women’s work’ can be directly contrasted 
with the case of Cox v Jones, in which non-financial acts were deemed to have financial 
worth and therefore constituted detrimental reliance, and as a result, interest.115 In that 
case Miss Cox had designated time and money into the renovation work on the ‘country 
house’ of which the judge said that  
                                                          
112 This ‘naturalisation’ is discussed in relation to detrimental reliance [4.3.1] and refers to the way in 
which women’s contributions are seen as stemming from natural love and affection rather than out of 
attempts to acquire interest in the property.  
113 For example, in Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733 in which the claimant contributed less 
than 7% and was awarded a 50% share. 
114 However, the quantification stage is still dominated by financial contributions not only in a sole-
ownership context, but under Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53.  
115 [2004] EWHC 1486 (Ch). 
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“she was doing something that either Mr Jones would have had to have done 
himself (but which he had insufficient time to do) or it would have to have been 
done by a professional (who would have charged for it)”.116  
Her actions were considered to have commercial value having led to a decline in her 
earnings. 117  However, those same arguments could be raised in cases involving 
childcare or housework having negatively impacted on the earnings of a woman, which 
her partner would have otherwise had to perform himself or employ another to perform 
them and yet such claims have been unsuccessful.118  
 
Even if this does indicate an extension of the ‘relevant’ contributions, the persistence of 
the gendered division of labour means that men are more likely to perform acts such as 
renovation/DIY and women remain more likely to do those acts which are not sufficient 
to constitute detrimental reliance.119 As such it would do little to alleviate the issues 
which result from the gendered construction of this principle.  This provides further 
evidence to the notion that the work done by women in the home is not valued in 
financial terms, unless it steps over the boundary between the public/private divide 
impacting their employment.120 Clearly, the property regime in domestic contexts is 
“unfair because insufficient attention is paid to what might be termed domestic labour 
contributed to the household”,121 domestic labour which tends to be performed by 
                                                          
116 Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486 (Ch) [73]. However, it ought to be noted that she also made indirect 
contributions to the property by way of the renovations.  
117 This is again inconsistent with the case law prior: see Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR. 308. In 
which giving up one’s job was insufficient to find detrimental reliance.  
118 See [4.3.1]. 
119 Auspurg K. (et al)., ‘Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-specific 
preferences’ (2017) 30 Social Science Research 1.  
120 Douglas, (n55), 51. Which links to the way in which only ‘deviant’ behaviour is deemed detrimental 
reliance: [4.3.1]. The value of work performed in the public/private domain is discussed from a theoretical 
perspective in Chapter 2 and can be identified in practice in Chapters 5-7.  




women at the expense of their careers. 
 
Finances seen as a form of commitment 
The additional flexibility in relation to financial contributions under Stack/Jones, could 
have signalled a departure from strict approach in Rosset. However, monetary 
contributions have remained considerably influential under this approach. In Jones the 
decision to jointly purchase property was used as an indication of their commitment to 
one another.122 In premising beneficial interest on the legal-ownership of the home the 
courts consider joint-owners “more economically and emotionally entwined and 
committed to their relationship”.123 Despite using legal-ownership as the starting point 
for determining equitable ownership, Lady Hale does acknowledge that couples do not 
“always have a completely free choice in the matter. Mortgagees used to insist 
upon the home being put in the name of the person whom they assumed would 
be the main breadwinner. Nowadays, they tend to think that it is in their best 
interests that the home be jointly owned”.124 
The external influence of mortgagees and the capacity for pressure from within the 
relationship to register the property in either joint/sole names means that the 
presumption which marks the starting point of the CICT is flawed. However, some 
comfort can be drawn from the fact that said presumption is rebuttable.125  
 
                                                          
122 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [19]. 
123 Garland F., ‘Jones v Kernott’ (2012) 34(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 479, 483. 
124 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [67]. 
125 However, often the most powerful method of rebutting this presumption is based on financial 
contributions/money management which has generally been shown to work to the detriment of women. 
It is also noteworthy that such rebuttal is entirely based on direct financial contributions under the second 
tier of the sole approach.  
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The introduction of the TR1 form was supposed to simplify the identification of 
equitable interest, avoiding the  difficulties surrounding express intention, or the 
reliance on the presumption discussed above. 126  However, this is generally used 
regarding the transfer from vendor to purchaser rather than between occupiers, or rather 
cohabitants.127  The ‘choice’ made regarding ownership at this stage cannot necessarily 
be seen to be a true indication of the intentions of both parties, as it is more likely that 
a vulnerable party (financially or emotionally) could be manipulated by the more 
dominant party into ‘giving away’ their rights, much like those risks associated with 
cohabitation contracts.128 The ‘solutions’ currently provided still rely heavily on the 
assumption of equality of bargaining power even where they recognise that there may 
not be equality between the parties.129  
 
The focus placed on the way in which a family’s finances are arranged can also be 
identified in Stack, where the ‘unusual’ circumstances which justified an uneven 
quantification of shares were based on the fact that the couple kept their finances 
separate.130 The notion that maintaining separate finances is somehow indicative of a 
lack of commitment is premised on a view of money management which fails to take 
                                                          
126 As the form would then constitute an express trust.  
127 The TR1 form involves notifying the land registry of any transfers of property, in such situations 
where land is to vest in joint proprietors, they are supposed to indicate whether the land is to be held 
beneficially as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common: Land Registration Act 2002, s44(1). It must be 
noted that the TR1 does not avoid the issues which arise in relation to property previously owned by one 
party which then becomes the ‘family home’ which accounts for a considerable number of cohabiting 
couples. 
128 Regarding the need to recognise the “interdependency” and “vulnerability” of adults and children in 
familial relationships and not merely focus on autonomy in this context: see Herring J., ‘Relational 
Autonomy in Family Law’ in Wallbank J. (et al)., Rights, Gender and Family Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009), 169-8. It also assumes that cohabitants will understand the consequence of not only sole/joint-
ownership but joint tenancy and tenancy in common. The use of the TR1 is further problematised given 
that many solicitors fail to fill in the form completely, particularly in relation to beneficial shares much 
to the frustration of the judiciary: see Carlton v Goodman [2002] EWCA Civ 545 [44]. 
129 See McLellan D., ‘Contract Marriage - the Way Forward or Dead End?’ (1996) 23(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 234, 239 on the inequality of bargaining power. This also relates to the lack of understanding 
which cohabitants have of the consequences of such choices/their legal position as discussed below. 
130 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [92] and [116]. 
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account of the diversity in how couples organise their relationships. Traditionally 
holding a joint account has been the way in which couples have organised their finances. 
However, an increasing number of couples are adopting a “new individualised 
approach”131  where part or all of a couple’s finances are kept separately.  
 
Financial independence in such relationships is often sought in order to “undermine the 
traditional inequalities within marriages and create egalitarian relationships”,132 one of 
the reasons given by cohabitants for avoiding the institution of marriage. That is not to 
say that all cohabiting couples “organise themselves as egalitarian economic units; that 
parties could and would “bargain” for an equal share in decision-making as well as in 
the allocation and management of household income”. 133  However, this is the 
perception of cohabiting relationship adopted by the courts, treating unmarried couples 
as if they were commercial parties bargaining at arm’s length.134 It is an assumption 
which does not fit with the research surrounding money management and the 
distribution of power in relationships.135  This is particularly problematic given the 
tendency for men to pay for “essentials” such as the mortgage, whilst women’s wages 
are spent on those items considered “luxuries”136 deemed insufficient contributions by 
the courts. 
 
                                                          
131 Pahl J., ‘Family Finances, Individualisation, Spending Patterns and Access to Credit’ (2008) 37(2) 
Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Economics 577, 577. Reflecting another way in which the 
cohabitation regime does not reflect the reality/complexity of cohabiting couples in reality.  
132 Elizabeth V., ‘Managing money, managing coupledom: A critical examination of cohabitants’ money 
management practices’ (2001) 49 The Sociological Review 389, 402. 
133 Wong S., ‘Would you “Care” to Share Your Home?’ (2007) 58 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
268, 272. 
134 That is despite a rejection of this construction of the family underpinning the decision to remove the 
presumption of a resulting trust in such cases.  
135  Vogler C. (et al)., ‘Intimate relationships and changing patterns of money management at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century’ (2006) 57(3) British Journal of Sociology 455. 
136  See Mossis A., & Nott S., With All My Worldly Goods: A Feminist Perspective on the Legal 
Regulation of Wealth (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995), 205. See also Wong ‘Would you “Care” to Share 
Your Home?’ (n133), 272. 
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The above analysis demonstrates that the way in which couples arrange their finances 
is an unreliable indicator of the nature of their relationship or their commitment.137 The 
focus on direct financial contributions in the case of sole-owners has consistently led to 
unfair results for women. Although financial contributions can be indicative of the 
intention of the parties, it should not be decisive, which is the role it currently 
performs.138 The strict approach under Rosset  
“ignores the significantly important and often substantial non-financial and 
indirect financial contributions that are made towards the welfare of the parties 
and members of their family, which are equally important aspects of sharing a 
home”.139 
Despite the approach adopted in Stack/Jones indicating a more relaxed approach in 
relation to relevant conduct, there remains a focus on financial contributions. As Probert 
notes, “the new approach to the family home has all the disadvantages of the traditional 
resulting trust, but without its logic and simplicity”. 140  Rather than signalling a 
departure from the decisive nature of financial contributions under the resulting trust, 
the CICT sees the judiciary indulge in an exercise of muted forensic accounting to 
consider additional financial criteria.  
 
Patronising Women and Replicating Models of Dependency 
“A woman’s place is often still in the home, 
but if she stays there, she will acquire no interest in it”141 
                                                          
137 See Douglas, (n55), 39 and Barlow A., Burgoyne C. & Smithson J., The Living Together Campaign – 
An Investigation of its Impact on Legally Aware Cohabitants (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 42. 
138 For example Montgomery J., Question of Intention? (1987) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 16 
proposed adopting a perspective which focusses on the parties’ state of mind within which contributions 
could form evidence but would not be decisive of common intention.  
139 Wong S., ‘The inequity of Equity: A Home-Sharer’s Tale’ (2006) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
326, 328. 
140 Probert R., ‘Equality in the Family Home?’ (2007) 15 Feminist Legal Studies 341, 350-1. 
141 Eekelaar, (n92), 94. 
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The injustice which resulted from the focus on financial contributions led to flourishes 
of judicial creativity which ‘found’ proprietary interest for female claimants where it 
would otherwise have been absent.142 This manipulation of legal principles has been 
critiqued as presenting women as the “weaker partner” who “needs the protection of the 
court against exploitation”.143 This approach is most identifiable in those judgments in 
which Lord Denning applied his ‘new model’ of constructive trust.144  
 
This ‘new model’ was charged with “reproducing the traditional patriarchal family”145 
within cohabiting couples through replicating the female dependency attributed to 
marital relationships. This was met with considerable critique from a feminist 
perspective, and led to claims that “Denning was a radical anti-feminist”. 146  An 
approach which relies on “female dependency and not on genuine contribution”147  
faces similar criticisms to those waged against gendered detrimental reliance above. 
Despite these critiques, in the ‘excuse’ cases Denning made significant contributions to 
the development of women’s rights utilising equitable principles and creative 
discourse(s), as such an approach which utilises feminine stereotypes to ensure a fair 
outcome can be described as “patronizing, perhaps, but effective”.148 
                                                          
142 This can be seen in the ‘excuse’ cases [4.3.1]. 
143  Deech R., ‘The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 480, 485 
144 This model is discussed in more detail in [4.3.3]; See the detailed analysis of these cases at [7.9] and 
[6.8]. 
145 Parker S., Cohabitees (Chichester: Barry Rose Publishers, 1981), 222-3. 
146 Stephens C., The Jurisprudence of Lord Denning: A Study in Legal History (Volume III) (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 109 
147 Deech R., ‘The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation’ (n143), 497; See also Pearl D., 
‘The Legal Implications of a Relationship Outside Marriage’ (1978) 37(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 
268-9 on the stigma attached to dependency and the way in which dependency does not form an adequate 
basis for a legal relationship. 
148 Auchmuty R., ‘Recovering Lost Lives: Researching Women in Legal History’ (2015) 41(1) Journal 
of Law and Society 34, 41. Although Auchmuty writes in the context of overriding interests the methods 
used by Lord Denning in the case referred to Williams Glyn Bank v Boland [1981] AC 487 are equally 
identifiable in the context of his cohabitation judgments among others as supported by the similar 




Mrs Burns is History 
Despite the characterisation of Mrs Burns having been used to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of the law relating to cohabitants and the need for reform, it has been 
claimed that she is no longer a representative figure, if she ever was. The way in which 
Mrs Burns  
“is used to present a pattern linking cohabitation, motherhood and economic 
vulnerability in a way which suggests… that the figure is representative of 
female cohabitants”149 
seemingly fails to take account of the societal shift in the position of women since the 
1970s. However, proposing that the law does not discriminate against women merely 
because they have a greater presence in the workforce, and the slowly closing wage gap 
is an insufficient argument.150  
 
There are still relationships which mirror that of the Mrs Burns scenario, and the fact 
that they are less frequent does not negate the need for reform particularly given that 
the research indicates that it is still women who are most frequently negatively 
impacted. 151  While such situations occur there remains impetus to protect those 
rendered vulnerable by virtue of the lack of recognition of what is traditionally a 
woman’s role, ignoring the lived reality of many women.152 It also fails to recognise 
                                                          
Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law’, in Bottomley A. & Conaghan J., (ed), Feminist 
Theory and Legal Strategy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 58. 
149 Bottomley A., ‘From Mrs Burns to Mrs Oxley: Do Cohabiting Women (Still) Need Marriage Law’ 
(2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 181, 194. 
150 The position of women, including their increasing presence in the workplace and the implications that 
this has had on their ability to contribute to property is analysed in detail in Chapter 5-7. 
151 See Probert R., ‘Trusts and the Modern Woman – Establishing an Interest in the Family Home’ (2001) 
13 Child & Family Law Quarterly 275, Douglas, (n55), and Douglas G. (et al)., A Failure of Trust: 
Resolving Property Disputes on Cohabitation Breakdown (Cardiff: Cardiff University, 2007), 3.4.  
152 Fineman M., The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 26. 
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that Mrs Burns herself worked outside the home and used those monies to contribute 
towards their joint resources and still failed to gain an interest in it.153 Instead what 
needs to be considered is the position of women in the market and in the home alongside 
the staying power of gender norms which act to maintain women’s ‘naturally inferior’ 
position.154  
 
While it can be said that it is the duty of the law to protect those considered vulnerable, 
“women, like any other disadvantaged group, do not want to go through life needing 
protection”.155 Yet, the impact of factors outside the law, both specifically related to 
property and wider afield, mean that until these are reconciled, patronising protection 
yields fairer results than fictitious equality which replicates women’s disadvantage 
while maintaining their theoretical position as equal.  
 
Jones & Stack, Reverse Sexism? 
Jones and Stack can be presented as ways in which men fair worse than women under 
the current rules, which gives rise to the argument “that the protection of women per se 
cannot be an appropriate expectation of the law”.156 However, this fails recognise that 
the reason that these men were awarded a smaller share was not due to the court 
recognising the value of the feminine contributions made by their partners, but due to 
                                                          
153 However, it ought to be noted that “During the greater part of the period when the plaintiff and the 
defendant were living together she was not in employment or, if she was, she was not earning amounts 
of any consequence” both her lack of significant earnings and periods of unemployment were however 
due to her role as mother and ‘housewife’ Burns (n23), 330. 
154 Probert, ‘Trusts and the Modern Woman’ (n151), 275.The theoretical Chapters 2 and 3, and in practice 
in Chapters 5-7. 
155 Contrast: Parker D., ‘Cohabitants, Their Homes and the Winds of Change’ (1984) 14 Family Law 40; 
Auchmuty R., ‘Using Feminist Judgments in the Property Law Classroom’ (2012) 46(3) The Law 
Teacher 227, 228. 
156Auchmuty R, Using Feminist Judgments in the Property Law Classroom (n155), 238. 
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the male parties’ lesser financial contributions.157 The financial focus which remains the 
underlying decisive factor in CICT proceedings may no longer almost-exclusively 
impact women (biological), but it continues to value masculine financial contribution 
over feminine acts of care or the absence of monetary contribution. As such it remains 
a gender biased system regardless of the sex of the parties.158   
 
4.3.3 Patriarchal Property Law 
“The law of property can be harsh on people, usually women”159 
Property law, as the basis for determining property rights for cohabitants, has been 
described as an inadequate tool for remedying the injustices which result from the 
current regime, as seen above, and “creates new ones of its own”.160  In particular, the 
focus on neutral principles and certainty which are central to traditional property law 
jurisprudence, produces gendered outcomes and has done little to secure certainty in the 
law. The shortfalls of the current framework had led to claims that a family law 
approach, or remedial approach which takes account of the relational aspects of the 
cohabiting context and allows for considerations of fairness to take place may be a more 
apt jurisdiction for such cases to fall into. The following section discusses the 
unreliability of equity as a method of securing just results, critiques lack of flexibility 
afforded to the judiciary under the property law regime and considers the use of 
remedial/family law approaches as an alternative.   
 
                                                          
157 In Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 Mr Kernott ceased paying bills once he left the property and Mrs 
Kernott paid off more of the equity in the home, the lack of maintenance paid towards the children was 
also considered. In Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 Ms Dowden paid more towards the purchase price.  
158 For a discussion of gender and sex see [1.2.2], [2.3] and [2.4].  
159 Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404 [9]. 
160 Law Commission., Sharing Homes (n21), 3.100.  
154 
 
Equity as an Unreliable Tool  
Historically equity was seen as “the white knight... [which has] ridden to the rescue of 
some damsel caught in the toils of the common law”.161 There were times in which 
equity did indeed rescue these vulnerable women who were without the protection of 
the law. However, as it has developed, the CICT has become a primary example of the 
“shortcomings and deficiencies” of property, equity and trusts, in the context of the 
family home.162 Despite its historical foundations lying in “principles of justice and 
conscience”163 intended to lessen the ‘harshness’ of the common law rules, justice and 
conscience have slowly been drained from trusts relating to the family home. 
Notwithstanding Lord Denning’s attempts to infiltrate this system with the application 
of wider principles, the courts have continued to focus on a property law approach.164 
 
Influenced by the ‘founding’ cases of Pettitt and Gissing the courts saw it appropriate 
to apply property-law principles to situations involving family property, so as to treat 
couples as strangers. 165  The focus on predictability, consistency and clarity have 
resulted in a trend which has reduced the ‘equitable’ element of implied trusts. The 
subsequent case law reveals the way in which the “neutral form [of trusts] ... masks a 
discriminatory substance … [which] operates against women on various levels”.166  
 
                                                          
161 Conway M., ‘Equity’s Darling?’ in Scott-Hunt S., and Lim H., Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (London: Routledge 2013), 27. 
162 Bridge S., ‘Cohabitation: Why Legislative Reform is Necessary’ (2007) 37 Family Law 911, 911. 
163 Halliwell (n80), 501.  
164 As discussed below. It is possible to state that there is perhaps a resurgence of the principle of fairness 
within the modern case law: see Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA 546, Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 
and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53. However this is both significantly limited in its application and 
for now only applicable to joint-ownership cases.  
165 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886. Although Pettitt and Gissing both 
involved married couples they were heard prior to the modern divorce framework, they were decided on 
the basis that the powers vested in judiciary under MWPA 1882, s17 did not entitle them to subvert the 
existing proprietary rights of the parties. 
166Tee ‘L., Co-ownership and Trusts’ in Tee L., (ed) Land Law, Issues, Debates, Policy (Devon: Willian 




Certainty over Flexibility 
The property law framework seeks to guarantee fairness through ensuring legal 
certainty. 167  Despite this, the adherence to strict rules and principles under this 
framework has in practice placed “logical consistency and predictability over 
compassion and substantive justice”.168 The issues which arise as a result from the “the 
unattainable precision of property law” when applied to the “inarticulacy of home 
sharing”169 has led to claims that family property would more adequately be dealt with 
utilising family law principles. However, there have been attempts within the property 
law framework at utilising equitable principles to alleviate this unfairness. Yet those 
attempts to extend the CICT have cost the property framework its certainty, casting 
further doubt on how adequate the doctrine is in this context.  
 
With the introduction of “family assets” as the ‘new model’ of constructive trust, Lord 
Denning sought to revive equitable principles which seemed forgotten in the property 
law context. The new approach recognised the way in which assets such as the family 
home, regardless of financial contribution are purchased in order to provide for a 
couple’s joint lives.170 Therefore a trust should be imposed “whenever justice and good 
conscience require it”.171  The flexibility this afforded the judiciary however, sat in 
conflict with the traditional construction of  property jurisprudence which opposes the  
                                                          
167  A procedural rather than remedial approach to fairness. These approaches are discussed in more detail 
below.   
168 Massaro T. M., ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: Old Words New Wounds’ (1988) 
87 Michigan Law Review 2099, 2101. 
169 Briggs ‘A., Co-ownership and an Equitable Non Sequitur’ (2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 183, 
183; The issues which arise from the application of property law principles are discussed above in relation 
to the ill-reflection of reality and the unfairness which results from the focus on financial contributions 
[4.3.2].  
170 Reflecting the reality of cohabiting relationships in a way which is absent in the classic CICT.  
171 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 3 All ER 744, 747. See also Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 521. The 
“joint family venture” approach has been adopted by the Canadian courts in which all relevant 
circumstances especially mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent and the degree of priority that 
the parties accorded to the idea that they were “a family” see Kerr v Kerr [2011] 1 SCR 269 at [80]-[100] 
based on similar principles to those utilised by Lord Denning regarding “family assets”. 
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prospect of judges acting as a “potentate stretched out under a palm-tree, dispensing 
justice upon the whim of the moment”.172 Yet, these judicial ‘whims’ provided fairer 
results for women than the orthodox application of the CICT.  
 
Rosset sought to clarify the law after a sustained period in which the classic and “family 
asset” approaches were both being applied in a haphazard manner. However, in practice 
the return to strict property formulation of the CICT did little to add clarity  to this area 
of the law which remains described as uncertain, illogical and complex.173 The renewed 
consideration of factors which indicate the parties’ “emotional and economic 
commitment to a joint enterprise”174 in Jones could signal a limited return to the concept 
of family assets and the considerations of fairness that this facilitates. Indeed, the scope 
for judicial discretion emerging from Jones has been seen by some as a departure from 
the property law regime: “it is something else: call it family law, call it an exercise of 
the court's inherent equitable jurisdiction, but, maybe, do not call it property law”.175 In 
doing so the courts seem to be reassessing the balance between fairness and certainty 
once again.176   
 
Until there is legislative intervention the courts will continue “in search of doctrinal 
consistency in an area notorious for doctrinal fudging and the consequent risk of 
destabilisation” and remain unable to find a satisfactory balance between the two under 
                                                          
172 Mee J., The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Oxford: Hart,1999), 179.  
173 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n58), 2.4. 
It also failed in its attempts to produce fair results as discussed above in relation to the focus on financial 
contributions and the way in which it fails to adequately respond to the reality of cohabiting relationships.  
174 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [19]. 
175 Dixon, ‘Editor’s notebook: the still not ended, never-ending story’ (n49), 85; See also Farooq I., ‘The 
erosion of property law principles in cohabitation disputes—a step too far?’ (2008) 14(2) Trusts & 
Trustees 2008 120, 120. 
176 See Chapter 7. 
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a property law regime.177 The courts are attempting to balance “coherent property law 
doctrine against the expectations of family law style justice”. 178  However, despite 
‘clarification’ of approach in Jones, the CICT remains “all things to all judges”.179  
 
‘Family Property’: Family or Property 
The inability for property law to adequately deal with the issues which arise in cases 
involving family property has led to considerable debates about the appropriate 
jurisdiction of such claims. That being whether the breakdown of cohabitation would 
be more adequately dealt with utilising family law principles. Property law is concerned 
with the identification of property rights, in an “unpurposive and formalist”180 manner, 
according to a pre-determined set of rules, culminating in a fixed set of principles which 
are applied without additional discretion as afforded in family law.  Despite the majority 
judgments’ rejection of the idea that family property should be treated in the same way 
as commercial property in Stack and  Jones, indicating that there should be a different 
set of rules applicable to family property as opposed to other forms of property, this has 
yet to be fully realised.181 As a result, the persistence of the “very deep-rooted tendency 
in the common law to privilege ‘property’ over ‘family’” 182  continues to have 
implications for cohabiting couples.  
 
                                                          
177 Miles J., ‘Property law v family law: resolving the problems of family property’ (2003) 23(4) Legal 
Studies 624, 624. 
178 Barlow A., ‘Rights in the Family Home: Time for a Conceptual Revolution?’ in Hudson, A., (ed) New 
Perspectives on Property Law: Human Rights and the Home (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003), 53. 
179 Dixon M., ‘The never-ending story - co-ownership after Stack v Dowden’ (2007) Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 456, 460. An overview of the ways in which the courts have applied/misapplied/ignored 
Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 can be seen in Sloan (n47), further demonstrating the lack of clarity 
and inconsistency in approach.  
180 Halliwell (n80), 516.  
181 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [3], [31], [33], [42] and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53[ [23]-
[25], [53] and [60]. 
182 Conway & Girard, (n105), 719. 
158 
 
The family law framework which deals with the breakdown of marriages and civil 
partnerships has  
“developed to protect the more economically vulnerable family members… who 
reduce their earning capacity as a consequence of fulfilling the home-making 
and child-caring functions within the relationship, leaving the breadwinning or 
most of it to their partner”.183  
This approach can be identified in both the legislation and case law which governs 
divorce and dissolution. 184  Within this context, proceedings are decided with 
considerations of “relationship-generated disadvantage” measured against a “yardstick 
of equality”.185 Sitting in direct contrast with the property law approach in which the 
principle of fairness is limited, or arguably almost absent. Thus creating a “hierarchy of 
relationships”186  between those who are married/unmarried.  
 
It has been argued that the regulation of marriage “treats women as perpetual 
dependents”. 187  However, martial law also affords those who are economically 
vulnerable a protection and recognition of their contributions that without their marriage 
certificate, they would be without. Cohabitation, in stepping away from the patriarchal 
trappings of marriage allows for couples “to define gender and personal identity in more 
liberating and non-traditional ways”. 188  This paints an idealistic notion of modern 
relationships, which is not reflected in reality. Even where relationships are formed on 
                                                          
183Barlow A., ‘Cohabiting Relationships, money and property: The legal backdrop’ (2008) 37 The 
Journal of Socio-Economics 502, 507.  
184 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Part II; Civil Partnership Act 2004 Ch II; White v White [2001] 1 AC 
596, Lambert v Lambert [2002] EWCA Civ 1685 and Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 
UKHL 24. 
185 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 [140]; White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, 
605 
186 Wong, ‘Would you “Care” to Share Your Home?’ (n133), 277.  
187 Deech R., ‘Cohabitation’ (2010) 40 Family Law 39, 43. 
188 ibid, 42.  
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an equal basis, the societal, political and legal inequality are almost inescapable.189 In 
‘trading’ the patriarchal institution of marriage for a more egalitarian relationship form, 
cohabitants risk having their interests determined by a patriarchal property regime.  
 
The family law regime surrounding divorce and dissolution may be imperfect, yet it is 
preferable to the approach currently applicable to cohabitants.190 It needs to adopt a 
more relational approach in order to give the appropriate weight to the nature of the 
parties’ relationship. Property law is an unsuitable mechanism for resolving property 
disputes on the breakdown of cohabiting relationships as it is “predicated on a view of 




The CICT within English law is institutional rather than remedial.192 Under a remedial 
approach the CICT “is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable 
obligation… the remedy can be tailored to the circumstances of the particular case”193 
which is more readily identified with family rather than property law. A remedial 
approach affords flexibility to the judiciary, allowing them to consider the diverse range 
                                                          
189 See this in Theory Chapters 2 and 3 and in practice Chapters 5-7.  
190 On the imperfect nature of the divorce legislation see for example Glennon L., ‘Obligations Between 
Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 22, 43 
191 Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (n108), 228. As discussed at [4.3.1].  
192 See Etherton T., ‘Constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel: the search for clarity and principle’ 
(2009) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 104 and Etherton T., ‘Constructive Trusts: A New Model for 
Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 265 on this point. The remedial 
approach is often adopted in other common law jurisdictions. With the exception of Lord Denning who 
seemed the most happy to play fast and loose with the 'remedial' constructive trust to affect an equitable 
outcome”: Sheedy J., ‘Civil Law Jurisdiction and The English Trust Idea: Lost in Translation?’ (2008) 
20 Denning Law Journal 173, 180. 
193 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] A.C. 669, 715-6. For detailed analysis 
on the remedial constructive trust: see Birks P., ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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of relationships and the needs of the parties. 194  Thus facilitating a discretionary 
approach which has been all but removed from the property law.  
 
Following Stack and Jones, there are indications that the English approach to the CICT 
is becoming more remedial particularly with the courts willingness to impute 
intention.195 However, the limited scope for inference and the even more significantly 
limited use of imputation does not signal a significant shift. It has been said that the 
“distinction between imputation and inference… marks the dividing line between the 
constructive trust as a discretionary remedy… and an institutional trust”.196 Clearly, if 
the courts are to value the impact of their judgments rather than focus on the consistent 
application of ill-fitting principles, a remedial approach should be adopted so that they 
might “appropriately compensate for the economic effects of the relationship. The 
nature and extent of the adjustment will depend on the circumstances of the 
relationship”.197 
 
Form over Function 
The “diverse circumstances”198 which constitute cohabitation has formed one of the 
central arguments against formulating a legislative regime. This reasoning can be 
                                                          
194 See Wong S., ‘Cohabitation and the Law Commission’s Project’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 
145, 152. It is for this reason that the remedial approach is used in other common law jurisdictions, such 
as New Zealand, Canada and the United States. It can also be identified in the Law Commissions 
proposals in 2007 when considering ‘qualifying contributions’ which were not limited to financial 
contributions and constructing a scheme based on benefit/economic disadvantage which also would have 
given the judiciary a range of powers similar to those applicable to divorce proceedings, albeit in a more 
limited manner: Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship 
Breakdown (n58), 4.26-4.40. 
195 See [7.4]. 
196 Etherton, ‘Constructive Trusts: A New Model for Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ (n191), 272-3.  
197 Chisholm R. (et al)., ‘De facto property decisions in NSW; emerging patterns and policies’ (1991) 5 
Australian Journal of Family Law 241, 264; such an approach is unlikely to be fully embraced without 
the consent of Parliament through legislation for those reasons relating to judicial law-making/activism 
as discussed above.  
198 Law Commission, Sharing Homes (n21), ix. 
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undermined by focussing on the nature of the relationships through distinguishing 
between couples, “blood relatives or ‘caring’ relationships and ‘commercial 
relationships’”.199 In addition to this, the ‘difference’ between married and unmarried 
couples emerges as a theme in anti-legislative literature/speech. However, research 
indicates that cohabiting and married couples are similar in both “function and 
effect”.200  Currently the law adopts a form over function approach in this regard, 
differentiating between the two groups on this basis producing “disparate and 
inequitable results”201 as a result.  
 
It is proposed that the law should look at the family in terms of function rather than 
form, meaning what the relationship does rather than what it is.202 Such an approach 
would allow for the law to react to “how the role-division assumed within a relationship 
has determined the different contributions which each party has made and has affected 
their respective financial futures”.203 The diversity of marital relationships is recognised 
within the family law framework, and yet under the property law approach such 
differences are almost entirely absent from consideration.  
 
A functional approach would signal a departure from the consideration of couples rights 
and needs on an abstract basis, and instead allow an approach which evaluates 
relationships in a more value neutral way to be adopted.204 It would also widen the 
                                                          
199Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n58), 1.19.  
Commercial relationships have already been distinguished by the courts in the existing CICT regime as 
noted above in this section. 
200 Barlow A., & James G., ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’ (2004) 62(2) 
Modern Law Review 143, 153. 
201 Conway & Girard, (n105), 748. 
202 See for example the dissenting judgment of Ward LJ in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association 
[1998] Ch 304; see also Glennon, (n190).  
203 Bailey-Harris R., ‘Law and the Unmarried Couples – Oppression or Liberation’ (1996) 8 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 137,141; which can be categorised as a relational approach as discussed above.  
204 See Glennon, (n190). 
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remedies available to cohabiting couples beyond the existence and scope of beneficial 
interest, but it could include a monetary or occupation award.205 In summary, allowing 
for a remedial approach to be adopted on the breakdown of both married and unmarried 
couples would alleviate a number of the issues faced by economically vulnerable 
individuals. Yet the law is reluctant to match the social reality of cohabiting couples as 
they are unwilling to further ‘dilute’ the cherished institution of marriage.206 
 
Undermining the Institution of Marriage  
Reform relating to cohabitation has proved controversial given its historical ties with 
social deviance. 207  Despite the normalisation and increasing levels of cohabiting 
relationships, reform is often ‘blocked’ due to “its perceived threat in some quarters to 
the institution of marriage”.208 There is currently a wide spectrum of legal responses to 
cohabitation. There are instances in which cohabitants are treated as though they were 
married, and in others it treats them as strangers with little clarification as to the reasons 
underpinning the diversity of approaches towards cohabiting couples.209  
 
Those who oppose legislative intervention frequently cite the increasing levels of 
cohabitation as a problem in itself, and seek to “promote marriage as an attractive 
alternative”.210 However,  
                                                          
205 See for example Dewar, J., ‘Land, Law and the Family Home’ in Bright S., & Dewar J., (eds) Land 
Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 327–355. 
206 HC Deb 05 February 2013, vol 558, col 161. 
207 As can be seen in Chapters 5-7. 
208 Miles J. (et al)., ‘Reforming family law – the case of cohabitation: ‘things may not work out as you 
expect’’ (2012) 34(2) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 167, 168. 
209 Barlow and James (n200), 147; Barlow A., (et al) ‘Just a Piece of Paper? Marriage and Cohabitation’ 
in Park A., (et al) (eds.)., British Social Attitudes: the 18th Report (2001), 44-5.  
210 Probert R., ‘Cohabitation: Current Legal Solutions’ (2009) 62(1) Current Legal Problems 316, 316. 
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“it does not follow logically that the support of one institution necessarily 
undermines another - support of a variety of institutions may simply be a 
manifestation of the pluralism characterising contemporary society”.211 
The significant societal shift in the nature of the family is a social phenomenon which 
“makes it imperative that the law acknowledges diverse family relationships and deals 
with them justly”.212 This is clearly a political issue, but it has, at least for cohabitants 
had significant legal implications. Despite public support for the extension of legal 
provisions similar to those which are applicable to married couples to those who 
cohabit, and in addition to this “most cohabitants in fact believe that they are already 
entitled to be treated as though married after some period of time”213 there seems little 
hope that there will be legislative intervention into the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships.  
 
Non-Intervention and the Protection of Autonomy  
“If cohabitants are dissatisfied with their legal position and believe 
that they suffer injustice…‘Why don't they marry?’”214 
An additional argument which has been waged against the creation of a legislative 
regime for cohabitants, is based on individual autonomy.215  The implication being that 
“fault does not lie with the common intention constructive trust” but rather with the 
“cohabitants [that] have chosen to remain unmarried or register the property in only one 
                                                          
211 Bailey-Harris, (n203), 138. 
212 Barlow & Lind, (n87), 469. 
213 Bowman C. G., Unmarried Couples, Law and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
175. Note the failed attempts at introducing such legislation as discussed Chapter 7. 
214 Deech, The Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation (n143), 482.  
215 Autonomy is discussed in depth at [2.5.3]. See also Eekelaar, (n92), 101 who discusses the objections 
to use of proprietary estoppel as an alternative is libertarian individualism – in that to allow domestic 
contributions to have their full weight acknowledged would intrude into their domestic relationship. 
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partner’s name”.216 From this perspective, individuals have chosen not to marry an in 
avoiding the “undesired norms of behaviour”217 associated with marriage and as a result 
they have also forfeited their right to the legal protection afforded to married couples. 
Such a decision should be respected by the state, and as a private matter, the state should 
not intervene.218  
 
The above argument is premised on the idea that individuals are making a free and 
informed choice. This neglects three central factors. First, the nature of many cohabiting 
relationships means that there is no ‘set’ date in which cohabitation can be said to have 
begun, which creates difficulties in terms of discussing assets upon breakdown, 
notwithstanding those issues addressed above regarding the communication of 
couples.219 Second, it does not recognise the number of cohabiting couples who live 
together in expectation of marriage.220 Finally, it assumes that such individuals are 
making an informed decision as regards their rights. However, despite attempts at 
raising awareness such as the ‘living together campaign’, of cohabitants as to their legal 
position, confusion remains.221 Even the judiciary have expressed confusion relating to 
the legal principles surrounding cohabitation.222  
                                                          
216 Yip M, ‘The Rules Applying to Unmarried Cohabitants’ Family Home: Jones v Kernott’ (2012) 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 159, 165; A perspective that can also be identified in Deech, The 
Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation (n143). 
217 Tee L., ‘Division of Property Upon Relationship Breakdown’ in Herring J., ed. Family Law: Issues, 
Debates, Policy (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2001), 46. 
218 See Chapter 2, particularly [2.5.2] regarding state intervention and the public/private division. On 
legal paternalism/maternalism in the context of cohabiting relationships: see Bailey-Harris, (n203), 137. 
219 As discussed in detail [4.3.1]. 
220 For example Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127 - engaged; Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317 - 
presenting and understood to ‘be’ married due to ‘Mrs’ Burns name change). Although this category 
cannot be said to encompass the majority of cohabitants, it still accounts for a significant number of them 
(Based on the British Household Panel Survey). See also Coast E., ‘Currently Cohabiting: Relationship 
Attitudes Expectations and Outcomes’ in Stillwell J. (et al)., Fertility, living arrangements care and 
mobility: understanding population trends and processes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 120.  
221 This is also premised on the assumption that cohabitants will behave “rationally” in reaction to the 
law: see Barlow & James, (n200), 167 and Chapter 6. 




Underpinning the notion of ‘choice’ is the assumption that couples who marry do so for 
legal protection, or at least that it is a substantial factor in the decision-making process. 
In contrast, Barlow’s study found that “marriage as a trigger for legal rights had less 
appeal than… anticipated”.223 In addition research indicates the majority of cohabiting 
couples are unaware that there is no specific legal protection associated with their 
relationship status, which is exacerbated by the continuing belief in common law 
marriage. 224  The ‘choice’ between getting married and obtaining rights or living 
together without that security whilst objectively true, serves as another example of the 
way in which the logic of the law does not adequately reflect the lived reality of 
cohabitants experiences.225 If the law continues to adopt the “Napoleonic approach of 
ignoring cohabitants because they ignore the law… [it does so] at a high cost to them 
and their children on relationship breakdown or death of a partner”.226 That is not to say 
that there is no value in respecting individual autonomy, there are those couples who 
wish to regulate their own affairs, and as such some of the legislative intervention which 
has been suggested, such as opt-out schemes would be problematic. 227  Equally 
however, “there still has to be a rule for those who do not give their minds to the 
matter”.228  
 
                                                          
223Barlow, ‘Cohabiting Relationships, money and property: The legal backdrop’ (n183), 517. The most 
recent data on public opinion relating to cohabiting couples rights on separation can be found in Jenkins 
S. (et al)., Families in Britain: The Impact of Changing Family Structures and What the Public Think 
(London: Ipsos MORI, 2009), 16. 
224 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n58), 1. 
225 Douglas, (n55), 36. 
226 Barlow A., ‘Cohabitation Law Reform – Messages from Research’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 
167, 175.  
227 The scheme put forward by the Law Commission in 2007 for example was an opt-out scheme: Law 
Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n58). 
228 Gardner S., ‘A Woman’s Work’ (1991) 54(1) Modern Law Review 126, 129. See also Deech, The 
Case Against the Legal Recognition of Cohabitation (n143), 483.  
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This overwhelmingly demonstrates that there needs to be a balance between autonomy 
and the protection of those made vulnerable by their relationship (gendered). Respect 
for autonomy need not require the total absence of the law.229 Clearly, if “pushed too 
far the autonomy argument may leave the vulnerable facing unjustified hardship on 
separation”,230 and yet the law needs to maintain a space within which those who do not 
wish to have their private affairs interfered with by the state can do so. Currently, despite 
the consequences of valuing autonomy over protecting those who are vulnerable, the 
law does little to attempt to rebalance the scales.231  
 
4.3.4 Parliamentary Inaction 
The inability for the courts to progress the CICT further than it has already means that 
“the hope that Parliament might intervene”, 232 a cry which echoes as far back as Gissing 
v Gissing continues.233 Despite attempts to implement change, and calls for intervention, 
this has been unheard by Parliament. 234  It is clear that “notwithstanding judicial 
[attempts]… to ‘familialize’ the law of trusts to allow for the social realities of 
cohabitation and associated domestic arrangements, judges have in a sense developed 
the law as far as they can”.235  Judges are clearly reluctant to continue developing 
cohabitation law, allowing for additional discretion until it is legitimised by 
Parliament.236 
 
                                                          
229 See for example Freedman J. (et al)., Property and Marriage: An Integrated Approach. Property, Tax, 
Pensions and Benefits in the Family, (London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1988), 16.  
230 Bridge (n162), 912. 
231 Conway & Girard, (n105), 747. 
232Rotherham, ‘The property rights of unmarried cohabitees’ (n52), 268. 
233 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886. 
234 See [7.5] for details on the proposed legislation which has been put to Parliament and rejected.  
235 Conway & Girard, (n105), 769. 
236 See for example Halliwell (n80), 518 and Harpum, (n93), 286. 
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The inaction of Parliament causes significant difficulties for the judiciary as they 
attempt to balance social need with their own constitutional principles. Patching up the 
old common-law scheme while attempting not to step on Parliaments toes. The adoption 
of “wide discretions can… be seen as an abdication of law's traditional mission”237 
without having been sanctioned by Parliament as in the case of divorce proceedings. 
This has resulted in a system in which “neither the rules applied nor the results achieved 
are consistent or coherent”.238 As such, the “patchwork” landscape which we are left 
with leaves much to be desired.239  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that the CICT is subject to two central critiques, both of 
which demonstrate the need for property law to “shake free from its patriarchal roots 
and react appropriately”240  to the changing social landscape. It needs to recognise that 
property is no longer valued in merely monetary terms, nor is a home created purely by 
financial means. In adopting a more relational approach, acknowledging the difference 
in gendered contributions and communication, the framework would more adequately 
interact and deal with the issues which arise on the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships.  
 
Two approaches have been identified in in the courts’ approach to the valuation of 
‘women’s work’. There are those cases in which women are patronised and given rights 
due to their perceived vulnerability. Or there are those cases in which “the very activity 
which deprives a woman of her independent means of acquiring security and saving 
                                                          
237 Birks P, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1985), 293. 
238 Barlow & Lind, (n87), 472. 
239 Tee, Co-ownership and Trusts (n166), 132. 
240 Barlow, ‘Cohabiting Relationships, money and property: The legal backdrop’ (n183), 502. 
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capital [namely pregnancy and raising children] is excluded”241 from considerations as 
to whether she is to have security in the home she has made for herself. This reflects the 
conflict which arises between a difference or sameness approach to equality as 
examined later in this thesis, and demonstrates the way in which recognising difference 
is sometimes a necessary prerequisite for achieving a just result. 242  The courts 
preference for uniformity, viewing the family as “posing a problem for the purity and 
logic of the law of property”,243 has led to considerable injustice for predominantly 
women, despite their seeming neutrality.  
 
This chapter has set out the current legal regime and alternative approaches which have 
been adopted by the judiciary, and provided an overview of the critiques which have 
arisen from the application of the CICT in practice. This gives an adequate background 
and understanding of the law in theory and practice which will subsequently be built 
upon in this thesis through an examination of these approaches from an 
equality/difference perspective. The following chapters provide the theoretical 
framework for the subsequent in-depth examination of the case law in its historical 
context so that the links between the social and legal treatment of women are made clear.  
 
                                                          
241 Eekelaar, (n92), 94. 
242 Here the perspective offered by Deech embodies a formal approach to equality and the latter approach 
noted by Eekelaar can be seen to reflect a more substantive approach. See Chapter 3 in relation to the 
differing notions of equality.  
243 Probert, ‘Cohabitation: Current Legal Solutions’ (n210), 332. It is for this reason that CICT cases 
provide an apt ‘case study’ for the analysis of the application of sameness/difference approaches to 
equality in principle and practice.  
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Chapter 5 - Socio-Legal Changes Influencing Cohabitation in Britain 
between 1960–1979. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of a number of the socio-historical and legal changes 
which occurred between 1960-1979 which provide insight into the position of women 
in society. It is arranged thematically, covering a variety of issues, from employment to 
the nature of the family, drawing on a variety of perspectives in order to construct an 
image of the historical context in which the cases, which are analysed at the end of the 
chapter, take place. In providing this historical overview, the adequacy of different 
equality perspectives, as used by the judiciary can be considered against the appropriate 
socio-legal backdrop. 
 
The chapter then analyses the key cases relating to the CICT which emerged during this 
period. This section predominantly focusses on the two distinct approaches to equality 
adopted by the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal. The case analysis examines the 
way in which the courts have constructed women, relationships and contributions. It 
also considers the impact that this has had on the outcome of the cases. Thus providing 
an insight into the impact which the application of differing forms of equality can have 
in practice.  
 
5.2 Employment  
The breadwinner paradigm of the family, and the gendered public/private divide had a 
considerable role in constructing the employment sphere as an environment based on 
masculine norms. The ‘ideal’ employee was the husband who required a ‘family wage’ 
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to support the family, whereas, as women increasingly entered into employment, they 
were seen to “only come to work for pin-money”.1 This section traces the development 
of women’s employment. In particular it examines the perception of working 
wives/mothers, and the conflict which was constructed between paid work 
(employment) and unpaid labour (motherhood). Finally, this section examines the way 
in which, due to the gendered construction of the ideal worker, and the perceptions of 
‘women’s work’ which have stemmed from it, the financial independence that 
employment ought to have brought women remained unfulfilled.  
 
5.2.1 Women’s Employment in the 1960s 
Working Wives 
The notion that a woman would work until she was married, and thereafter be 
financially supported by her husband was the prevalent ideal during the 1960s. Women 
were frequently posed with the choice between work and marriage, thus reinforcing the 
housewife/breadwinner model of the family. Although there was a perception that this 
was changing, and that women had a choice, the discourses surrounding working wives 
was filled with conflicting notions:  
“not so long ago women were expected to choose either a job or marriage… 
Today the ambitious girl doesn’t see why she can’t have marriage and a career. 
A clear pattern has emerged: girls expect to leave school, spend the next few 
years training and working then leave to have a family”.2 
Here Woman’s Own, presents the idea that the ‘ambitious girl’ can have it all. Yet, this 
is directly contrasted with the discussion of the ‘pattern’ that follows. The fact that the 
                                                          
1 Sheila Douglass at approximately 2.09 in Trades Union Congress., A Woman’s Worth: the story of the 
Ford sewing machinists, Recording Women’s Voices: <www.tuc.org.uk/publications/womans-worth-
story-ford-sewing-machinists-1968-84> accessed 20/01/18. 
2 The Mystery of Being a Woman: going out to work Woman’s Own (29 November 1969), 1. 
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traditional progression from worker to wife is maintained, reinforces the idea that 
motherhood and work remain incompatible no matter how ‘ambitious’ a woman may 
be. 
 
The prevalence of the idealised ‘traditional family’ model and associated familial 
stereotypes meant that many women who did not have children were still treated as 
though they had made, or would make, the choice between work or marriage.3 Those 
women who were able to balance work and marriage were to seek employment which 
fit “comfortably with the concept of companionate marriage without upsetting the 
conventional distribution of economic and other power”. 4  Although women’s 
magazines, as can be seen in the extract above, were supposedly praising the idea that 
women had a choice, the purported conflict between matrimonial harmony and work 
was frequently peddled by those same publications: 
“ask any man if he’d rather his wife worked or stayed at home and see what he 
says; he would rather she stayed at home… You can’t have deep and safe 
happiness in marriage and the exciting independence of a career as well”.5 
Women’s choices were therefore, still limited due to their position as wife and mother.6  
  
The construction of the worker, premised on the masculine breadwinner, meant that 
often women would only work menial jobs, or would be prevented from working at all.7 
                                                          
3 Despite the increase in the rate of married women working, according to census data (which almost 
certainly under recorded women’s part-time, casual labour), 26% of married women were employed 
outside the home in 1951, 35% in 1961 and 49% by the early 1970s: McCarthy H., ‘Women, Marriage 
and Paid Work in Post-War Britain’ (2017) 26(1) Women’s History Review 46, 47.  
4 Finch J., & Summerfield P., ‘Social Reconstruction and the Emergence of Companionate Marriage’ in 
Allen G., (ed) The Sociology of the Family: a reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 20–21. 
5 Dickins M., Woman’s Own (28 January 1961).  
6 A choice which stems from the series of liberal dichotomies discussed in Chapter 2.  
7 This would of course vary depending on the circumstances. For example, working-class women have 
historically deviated from this model due to the need for wives to work out of necessity.  
172 
 
“Working wives could imperil marital harmony because of the challenge they posed to 
men’s ‘traditional’ identity as providers”.8 Wives that worked risked emasculating their 
husbands. If a wife needed to work, then the assumption was that her husband was 
unable to provide, thus questioning his ‘identity’.9 The importance of maintaining the 
work/marriage divide can be seen in the statement made at the 1966 Civil Service 
Clerical Workers Association annual meeting: 
“What is needed was better pay so that we could keep our wives at home where 
they belonged. What we want is to give breadwinners throughout the country 
enough pay to keep their wives at home”.10 
Securing the division between the masculine public sphere, and the feminine private 
sphere required the continuation of the breadwinner/housewife model of the family. A 
position which was seen to be undermined by the presence of wives in the workplace.  
 
The uncertainty of women’s position in the workplace placed limitations on their career 
aspirations, “it was never worth trying to define it too sharply; after all, so much 
depended on the man”.11 The perception that the breadwinner/housewife roles were and 
ought to be the norm was not only held by the public due to the way in which such roles 
‘learnt’ from a young age, but they were consistently reinforced through the legal sphere, 
society, and the media.12 The assumptions held by employers also had their role in 
limiting those jobs which were suitable for women, “the spectrum of careers was limited; 
professional training was thought to be wasted on a girl who was only going to give up 
                                                          
8 McCarthy, ‘Women, Marriage and Paid Work in Post-war Britain’ (n3) 3. 
9 This is also based on the notion that a wife would only work because the family needed a second income. 
This assumption discounted the fact that perhaps a wife had other motivations for working, further 
providing insight into the perception of ‘women’s work’.  
10 As quoted in Boston S., Women Workers and Trade Unions, (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1987), 
255. 
11 Ingham M., Now we are thirty: Women of the breakthrough generation. (London: Eyre Methuen, 
1981), 15. 
12 Examples of which can be seen throughout this chapter.  
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work when she married”.13 Marriage constructed women as dependents, why would a 
wife need to work?14 
 
Working Mothers 
The position of working mothers, though sharing many of the problems expressed above, 
also faced additional backlash from society and the state, both for single mothers, and 
those who were married. One of the key issues for working mothers was the “public 
provision [of childcare] reach[ed] an all-time low in the late 1960s”.15 This meant that 
women were either ‘trapped’ in the home having to look after their children if they could 
afford to do so, or ‘guilted’ into working in order to pay for private childcare.  
  
The Plowden report 1967, which examined primary education, reflected the unsettled 
public perception of working mothers at the time, putting forward conflicting positions. 
First, they acknowledged that “much as we may deplore the increased tendency of 
mothers of young children to work, it would be unrealistic not to count its economic 
yield”.16 The report then proceeded to express concerns that despite the possible harm 
to children “many mothers will work”.17 Within this period, a distinction tended to be 
drawn between women who needed to work and those who chose to work: 
“it ceases to be for the good of the child that the mother should stay at home if 
the result is that there is no bread to eat; on the other hand the argument that it 
is better for a child to have a television set, a record player and a bicycle than to 
                                                          
13 Auchmuty R., ‘Law and the Power of Feminism: How Marriage Lost its Power to Oppress Women’ 
(2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 71, 74. 
14  See Smart C., The ties that bind: Law, marriage and the reproduction of patriarchal relations. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). 
15 Lewis J., ‘The Failure to Expand Childcare Provision and to Develop a Comprehensive Childcare 
Policy in Britain During the 1960s and 1970s’ (2013) 24(2) Twentieth Century British History 249, 250. 
Also see Riley D., War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and the Mother (London, Virago, 1983). 
16 Department of Education and Science., The Plowden Report (London: HMSO, 1967), 457. 
17 ibid, 120.  
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have his mother at home is not completely convincing”.18  
Thus suggesting that only legitimate reason for mothers to take up employment should 
be financial necessity. However, there were those who recognised that mothers needed 
more than domesticity. For example, the Mothers Union in 1964 urged women, 
especially those with young children to keep in touch with the world outside their homes, 
to take up voluntary work, attend evening classes all in order to ensure that they were 
not viewed merely as housewives, but as valued members of society.19 
 
Jobs for Women? 
Despite reinforcing traditional stereotypes and patterns of work (or lack of work) for 
women, in response to labour shortages in the late 1960s the need to create jobs ‘for 
women’ was becoming increasingly recognised.20 In the Lords there was a discussion 
regarding “the need to encourage industry, the Civil Service and the professions to make 
more use of qualified married women on a part-time basis”.21  However, this move was 
not made for the benefit of women. Rather:  
“jobs were set up in a context in which married women were seen as a necessary 
expedient to tide over a period of labour shortage... and on the assumption that 
their primary responsibilities lay at home. Thus, part-time work was explicitly 
designed to be undemanding and lacking in promotion prospects and 
responsibility. The ramifications of this are still being experienced by women 
today”.22 
                                                          
18 ‘Day Care of Children under Five Years Old’ (January 1963, MH 156/51).  
19 Mothers Union., Mothers Union News (January 1964), 2-3. 
20 See for example the comments about married women as an unused resource in Hunt A., A Survey of 
Women’s Employment, 2 vols (London: HMSO, 1965). 
21 HL Deb 13 Nov 1968, vol 297, col 500.   
22 Brendan B., Dale A., &Joshi H., ‘Part-Time Work Among British Women’ in Blossfeld H. P., & Hakim 
C., (eds.), In Between Equalization and Marginalization: Women Working Part-Time in Europe and The 
United States of America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 211. 
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Despite the ways in which the creation of new jobs can be seen to benefit women, giving 
them some financial independence from men, gender equality did not underlie this 
policy.  
 
The leak of the Women’s Employment Survey 1968 demonstrates the way in which 
women’s employment was not the source of economic freedom that some women had 
hoped. The Observer reported that the leak showed “that a least four million women are 
used virtually as slave labour in this country”.23 The remainder of the article drew on 
the problems with a lack of provision of nurseries for those women who wished to work, 
to the ‘wastage’ of women’s abilities and qualifications, to the lack of governmental 
pressure placed on employers to facilitate practices which would benefit or encourage 
working women and they drew on the division of labour in the home.24 The content of 
that article, demonstrates the way in which, despite increasing numbers of women 
entering employment, it remained a ‘man’s world’. One which had failed to adapt to the 
needs of workers with childcaring responsibilities, and which continued to place women 
in jobs which were underpaid and undervalued.  
 
5.2.2 Women’s Employment in the 1970s 
In 1971 53% of women aged 16 to 64 were in work compared to 92% of men.25 At this 
time “men with children [were] more likely to work than those without”,26 with the 
opposite being true for women, though this gap narrowed when it came to older women. 
This exemplifies the gendered nature of work, and the distinct roles and expectations 
assigned to men and women at this time. Men as the provider, women as the carer who 
                                                          
23 Haworth D., ‘Shock Report on women ‘censored’’ The Observer (31 March 1968). 
24 ibid.   
25 ONS., Women in the Labour Market 2013 (25 September 2013), 2. 
26 ibid, 7-8.  
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could return to work once their children reached school age. As a result of this 
employers  
“showed very little interest in courses leading to professional qualifications [for 
women, as women were], giving the impression that they regarded it as a job for 
the moment only until they married. In view of this, one forgives a male 
employer for any prejudice he might have against employing women!”27  
This quote from The Times provides insight into the media coverage of women’s 
employment and the tone it adopted. Despite acknowledging that, based on gendered 
assumptions relating to working patterns, employers were unwilling to train women, it 
then legitimises discrimination and blames women for their own inequality.28   
 
By the late 70s there had been a more notable shift in the pattern of women’s 
employment. Rather than women employment ending prior to marriage/childbearing, it 
was primarily married women who went to work in order to support their families.29 
Increasing numbers of women began to make the transition from private to public, the 
feminine realm of domesticity to the masculine sphere of employment. That is not to 
say that women had not formed part of the male dominated culture prior to this, for 
example the role of women's labour during the First and Second World War is well 
known, but rather that “they have [previously] occupied and spoken from a different 
place within it”.30 
 
The increasing employment opportunities for women was undoubtedly an improvement, 
                                                          
27 Symon P. H., ‘Advertising: setting the standards—encouraging women’ The Times (28 Jun 1971), 8. 
28 Reflecting the way in which classic liberal theory has dealt with difference: see [3.2.1].  
29 Vincent D., Poor Citizens: The State and the Poor in Twentieth Century Britain. (London: Longman, 
1991) 183. 
30Pollock G., ‘Feminism, Femininity and The Hayward Exhibition 1978’ (1979) 1(2) Feminist Law 
Review 33, 38. 
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it did not have a considerable impact on women’s financial stability: 
“Women were yoked to men economically, not just because they earned much 
less but because they often needed a signature from their father or husband to 
gain credit or buy bigger items”.31 
Women still needed to rely on men, their father if they remained single, and their 
husband if they were married to make purchases, or even to be granted a mortgage.32 
Even though women were gaining more financial independence, given the increase in 
the number of women working, they were not able to spend the money they had earned 
freely. Again, what seems like progress towards equality, is undermined in practice, by 
societal and institutional sexism. 
 
Despite the positive trends in women’s employment, social attitudes and business 
culture remained outdated. “Entry into male-defined culture involved a denial of what 
was specifically female” 33  their traditional role assigned them to wifedom and 
motherhood which has been constructed as incompatible with employment. One of the 
key issues during this period was the extent of occupational gender segregation in the 
labour market and the tendency for women to be concentrated within industries which 
were underpaid/undervalued and those which provided fewer hours.34 The first report 
produced by the Equal Opportunities Commission acknowledged that: 
                                                          
31 Cochrane K., 1963: The beginning of the feminist movement: Fifty years on, we look back at the year 
that signalled the beginning of the modern era (The Guardian 7 May 2013):  
<www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/may/07/1963-beginning-feminist-movement> accessed: 
20/01/2018. 
32 The inability to be granted a mortgage even if she was able to contribute her own money without 
permission from their father for those who were cohabiting covertly, which was frequent during this 
period.   
33 Rowbotham S., A Century of Women, The History of Women in Britain and The United States (London: 
Penguin Books, 1999), 399. 
34  See Hakim C., ‘Sexual divisions within the labour force: occupational segregation’ (1978) 
86 Employment Gazette 1264 and Hakim C., ‘Job segregation: trends in the 1970s’ (1981) 
89 Employment Gazette 521. 
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“traditional distinctions between what is men’s work and what is women’s work 
have been steadily abolished in fact, although many of our industrial and social 
practices continue to be based on these assumptions”.35 
This perceived legal ‘progress’ as undermined by the trappings of socially constructed 
gender roles which continued to be embraced by employers and seen as the norm by the 
public.  
 
The ‘economic success’ achieved by women came at a cost. The structure of the 
workplace and legislation surrounding it was still very much androcentric, with little 
consideration of the fact that the majority of women in the workplace still had the role 
of primary caregiver and the unequal division of labour in the home. Employment 
outside the home did not free them from their household duties, instead women began 
to perform a ‘second shift’.36  This reinforced the perception of part-time work as 
‘women’s work’, as it was the only form of employment which they could sustain 
alongside their full-time job as wife and mother.  
 
Further contributing to the issues faced by working mothers was the lack of progress 
concerning the provision of childcare outside the home. The economic crisis rendered 
the Conservative manifesto pledge to increase part-time nursery care “a promise 
unfulfilled”.37 This meant that the obligation/expectation that women would care for 
their children meant that a women’s place was still seen as at home. Again, a woman 
                                                          
35  Equal Opportunities Commission., First Annual Report of the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(London: HMSO, 1977). 
36 This was due to the way in which part-time work was more compatible with performing her two ‘jobs’ 
most adequately. The ‘second shift’ was a term used by Hochschild & Machung to describe the double 
burden faced by women who were balancing work outside the home with childcare and housework: see 
Hochschild A. & Machung A., The Second Shift (New York: Penguin, 2003).  
37 Conservative Party Manifesto: For a Better Tomorrow, 1970. Also see ‘Nursery Education’ (August 
1971, MH 156/220). 
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could work if she found flexible or part-time work, or if she could afford childcare, but 
this clearly limited the potential of many women.  
 
The lack of flexible work and the economic consequences of part-time work which will 
be discussed in detail below, meant that though women had the ability to earn their own 
money, they were still significantly more disadvantaged than their male counterparts.38 
Those women who had entered into the world of business were said to have done so 
“because they have no money to live off”39 they were not thought of as equals but 
looked on with pity. There were no individual women looking to improve their own 
lives, or those of their family, gender stereotypes prevailed and these women were to 
remain ‘just housewives’ who had been forced to work. 
 
5.3 Employment Legislation 
Having examined the more social elements of women’s employment in the 1960s-
1970s, this section provides an overview of the acts which led to legislative change and 
the implications of a number of central pieces of legislation which were enacted. In 
particular it traces the impact which women had on legislation, and in turn, the impact 
which legislation had on women.  
 
5.3.1 Industrial Action 
The strike action of women in the late 1960s provided incentive for later legislative 
change. The most notable strike was that of the Dagenham sewing machinists in 1968. 
The machinists went on strike against sex-discrimination in their job grading, they 
                                                          
38 Both financially, as is discussed in [5.3], and in terms of the jobs deemed suitable for women. 
39 Business News The Sunday Times (28 May 1972) as cited in Adams C., & Laurikietis R., The Gender 
Trap: A Closer Look at Sex Roles (Virago, London, 1976), 76. 
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demanded to be recognised as ‘skilled workers’. 40  Striking for three weeks, this 
“handful of discontented women”41 halted production of the entire Ford factory. In 
seizing their economic power, the women at Dagenham forced their employers to react. 
As one manager noted, if the strike action continued “the company would be forced to 
lay off thousands of men and eventually stop production”. 42  These concerns were 
focussed on the loss of male income, reflecting the gendered construction of the 
breadwinning worker which was dominant at the time, the threat that the machinists 
posed meant that their concerns had to be listened to.  
 
Through the impact of their strike action, women realised that they had power, that they 
could have an impact that was beyond their individual life. “They could stop a huge car 
factory... women are not used to feeling powerful, so it had a very great effect on 
them”.43 The publicity about women's ability to impact on men's lives in a man's world, 
for the recognition of their role, began to dismantle the notion that women in 
employment were powerless.44 Despite the fact that the women at Dagenham did not 
seek equal pay themselves, their acts placed gender inequality firmly on the political 
agenda, which was subsequently seized upon by the Women’s Liberation Movement 
and political actors, notably Barbara Castle.45 Thus placing considerable pressure on 
                                                          
40 This was in reaction to the new pay structure implemented at the factory which categorised the 
machinists as ‘unskilled workers’ and they were therefor entitled to less pay. Notably those considered 
skilled workers in the factory were predominantly men. See McCarthy H., ‘Gender Equality’ in Thane 
P., (ed) Unequal Britain: Equalities in Britain since 1945 (London: Continuum, 2010), 111. 
41 Friedman H., and Meredeen S., The Dynamics of Industrial Conflict: Lessons from Ford (London: 
Croom Helm, 1980), 107.  
42 Beynon, H. Working for Ford (London: Allen Lane, 1984), 91. 
43 Wandor M., Once a Feminist: Stories of a Generation (London: Virago, 1990), 202. 
44 There was significant media coverage of the strikes. See for example ‘Ford talks failure threat to 
40,000’ The Times (14 June 1968), 22; ‘Ministry acts as women threaten jobs at Ford’ The Times (15 
June 1968), 1; The Times also dedicated an editorial to discussing the strike: The Times (24 June 1968), 
9. All of which were cited in Stevenson G., ‘The Women's Movement and ‘Class Struggle’: gender, class 
formation and political identity in women's strikes, 1968–78’ 25(5) (2016) Women’s History Review 741, 
744. 
45 See generally Lewis J., Women in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell 1992), 117 and Coote A. & 
Campbell B., Sweet Freedom: The Struggle for Women's Liberation (London: Picador, 1982), 10. 
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politicians to act on the issue of gender inequality. The following section goes on to 
provide an overview of the changes to employment legislation as influenced by such 
industrial action, the Women’s Liberation Movement and other pressure groups in the 
1970s and the impact of these changes on the position of women.  
 
5.3.2 Restricting Rights  
The Industrial Relations Act 1971, which attempted to restrict workers’ rights, was met 
by strikes by not only male workers but women. The Act was seen as a way to “make 
the trade unions the whipping boy for their [meaning the government] economic 
mismanagement”.46 Conservative policies had angered many workers, as such when 
Labour came to power in 1974 a plethora of legislation which attempted to improve the 
position of workers, particularly focussing on women, including provisions for 
maternity leave, the right of reinstatement and equal pay followed.47 
 
5.3.3 Equal Pay and Anti-Discrimination 
As demonstrated through the discussion of striking women above, pay inequality and 
sex discrimination were becoming increasingly visible public issues. As a response to 
this the Equal Pay Act 1970 (EPA) and Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) were passed.48 
The EPA made pay disparity between men and women performing the same work 
illegal. One of the major aims of this act was to dismantle occupational segregation in 
the workplace.49 Meaning that women were to be treated equally in the sphere from 
which they had previously been excluded. The SDA prohibited discrimination on the 
                                                          
46 HC Deb 24 March 1971, vol 814, col 569. 
47 These include: Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Employment Protection Act 
1975. As well repealing the Industrial Relations Act 1971 with the introduction of the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations Act 1974. 
48 The EPA was not fully enacted until five years later. 
49 Walker D. J., Sex Discrimination (London: Shaw, 1975), xiii.  
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basis of sex or marital status within the context of work, education and training with the 
aim of “promoting equality of opportunity between men and women”.50 
 
These equality ‘landmarks’ seemed to be putting women’s equality at the forefront. Yet 
the practices which followed demonstrate that employers were not yet ready to give up 
their cheap labour or sexist practices. Despite the implementation of both of these pieces 
of ‘equality’ legislation, in 1975 “the pay gap between men’s and women’s average 
hourly earnings in full-time employment was 28.7 per cent”,51 and this gap continues. 
Thus demonstrating the inability for equality of sameness, in this context, to adequately 
address the differentiated social construction of men and women in this period.  
 
The debates which preceded the passing of the EPA were generally positive in tone, 
recognising that women ought to have equal pay for equal work. However, there 
remained echoes of the past: 
 “We know the terrible price which we pay in juvenile delinquency and all that 
sort of thing because some married women go into factories. I have great 
admiration for the woman who can realise herself through her growing family 
and through looking after her husband”.52  
Here, the breadwinner/caregiver model is idolised, and mothers who worked were again 
to blame for childhood delinquency. Despite this disappointing rhetoric, the discussions 
surrounding the SDA featured instances of chauvinism being ‘called out’ in parliament 
by numerous members.53 Demonstrating a shift in the attitudes deemed acceptable by 
                                                          
50 SDA 1975 Introductory paragraph. The denial of training to women based on gendered assumptions 
regarding work patterns and the impact this had on women has been discussed in [5.2].  
51 Leaker D., (ONS) ‘The Gender Pay Gap in the UK’ (2008) 2(4) Economic & Labour Market Review 
19, 23. 
52 HC Deb 09 February 1970, vol 795, col 945. 
53 HC Deb 21 January 1975, vol 884, cols 1203-5. 
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Members of Parliament and a willingness to make this known.  
 
Legislative Loopholes  
Despite these welcome legislative changes, there was within the equality provisions, 
capacity to undermine them in their application. There were numerous loopholes which 
allowed employers to depart from their obligations without consequence. For example, 
the regulations pertaining to maternity made no mention of part-time workers, which is 
the category under which a large proportion of women fell under.54 It was also the case 
that part-time pay rates which did not correspond to the full-time pay rate were not seen 
as discriminatory if an employer viewed part-time employment as not being ‘equivalent’ 
to full-time work, by the very nature of it being part-time, even if the work performed 
was otherwise identical.  
 
Due to the inapplicability of these provisions to part-time workers, and flexibility 
afforded to employers regarding these provisions, “employers utilised part-time work 
to extend overall labour hours and to develop a more flexible, and exploitable, labour 
force”.55 Part-time work, which was supposed to afford women flexibility allowing for 
them to manage work and childcare was instead providing an additional way for 
employers to indirectly discriminate against women. There also remained legitimate 
restrictions on the number of hours women could work and restrictions relating to night 
shifts.56 Overtime and night shifts were often better paid and women remained excluded 
from this by virtue of archaic provisions and the imbalance of childcare within the home 
                                                          
54 In 1971 35.4% of women worked part-time, which rose to 49.2% in 1977: Roberts B. (et al)., New 
Approaches to Economic Life: Economic Restructuring, Unemployment and the Social Division of 
Labour (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 256. 
55 Stevenson, (n44), 745. 
56 Factories Act 1961. 
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would prevent them from taking on such work, until 1986.57 
 
The equal pay provisions applied only where there was no “material difference” 
between those jobs performed by men and women. This required for an individual 
making a claim to identify an ‘actual comparator’.58 Due to the occupational between 
‘men’s work’ and ‘women’s work’ most women were unable to invoke this provision. 
As demonstrated in the case of Meeks v National Union of Agricultural & Allied 
Workers59  in which all of the secretarial workers in the Norwich office where Meeks 
worked were women, as there was no male comparator the claim under EPA failed. 
Those women who were doing the same jobs as men often had their contracts or titles 
changed in order to avoid breaching the law, discrimination took the form of low-paid 
jobs for women (but not lower pay for the same job) and so the introduction of 
legislation did virtually nothing.60 
 
Further to this, the number of women bringing cases under the EPA and SDA was lower 
than expected. 61  Many were reluctant to pursue legal action given the costs of 
proceedings as well as the perceived risk of losing the employment they had. The 
legislative loopholes in the law also allowed employers to avoid penalties for any 
perceived breaches. As such, despite the apparent progress which the legislation 
attempted to secure, employers reluctance won out in practice.  
 
                                                          
57 Where it was removed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1986 amending previous provisions. 
58 Equal Pay Act 1970 ss1-2.  
59 [1976] I.R.L.R. 198. Claiming under EPA s1(4). 
60 Tzannatos Z., ‘Narrowing the Gap – Equal Pay in Britain 1970-1986’ (1987) 20(2) Long Range 
Planning 69, 75. 




5.3.4 Maternity Leave 
There were growing concerns about women’s participation in the workforce. The 
pattern of working until the birth of a child continued. The lack of maternity provisions 
had reinforced the societal expectations about women’s role as mother and wife. There 
was no financial provision or job security for pregnant women who intended to return 
to work. The introduction of paid maternity leave in the Employment Protection Act 
1975 was not without controversy.62 Despite recognising the benefits that the provisions 
would have for women, there was clearly an economic incentive underpinning the 
legislative action: 
“The concept of providing maternity leave and the right to return to work for 
expectant mothers has a double function; it benefits the woman by giving them 
some security in their work and it benefits the nation as a whole”.63 
There remained concerns that the provisions might have the opposite effect, 
discouraging businesses from employing women of childbearing age. MPs used letters 
from employers in their constituencies in order to give strength to these claims. One 
states that “the natural result will be that women will become less attractive to recruit 
by virtue of the maternity benefits proposed in the Bill which put an added burden on 
the employer”.64 Overall, the debate focussed, not on the benefit to individual women, 
but rather on whether the provisions would have a positive or negative economic impact 
on the country and for individual businesses.  
 
Recognising Difference? 
The maternity provisions signify a recognition of the difference between men and 
                                                          
62 EPA 1975, ss34-52:  provided women who contributed to the maternity fund with six weeks maternity 
pay (90% of their pay with deductions made for any maternity allowance they were entitled to). 
63 HL Deb 22 September 1975, vol 364, col 137. 
64 HC Deb 05 August 1975, vol 897, col 288. 
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women based on their ‘natural’ role as caregiver and the social stereotypes which they 
were battling against. However, it can also be seen that there needs to be a more 
widespread recognition of this difference, where it is dominant as it was in the 1970s, 
in order for it to make real change in practice. As one commentator stated, it is up to  
“Governments to introduce on the one hand positive measures which will enable 
women to circumvent the obstacle of child rearing (for example Britain is 
notorious for the lack of provision of crèche and nursery facilities) and on the 
other hand to abolish tax and social security legislation which induces the 
continuation of sex stereotypes after marriage”.65  
This acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of the issues facing women is key. A 
recognition of the fact that employment provisions do not work alone, rather what is 
needed is action within the political sphere, and within private sphere, particularly 
concerning the division of labour and childcare. Moves towards equality under these 
Acts were limited to the public sphere, when action is required in both spheres in order 
to achieve equality.66 
 
5.3.5 Employment: Ending Economic Dependency?  
The increase in women in employment ought to have alleviated some of the economic 
dependency women had on men. However, due to the persistence of unequal pay, 
insufficient legislation relating to maternity and occupational segregation prevented the 
attainment of financial independence. The masculinity of the ‘ideal employee’ and the 
notion that equality in the workplace ought to mean ‘sameness’ was frequently 
manipulated by employers despite legislation having been formulated to prevent 
inequality/discrimination. This model of dependency reinforced the 
                                                          
65 Tzannatos (n60), 75. 
66 Chapter 3 demonstrates this necessity. 
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housewife/breadwinner model of the family which would prove particularly 
problematic in the context of the CICT, with the focus on financial contributions.67  
 
5.4 ‘Swinging’ Sixties and Beyond 
This section examines the development of attitudes towards sex. It begins with a 
discussion of the contrast between public attitudes and political action. This is then 
followed by an overview of the key legislative changes concerning contraception, 
abortion and sexuality. Such changes demonstrate the gradual acceptance of non-
traditional family arrangements. This societal shift had a role in the transition of 
unmarried cohabitants from ‘illegitimacy’ to a more accepted family form.  
 
The 1960s saw sex discussed more freely than in previous decades. The public trial 
concerning Lady Chatterley's Lover, in which Penguin Publishing successfully disputed 
the claim against the publication of the erotic novel, provides an example of the shift in 
attitudes which was occurring at the time.68 It was also a decade in which Penthouse 
magazine was launched, opening up the pornography industry; it was the era of the 
miniskirt and sex guides were becoming more widely available. 
 
Despite this social ‘revolution’ the political sphere was reluctant to react. The concept 
of the conservative nation, housed many meanings from sexuality, the family and the 
state”.69 It dictated identity, and anyone who fell short of the stereotypes perpetuated 
and supported by the Tory government were neglected. Conservative ideology strove to 
preserve and protect the nuclear family and the institution of marriage, rather than 
                                                          
67 See [4.3.2]. 
68R v Penguin Books [1961] Crim LR 176. 
69 Campbell B., The Iron Ladies, Why Do Women Vote Tory? (London: Virago, 1987), 102. 
188 
 
recognising the needs and rights of the individual. Harold Wilson’s election in 1964 was 
followed by a raft of legislation which reflected the appetite for change. The idea of 
‘change’ featured heavily in the discourse adopted by Labour prior to their election as 
can be seen with the repetition of the phrase “only a major change”70 in their manifesto, 
which was itself entitled ‘New Britain’. They were putting forward that change was 
necessary, that politics and the legal realm need to respond to the societal shift that was 
occurring. That there needed to be a step away from the “backward-looking approach 
has prevented [the Conservatives] from responding to the major world changes of the 
last decade”.71  
 
The Sex legislation of the 1960s has been said to be “Labour’s most radical legacy... 
Parliament was responding to changing social attitudes rather than initiating permissive 
policies”.72 This signalled a shift in the interaction between law and society. The Sex 
Offenders Act 1967 legalized homosexuality, the Family Planning Act introduced birth 
control and the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1967 meant that abortion was 
legal when certified by two doctors. Finally, under the Divorce Reform Act in 1969 a 
marriage could be ended if it had irretrievably broken down, and neither partner no 
longer had to prove “fault”.73 The significance of some of these developments are 
discussed below.  
 
The 1959 handbook Is Chastity Outdated? for engaged couples was pulled from the 
                                                          
70 Labour Party Manifesto: The New Britain, 1964. 
71 ibid. 
72 Rowbotham, (n33), 341. 
73 Instead the Act allowed couples to divorce after they had been separated for two years (or five years if 
only one of them wanted a divorce). See s1-2. 
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shelves (after selling 200,000 copies). 74  Although this occurred just before the 
‘swinging sixties’ began,  “that fact that this question… [was] posed indicates that we 
are at a point of change; that the posing of it created an avalanche of outrage and protest 
indicates that any change was still very limited and still very far from having gained 
public acceptability”. 75  The introduction of the 1960s sex legislation signified a 
movement away from the ‘conservatism’ of the 1950s. Even the Church of England was 
beginning to adopt a relaxed attitude towards issues such as premarital sex and divorce, 
as can be seen with the Bishop of Woolwich advocating a position “based on love”.76 
This notion was not fully embraced by members of the Church, it at least indicated the 
capacity for change.  
 
5.4.1 Contraception 
In 1961 the NHS began prescribing the contraceptive pill to married women only. This 
reinforced the idea that sex was only to take place within marriage. The pill was seen 
as a method of controlling the number and timing of pregnancies, rather than giving 
women sexual agency. However, in 1967 the contraceptive pill became available for all 
women regardless of marital status.77 Though this can be seen as a marker of progress 
it was not until 1974 that it became available free of charge. Prior to this, women’s 
control of their sexual bodies came at a cost, one that working-class women often could 
not afford.  
 
                                                          
74 Wilson E., Only Halfway to Paradise: Women in Post-War Britain 1945-1968 (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1980), 102. 
75 Marwick A., The Sixties: Social and Cultural Transformation in Britain, France, Italy and the United 
States 1958-74 (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1999), 94. 
76  Lewis J., Lone Mothers in European Welfare Regimes: Shifting Policy Logics (London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1997), 56. 
77 National Health Service (Family Planning) Act 1967. 
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Prior to the widespread availability of the pill there were instances women who 
pretended to be married to get contraception, “Woolworth’s did a good trade in cheap 
rings”.78 The need to ‘fake’ marriage was not restricted to the purpose of obtaining 
contraception, but was a trick also used in order to avoid controversy on the maternity 
ward, and when renting property. This exemplifies, as stated above, that sex was only 
to take place within the context of marriage, and that marriage was and should remain 
the norm.   
 
Despite the reality of the ‘slow’ sexual revolution, the “position of women in relation 
to sexual purity was the hallmark of 1960s’ moral panic”. 79  In previous decades, 
contraception was the “man’s responsibility”,80 handing over this ‘power’ to women, 
was seen by some as a threat to traditional values. For them, the pill represented men’s 
diminishing “social power in the family”, a supposedly feminist milestone.81   However, 
there was not an instantaneous shift in the attitudes of the public towards pre-marital 
sex/contraception. Even prior to the passing of the 1967 Act, the idea of a clinic even 
giving advice on contraception to single women faced opposition:  
 “I feel I must protest at the proposed institution of a ‘sex clinic’ in Sheffield. 
The doctors say that their desire is to prevent the birth of unwanted children, but 
surely they must realise that by the widespread issue of contraceptives they are 
removing the only natural barrier to illicit sex encouraging a moral delinquency 
                                                          
78 Murray J., The woman’s hour: 50 years of women in Britain (London: BBC Books, 1996), 248. This 
was a method of disguising unmarried cohabiting relationships. 
79  Brown C., ‘Masculinity and Secularisation in Twentieth-Century Britain’ in Werner Y. M., (ed) 
Christian Masculinity: Men and Religion in Northern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2011), 57.  
80 Fisher K., Birth Control, Sex, and Marriage in Britain, 1918-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 244 
81 Collins M., Modern Love: An Intimate History of Men and Women in Twentieth Century Britain 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 173. 
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which is already woefully out of hand”.82 
This letter in framing the contraception debate within the context of illegitimate children, 
reflects one of the key attitudes of the time, that contraception was not a matter of sexual 
freedom, allowing women to control their sexuality, but to prevent ‘incapable’ mothers 
from having illegitimate children.   
 
5.4.2 Abortion 
The Abortion Act 1967 was first put forward in the House of Lords, but the interruption 
caused to the parliamentary calendar by the general election meant that it did not 
progress. However, the extensive media coverage of the debate meant that the Lords 
Bill was a discussion point not only within the medical profession and religious groups, 
but for the wider public which played an important role in raising support for the Bill 
in the Commons when it was introduced there.83 Steele, who introduced the Bill did so, 
in part, due to the fact that “any law which means one law for the rich and one law for 
the poor is in itself unsatisfactory and should be examined”84  drawing the attention to 
the fact that those women who could afford would pay a substantial fee to a medical 
practitioner for an illegal abortion with the ‘covering’ of legality.  
 
The Bill was also needed to protect women from the danger of back street abortions 
provided by those who were medically unqualified which also required payment, and 
from inflicting harm upon themselves if they did not have the money to spare or did not 
want to risk anyone finding out about their illegal act:  
“Many women to-day are so desperate that they resort to means which are 
                                                          
82 A letter printed in The Sheffield Star (September 1966) as cited by Laffin D., British Society since 1945 
(London: Hodder Education, 2013), 66. 
83 Marsh D. & Chambers J., Abortion Politics (London: Junction Books 1981), 14. 
84 Steel D., Against Goliath, David Steel’s Story (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1981), 50. 
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gravely damaging to their health, or even to their life, to create an abortion. They 
take drugs and pills… they insert things into the womb by means of a syringe; 
they use disinfectants, running a grave risk of serious injury to tissues and organs; 
they use methods of violence, such as moving heavy furniture and jumping 
down stairs”.85 
The cost of the illegality of abortion, save in the few circumstances under which it was 
permitted, was borne by poor women.  
 
Prior to the legalisation of abortion it was stated that women were “not only… ignorant 
about contraception, but… [they also] had no idea who we could ask for advice … 
Abortion, an inconceivable horror of gin and screams, was still illegal”.86 This new era 
of ‘choice’ lessened the risks associated with premarital sex, in particular regarding 
illegitimate children, the liberalization of attitudes to pre-marital sex. However, it did 
not translate into an instantaneous shift in practices given that most people remained 
virgins before marriage.87 
 
The progress that the availability of the pill and legal abortions supposedly represented 
was not only subject to opposition from the public, but was also critiqued from a 
feminist perspective. “The freedom that women were supposed to have found in the 
1960s largely boiled down to easy contraception and abortion; things to make life easier 
for men, in fact”,88 the idea behind this being that men would no longer be ‘tricked’ into 
marriage due to an unexpected pregnancy. It has also been argued that these 
                                                          
85 HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270, col 1141. 
86 Cochrane, (n31). 
87  Weeks J., Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths and Modern Sexualities (London: 
Routledge, 1985), 17–21. 
88 Burchill J., Damaged Gods: Cults and Heroes Reappraised (London: Arrow Books, 1987), 57.  
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developments made women more vulnerable to pressure from men to have sex. As 
MacKinnon stated, “the availability of abortion removes the one remaining legitimized 
reason that women have had for refusing sex besides headache”.89 As such, whether the 
availability of contraception, and abortion should be regarded as a progressive marker 
for women is questionable.  
 
5.4.3 Illegitimacy and Pre-Marital Sex 
Changes to divorce were preceded by calls for reform from the Law Commission.90 A 
number of MPs also raised the issue in Parliament. Using letters from constituents in 
the Commons to demonstrate the “misery of… living in sin”,91 caused by cohabitants 
having to conceal the reality of their relationships and the problematic “brand of 
illegitimacy” 92  faced by children given that many couples were unable to form 
‘legitimate’ unions under the previous legislation. Children who were born outside 
marriage were described as being “condemned to permanent illegitimacy”,93 the social 
stigma attached to them was still rife. 
 
The undesirability of unmarried unions made “divorce and remarriage the lesser of two 
evils”.94 The importance of maintaining the status of marriage can be seen in that where 
divorce was discussed within this period, it was done within the context of restabilising 
marriage. For example, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 the argument was put forward, 
                                                          
89 MacKinnon C. A., Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press, 
1987), 99. 
90 Law Commission., Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice (Cmnd 3123, 1966), 39: 
which made claims that if divorce were more easily obtained then “about 180,000 living illegitimate 
children could be legitimated… [and] in each future year some 19,000 children who would otherwise be 
condemned to permanent illegitimacy might be born in wedlock or subsequently legitimated”. 
91 HC Deb 9 March 1951, vol 485, col 961. 
92 HC Deb 9 March 1951, vol 485, col 982. 
93 HC Deb 6 December 1968, vol 774, col 2037. 
94 Probert R., The Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation: From Fornicators to Family 1600-2010 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 153. 
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that abolishing matrimonial fault, and making the grounds for divorce less arduous, 
would stabilise the institution of marriage.95 It was said that allowing people to divorce 
was the only way to allow them to re-marry and thus have legitimate children in their 
new relationships. It was not the end of a marriage but rather “a licence to remarry and 
form a new union”.96 The legislature was attempting to prevent the growth of non-
traditional families, despite changing societal views/needs.   
 
Similar attempts to prevent devaluing marriage can also be seen in relation to premarital 
sex. By this time, “premarital sex was justified or condemned by relating it to the 
success or failure of subsequent marriage”,97  though this still relied on the idea that a 
couple would eventually marry, it signifies a shift in attitudes towards sex which 
indicates the potential for change. Yet for cohabitants, acceptance was still a way off, 
the historical negative connotations of cohabitation denoting sex was still in use at this 
time. 98  The attitude towards sex may have been changing, it could not, without 
controversy be framed within the context of cohabitation: 
 “I was prepared to continue as Miss X… but it would have created great 
problems for my mother and, as I wanted to continue teaching and was 
obviously pregnant, it would have been difficult. So I changed my name by deed 
poll and this terrible double life started. A little group of friends and tolerant 
relatives knew, but what about the others? Mother told them we had been 
secretly married”.99 
                                                          
95 Divorce Reform Act 1969. 
96 HC Deb 09 February 1968, vol 758, col 882. 
97 Hall L. A., ‘Sexuality’ in Zweiniger-Bargielowska I., Women in Twentieth Century Britain (London: 
Longman, 2001), 59. 
98See for example: Morse M., Unattached (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965). 
99 Nova (October 1967), 125 as cited in Probert, (n94), 168.   
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An unmarried, working expectant mother, who had to change her name to hide her 
cohabitee status in order to be accepted exemplifies the reality of the attitude to sex in 
the ‘swinging sixties’. Procreation was still shameful outside of the institution of 
marriage. Indeed, one of the couples featured in Man Alive: Living in Sin documentary, 
who were happily living visibly as an unwed couple stated that “this is in fact the only 
reason I would get married”, for the children, as it would be “embarrassing for them”.100 
Showing that even for the boldest of couples, illegitimacy, and the social stigma this 
would cause such a child, would push them into an institution in which they otherwise 
had no interest.  
 
5.5 The Family 
Prior to the 1970s “cohabiting unions were largely statistically invisible and may well 
have been socially invisible”101 due to the stigma attached to such relationships. As the 
levels of cohabitation increased, many couples were still reluctant to be seen to be 
‘living in sin’. It was commonplace for unmarried cohabitants to adopt the same last 
name, and present as married couples.102  The following section provides an overview 
of the socio-legal construction of the family and the difference in the treatment and 
perception of married/unmarried cohabiting couples through an examination of political 
rhetoric and the legal treatment of the family.  
 
                                                          
100 BBC., Man Alive: Living in Sin (First aired in 1966), at approximately 8.52. 
101 Kiernan K., ‘Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends, Issues and Implications’ in Booth A., (ed) Just 
Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation on Families, Children and Social Policy (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 3.  
102 There are numerous examples of women changing their names by statutory declaration, deed poll or 
just using their partners name in order to appear married in the case law of this period including Eves v 
Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338; Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 are also examples of this – though Burns was 
brought to the court in the 1980s, the period of cohabitation took place within the 1960s/1970s.  
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5.5.1 Marriage, Moves Towards Equality? 
Since its inception there have been numerous revisions to the Married Women’s 
Property Act (MWPA), in 1964 it was updated once again.  This provision made it so 
that money derived from the allowance a woman gained during the marriage, and any 
property acquired out of that money, should be treated as belonging to the husband and 
wife in equal shares.103 This was a considerable marker of progress for married women, 
as it extended the property rights of those women who were economically dependent 
on their husbands.  
 
When discussing the MWPA in parliament, there was recognition of the role of 
housewives and mothers. The attitude towards women was relatively progressive: 
“Concerning the matrimonial home and the contribution that the wife makes to 
it, it means that she has a real interest in it, but, in fact, she has very few legal 
rights... the wife, whether she works in the home or outside, is at a great 
disadvantage”.104 
The acknowledgement of non-financial contributions by wives in this context, 
demonstrating an awareness of the different abilities for men and women to contribute, 
and the different ‘roles’ they were assigned in the family remained unacknowledged in 
the context of the CICT. Providing additional evidence of the unwillingness to protect 
‘mistresses’.  
 
The introduction of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 made it so that the starting point 
for distributing assets upon divorce was equality, however: 
“where there were young children, or a dependent wife who could not be 
                                                          
103 Married Women’s Property Act 1964, s1. 
104HC Deb 24 January 1969, vol 776, col 802-4. 
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expected to provide for herself in the future, the priority might be to keep a roof 
over their heads and to provide for the reasonable needs of both parties”.105  
Acknowledging the way in which, during this time it is likely that a wife would be 
financially dependent on her husband, and as such ‘equality’ may need to be departed 
from, recognising difference, in order to prevent poverty.  
 
Following this, the rights of married women with regard to financial orders/property 
distribution upon divorce was improved significantly with the introduction of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.106 Of which it was stated that “in seeking to achieve a 
fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their 
respective roles”,107 whether that be housewife or breadwinner. Recognising different 
ability for men and women to contribute to the acquisition of property in a way which 
is still devoid in cohabitation.108 Despite the increased protection for wives, campaigns 
such as ‘YBA Wife?’ and ‘Wages for Housework’ demonstrates that there was still 
dissatisfaction with the ‘inferior’ position of wives in law and society, and the lack of 
meaningful acknowledgement of ‘women’s work’ in the home.109   
 
5.5.2 Threats to the ‘Traditional Family’ 
As a result of a number of legal and societal changes, many of which have been explored 
above, the traditional construction of the family was undergoing transformation.110 As 
                                                          
105 Hale B., ‘The 8th ESRC Annual Lecture 1997 Private lives and public duties: What is family law for?’ 
(1998) 20(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 125, 129.  
106Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s25(2). 
107 White v White [2001] 1AC 596 605. It must be noted that by 2001, Lord Nicholls when making this 
statement emphasised that the “traditional” division of labour was “no longer the order of the day” and 
as such this provision ought not to “bias” either party. 
108 Regarding the contrast between these approaches: see [4.3.3]. 
109 Taking place in 1977 and 1975 respectively. See Bouchier D., The Feminist Challenge: The Movement 
for Women’s Liberation in Britain and the USA (London: MacMillan, 1983), 110-1.  
110 The increasing number of women at work, and the deterioration of the bimodal pattern of work 
undermined the housewife/breadwinner construction of the family, as discussed in the ‘Employment’ 
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a reaction to the ‘moral panic’ surrounding these changes, ‘the family’ was sized on as 
a central issue by the key political parties, intending to secure votes. For example, 
Margaret Thatcher described the Conservatives as the “family party”.111 Of particular 
concern was the considerable increase in the divorce rate, which did not stabilise until 
the mid-1980s, and the increase in couples openly living together outside of marriage.112 
This was seen to undermine one of the key strands of Thatcherite ideology was the 
repositioning “the patriarchal family as the bedrock of social order”.113 The attempts to 
portray the Conservatives as the protectors of the traditional family, just as the “golden 
age” for the long and stable marriage was coming to an end, and cohabitation was on 
the increase, sought to appeal to those with traditional ideals.114   
 
5.5.3 ‘The Family’ and the Law 
The attitude towards the family can also be traced through the legislative changes and 
the discourse adopted by the courts during the 1960s-1970s. This section will therefore 
examine the legal construction of the family, and the extent to which this included 
unmarried cohabitants. In the 1950s, the infrequency of cohabitation meant that the 
courts were unwilling to consider unmarried cohabitants, as a family. “To say of two 
people masquerading, as these two were, as husband and…that they were members of 
the same family, seems to be an abuse of the English language”.115 As unmarried 
                                                          
section above. The more relaxed attitudes towards remarriage and illegitimate children and introduction 
of the contraceptive pill giving women had more choice about when/whether they would have children 
also led to changes in the nature of the family as discussed at [5.4] 
111 Thatcher M., Speech to Conservative Party Conference (October 14 1977). 
112 See ONS., Divorces in England and Wales 2016 (18 October 2017), fig 2.  
113 Lovenduski J. & Randall V., Contemporary Feminist Politics: Woman and Power in Britain (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 34. The approach taken to the family and Thatcher’s construction and 
treatment of the family is considered in additional in Chapter 6.  
114 Thane P., ‘Unmarried Motherhood in Twentieth Century England’ (2011) 20(1) Women’s History 
Review 11, 22. See also Lewis J., The End of Marriage? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), 34. 
115 Gammons v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328, 331. This case focussing on whether a woman living ‘in an 
unmarried association’ with a tenant would constitute "family" under s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g), of the Increase 
of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920, and thus be entitled to the protection of the Rent 
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cohabitation was becoming more commonplace, fuelled by a number of the 
developments above, in particular the liberalisation in attitudes towards sex, the 
judiciary were, in some circumstances increasingly inclined to recognise unmarried 
cohabitants as a legitimate family form.  
 
By the mid/late-1970s there were increasing instances of the courts being reflexive to 
societal change. For example, in Dyson Holdings Ltd. v Fox116 that court felt that the 
popular meaning of ‘family’ would, according to the answer of the ordinary man, now 
include unmarried cohabitants as a member of the family. 
 “The popular meaning given to the word ‘family’ is not fixed once and for all 
time… This is not to say that every mistress should be so regarded. 
Relationships of a casual or intermittent character and those bearing indications 
of impermanence would not come within the popular concept of a family 
unit”.117   
Interestingly, this did not mark a significant shift in the treatments of cohabitants by the 
court. In Dyson Holdings, the court emphasised that this construction of the family, and 
the rights attributed to the ‘mistress’ here, were not indicative of an acceptance of such 
relationships as a whole. There was significant emphasis placed on the stability and 
longevity of the relationship, and how such a relationship would be perceived by the 
                                                          
Restriction Acts, enabling her to remain in the rented property they lived in together (post the death of 
her partner). 
116 Dyson Holdings Ltd. v Fox [1976] 1 Q.B. 503. Hereafter Dyson Holdings. This case dealt with the 
question as to whether a woman living with a man (unmarried cohabitation) for 21 years until his death 
could be considered “a member of the original tenant’s family…” so that she was entitled to security of 
tenure as a statutory tenant under the Rent Act 1968 (Sched 1 para 3). The importance of the perception 
of such relationships by the public/their peers can also be identified in Eves, where emphasis is placed on 
the fact that the couple “live[d] as husband and wife” and were “known to their neighbours as husband 
and wife” though in the context of the CICT this information was not of legal significance: Eves v Eves 
[1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1341. 
117 [1976] 1 QB 503, 511. It should be noted that the considerations made in this case were based on the 
view that the ordinary man would have had this view in 1961, this was, given the analysis of attitudes 
towards cohabitation discussed above, perhaps premature but the willingness for the courts to consider 
this perspective is indicative of a willingness to find rights for such women.  
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ordinary man. The conflict between the rights awarded to the claimant in this case, and 
the labelling of women in such relationships as ‘mistresses’ indicates further the fact 
that cohabitation in this period was still undergoing change.  
 
During this period there was also an increasing number of policies/legislative changes 
which recognised, unmarried cohabiting relationships. However, much like the attitude 
of the courts above, the inclusion of protection for such individuals was premised on 
their longevity/stability. The phrase “as man and wife”, or similar, was frequently used 
in order to include otherwise excluded relationships within provisions.118 The way in 
which such relationships had to be seen to be ‘marriage-like’ also indicates a shift in 
attitudes towards unmarried cohabitation, to one which was willing to recognise those 
relationships which society would recognise. 
 
5.5.4 The ‘Benefits’ of Cohabitation 
Within the context of benefits and welfare cohabitants were increasingly treated as 
though they were married. Assuming that cohabitants acted in the same way as married 
couples for the purposes of taxation may seem progressive, as the law neglected to 
protect the financially vulnerable party on the breakdown of the relationship, such 
parties were left more vulnerable than prior to such acknowledgement.  The following 
section focusses on the development of the ‘cohabitation rule’.119  
 
                                                          
118 See for example Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 Sched. 1, para. 3 (1) (6) refers to "two persons 
cohabiting as man and wife"; Social Security Act 1975 s24(2); s25(3); s26(1); s31; s36(2) refers to 
cohabitation "with a man as his wife"; Family Income Supplement Act 1970 s1(1)(b) mentions the 
woman "who lives with him as his wife"; Housing Finance Act 1972, Sched. 3 para 2 “a man and a 
woman who lives with him as his wife” were included alongside married couples; The Domestic Violence 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 ss1-2 used the phrase " a man and a woman who are living with 
each other in the same household as husband and wife”.  
119 The cohabitation rule required the aggregation of cohabiting couples income for the purpose of 
assessing their entitlement for supplementary benefits.  
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The cohabitation rule had formed part of social security legislation since 1948.120 In 
1977, the term “cohabiting as man and wife”121 was replaced with the phrase “living 
together as husband and wife”122 (LTAHAW) due to the negative connotations which 
had been associated with the term “cohabiting”. The legislation treated married and 
unmarried couples in the same way.123 
 
On the surface, this ‘equal treatment’ seems to signal the acceptance of diverse family 
forms. However, this was not the case. The reformulation of the rules relating to 
unmarried cohabiting couples in this context, limited the number of individuals who 
would be in receipt of means-tested benefits, meaning that unmarried cohabitants were 
negatively impacted by the application of the cohabitation rule. The investigations 
involved in discovering whether a couple should be considered as LTAHAW, despite 
the existence of guidance, predominantly focused on the existence of a sexual 
relationship.124 There were examples of intrusive investigation of sexual relationships, 
and often benefits were withdrawn despite the couples under investigation not being in 
relationships which could be considered LTAHAW.125 As such, unmarried cohabitation 
posed a considerable financial risk both during and at the end of the relationship.126  
                                                          
120 National Assistance Act of 1948. Under the cohabitation rule means-tested benefits were assessed on 
the basis of a couples combined income, rather than as two single individuals.   
121 Social Security (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1977 s14(7).  
122 Supplementary benefits commission: Living together as Husband and Wife (1976) para 52. 
123 Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, Sched. 1, para. 3 (1) 
124 Department of Health and Social Security., Living Together as Husband and Wife (London: HMSO, 
1976) which put forward six criteria in deciding whether cohabitation exists or not; namely public 
acknowledgment, stability of the relationship, the sharing of accommodation, whether there are children 
of the relationship, financial support and the existence of a sexual relationship. 
125 See generally Lister R., As Man and Wife? A Study of the Cohabitation Rule (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group, 1973); This injustice is also noted by Moore in Moore P., Sex and the Undeserving Poor, 
The New Statesman (13 July 1973), 47: in which he examines the case of ‘Mrs’ Silver who was denied a 
number of her benefits under the cohabitation rule after having an affair with a man (who was observed 
‘visiting’ her rather than cohabiting in the proper sense of the word). 
126 It is notable that cohabiting women were also precluded from receipt of the death grant, widows 
benefit/widowed mother’s allowance/widow’s pension as they were only available if the couple was 
married. See Social Security Act 1975, ss. 24, 25, 26, 32. Social Security Pensions Act 1975, ss. 13, 15. 




The approach of such investigators and the assumption that women would be supported 
by their partner was particularly problematic for women who were economically 
dependent on their partner and/or the state. In considering household income as 
aggregated and allowing this to impact the receipt of benefits, the cohabitation rule 
reinforced the traditional masculine obligation to maintain the family.127  
“The cohabitation ruling only embodies in slightly more glaring form the 
innermost assumption of marriage which is still that a man should pay for the 
sexual and housekeeping services of his wife”.128 
This assumption was, under the cohabitation rule, applied to cohabiting couples whose 
relationships were considered to be like that of a ‘husband and wife’. However, this 
proved more damaging for women in cohabiting relationships as married men were 
under a legal obligation to support their wife, but there was no same provision for 
cohabiting couples.129 Indeed the ‘equal treatment’ approach here was based on the 
notion that “an unmarried couple should not get more favourable treatment than a 
married couple, which they would if they were able to claim as single persons”.130 It 
attempted to reverse the perception that there was a financial benefit connected to 
‘living in sin’.  
                                                          
the end of unmarried cohabiting relationships, there were a number of additional risks associated with 
such relationships on dissolution.  
127 See Lewis J. (et al)., Lone Motherhood in Twentieth-century Britain: From Footnote to Front Page 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 117. 
128 Wilson E., Women and the Welfare State (London: Tavistock, 1977) 81. In addition, the Department 
of Health and Social Security, (n124), 29 acknowledged that “it would be unjustifiable for the State to 
provide an income for the woman who has the support of a man to whom she is not actually married 
when it is not provided for the married woman”. Whether or not a woman actually received such support 
was merely assumed rather than based on evidence.  
129 Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, s17. An unmarried woman cannot obtain a maintenance order and 
as such if a man did not support his partner in cohabiting relationship there is no protection for her. 
However, there was some protection under Family Income Supplement Act 1970, s1(1)(b) under which, 
those in low paid work, could obtain financial assistance to support their family (including unmarried 
cohabiting couples) 
130  Department of Health and Social Security., Supplementary Benefits Handbook: Supplementary 




5.5.5 Rights for ‘Common Law Wives’ 
As the number of unmarried cohabiting couples increased, and changes in law and 
policy began to recognise the existence of such couples, the myth of common law 
marriage took hold. In particular, the way in which such reforms were (mis)reported 
contributed to a “belief among cohabiting couples – and indeed the wider population – 
that there were no longer any significant legal differences between cohabitation and 
marriage”.131 For example, the equal treatment of cohabitants under the cohabitation 
rule, discussed above, added to the perception that there were rights derived from ones 
position as a ‘common law wife’, despite the negative implications for cohabiting 
women in this context. As Probert notes,   
“the publicity given to the fact that cohabiting couples were treated in the same 
way as spouses in this context is likely to have contributed to an expectation that 
this was also true in other areas, especially when combined with the new 
language of ‘common-law wives’”.132  
Even pamphlets produced in order to inform women of their rights contributed to the 
perpetuation of this myth. For example, Women’s Rights: A Practical Guide advised 
readers that “you are normally regarded as a ‘common law’ wife if you have been living 
with a man for more than two years as though you were married, without actually going 
through the ceremony”.133 This guidance was accurate in the narrow context of the 
article this fed into the rapidly growing myths surrounding common law marriage.134 
The increasing perception that unmarried couples would, at least after a certain period, 
have the same rights as married couples, meant that numerous individuals would 
                                                          
131 Probert (n94), 214.  
132 ibid, 203. 
133 Coote A. & Gill T., Women’s Rights: A Practical Guide (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 258. 
134 This guidance was given in regard to financial assistance for prison visits. 
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LTAHAW under the impression that there was no legal/financial incentive to getting 
married, thus making the vulnerable on breakdown.135 This is an issue which was 
pertinent for unmarried cohabitees, especially given the widespread belief in common 
law marriage.136  
 
5.6 Cohabitation: An Overview 
The 1960s is the lowest level of cohabitation examined within this thesis.137 In this 
period marriage was almost universal, following on from the 1950s structure of the 
family in which the housewife/breadwinner family structure was the norm. 
Approximately 1% of women under 50 cohabited in this period.138 1960s sociologists 
had “failed to notice that [the home] was also a place of work”,139 and this was a notion 
which was replicated in the legal sphere in which women’s rights were menial. The 
changes which occurred within this period can be identified within cultural/societal 
shifts much before it prompted legal/political action.140  
 
Despite the slowly emerging view that women were more than mother/wife, the notion 
that women must choose between work or wifedom/motherhood prevailed. As a result, 
though the increasing levels of women in the workplace allowed some women a degree 
of independent income, the majority of women who would betray their ‘natural role’ as 
                                                          
135 Probert’s extensive research concludes “in the mid-to-late 1970s that couples began to believe that 
living together gave them the same rights as if they had married” Probert (n94), 216. 
136 See [5.7] for examples of this in the CICT case law.  
137 The exact levels of cohabitation prior to this period are unknown as it was either unexamined, or 
inaccurately examined, in studies prior to this, as is acknowledged by Probert (n94), 166. Despite the lack 
of data concerning cohabitation there is evidence that “free unions are at least as old as marriage itself” 
Frost G. S., Living in Sin: Cohabiting as Husband and Wife in Nineteenth Century England (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), 1.  
138 Murphy M., ‘The evolution of cohabitation in Britain, 1960-95’ (2000) 54 Population Studies 43, 45.  
139 Oakley A., The Sociology of Housework (London: Martin Robertson, 1974), 32.  
140 Which is a pattern that is identified in Chapters 6-7.  
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wife and mother, to enter the workplace, did so out of financial need.141 Making it 
unlikely that women would be able to contribute financially to the acquisition of their 
home.142 
 
The number of couples cohabiting was increasing, in part due to the introduction of the 
pill and the legalisation of abortion, which allowed for a form of ‘trial marriage’ without 
the same risk of pregnancy, it was an arrangement which still faced stigma. Cohabitation 
was defined by a “fear of disapproval and… concealment of their relationship”.143 They 
were considered to be ‘living in sin’ and as such for many couples keeping up the 
pretence of marriage, even if they did not desire it, was key. Indeed, even by the early 
1970s women who wished to cohabit were advised to adopt her partners name and the 
title ‘Mrs’.144 The myth of the common-law marriage prevailed, many believing that as 
cohabitants, they had rights, when in reality the law treated cohabitants as strangers.145  
 
By the 1970s increasing numbers of women were entering employment, but they were 
still often faced with the assumption that they would work until marriage or the birth of 
their first child. Where they did work, it was often underpaid and undervalued. All of 
this meant that despite a perceived improvement in terms of women’s financial 
position/independence, in reality women had little more money than they had 
                                                          
141 See [5.3.5]. 
142 Consequences explored in the context of the CICT in [5.7]. 
143 Beyfus D., The English Marriage: What is it like to be Married Today (London: Penguin, 1971), 140.  
144 Woman (29 April 1972), 12 as cited in Probert, (n94), 182. And many did so, as discussed at [5.4.3] 
and evidenced in [5.7].  
145 See Merin Y., Equality for Same Sex Couples: Legal Recognition of Gay Partners in Europe and the 
United States (London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 38; Glendon M. A., The Transformation of 
Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the United States and Western Europe (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 253. 
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previously.146 This impacted on women’s (in)ability to contribute to the purchase of 
property, and as such their rights on the breakdown of cohabiting relationships.  
 
In the 1970s, attitudes towards cohabitation were again changing. Probert describes 
three distinct phases which took place during this period; It began with the increase of 
covertly cohabiting couples, followed by an increasing openness – though this remained 
controversial as such couples faced “disappointment and disapproval” 147  from the 
families, and it ended with a lack of social stigma attached to cohabitants, aside from 
those held by the older generation.  
 
Guides on concealing cohabitation appeared in women’s magazines, in the early 1970s, 
for example in Cosmopolitan’s Living Together Handbook, they suggested purchasing 
removable labels for letterboxes “so you won’t have to spend hours scratching his name 
off when your mother arrives”.148 The barriers to cohabiting couples both with regard 
to council housing and private rentals began to decline. Moving from a need to produce 
a marriage licence, to a situation in which they were treated as married couples.149 
However, the seeming equality within the rental market, again did not match the 
restrictive approach regarding ownership.  
 
By the mid-1970s even the courts accepted that there has been “a complete revolution 
in societies attitude to unmarried partnerships”150 also claiming that the social stigma 
                                                          
146 See [5.3], [5.2]. 
147 Probert, (n94), 188. 
148 Cosmopolitan., Living Together Handbook: Cosmo’s Guide to Unwedded Bliss Cosmopolitan (March 
1973), 93. 
149 See for example Council Tenants Accused of Immorality The Times (17 April 1971), 3; Bottomley A. 
(et al)., The Cohabitation Handbook: A Women’s Guide to the Law (London: Pluto Press, 1981), 29. 
150 Dyson Holdings v Fox [1976] QB 503, 512. 
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attached to them has almost disappeared. Despite this where women were successful in 
gaining rights in the court, the media drew on many of the old derogatory terms which 
had been used to describe cohabitants. The Daily Express even went so far as to say that 
“judges and Parliament between them have done away with nearly all the differences in 
the rights of wives and mistresses”.151 Such misleading coverage was both dangerous, 
in that it both reaffirmed the myth of common law marriage, and it was used to demonise 
those women who dared to have a family outside of the institution of marriage.  
 
During this period home ownership remained a male activity. Women were still 
required to have a male guarantor, their father or husband, in order to acquire a loan, 
credit or a mortgage until the passing of the SDA.152 This based on the prevailing view 
was that “women as a class were not credible economic participants”153 embracing the 
stereotype of women as dependants whilst simultaneously dismissing their opportunity 
to be independent. Within the context of cohabitation the implications were two-fold. 
First was that this construction of women financially dependent on men is in stark 
contrast with the requirement that, in the absence of an express agreement, they should 
contribute financially to the acquisition of property. Secondly, the restrictions placed 
on women’s ownership also meant that where there was a sole-ownership case, in all 
likelihood it would be held in the male cohabitants name. 
 
                                                          
151 The Daily Express (30 November 1978), 9 as cited in Probert, (n94), 210.  
152 Numerous first-hand examples of the discrimination women faced in this context can be seen in Bates 
C., Credit card sexism: The woman who couldn’t buy a moped (BBC News Magazine, 6 July 2016): 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36662872> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
153 Enke F. A., Finding the Movement: Sexuality, Contested Space, and Feminist Activism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 7. 
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5.7 Case Analysis 
This section begins with an overview of the development of the CICT, though this is 
provided in detail in Chapter 4, it is helpful to view such developments in their historical 
context.154 The first section also provides a brief overview of the facts in the central 
cases during this period so that where relevant, they can be linked with the thematic 
analysis which continues. The themes which have emerged from an analysis of the 
judgments will then be examined. 
 
5.7.1 Background 
From the 1950s the courts had been developing the notion of ‘family assets’ and 
interpreting the MWPA in a way which gave the court considerable discretion when 
determining the distribution of beneficial interests in family property.155 The use of 
‘family assets’ in particular sought to alleviate the injustice faced by the economically 
vulnerable party, most often wives, upon the breakdown of marriage by virtue of their 
dependence on their husbands.156 In the case of Wachtel v Wachtel Lord Denning drew 
on a number of sources which illuminate his position regarding the injustice of property 
distribution on the breakdown of a relationship.157  
“If, on marriage, she gives up her paid work in order to devote herself to caring 
for her husband and children, it is an unwarrantable hardship when in 
consequence she finds herself in the end with nothing she can call her own”.158 
                                                          
154 See [4.2]. 
155 Specifically, MPWA s17 1882. 
156 The phrase was ‘invented’ by Lord Denning, it was first used overtly in Cobb v Cobb [1955] 1 W.L.R. 
731 though in Denning B. A., The Due Process of Law (London: Butterworths, 1980), 232 that he claims 
that he had applied the principle two years earlier in Rimmer v Rimmer [1953] 1 QB 63. 
157 Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72.  
158 Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (Cmd. 9678, 1956), 178 as cited in Wachtel v Wachtel 
[1973] Fam 72, 92. See also Sir Jocelyn Simon Law Society (1965) 62 Law Society Gazette, 34 as cited 
in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72, 92.  
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This extract emphasises the economic dependency faced by many wives due to the 
gendered construction of appropriate roles in relationships and the working patterns 
which were interrupted for marriage/childbearing.159 He then reflects on the “injustice” 
which arose as a result of the courts inability to consider “other contributions”,160 
namely non-financial feminine contributions. The formulation of ‘family assets’ on the 
basis of this injustice, determined that “where a couple, by their joint efforts, get a 
house… intending it to be a continuing provision for them for their joint lives, it is the 
prima facie inference from their conduct that the house… is a ‘family asset’ in which 
each is entitled to an equal share”.161 
 
In Pettitt v Pettitt and Gissing v Gissing, the courts sought to depart from the application 
of these increasingly flexible rules, emphasising that there were no special rules 
concerning family property, instead they were to be decided by reference to strict 
property law principles.162 The more restrictive approach adopted in Gissing and Pettitt, 
lay the foundations of an approach based on gender-neutral financial contributions 
which would continue to be developed.163  
 
The following section will analyse the central themes which emerge from the 
discourse(s) identified in the central cases taking place in within this period. Beginning 
with ‘formal’ approach in Gissing and Pettitt, this section will progress chronologically 
                                                          
159 As discussed in [5.2]. A position which was not unique to wives but also those LTAHAW. 
160 Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72, 92. 
161 Gissing v Gissing [1969] 2 Ch 85, 93. The attempts Lord Denning made to covertly apply the 
principles which underpinned ‘family assets’ see [5.7.3]. 
162 In Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, hereafter Pettitt, this took the form of rejecting the notion that 
MWPA s17 gave court a wide discretion to alter property rights between spouses: Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] 
AC 777, 792-3. In Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, hereafter Gissing, the court rejected the concept of 
‘family assets’: Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 899-900.  
163 This approach reflects the adoption of a formal approach to equality. The formal equality approach 
with regard to the CICT is most evident in Rosset: see [6.8.3].  
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to discuss the ‘difference’ based approach adopted by Denning. This provides additional 
insight into the position of unmarried cohabitants in law and society and the perception 
of the law surrounding the division of assets on breakdown. It also provides a base from 
which the construction of gendered family roles and how they have been used in this 
context to be analysed. Taken together with the historical analysis which preceded it, 
the adequacy of a formal/difference approach can be accurately considered.  
 
5.7.2 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777; Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 
Both Gissing and Pettitt involved considerations of ‘contributions’ made to the home 
as there was an absence of express agreement. Pettitt concerned a claim by a husband 
to beneficial interest in the matrimonial home which was in his wife’s sole name, based 
on work he had done on the home. Gissing, more typically, involved a claim by a wife, 
attempting to assert beneficial interest in the family home as a result of indirect 
contributions and work she had done to the property. The claims by the non-owning 
parties in Gissing and Pettitt were both unanimously rejected by the court. The cases of 
Gissing and Pettitt, though involving married couples, were central in the establishment 
of the CICT. For the purposes of this chapter, they also provide a key point of analysis 
as regards the discourse(s) surrounding family property, and the courts perception of 
gender roles and the nature of the family.   
 
Considering Contributions 
The requirements of the CICT, relying on express agreement or contributions from 
which intention as to beneficial interest can be inferred is at odds with the way in which 
couples’ act and how they perceive their proprietary interest.164 Even those cases in 
                                                          
164 See [4.3.1] for an overview of this issue. 
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which the court was unwilling to manipulate the principles of the CICT in order to ‘do 
justice’, the conflict between legal principles and social reality was recognised. For 
example, the court in Pettitt acknowledged the way in which couples’ relationships 
progress: 
“without any thought of legal consequences and without making any agreement, 
one spouse may pay the instalments of the purchase price and the other may pay 
for the improvements… Payment of the instalments will obtain for him or her a 
proprietary interest in the house, but payment of the cost of the improvements will 
not give him or her either an interest in the house or a claim against the other 
spouse. That seems to me to be entirely unsatisfactory”.165 
This recognition of the reality of dealings within the relationship context can be seen 
when Lord Reid refers to the fact that many couples will arrange their finances, or 
contribute in different ways ‘without any thought of legal consequences’. Despite this 
admittance, the application of the CICT is then based on those same 
arrangements/contributions.166 This undermines the notion that the CICT is based on 
common intention given that contributions are deemed to be evidence of an intention 
which the judges admit parties will not have thought about.167 It also allowed the 
continuation of the arbitrary distinction between payments to the purchase price and 
payment/performance of improvements, at odds with reality. 
 
Promises/Discussions 
An additional issue which further indicates the conflict between law and reality is that 
                                                          
165 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 794 per Lord Reid. Lord Reid also makes similar comments in Gissing 
v Gissing [1971] AC 886. This issue is raised in a number of subsequent cases, discussed below in this 
chapter, and in Chapters 6-7.  
166 Both in relation to sole/joint-ownership as a starting point, and financial contributions as indicative of 
common intention/detriment as discussed in [4.2] [4.3.2].  
167 See [4.3.1]. 
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discussions between the couple, or promises which have been made are used to evidence 
common intention. However, where such agreements are made, they are unlikely to be 
expressed in writing, and are therefore unenforceable as an express trust.168 Further, 
where such comments are made, they must also be supported by some detrimental act 
on the part of the non-owning party. Given the financial focus of detriment, this would 
often be unfulfilled.169 For example, in Gissing, when Mr Gissing left, he stated, “don’t 
worry about the house: it’s yours”.170 Yet, upon finding himself in financial difficulties, 
this position changed. He suggested that the wife should move out so that he may sell 
the property. Despite the way in which such a statement would indicate that the wife 
would have security in a property she considered her home, and that it would be 
detrimental were she to lose her home, the court were unwilling to be flexible in their 
application of the CICT.171  
 
Stereotypes and contributions 
When considering the nature of an individual’s non-financial contributions, they have 
often been constructed in a gendered way. In Pettitt, Mr Pettitt’s claim, attempting to 
assert beneficial interest in the property was based on the fact that he had “carried out a 
considerable number of improvements to the house and garden”.172  His claim was 
rejected. When explaining his reasoning. Lord Reid refers to the judgment of Lord 
Denning in Button v Button with agreement, in which he states with regard to the 
husband, that: 
“he should not be entitled to a share in the house simply by doing the 'do-it-yourself' 
                                                          
168 See [4.2]. 
169 Particularly by financially dependent women. 
170 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 889. 
171 On the consequences of the breakdown of such relationships: see [1.5]. 
172 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 792. 
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jobs which husbands often do”.173  
In Button, the wife’s contributions were also discussed, noting that she: 
“does not get a share in the house simply because she cleans the walls or works 
in the garden or helps her husband with the painting and decorating. Those are 
the sort of things which a wife does for the benefit of the family without altering 
the title to, or interests in, the property”.174 
It is notable that in reference to both the wife and husband, the court in Button were not 
satisfied that acts which can be considered gender-typical were insufficient to be 
considered as a ‘contribution’. Indeed, those cases in which gender roles have been ‘out 
performed’ are the only ones in which, non-financial contributions have been 
considered adequate.175 See for example the analysis of Eves v Eves, in which Lord 
Denning notably reinforces the ‘housewife’ gender stereotype, but uses this as a marker 
which must be surpassed in order to obtain proprietary rights.176 
 
The gendered construction of certain behaviours and contributions can be seen in the 
overview given by Lord Diplock in Pettitt: 
“If the husband likes to occupy his leisure by laying a new lawn in the garden 
or building a fitted wardrobe in the bedroom, while the wife does the shopping, 
cooks the dinner and bathes the children, I, for my part, find it quite impossible 
to impute to them as reasonable husband and wife any common intention that 
                                                          
173 Button v Button [1968] 1 WLR 457, 461 as cited by Lord Reid in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 796. 
174 Button v Button [1968] 1 WLR 457, 462. 
175 However, it is questionable as to whether the case was decided on this basis, the courts post-Eves 
interpreted the decision as such. 
176 Although this is used in order to assist Janet Eves in obtaining interest in the property as discussed in 
the following section of this chapter.   
214 
 
their domestic activities or any of them are to have any effect upon the existing 
proprietary rights in the family home”.177 
Discussing the likely scenario, that there has been no express agreement as to beneficial 
shares “then the crucial question is whether the law will give a share to the wife who 
has made those contributions without which the house would not have been bought”.178 
Despite this seeming to indicate that some consideration could be given to whether it 
would be inequitable to deny the wife a share, when coming to a decision the court only 
considers financial contributions. No weight is given to other gender-typical activities, 
or the payment of bills of purchase of chattels – the property is viewed as just that, a 
property and not a home.179 As can be seen in the judgment of Lord Pearson “it is 
concerned solely with a property claim arising in the sphere of property law as distinct 
from matrimonial law”.180 
 
The discussion of hypothetical relationships made by Lord Reid in Pettitt also provides 
an insight into the courts perspective on contributions.181 He continues on from his 
discussion of an individual who makes ‘improvements’ with two additional examples.  
The first involving a wife who pays all of the household bills, and the second in which 
a wife who “unable” to contribute directly to the property but through “good 
management and cooperation”182  enables her husband to make said payments. In both 
of these situations the wife would have “no claim of any kind”.183 In contrast to the 
‘entirely unsatisfactory’ treatment of the individual who makes improvements, socially 
                                                          
177 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 826. 
178 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 896.  
179 See [1.5]. 
180 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 902. Emphasising the difference between two jurisdictions, as 
discussed at [4.3.3]. 
181 The first part of this hypothetical discussion can be seen above in this section.  
182 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 794 
183 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 794 
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constructed as a masculine act perceived to have financial value, Lord Reid notes that 
“opinions may differ… as to whether she should have any claim”.184  
 
It is notable that following on from the gender-neutral discussion of contributions in the 
first instance that ‘wifely’ contributions are overtly classified as different. However, 
under a formal approach, difference is used as a legitimate reason for denying 
proprietary rights. 185  The dissatisfaction which arises as a result of the masculine 
contribution (improvements), which is lacking when considering a wife spending her 
‘pin money’ on bills or contributing to ‘family life’, indicates the gendered construction 
of family roles and contributions as perceived by the courts during this period. The 
differing opinions as to whether or not such acts should result in a successful claim 
reflects the societal shift which was taking place during this period, particularly in 
relation to women’s ability to contribute financially (directly or indirectly), due to the 
increasing levels of women in employment. 186  Despite these differing opinions, 
masculine financial contributions were given precedence. 
 
Ability to contribute 
In the Gissing judgment, the court acknowledges the different earning capacities of 
men/women. Lord Diplock gives the hypothetical example of a property obtained by a 
“young couple who were both earning when the house was acquired but who 
contemplated having children whose birth and rearing in their infancy would necessarily 
affect the future earning capacity of the wife”. 187  The payment of indirect/direct 
financial contributions made irregularly/at variable amounts, would in those 
                                                          
184 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 794 
185 See Chapter 3 on the relationship between formal equality and difference.  
186 As discussed in [5.2] and [5.3] above. 
187 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 909.  
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circumstances be considered evidence of a common intention that the property was to 
be held in equal shares. Thus in some way acknowledging the need to consider the 
ability to contribute to property consistently, but in a way which remained underpinned 
by financial contributions.  
 
In later cases, the different ability to contribute was also noted, “as very often happens, 
the major contribution in cash was made by the man, who in this case was earning a 
good deal more than the woman”. 188  This clearly links with the unequal earning 
capacity and economic dependence which impacted the ability of women to contribute 
financially as discussed above. However, despite acknowledging the difficulties in 
relation to women contributing consistently due to working patterns impacted by 
maternity/childcare, the requirement that there be some direct/indirect financial 
contribution was maintained.  
 
Despite recognition of the different earning capacities of men and women in this period, 
the notion that women were no longer economically dependent on their partner was also 
relied on in Pettitt in relation to whether proprietary interest could be found on behalf 
of a non-contributing woman based on a ‘gift’. The contradictory approach, resulting 
from gendered assumptions is highlighted in the Pettitt judgment: 
“Where a husband expends money on his wife's property there is a presumption 
that it is a gift to the wife. Where, however, a wife expends money on the 
husband's property there is a presumption of a trust in her favour”.189 
Lord Reid discussed the tendency for courts to assume that works done to a property 
would be considered a mere gift. He postulated that the justification for this ‘gift’ 
                                                          
188 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 522. 
189 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 781.  
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approach which had been based on the assumption that “husbands so commonly 
intended to make gifts”.190 He also drew attention to the way in which the economic 
dependency of wives on their husbands, at one time justified the presumption in their 
favour.191   
 
Adopting a formal equality approach, Lord Reid noted that “these considerations have 
largely lost their force under present conditions”.192 This would, on the face of it, seem 
progressive. No longer treating women as if they were dependent on men, that they 
would be gifted property because they could not obtain it otherwise. However, given 
the societal context in which this case was decided, such an approach was premature. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, women were not yet free from dependency on their 
husbands/partners. 
 
5.7.3 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340; Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518  
Despite the attempts to restrict the ambit of the CICT in the House of Lords, Lord 
Denning attempting to re-establish the principles underlying his rejected invention, the 
‘family asset’, adopted a more flexible approach which sought to give legal recognition 
to the contributions of the non-owning party. This section will focus on two key cases 
in which physical contributions were acknowledged by the court. This approach is one 
which can be categorised as adopting equality of difference.193 In straying away from a 
focus on financial contributions, it recognised the different abilities for men/women to 
contribute to the home, the different power held by each party and the financial 
dependency many women were subject to during this period.  The central case in 
                                                          
190 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 793. 
191 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 793. 
192 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, 793.   
193 See [3.2.2]. 
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demonstrating this approach is Eves v Eves, in which Janet Eves was awarded ¼ 
beneficial interest in the property based on the deceptive behaviour of her partner, 
supported by her physical contributions to the property.194 The case of Cooke v Head 
which involved unmarried cohabitants also provides an insight into Denning’s approach 
and as such forms part of the following analysis. 195  In Cooke, the property was 
purchased in the sole name of Mr Head, and Ms Cooke asserted that her physical and 
financial contributions entitled her to a beneficial interest in the property, and therefore 
a percentage of the proceeds of sale. She was awarded ⅓ beneficial interest based on 
the combination of her financial and physical contributions.  
 
Stereotypes 
Ms Cooke did not contribute towards the purchase of the property, but she did however 
contribute to the mortgage instalments and she also did considerable work to the 
property.196 It is interesting that the work she performed was considered distinct from 
the work a ‘typical’ woman would do:  
 “the plaintiff did quite an unusual amount of work for a woman. She used a 
sledge hammer to demolish some old buildings. She filled the wheelbarrow with 
rubble and hard core and wheeled it up the bank. She worked the cement 
mixer… She did painting, and so forth. The plaintiff did much more than most 
women would do”.197 
The combination of her financial contributions to the mortgage, and the masculine work 
on the property going beyond that expected of a woman assisted the judges in 
determining that she did have beneficial interest in the property. 
                                                          
194  Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340, hereafter Eves. 
195 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, hereafter Cooke. 
196 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518. 




In Eves, Lord Denning’s lengthy overview of the facts presents Janet’s role as one which 
was not only of ‘housewife’ and ‘mother’ but that she went further than this: 
“She did much more than many wives would do. She stripped the wall paper in 
the hall. She painted woodwork in the lounge and kitchen. She painted the kitchen 
cabinets. She painted the brickwork in the front of the house. She broke up the 
concrete in the front garden. She carried the pieces to a skip. She, with him, 
demolished a shed and put up a new shed. She prepared the front garden for 
turfing. To add to it all, they had their second child”.198 
Here Lord Denning uses Janet’s hard labour as going beyond that usually performed by 
women, perpetuating the distinct gender norms assigned to women. He notes that she is 
a mother, signifying her feminine role. However, he places considerably more emphasis 
on those masculine contributions which distinguish her from that of the stereotypical 
wife. Despite having been used as authority in later cases concerning physical 
contributions, they were not the determinative factor in awarding beneficial interest to 
Janet in Eves.199  Rather, they were acts done in “pursuance of some expressed or 
implied arrangement and on the understanding that she was helping to improve a house 
in which she was to all practical intents and purposes promised that she had an 
interest”.200 They were merely used to demonstrate the detriment she suffered.201 
 
It is clear that the use of stereotypes in these cases performs two functions. First, in 
considering the ‘typical’ work performed by women, the work done by Janet and Ms 
                                                          
198 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340. 
199 See for example Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 and Hall v Hall (1982) 3 FLR 379, both of which 
are discussed in [6.8]. 
200 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1345.  
201  As discussed at [4.3.1]. 
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Cooke is categorised as masculine. This out-performance of their gender role is given 
value, as evidence of their detrimental reliance, in a way which is absent in those cases 
involving gender-typical behaviour.202 Despite minimising feminine contributions, in a 
way which reflects the socio-political construction of ‘women’s work’ at the time, the 
result is one which allows the court to find beneficial interest where it would otherwise 
be absent. Secondly, in Eves the emphasis which is given to her role as ‘wife’ and 
mother, acknowledges that she performed those masculine acts in addition to 
performing her natural role, caring for her children. Thus emphasising the detriment 
she suffered, contributing to the construction of such women as ‘victims’ of both the 
laws inadequacy and the ill-treatment they suffer at the hands of their partners.203  
 
Moral Judgments 
The emotive nature of Lord Denning’s judgments, employing discourse(s) which 
“reinforc[e] stereotypes of weakness”204 constructing women as vulnerable. This is 
demonstrated in the way in which he often constructs unfaithful/lying men as ‘the 
villain’ in his judgments, attempting to raise sympathy for the wronged woman, thus 
disguising his manipulation of the law. The use of stereotypes, in particular those which 
categorise women as weak or vulnerable is far from uncontroversial, it is through the 
adoption of these discourses that he is able to find women interest in the family home 
which they would otherwise be denied. It is for that reason that Eves and Cooke are 
categorised as ‘moral’ judgments.  
 
                                                          
202 See Pettitt and Gissing in [5.7.2]. 
203 That is, they are characterised as the victim in contrast to villain construction of men within these 
‘moral judgments’. 
204Posner R., Law and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 349. 
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In Cooke, the money the couple accumulated was put into an account in “the plaintiff's 
name. It was not put into the defendant's name because he did not want his wife to know 
of it”.205 This account was used to buy furniture and pay mortgage instalments. It is 
notable that Lord Denning frequently mentions the fact that Mr Head was married, 
while he was cohabiting with another woman, not to derogatively construct Ms Cooke 
as a mistress, but instead to portray Mr Head as a man toward which we should have 
contempt. Thus justifying the equal distribution of beneficial interest in the family 
home. Albeit, with the minor financial contributions in this case, the construction of Mr 
Head as ‘the villain’ and Ms Cooke as ‘the victim’ did not deem it necessary to go so 
far as it did in Eves.   
 
In Eves, the lies espoused by Stuart are seen to be a “clear inference” that the property 
was to be shared “otherwise no excuse would have been needed”.206 It was on this basis 
that an agreement between the couple was identified by the court, which then gave rise 
to her interest in the property. When discussing Stuart’s behaviour Lord Denning argued 
that “he should be judged by what he told her – by what he led her to believe – and not 
by his own intent which he kept to himself”.207 In manipulating the law, Lord Denning 
makes a ‘moral’ judgment which is given additional weight as a result of the discourse 
he constructs surrounding the women ‘victims’ of male manipulation. It also evidences 
the difficulty concerning express trusts, the expectation that a couple will vocalise their 
intention, and the supposed reliability of such statements is undermined when 
considering the frequency at which ‘promises’ are made and broken in such cases.208  
 
                                                          
205 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 520.  
206 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1344. 
207 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1342. 
208 As discussed at [4.3.1]. 
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Similar issues are raised in relation to promises to marry which were never fulfilled.  In 
Eves the couple were said to “intend… to marry when they were free to do so”,209  
though this intention was only truly held by Janet. Having purchased the property Stuart 
“told her that it was to be their house and a home for themselves and their children”210 
and had stated that, if it were not for her age, that the property would have been put in 
joint names. This shows the nature of a relationship based on trust, in which ones 
expectations can be easily manipulated. Janet herself stated that: 
“So far as I was concerned, we were husband and wife, and I did trust him. I never 
ever thought anything was going to happen while we were building the home up: 
as far as I knew we were going to stay there”.211 
This demonstrates the lack of awareness unmarried cohabitants had regarding their legal 
position.212  
 
Giving a summary of the case Lord Denning made a point of emphasising the immoral 
behaviour of Stuart once again 
“Although Janet did not make any financial contribution… He told her that it 
was to be their home for them and their children. He gained her confidence by 
telling her that he intended to put it in their joint names (just as married couples 
often do)”.213  
In emphasising the lies and deception of Stuart, Lord Denning was again constructing 
Janet as the naive woman contrasted with manipulative man. The recognition of the way 
                                                          
209 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340. Again evidencing the often one sided nature of how the courts 
perceive ‘common’ intention, albeit a common intention to marry would not be a sufficient basis from 
which to imply a CICT. 
210 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340. 
211 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340.  
212 As discussed in [4.3.3]. 
213 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1341. 
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in which Stuart “gained her confidence” raises the issue of trust in cases involving 
couples, particularly concerning agreements from which common intention is 
inferred. 214  It also recognises the difference in decision making power within 
relationships, which usually vested in the partner who is the highest wage earner, most 
often the male partner.215 Both of which serve to emphasise Janet’s vulnerability.  
 
Describing Stuarts treatment of Janet after the breakdown of the relationship, though 
not relevant to the proceedings, Lord Denning sought to again rouse sympathy towards 
Janet: 
“He did not keep up… [the child maintenance] payments. He went back to the 
house… He locked up two big rooms, leaving Janet and the children one bedroom 
and the kitchen and toilet. He took away the deep freeze and the stair carpet. It 
was a poor return for all she had done”.216 
Lord Denning also repeatedly discusses the threats of violence made to Janet by Stuart’s 
new partner.217 It is through this “vortex of wife/mother/innocent… Janet is transformed 
into the victim who needs the protection of law”. 218  Although the use of gender 
stereotypes and the construction of Janet as a victim raises a number of issues, it is only 
through acknowledging difference and manipulating the law that Janet is successful in 
her claim.  
 
                                                          
214 Trust is discussed in [4.3.1] and in additional detail in the Case Analysis section in [6.8]. 
215 Power as it is linked with financial position discussed in [6.5.1]. 
216 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1340. 
217 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1341. 
218 Bottomley A., ‘Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law’ (1993) 20 Journal of 
Law and Society 56, 57. 
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‘Man and Wife’ 
The series of cases which developed the CICT in this period emphasised that there was 
no difference between married and unmarried couples in this context.219 However, as 
the law relating to married couples developed so as to protect, to some extent, the 
economically vulnerable party, the position of unmarried cohabitants remained subject 
to antiquated property law principles. 220  The reluctance to adhere to the orthodox 
approach in Gissing and Pettitt can also be identified as stemming from Lord Denning’s 
unwillingness to treat unmarried couples differently from married couples: 
“I do not think it is right to approach this case by looking at the money 
contributions of each and dividing up the beneficial interest according to those 
contributions. The matter should be looked at more broadly, just as we do in 
husband and wife cases”.221 
A similar point is raised in Eves where “her contribution was such that if she had been 
a wife she would have had a good claim to have a share in [the house] on a divorce”.222 
To treat all couples in a way which acknowledges the different ability for men and 
women to contribute financially to the property would “accord with recent 
developments”. 223  Thus acknowledging the developing societal acceptance of 
relationships between men and their mistresses, and the way in which the function of 
such relationships is often the same.224  
 
The way in which Lord Denning constructed women has been condemned for being 
                                                          
219 See the discussion of Gissing and Pettit in [5.7.2].  
220 See the discussion of the development of marriage in [5.5.1].  
221 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 521.  
222 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, 1342. 
223 Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518, 520 drawing on Diwell v Farnes [1959] 1WLR 624. 
224 See [4.3.3] for a discussion of the differences (or lack thereof) between how married and unmarried 
couples act in their relationships.  
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patronising, particularly by feminists who see the role of the law as being to “mitigate 
structural inequalities ... without reproducing models of dependency”.225 However, the  
difference approach he adopted did succeed in obtaining property rights for women who 
would have otherwise been denied them. In recognising the position which many 
women had been placed in by virtue of the dominant gender stereotypes during this 
period and economic dependency, the sameness based focus on financial contributions 
was avoided so as to result in equality in practice. Despite the fact that this was 
facilitated through the adoption of creative, albeit questionable, discourses, the use of 
gender stereotypes, ‘moral judgments’ and a manipulation of express agreements, the 
orthodoxy of the formal approach under Gissing and Pettitt was avoided. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The historical analysis section(s) of this chapter have provided an overview of some of 
the central shifts in the position of women so as to provide a sufficient socio-legal and 
economic background from which the treatment of unmarried cohabitants, and in 
particular the woman in such cases, have been treated by the courts. In particular it has 
emphasised the ways in which, despite their increasing presence in the public sphere, 
women were still viewed as wives/mothers rather than individuals. As a result, the 
sameness based equality legislation did little to address the substantive differences in 
women’s experience, which meant that the economic dependency of women was yet to 
be alleviated.  
 
The case analysis section of this chapter provided an analysis of the two distinct 
approaches which emerged in the courts concerning the CICT. The formal approach 
                                                          
225Bottomley, ‘Self and Subjectivities’ (n218), 58. 
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exemplified by Gissing and Pettitt, in refusing to acknowledge the persistence of 
socially constructed differences between men and women as replicated in law and 
society, and the inability for most women to contribute at the same level as their male 
counterparts to the acquisition of property, meant that women faired worse under this 
approach. 226 
 
The difference approach which did recognise the issues raised above, rather than relying 
on fictitiously neutral financial contributions, allowed women to obtaining proprietary 
rights which they would have otherwise been denied.227 However, the way in which 
such an approach was facilitated, positioning acts considered appropriate for the 
individuals gender being set as a bar which must be surpassed, is not without its issues.
                                                          




Chapter 6 - Socio-Legal Changes Influencing Cohabitation in Britain between 
1980 – 1999. 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of a number of the socio-historical and legal changes 
which occurred between 1980-1999 which provide insight into the position of women 
in society. Like the chapter which preceded it, it is arranged thematically, covering a 
variety of issues ranging from employment to the nature of the family drawing on a 
variety of perspectives in order to construct an image of the historical context in which 
the cases, which are analysed at the end of the chapter take place. In providing this 
historical overview, the adequacy of different equality perspectives, as used by the 
judiciary can be considered in context. 
 
The chapter then analyses the key cases relating to the CICT which occurred during this 
period. This section predominantly focusses on the resurgence of the formal approach 
which dominated the approach of the courts. However, it is notable that there were also 
instances of the court attempting to reinstate elements of the difference approach 
adopted by Lord Denning.  The case analysis section identifies and examines the way 
in which they have constructed women, relationships and contributions. The dominance 
of the formal finance-based regime, in this period meant that feminine contributions 
were given little weight. As a result, many women were left without interest in their 
homes. Thus demonstrating the inadequacy of such an approach to equality.   
 
6.2 Women and Employment 
This section provides an overview of the development of employment legislation, and 
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the impact it had on women during the 1980s/1990s.1 The position of women in the 
employment sphere, particularly those changes which have lessened their earning 
capacity have had a considerable impact on their ability to contribute financially to 
property, and the power dynamics of the family unit and as such has made them 
vulnerable within the context of the CICT.2   
 
6.2.1 Unemployment, (Un)equal Pay and Discrimination: Employment in the 1980s 
The pressure was on, both economically and ideologically, to keep women in the home 
due to the levels of unemployment and cuts in public expenditure. However, women’s 
financial contribution to the home was becoming increasingly necessary to individual 
families. It is this contradictory position which underlies the difference between 
political ideals and the lived reality of the poor during this period. Despite the 
improvements which ought to have been borne from the SDA and EPA the position of 
women in the workplace was still one in which they felt, and indeed were underpaid 
and undervalued.3 Pollert described the ‘choice’ women had during this decade as 
“increasingly grim: go back home or accept the role of being cheap and disposable 
commodities”.4  
 
6.2.2 Unemployment  
Unemployment more than doubled between 1979-1984.5 Despite women’s full-time 
employment falling at a similar rate to men’s, part-time employment increased during 
                                                          
1 Maternity provisions will be dealt with as a distinct issue in this chapter see [6.4]. 
2 Issues which are discussed in detail at [6.8]. 
3 See [5.4] and [5.5].  
4 Pollert A., Girls, Wives and Factory Lives (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 231. 
5 Leaker D., (ONS) ‘Unemployment: Trends since the 1970s’ (2009) 3(2) Economic & Labour Market 
Review 37, 37-38. 
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this period.6 Given the construction of part-time work as women’s work in decades prior 
this meant that women were a good source of cheap labour. Where employers wished 
to cut costs and maintain business, it was essential to retain a more affordable workforce, 
women working part-time.  
 
The widespread unemployment of men was incompatible with the government’s focus 
on the breadwinner/housewife construction of the family.7 In keeping with the ideology 
of free market individualism, men needed to work and contribute in order to be 
considered a worthy member of society.8 Within this climate “the workless tend[ed] to 
be viewed as worthless”.9 This attitude can be seen to have been embedded within the 
Conservative ideology when considering this statement made by the Secretary of State, 
“everyone knows the apathy of dependence and can compare it with the sheer delight 
of personal achievement”.10 This echoed the rhetoric of self-reliance inherent in free 
market ideology which was promulgated by the government, which occurred at a time 
where many people were unemployed and most needed support from the State.  
 
6.2.3 Part-time Work 
The concentration of women in part-time work proved problematic for a number of 
reasons.11 First, women in part-time work were the lowest earning individuals. An 
examination of part-time wage differentials, shows that the percentage of the male full-
                                                          
6 Part-time work is discussed in detail at [6.2.3]. 
7 See [6.5]. 
8 Free market ideology was integral to Conservative thought during this period and the 1970s. For a full 
discussion of the Liberal roots of individualism and its links to citizenship: see Chapter 2 generally.  
9 Marsden D. Workless (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1982), 2. Again reflecting the masculine construction 
of the individual discussed at: [2.1.2]. 
10 John Moore, UK Secretary of State for Social Security 1987, quoted in Fine M. & Glendining C., 
‘Dependence, Independence or Interdependence? Revisiting the concept of “Dependency”’ (2005) 
Ageing and Society 601, 601. 
11  During this period 99% of part-time workers were women: Office of Population Censuses and 
Surveys., Labour Force Survey 1984 (London: HMSO, 1986).   
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time wage earned by part-time women “rose in the late-1970s... it fell back in the 1980s, 
and by 1993 female part-time earnings were still only 63 per cent of male earnings”.12 
Secondly, the unequal division of labour in the home meant that women sought work 
which would fit around childcare, flexible work with less hours than they might 
otherwise take. “Employers who can offer these convenient working hours may be in a 
good bargaining position concerning the other aspects of the pay and employment 
conditions package, particularly pay”.13 Further to this, part-time work was primarily 
viewed as unskilled. This was due to the construction of such work as ‘women’s work’ 
and “women workers carry into the workplace their status as subordinate individuals, 
and this status comes to define the value of the work they do”.14 In turn, the perception 
that such jobs only required a low level of skill, which though untrue, was often used in 
order to justify a lower level of pay.15  
 
6.2.4 Equal Value? 
In 1982 the Conservative government were found to be non-compliant with EU 
provisions concerning equal pay for work of equal value, which led to the enactment of 
the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983.16 However, these amendments left a 
number of issues unresolved. A male comparator working for the same employer was 
still required though they did not need to perform the same role.17 In addition the new 
procedure for bringing claims was said to be so complex that “no ordinary lawyer would 
                                                          
12 Low Pay Commission, The National Minimum Wage (Cm 3976, 1998), 194. 
13 Ermisch J.F. & Wright R.E., ‘Wage offers and full-time and part-time employment by British women’ 
(1993) 28 Journal of Human Resources 111, 113.  
14 Phillips A. & Taylor B., ‘Sex and Skill: Notes towards a Feminist Economics’ (1980) 6 Feminist 
Review 79, 79. 
15 Horrell S. (et al)., ‘Unequal Jobs or Unequal Pay’ (1989) 20(3) Industrial Relations Journal 176, 181-
182. This is also linked to the genuine material factor/difference defence used by employers which is 
discussed in detail below. 
16 Art 119 Treaty of Rome 1957 (later. Article 141); Equal Pay Directive 1975 75/117/EEC; Case 61/81 
Commission v United Kingdom [1982] ECR 2601. 
17 The issues with the need for a male comparator have been discussed in detail at [5.3.3]. 
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be able to understand them”.18 How was it that lay people were supposed to understand 
and invoke their rights? It was said that for a woman to have a chance at a successful 
claim under these provisions that “she will need to be well informed herself or receive 
strong support from her union”.19 This occurred at the same time as unions’ power was 
declining. Even where a claimant was lucky enough to have the support of their union, 
“union negotiators… [had] an inadequate understanding on equality issues”20 meaning 
that women who wished to bring claims had very little adequate support to do so. 
 
Unable to deviate from their obligations under EU law the government took on a “policy 
of damage limitation and produced domestic legislation offering the maximum number 
of escape routes for employers”. 21  The genuine material factor/difference defence 
remained a key tool for employers seeking to legitimately avoid their equal pay 
obligations.22 Occupational segregation allowed for employers to use different pay 
structures of the material difference defence in order to pay women less for their 
labour.23 Job valuations performed by employers were deemed to be relevant evidence 
of the value of different jobs.  
 
The broad nature of the new provisions relating to equal pay were termed so that there 
should be pay equity “where a woman is employed on work… of equal value to that of 
a man in the same employment”.24 As a result, whether pay was ‘equal’ was based, not 
                                                          
18 HL Deb 5 December 1983, vol 455, col 901. 
19 Townsend-Smith A., ‘Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations’ (1984) 47(2) Modern Law Review 201, 
202.  
20 Gregory J., ‘Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Legislation’ (1992) 
6(3) Employment & Society 461, 446. 
21 ibid, 463. 
22 See the [5.3.3].  
23 See Reed Packaging Ltd v Boozer [1988] ICR 39 on the use of different pay structures. See for example 
Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1991] ICR 382 regarding the use of the “genuine material factor” 
defence.  
24 Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, s2(1).  
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on similar work, but work which is of comparable value to the employer. For example, 
in Neil and others v Ford Motoring Company,25 in which job valuations performed by 
the employers seemed the work of female machinists as of less value than that of male 
cutters were upheld. Setting this against the earlier strikes by the Ford Sewing 
Machinists demonstrates how little progress had been made for those women who 
prompted the equal pay legislation over a decade prior.26  
 
Women’s work is “habitually viewed as less important than the work performed by men, 
and may not be considered ‘real’ work”.27 Even where work takes place within the same 
sector, the notion of skilled work is one which has historically been gendered, sewing 
does not require skill, it is women’s work, whereas cutting is men’s work, clearly then 
requiring skill. As such, deciding cases based on the ‘value’ of work, as decided with 
reference to the employer’s valuation, who had an economic incentive to continue the 
devaluation of women’s work meant that women would never really find a just result 
under this legislation in practice.  
 
6.2.5 Gender Pay Gap 
Despite the fact that equal pay provisions had been in force since the mid-1970s, the 
gender pay gap continued.28 Blau and Kahn found that in Britain, single, childless 
women faired relatively well, earning 95% of a single man’s wage, married mothers on 
average only earnt 60% of a married man’s pay. 29 This reflects the impact of the 
                                                          
25  [1984] IRLR 339. 
26 See [5.3.1] regarding the Ford Sewing Machinists Strike.  
27 Bradley H., Men’s Work, Women’s Work: A Sociological History of the Sexual Division of Labour in 
Employment (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 1. 
28 It is acknowledged that equal pay and the gender pay gap are two distinct issues, there are ties between 
them and as such the enactment of the EPA should have had some impact on the gender pay gap. 
29 Blau F. & Kahn L., ‘The Gender Earnings gap: Learning from International Comparisons’ (1992) 82 
American Economic Review 533, 534. 
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systemic and social pressures encouraging women to return to the home after childbirth, 
and the minimal remuneration women received where they did work. This ‘family pay 
gap’ is gendered, in that unlike married women, historically married men have earnt 
more than their single counterparts.30 The family gap reflects the role of the mother as 
care giver, who should sacrifice her career so that her husband may progress and provide.  
 
6.2.6 Occupational Segregation/Gender Roles 
The prevalence of occupational segregation and the continuation of familial gender 
roles contributed considerably to the ineffectiveness of the equal pay provisions. In the 
mid-1980s, close to half the public agreed “a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s 
job is to look after the home and family”.31 Despite the increasing levels of women in 
the workplace, the dominance of the traditional model of the family has acted as a 
barrier to progress. “The assumption that a woman’s place is in the home implies that it 
is not in a career”, 32  given that the role of homemaker and child carer has been 
constructed as feminine, whether a woman works or not, the expectation is that she will 
assume this position. 
 
Given that “attitudes towards the employment of women… [are] bound up with 
people’s beliefs about appropriate behaviour” 33  the compulsion to subscribe to 
‘appropriate’ roles which ‘fit’ their sex is considerable. Societal pressure and 
assumptions, fed by the media and Thatcher’s ‘family’ discourse meant that the idea 
                                                          
30 Greenhalgh C., ‘Male-Female Wage Differentials in Great Britian: Is Marriage an Equal Opportunity?’ 
(1980) 90(360) The Economic Journal 751, 771. It has been argued that this could be due to experience. 
However, the experience of women workers has made little difference to their pay. Historically women 
are more likely to be overqualified for a job than a man: see Brynin M., ‘Overqualification in 
Employment’ (2002) 16(4) Work, Employment & Society 637. 
31 Park A. (et al) (eds)., British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report (London: NatCen Social Research, 
2013), 119. 
32 Oakley A., Sex, Gender and Society (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1985), 197. 
33 ibid, 152. 
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that women should be in the home, to support the working husband took precedence. 
At a time where unemployment was widespread, a woman who worked while her 
husband was left searching for work would be seen as emasculating rather than 
supportive.  
 “If men fail to be breadwinners, they challenge not only norms of masculinity, 
but also the more general social norm of work itself. In this way, stronger work 
cultures reinforce expectations to live up to the breadwinner norm”.34 
The centrality of self-reliant individuals/families under conservative ideology at this 
time, there would be an increasing pressure amongst men to be seen as a breadwinner.  
 
The slow movement of women into traditionally male jobs, had not been mirrored by 
men at the same rate. There was little incentive provided for men to take up traditionally 
feminine roles both within and without the workplace, given that they remained 
undervalued both socially and financially in comparison to those perceived as masculine. 
Women who worked performed what has been termed a ‘double shift’. One in the work 
place, and one at home. The pressures of ‘keeping house’ did not automatically decline 
when a woman entered paid employment. This was especially so for those women 
working in jobs which were less well paid given the lack of nursery provision by the 
state and employers.35  
 
It is clear that “once jobs have become sex-typed, it is… hard to break down the patterns 
of segregation”.36 This difficulty can be identified in the fact that despite legislation 
which purported to make changes for women having been enacted “Britain in the 1980s 
                                                          
34 Thebaud S., ‘Masculinity, Bargaining and Breadwinning: Understanding Men’s Housework in the 
Cultural Context of Paid Work’ (2010) 24(3) Gender and Society 330, 336. 
35 Discussed at [6.2.7]. 
36 Bradley, (n27), 9.  
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retain[ed]… a structure of sexual differentiation at work which has apparently resisted 
all the campaigning for equality”.37 The relationship between law and society is a 
difficult one. Even where the law attempts to push progress, change needs to be adopted 
by society, and socio-political structures. Without this societal overhaul, changes in 
women’s equality cannot be implemented at a desirable pace.  
 
6.2.7 Childcare 
The Education Act of 1980, removed the obligation for local authorities to provide 
nursery care for children aged 3-5.38 This exacerbated the pre-existing issues regarding 
a lack of affordable childcare.39 It represented another way in which support was taken 
away from, in particular, working class families, shifting the burden from the state to 
families, the community and the charitable sector.40 The government refused to review 
state-based child provision stating that “day care will continue to be primarily a matter 
of private arrangements between parents and voluntary organisations”.41 This inaction 
however, was interrupted in 1985 when workplace subsidised nurseries were 
categorised as a taxable benefit.42 This added to women’s tax bills, and unless they were 
working in a well-paid job, would incentivise them to return to the home and assume 
the role of child carer.  
 
6.2.8 Discrimination  
The previous neglect of women in the workplace was somewhat curtailed with the Sex 
                                                          
37 ibid, 10. 
38 Education Act 1980, s24. 
39 On the issues raised regarding childcare prior: see [5.2] and [5.3]. 
40 David M., ‘Women and “work” in the Decade of Thatcherism’ in Taylor I., (ed) The Social Effect of 
Free Market Policies: an international Text (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 119.  
41 HC Deb 18 Feb 1985, vol 73, col 396.  
42 See Heitlinger A., Women's Equality, Demography and Public Policies: A Comparative Perspective 
 (London: MacMillan, 1993), 257. 
236 
 
Discrimination Act 1986, which made it illegal to dismiss women at 60 within the public 
sector and extended acts’ provisions to small undertakings and private households.43 
Sexual harassment was illegal in its entirety by 1989, as the exceptions in the previous 
SDA were alleviated. This had a role in increasing the number of women appearing in 
traditionally masculine jobs, and the numbers of women entering the employment 
sphere more generally. The opportunity for economic stability for women seemed to be 
appearing. Yet this hope once again remained unfulfilled in practice. The workplace was 
still seen as the domain of men. Although the progress made by women was not as 
substantial as hoped, perceptions can be powerful. If women believed that they could 
'make it' then more would strive to do so, paving the way for increased levels of female 
employment. 
 
6.2.9 Tax and Benefits 
When Thatcher gained power in 1979 and the consequences for the ‘poor’ were 
considerable. Direct taxes were used to substitute indirect taxes, making concessions 
for the rich.44 Thatcher reflected on 1980s Conservative policy/ideology noting that 
they were “rediscovering… [Victorian values which] distinguished between the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving poor’”. 45  These actions have been described as 
demonstrating the way in which the Conservative government were “committed to 
increasing inequality in income and wealth for a number of reasons and regarded 
poverty as an absolute condition”.46  
                                                          
43 Sex Discrimination Act 1986, ss 1-2. 
44 Income tax for the well off in society fell from 83%, to 60% and finally to 40%: 1979 Budget Hansard 
HC, vol 968, col 235-264; 1988 Budget Hansard, HC vol 129, col 993-1013; In that same period the VAT 
was doubled to a rate of 15%: 1979 Budget Hansard HC, vol 968 col 235-264, continued under the 1988 
budget. 
45 Thatcher M., The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 627. 
46 Hickinson K., ‘Conservatism and the poor: Conservative party attitudes to poverty and inequality since 




Despite greatly increased unemployment, the Thatcher’s government ‘turned the screw’ 
on benefits out of work.47 The market was promoted over state provision and individual 
benefits were cut. The earnings-related supplement for the unemployed was abolished, 
making the short-term unemployed much worse off and forcing them onto 
supplementary benefit.48 In 1982 The Economist published extracts from a confidential 
report on “options for radical cuts in public spending, many involving the dismantling 
of huge chunks of the welfare state”.49 This was followed by the leaked minutes of the 
Family Policy Group to The Guardian. These minutes showed that serious 
consideration was being given to a range of options for reducing state spending on 
welfare provision. 50  This provides insight into the attitude of the Conservative 
government towards the welfare state, “everything that could be privatised would be 
privatised, leaving only a residual role for the state in securing the living standards of 
the population”.51 This reduction in state funded welfare would have a considerable 
impact on women who were expected to fill the care deficit it created.  
  
The Married Couples Allowance also introduced in the 1988 Budget serves as “prime 
example” of using the “tax system to encourage certain behaviours that its members 
regarded as virtuous”.52 Protection of marriage was embedded into the tax system at a 
time in which the diversity of family forms was a cause of concern for traditionalists. 
                                                          
47 Atkinson A. B. & Micklewright J., 'Turning the Screw: Benefits for the Unemployed 1979-1988' in 
Dilnot A. & Walker I., (eds) The Economics of Social Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
48 Social Security (No. 2) Act 1980. 
49 The Economist (18 September 1982), as cited in Mack J. & Lansley S., Poor Britain (London: George, 
Allen & Unwin), 243. 
50 The Guardian (17 & 18 February 1983), as cited in Mack J., & Lansley S., Poor Britain (London: 
George, Allen & Unwin), 243. 
51 Mabbett D., ‘The Second Time as Tragedy? Welfare Reform under Thatcher and the Coalition’ (2013) 
84(1) The Political Quarterly 43, 43. 
52 Wade R., Conservative Party Economic Policy: From Heath in Opposition to Cameron in Coalition 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 65. 
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The preservation of the nuclear family can also be seen in the cuts to nursery 
provisions.53 These cuts increased the instability women faced in the workplace and in 
the home, those who did work needed to rely on flexible working hours or part-time 
work which meant that they could still care for children who were not yet of school age. 
As discussed previously, this sort of work left women vulnerable to inequality in terms 
of pay.54 Overall, the Conservative approach to benefits sought to incentivise work and 
reinstall the traditional notion of the breadwinner family. Only by cutting benefits which 
Thatcher believed “encouraged illegitimacy, [and] facilitated the breakdown of 
families” 55 could the traditional family remain in prime position. 
 
6.3 Employment in the 1990s 
6.3.1 Benefits and Work Incentives  
In 1997, New Labour took over the core Conservative aim of strengthening incentives 
to work. They mirrored much of the discourse adopted by their predecessors, for 
example Blair stated that “the new welfare state must encourage work, not 
dependency”.56 This same notion can be seen in the New Contract for Welfare Green 
Paper which proposed a system based on “rights and responsibilities” 57 reinforcing the 
focus on “empowerment not dependency”.58 Despite this, there was a renewed sense of 
acceptance, and attempts to assist, those who could not work and a blurring (if not 
removal) of the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. 
 
From a socio-economic perspective “worklessness... [was seen as] the main cause of 
                                                          
53 As discussed in the [6.2.7] and [6.3.3]. 
54 See [6.2.3]. 
55 Thatcher, (n45), 8. 
56 Blair T., Leaders Speech (May 1 1997). 
57 A New Contract for Welfare, Cm 3805 (London, HMSO, 1998), 23. 
58 ibid, 19. 
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poverty and social exclusion” 59 and Labour saw “work for those who can”60 as key to 
solving those issues. This was to be tackled using a multi-pronged approach, including 
welfare-to-work programmes, providing incentives to work, and reforms to child 
benefits and childcare. ‘Making work pay’ was keystone of New Labours welfare 
strategy aimed at reducing dependency which can be seen in the introduction of the 
national minimum wage and the introduction of the Working Families’ Tax Credits for 
low-wage families. 61  These changes were implemented alongside the National 
Childcare Strategy. This strategy included the childcare tax credit, additional 
expenditure on afterschool care, the promise of a nursery place for all under 4s and 
funding child-care workers.62 This signalled a departure from the Conservative strategy 
which saw women’s employment and childcare as matters as a purely private issue, 
requiring minimal legislative intervention.63 What was now seen to be essential was the 
recognition of individual circumstances, needs and assets and that the best way to 
improve employment opportunities was through ‘tailor-made’ packages.64  
 
6.3.2 Part-time/Flexible Work 
The gap between male and female workforce participation was closing, though still 
notable at 67.8% of women, and 83.9% of men in 1998.65 Despite an increase in the 
number of women working full-time during the 1990s, a significant number of women 
                                                          
59 Department of Social Security., Opportunity For All: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion, First 
Annual Report (London: Department for Social Security, 1999), 78.  
60 ibid, 7.  
61 National Minimum Wage Act 1998; The working families tax credits replaced the previous system of 
family credit in 1999. 
62 Department for Education and Employment., Childcare a Framework and Consultation Document 
(London: HMSO, 1998) and Minister for Women., Focus on Childcare (London: Minister for Women, 
1998). 
63 See [2.5.4]. 
64 Millar J., ‘Changing Obligations and Expectations: Lone Parenthood and Social Policy’ in Boje T. & 
Leira A., Gender, Welfare State and the Market: Towards a New Division of Labour (London: Routledge, 
2000), 248. 
65 OECD., Employment Outlook, Statistical Annex (Paris: OECD, 1999), Table B. The percentages above 
are based on the total working age population for women and men respectively.  
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still worked part-time.66 This is particularly problematic given the levels of poverty 
amongst those who were in part time work, in 1996 a survey found that “2.5 million 
part-time workers are on poverty level pay”.67 The poverty associated with part-time 
work was however, lessened with the introduction of the national minimum wage in 
1999, which also increased the number of employees who met National Insurance 
contributions, giving them access to a wider range of employment rights including 
maternity and redundancy pay.68 
 
Further to this, the gap between the hours worked by women working part-time and 
full-time was significant, the pronounced difference in working hours impacted earning 
capacity and access to rights for women in the UK.69 The difference in patterns of 
working associated with women with children and without children persisted, though 
to a lesser extent than in previous decades. 70  Despite these improvements, the 
employment rate of lone mothers in the early 1990s was lower than in the late 1970s at 
just under 40%.71 Labour  did create a number of initiatives, which were introduced by 
after the 1997 election, aimed at reducing this gap through the introduction of the 
Working Families Tax Credit which sought to improve the financial incentives to work, 
and the New Deal for Lone Parents which aimed to encourage and support single 
parents in returning to work.  
                                                          
66 80.4% of part time employment was still fulfilled by women 1998: ibid, (Table E). 
67  Carby-Hall J., ‘The function and effect of British social law in the context of the employment-
unemployment debate’ (1996) 38(6) Managerial Law 1, 30. 
68 Maternity is discussed in detail at [6.4]. 
69 On average ¼ of women who worked part-time, worked for less than ten hours, whereas those who 
were in full-time employment worked over 41 hours: Rubery J. (et al)., Changing Patterns of Work and 
Working-time in the EU and the Impact of Gender Divisions (Manchester: UMIST, 1995), 93. 
70 Duffield M., ‘Trends in Female Employment 2002’ (2002) Labour Market Trends 605, 610 and Millar 
J., ‘State, Family and Personal Responsibility: The Changing Balance for Lone Mothers in the United 
Kingdom’ (1994) 48 Feminist Review 24, 26.  
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Women’s preference for flexible work were thought to arise out of inadequate or costly 
childcare provision.72 For example in 1997 it was found that “14% of women part-
timers would like fulltime work but were prevented from seeking it by domestic 
commitments”.73 The lack of affordable and adequate childcare was a persistent barrier 
to parents working full-time, and in particular given the gendered division of childcare 
within the home, this often fell on women. Rather than signifying increased gender 
equality, part-time employment can “be regarded as a means of avoiding more basic 
changes in the relationship between women and men”,74 since it enabled women to enter 
the labour market but still maintain their primary responsibility for unpaid caring work.  
In 1995 there was still over an hour and a half more housework performed by women 
than men, not including ‘neutral’ chores such as shopping or childcare, which have 
historically been performed by women.75 Taken together, this shows that though the 
number of women participating in the labour market was increasing, their 
responsibilities in the home were not declining to match this, meaning that the ‘double 
shift’ for women continued.  
 
6.3.3 Childcare 
One of the key issues which has proved problematic for women generally, and 
particularly for lone mothers has been a lack of affordable/adequate childcare. There 
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73 Burchell B. (et al)., ‘Part-Time Work Among British Women’ in Blossfeld H. & Hakim C., (eds.) In 
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was a clear gap between the intentions of promoting lone mothers’ participation in the 
labour market, with the reality of low wages and a lack of publicly funded day care. A 
situation which “can make labour force participation a very poor deal for lone 
mothers”.76 In the early 1990s, and prior, working parents with children under three 
relied almost entirely on either the private market or their social networks. 77  The 
position on childcare shifted with the election of the labour government. Gordon Brown 
in his 1997 Budget speech drew attention to this by stating  
“A generation of parents have waited for their Government to introduce a 
national childcare strategy. From this Budget forwards, child-care will no longer 
be seen as an afterthought or a fringe element of social policies but from now 
on as it should be an integral part of our economic policy”.78 
Attempting to emphasise the centrality of childcare within forthcoming Labour policies.  
 
As part of its National Childcare Strategy, alongside the in-work-benefits discussed 
above, Labour also aimed to improve the provision of childcare in the UK. The 
government recognised the impact of the previous failures with regard to the provision 
of childcare when it stated that 
“For too long, the UK has lagged behind in developing good quality, affordable 
and accessible childcare. The approach taken by previous Governments to the 
formal childcare sector has been to leave it almost exclusively to the market”.79 
                                                          
76 Larsen J. E., ‘Lone Mothers: how do they Work and Care in Different Welfare State Regimes? in 
Employment’ in Boje T. & Leira A., Gender, Welfare State and the Market: Towards a New Division of 
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77 Moss P., ‘Day Care for Young Children in the United Kingdom’ in Melhuish E. & Moss P., (eds.) Day 
Care for Young Children (London: Routledge, 1991), 125.  
78 Brown G., Budget Speech (July 2 1997). 
79 Department for Education and Employment., Meeting the childcare challenge (Cm 3959, 1998), 5-6. 
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In leaving childcare to the market, many of those who wished to work, or wished to 
work more than a part-time job, particularly women, were excluded from doing so.  
 
One of the key ways in which Labour sought to rectify this issue was with the provision 
of “good quality, affordable childcare for parents who wish to work outside the home”.80 
The emphasis on ‘good quality’ and ‘affordable’ nursey provision were themes which 
ran throughout the Green Paper, acknowledging that it was primarily those on lower 
incomes who struggled to find adequate childcare, particularly given the need to balance 
the cost of childcare against low wages. As a result of this policy, after 1998 all four-
year-olds have been entitled to receive a free part-time nursery education place for the 
three terms before they reach statutory school age.81 
 
These provisions tied in with the overall welfare-to-work strategy, addressing the fact 
that unaffordable and unsatisfactory provision of childcare was proving to be a major 
barrier to parents, in particular mothers, in returning to or taking up paid work. In 
addition to this the introduction of Childcare Tax Credit within the Working Families 
Tax Credit in 1999 subsidized the cost of childcare for lower income families.  
 
Despite these improvements 
                                                          
80  Department for Education and Employment, Department of Social Security & the Minister for 
Women., Meeting the Childcare Challenge: A Framework and Consultation Document (Cm 3959 1998), 
5. 
81 A provision extended in 2004 to include all three-year olds.  
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“some parts of care work have been commodified but the rest of the 
responsibility for care work still rests with women and is unpaid – in spite of 
their growing involvement in paid work”.82 
What is clear is that though increasing numbers of women were in paid work, this did 
not alleviate the gendered association of women with childcare. Historically, the 
cultural values held in the UK have stressed the role of motherhood, which has often 
been constructed as incompatible with employment and many policies have gone on to 
support this model. The introduction of the progressive policies above indicates that 
there was some political appetite for readdressing the balance between these supposedly 
opposing categories. However, despite improvements in this regard, the increased 
number of nursery places, were still insufficient to cover demand.83 As such, though the 
position of many women had been improved, there were still many who were unable to 
take advantage of the new provisions.  
 
6.3.4 Legislative Inaction & The Pay Gap 
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in 1998 made numerous suggestions 
which called for a single sex equality act based on the principle of a fundamental right 
to equal treatment between men and women and the introduction of a duty on employers 
to review their pay systems and take action to close the gender pay gap.84 One of the 
key issues identified by the EOC was that the EPA and SDA were often contradictory, 
and complex, meaning that the protection offered by the equality legislation was 
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limited.85 The legislation concerning sex discrimination was “hopelessly out of date”86  
and relied on notions of sex discrimination from two decades ago which failed to 
properly recognise maternity rights and sexual harassment.87   
 
Despite these issues, and Labour’s supposed commitment to equality, the government 
rejected the proposals stating that “at this stage we do not consider that undertaking a 
major legislative overhaul… will of itself achieve the practical changes that are 
needed”.88 The media coverage of the governments’ refusal to act was damning as can 
be seen in the ‘Equal Pay? No Way?’ article criticising this inaction: 
 “The government yesterday sent a message to all those who believe women 
should earn the same pay as men for the same work or work of equal value. We 
care, really we do, the minister said. We just don’t care enough to change the 
law.” 89 
There was a perception that Labour’s equality rhetoric was not matched by an intention 
to implement real change for women.   
 
The gender pay gap, though still substantial, was in decline. By 1999 it had dropped to 
26.9% male median wage from 32.71% in 1990.90 However, it is interesting to note that 
much like the inaction regarding equal pay, this gained media coverage. 91  The 
organisational structure(s) within the employment sphere based on “large bureaucracies 
                                                          
85 EPA and SDA discussed in [5.3]. 
86 Kamlesh Bahl (chair of the EOC) as quoted in Bolger A., Equality body urges updated law against sex 
discrimination Financial Times (16 June 1998), 11. 
87 As discussed in [5.3.4]. 
88 HC Deb 14 July 1999 vol 335 col 194. 
89 Ward L., ‘Equal Pay? No Way’ The Guardian (15 July 1999), A6. 
90  OECD (2017), Gender wage gap (indicator) <www.oecd.org/gender/data/gender-wage-gap.htm> 
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91 See for example Cenny C., ‘Pay Gap between the sexes widens’ The Guardian (16 October 1998), 2. 
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with tall hierarchies requiring long unbroken service”92 were considered to be a key 
contributing factor in the continuation of the gender pay gap. Such a model, based on 
masculine norms had not evolved to accommodate  employees with primary childcaring 
responsibilities, or adapted to alleviate the financial burden caused by gaps taken for 
the purpose of childbirth/rearing. Further to this, the fact that many women remained 
concentrated in part-time jobs “characterised by lower wages, high job insecurity, and 
little chance of promotion”93 contributed to the difficulties in obtaining similar earnings 
to men.  
 
The ineffectiveness of the equal pay regime is emphasised by the persistence of the 
‘motherhood gap’. A typical mid-skilled mother of two lost over half of her potential 
earnings after having her first child in 1980 and now loses a quarter.94 Though in 
decline, the loss of a quarter of one’s wages due to ‘motherhood’ is clearly substantial. 
Rake’s study also notes that the contributions to a couples’ joint lifetime earnings 
ranged from 40-49% where they did not have children but those women with children 
would only contribute 24%.95  
 
This is particularly problematic when considering the focus on financial contributions 
and common intention in cohabitation cases. First, women are less likely to be able to 
contribute as much due to the difference in employment patterns/pay. Secondly, as 
Vogler notes: 
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93 Bardasi E. & Gornick J C., Women and Part-Time Employment: Workers’ ‘Choices’ and Wage 
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“when couples saw the man as the main breadwinner, discourses emphasising 
earners’ rights of ownership and entitlement to money tended to clash with and 
take precedence over, discourses of equal sharing, regardless of how much 
wives actually earned”.96  
This tends to result in gendered unequal bargaining positions, which in turn makes it 
unlikely that a common intention which benefits the economically dependent partner 
will be found between the couple.97 Notwithstanding those additional problems raised 
due to social expectations derived from the breadwinner/caregiver model. 
 
6.3.5 Glass Ceiling  
By 1997 women had increasingly been entering professions such as law, banking and 
medicine. To take banking as an example, in 1995 almost 2/3 of banking employees 
were women. However, there was only a growth from 1-35% of women in managerial 
positions and the number of women in executive roles was minute. These figures 
indicate that there was still some way to go in terms of addressing the glass ceiling.98 It 
has been indicated that in some sectors, the glass ceiling, rather than being broken 
through, has in fact been heightened and now occurs at higher levels within 
organisational hierarchies. There has therefore been some considerable improvement, 
but women were still restricted from the top jobs. There were still examples of covert 
discrimination not only in the attitudes of employers towards women, often asking 
whether they intended to have children, or not hiring women who were of ‘childbearing 
age’. Employers also continued to engage in those methods which have been in use 
since the enactment of the equal pay provisions, such as by changing job titles in order 
                                                          
96 Vogler C., ‘Cohabiting Couples: rethinking money in the household at the beginning of the twenty first 
century’ (2005) 53(1) The Sociological Review 1, 14.  
97 Smart C. & Neale B., Family Fragments? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 101. 
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to avoid paying women the same as men.99  
 
6.3.6 Outperformance 
Girls were outperforming boys academically, and increasing numbers of women were 
entering university, by 1999, almost half of the university undergraduate population 
were women.100  The outperformance at schools and increased attendance at university, 
combined with the increasing feminine service industry and numbers of women in work 
were seen as a threat to masculinity.101 In 1999 Heath’s research indicated 
“that girls are outstripping boys at the top end of the academic league tables has 
captured the imagination of the media to an astonishing degree, feeding into 
much broader debates around the changing role of women and the resultant 
‘crisis of masculinity’ in British society”.102 
This concern surrounding female achievement was linked with backlash against 
feminism in the 1990s where feminism was portrayed not as seeking equality, but 
female superiority. “The dominant explanation takes an anti-feminist stance, arguing 
that anti-sexist policies have gone too far and that boys are the 'new victims' of a de-
industrialising society”.103 
 
The media coverage of the issue can be seen to support the emergence of a masculinity 
crisis in various forms. In the Panorama 1995 documentary ‘Men Aren’t Working’, 
which explored contrasting the experiences of men and women post-school, much of 
                                                          
99 See [5.3.3]. 
100 McNabb R., Pal S. & Sloane P., ‘Gender Differences in Educational Attainment: The Case of England 
and Wales’ (2002) 69(275) Economica 481, 481.  
101 Including in feminine jobs discussed in [6.3.7]. 
102 Heath S., ‘Watching the Backlash: the problematisation of young women’s academic success in 1990s 
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the rhetoric of the programme was one which reinforced the idea that women’s success 
came at the cost of men’s failure.104  However, there were examples of more enlightened 
views, such as those voiced by Jacqui Lait MP who stated “ I suspect that those young 
men are still brought up in an atmosphere in which they believe that the only real jobs 
are physical, heavy jobs”.105  The issue was not one of women and girls ‘taking’ jobs, 
but rather that occupational segregation and gender stereotypes, were standing in the 















Furthermore, in articles such as ‘Death of the Dad’106 the print media pushed ideas of 
biological determinism, masculine aggression ‘repurposed’ into ‘pro-social purposes’ 
                                                          
104Panorama: Men Aren't Working (first aired 16 October 1995). 
105 HC Deb 07 March 1996 vol 273, col 527-8. 
106 Phillips M., Death of the Dad The Observer (2 November 1997) as seen in Figure1 above.  
(Fig 1) Phillips M., Death of the Dad 
The Observer (2 November 1997). 
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within the workforce.107 The article also discussed the ‘growing crisis among men’ 
linked to fatherhood, employment and the outperformance of girls at school. Fuelling 
the anti-feminist, or even anti-women flames, particularly notable when the article ends 
on a note which speaks of ‘destroying the male role’ and the ‘alarming implications for 
the social order’ that this would have.108 This not only gives insight into the extent to 
which the notion of a ‘masculinity crisis’ was feared, but that it was the fault of women 
and girls, and the progress they were making.  
 
6.3.7 Feminisation and Macho Culture 
Employment in the 1990s was problematised by the contrasting arguments of the 
feminisation of employment and macho work culture. The privatisation of state services 
since 1971 resulted in an “explosion… [of] low-level service work for women”.109 It 
was now men who ‘struggled’ to enter these new ‘feminine’ jobs without risking their 
masculinity. The growth of ‘feminine’ service/care industries and the decline in 
‘masculine’ manufacturing jobs meant that men were increasingly moving into 
‘women’s jobs’. 110  This shift was particularly problematic in that in adopting a 
traditionally ‘feminine’ job such as nursing “men… have repeatedly noted challenges 
and threats to their masculine identity”,111 conflicting with their masculine breadwinner 
status.  
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In this same period there was an increasingly ‘macho’ culture within many industries, 
where the ‘long hours’ culture and enduring high levels of stress were seen as 
requirements for employees who wished to progress. 112  This sort of working 
environment has been critiqued for being incompatible with work/family balance.  Such 
working environments reinforce the gendered notion of employment as “women who 
wanted to get on remained childless and were still expected to behave as one of the 
boys”.113  Women who wanted to be truly economically dependent, working outside of 
traditionally feminine jobs were not women at all, but were to act as men; to forfeit a 
family in order to have success and live as an individual. The fear of unemployment 
meant that those who did have jobs were desperate to keep them, regardless of the low 
level of income this might equate to. 
 
6.4 Maternity Provisions 
“In the 1980s Britain became the only member state in Europe to have decreased 
maternity rights”. 114  Conservative ideology perceived measures which protected 
employees such as maternity leave/pay or unfair dismissal as increasing the costs to 
employers and reducing the flexibility of the market.115 Thus one of the key aims of 
limiting such rights was to restrict the number of people relying on the state. This 
section explores the series of Acts which limited maternity leave/pay and unfair 
dismissal, eroding the progress which had been made in the provisions enacted in the 
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1970s.116 This is then followed by an examination of the resurgence of maternity rights, 
and the introduction of shared parental leave in the 1990s. 
 
6.4.1 Maternity Rights in the 1980s 
Statutory Maternity Pay 
In 1987 the Statutory Maternity Pay Provisions (SMP) replaced the previous maternity 
pay regime.117 The new scheme was considered “too complex” and concerns were 
raised about making employers, who were “often ill-informed about the payment of 
maternity pay”118 responsible for making these payments. The claims of complexity 
arose as a result of the tiers of entitlement based on length of service.119 In addition, the 
eligibility criteria for SMP was further qualified by the requirement for women to have 
received normal weekly earnings for the last eight weeks of that period, which could 
not be less than the lower earnings limit for National Insurance contributions.120 The 
requirements relating to National Insurance Contributions rendered a considerable 
number of women ineligible, especially those in part-time work. By the end of the 1980s 
almost 50% of women’s contributions were below the lower limit and so would not be 
entitled to receive SMP.121  
 
Rather than acting as a form of support for those who needed it, the new scheme was 
constructed as “a form of reward for continuous service with one employer for a period 
                                                          
116 See [5.3]. 
117 Social Security Act 1986, s46-50. The regime prior was discussed in [5.3]. 
118 Wyvill V., ‘Maternity Rights: Equal Opportunities at Work’ (1989) 31(3) Managerial Law 1, 7-8. 
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s48. 
120 Social Security Act 1986, s48(4). 
121 Lister R., Women’s Economic Dependency and Social Security (Manchester: EOC, 1992), 27. 
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of years”. 122  This notion of ‘reward’ mirrored the Conservative market-oriented 
ideology which focussed on individualistic self-sufficiency.123 By the end of the 1980s 
only 40% of mothers received some form of maternity pay.124 When combined with the 
abolition of the universal maternity grant meant that women were worse off under the 
new provisions. Overall, maternity amendments under the Conservative government 
“restricted women’s maternity rights or rendered them more complex”.125 
 
Maternity Grant 
In this same period, the universal provision of maternity payments, the maternity grant, 
was replaced by discretionary payments from the social fund.126 These payments were 
made “to meet, in required circumstances, maternity expenses”.127 They were usually 
linked to the receipt of other benefits, meaning that there was some level of provision 
for women who were low/non-earners. However, placing the decision as to how 
much/whether a payment would be made with a social fund officer added uncertainty 
to the financial position of pregnant women. Eradicating the flat rate meant that “the 
new provisions offer[ed] less in real terms even to those who are in the most need”, 
even those awarded the highest rate under new system would  be entitled to less than 
they would have been entitled to prior.128 It was estimated that 94,000 mothers would 
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lose the right to maternity allowance and only 20,000 were expected to gain under these 
new provisions.129 
 
The decreasing financial support for women from the state, combined with the lack of 
childcare provision, reinforced the housewife/breadwinner model of the family by 
making women economically dependent on men.130 Such concerns were raised by the 
NCCL who characterised the provisions as “reflecting a Victorian view of women as 
subservient, dependent and unequal”.131 It also reflected the notion that motherhood and 
employment were incompatible, which had been dominant in decades prior.132 
 
Maternity Leave and Dismissal 
Maternity leave provided job security for women by allowing them to return to their job 
after the birth of their child. However, the inclusion of “where it is reasonably 
practicable”133 in the Employment Act 1980, undermined the right to reinstatement. It 
also allowed for employers to offer women a different job, if a woman rejected this 
offer, she effectively revoked her right to return.134This provided an additional loophole 
for employers to utilise and lessened the protection of women. Small businesses were 
made entirely exempt from providing the right to return.135 The White Paper ‘Building 
Businesses… not Barriers’ proposed the expansion of this exception for firms with less 
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than ten employees, a clear policy statement in favour of employers and the market, at 
the expense of women.136  
 
The new provisions also required women to give written notice of their intention to 
return 21 days prior to their proposed return date, without which their right would be 
forfeited.137 The lack of protection for pregnant women and new mothers regarding 
dismissal was worsened as the qualifying period claims was increased from 12 months 
to two years (full-time) or five years (part-time women). 138  Concerns related to 
unemployment provided additional impetus for the restriction of women’s rights. “The 
government cannot alone create jobs… It is important that we should take all reasonable 
steps to remove the barriers that might be standing in the way of new jobs being 
created”.139 Those barriers protecting women were seen as detrimental to the enterprise 
culture which was central to many of the provisions enacted by the government. 
 
Women’s employment issues were a secondary concern in a climate in which 
employment conditions and prospects for men were declining. The changes which had 
been made to the original equality legislation, though not without their problems, 
embodied the idea that women “could have ‘equality’ if they continued to care for the 
family”.140 This is clearly a flawed interpretation of equality, attempted to limit women 
to the private sphere once again. Women were to pay the price for men’s market 
freedoms, the idea that the state must step away from welfare meant that women were 
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to fill this gap – reinforcing their role as carer, whether or not this fit with the shifting 
nature of the family at the time. 
 
The approach of the Conservative government in this regard provides an interesting 
historical example of a formal equality approach in action. Reflecting on the impact of 
Thatcherism, Douglas noted that it had 
“done nothing concrete and positive to enhance women's rights to equality 
indeed, it has made things worse… because it prefers to ignore issues of gender 
entirely. When it comes to employment, women are regarded in exactly the same 
light as men, with no account taken of the reality of their economic and social 
circumstances”.141 
In refusing to acknowledge both social and biological differences between men and 
women, and reinforcing the division the public/private spheres, the employment 
legislation of the 1980s significantly disadvantaged women who sought work.  
6.4.2 Maternity Provisions in the 1990s 
Maternity Leave 
From 1993-4 a series of Acts were passed with the intention of extending maternity 
leave, making it more inclusive.142 These changes formed the basis of the maternity 
leave scheme implemented under the Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996.143 Under 
the 1996 Act there were three types of maternity leave: ordinary, compulsory and 
additional.144 Compulsory leave refers to the two weeks leave which must be taken for 
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health and safety reasons. Ordinary leave under the Pregnancy Directive required a 
minimum period of 14 weeks.145 Additional leave was available to women who had two 
years’ continuous employment to qualify.146  
 
The new Labour government, in the White Paper Fairness at Work, stated their intention 
to create 'Family Friendly' employment policies and, in order to facilitate this, maternity 
leave provisions again needed to be improved and simplified.147 Following on from this, 
the ERA 1999 was implemented, amending the ERA 1996 and introducing the 
Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations. 148  These changes meant that ordinary 
maternity leave was extended to 18 weeks from 14 to bring it in line with maternity pay 
provisions, and the requirements to qualify for additional maternity leave were reduced 
to one year.149 All women, regardless of length of service were entitled to ordinary 
maternity leave which was the first 26 weeks and employees no longer had to notify 
their employer of their intention to return. The second 26 weeks was considered 
additional maternity leave providing the ability on qualification for 52 weeks maternity 
leave in total.150  
 
Maternity Allowance/Pay 
As a result of the Maternity Allowance and Statutory Maternity Pay Regulations 1994 
the provisions relating to SMP were changed. The qualification period for SMP was 
more easily satisfied.151 The rate of pay was for the first 6 weeks, 90% of their rate of 
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pay, followed by 12 weeks at a flat rate which was in line with statutory sick pay. As a 
result of these legislative changes more women were eligible for maternity leave and a 
higher rate of maternity pay was available. The new provisions would 
“benefit around 285,000 women a year. Some 90,000 women a year will be 
entitled to the higher rate of statutory maternity pay… for the first time. Women 
will have greater freedom about when to start their maternity leave. At the same 
time the scheme has been simplified to make it easier for employers to 
administer”.152 
 As such the position of mothers in the employment sphere were improving. With this 
additional freedom, women could combine motherhood and employment without the 
same level of dependence on their partner.  
 
Parental Leave  
The introduction of parental leave, available to both fathers, mothers and adoptive 
parents aimed to “help working parents balance their work and family 
responsibilities”.153 The provisions allowed for unpaid leave to be taken where a mother 
or father had been employed for one year meaning that qualifying criteria was 
considerably more easily fulfilled than those concerning maternity.154  Some of the 
attitudes towards the introduction was considerably more enlightened than those made 
in relation to the maternity provisions. Lord Sainsbury noted that 
“We live in a changing society. The traditional image of the breadwinner 
husband and the home-making wife will become an outdated concept as we 
move into the 21st century. More women are entering the labour market, and 
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more men want to play a role in caring for their children. Family friendly 
employment practices can help people care for their family without risk to their 
jobs”.155 
Emphasising the compatibility of motherhood and employment, and denouncing the 
housewife/breadwinner construction of the family.  
 
The fact that parental leave was unpaid, led to concerns that “only people who can afford 
to take advantage of the Government's policy on parental leave are well-off and 
professional people who are on the sort of salaries that allow them to take their parental 
leave entitlement”. 156  It was also stated that the take-up among fathers will be 
particularly low given that the leave is unpaid. 157  Both the difference in attitudes 
identified by the legislature, the simplicity of the provisions and the easily fulfilled 
qualification criteria reflect the minimal ‘economic burden’ placed on employers as a 
result of the minimal absence allowed by virtue of these provisions.  
 
Overall, the increased protection of mothers in employment in the 1990s was a welcome 
departure from the restrictions imposed by the Conservative government in the decade 
prior. Through the implementation of Parental leave and the extension of maternity 
rights, the breadwinner/housewife model of the family was being questioned, and the 
economic burden placed on women by virtue of their ‘role’ as mother was lessened.  
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6.5 Restructuring the Family  
This section examines the way in which the ‘family’ was perceived and treated over the 
1980s-1990s, focussing on the increasing number of ‘illegitimate’ families, the attempts 
for the Conservatives to revive traditionalist values, and Labours support for marriage.  
 
6.5.1 Illegitimacy & Marriage  
In 1983 leaked government papers on one parent families were filled with mentions of 
the “illegitimacy and immorality” of said families.158 The family policies with regard to 
benefits and maternity as discussed above, go some way in demonstrating the ways in 
which the Conservatives attempted to maintain the traditional family unit. However, by 
the end of the 1980s the stigma attached to illegitimacy, divorce and infidelity was near 
to non-existent as reflected in the development of legislation surrounding those issues. 
The time limits relating to divorce were reduced, and some of the disadvantages tied to 
‘illegitimacy’ were eliminated. 159 It was at this time that pre-marital cohabitation began 
to be increasingly commonplace, lessening the stigma attached to ‘living in sin’.160 
 
6.6.2 Conservative ‘Back to Basics’ 
The early 1990s continued the period of ‘moral panic’ surrounding single mothers.161 
This was covered by the media with various inflammatory headlines such as ‘Single 
Parents Cripple Lives’.162 As a response to this ‘panic’, the Conservatives ‘Back to 
Basics’ campaign stressed a ‘return to family values’ and castigated the role of the 
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welfare state in providing housing benefit and welfare to lone mothers.163 The “moral 
and traditionalist” 164  discourse utilised by the government sparked political 
campaigning seeing to reinforce the centrality of the family. For example, the 
Conservative Family Campaign argued the family as under attack with “too easy 
divorce” and social security and tax systems which “promote… unnatural 
arrangements… fundamentally by undermining the role of men in society today”.165   
 
These notions were also seen from within the party itself. The Minister of Housing in 
particular scapegoated lone mothers for issues surrounding a lack of council housing 
“How do we explain to the young couple who want to wait for a home before 
they start a family that they cannot be rehoused ahead of the unmarried teenager 
expecting her ﬁrst, probably unplanned, child”. Social security beneﬁts were 
reviewed with the goal of “tackling incentives to become or remain a lone 
parent”.166 
Though there were examples of media coverage which acknowledged that lone mothers 
were subject to vilification by the government, such as ‘Tories Target Lone Mothers’, 
on the whole, lone mothers in particular were “subject to much adverse comment from 
politicians, media and some policy ‘think tanks’ and highly negative images of these 
families have been very strong in the UK”.167  
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Lone mothers were both perceived and constructed as a social problem, seeing them at 
fault for their own and their children’s deprivation. This notion of depravation is then 
linked to the social cost of lone mothers and anti-social behaviour, as it has been since 
lone mothers became a focus of political and cultural discourse.168 One of the key issues 
was the way in which lone mothers were “characterised and caricatured as ‘welfare 
mothers’”.169 The economic cost of single parenthood was problematised, and seen as 
leading to those social problems which were also rooted in ‘unstable’ families, those 
outside the institution of marriage. Such images were adopted and reinforced by the 
media coverage of single mothers with headlines such as “Wedded to Welfare”170 
appearing with increasing frequency. The Panorama programme “Babies on 
Benefits”171 which portrayed lone mothers as young and irresponsible who were having 
children in order to obtain benefits and council housing also contributed to this 
perception. It used “inflammatory and derogatory” language to describe the ‘case 
studies’ involved and used “misleading [and]… unrepresentative”172 figures in order to 
enflame the pre-existing negative perception of lone mothers.  
 
One of the moral fears associated with lone mothers was that 
“Families without fathers produce egoists. We become a society of fatherless 
families… When the process is far enough spent, by what magic then will we 
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be able to produce the dutiful citizens who will protect their partners and their 
children from their economic and cultural disadvantages?”173 
Emphasising the necessity for a male breadwinner to support the family.  
 
The Child Support Act 1991 was the legislative expression of the notion that 
“parenthood is for life... Legislation cannot make irresponsible parents responsible. But 
it can and must ensure that absent fathers pay maintenance for their children”. 174 
Despite the Act having seemingly been created in order to support single mothers, in 
practice placed more emphasis on cutting state benefits by making fathers responsible 
for the maintenance of their children. This can be seen as part of the attempts to reduce 
reliance on the welfare that and a “renewed move towards men’s role as the 
breadwinner”.175  
 
Though these reforms in some ways support the position of lone mothers, they also 
attempt to restrict changes to the familial structure so far as is possible, rather than 
adapting to and accepting the change. As Millar puts it,  
“what these proposals do is to try and reproduce traditional family and gender 
relationships after couples have separated. The separated family is treated 
almost as if the relationship had not broken down at all”.176  
The men remain breadwinners, financially providing for the family, though absent from 
the home, and the mothers continue as the primary caregiver. It replicates the gender 
                                                          
173 Dennis, N. & Erdos G., (eds) Families Without Fatherhood (London: Institute of Economic Affairs 
1992), 71.  
174 Margaret Thatcher speaking at the Pankhurst Lecture to the 300 Group, London 18.7.90, reported in 
The Independent (19 July 1990). 
175 Larsen, (n76), 233. 
176 Millar, ‘State, Family and Personal Responsibility: The Changing Balance for Lone Mothers in the 
United Kingdom’ (n70), 33. 
264 
 
roles within the family even without the traditional structure of the family “it is clearly 
expected that the Child Support agency should turn fathers back into breadwinners, 
making them support lone mothers – who are 90 per cent of caring parents”.177 That is 
not to say that there ought not to be support for those providing the caregiving role, but 
rather, the method adopted in the Child Support Act merely replicates a model based on 
reliance on a breadwinner and creating a faux-marriage.  
 
The extension of Family Credit, a wage supplement paid to low-paid workers with 
children, to part-time workers in 1992 aimed at incentivising the combination part-time 
work and benefits, lessening the economic burden on the state. However,  
“while Family Credit may encourage lone parents to go out to work, it 
encourages married mothers to stay at home and look after their children. If they 
take up work, they lose 70p in Family Credit for each pound they earn before 
counting work expenses”.178 
These legislative changes though appearing to readdress the incompatibility between 
parenting and employment, in practice reinforced the dichotomy between carer and 
worker. Lone mothers in particular faced a double burden in that they have traditionally 
been excluded from the labour market by virtue of their gender which is exacerbated 
when their role as mother is not supported by the state or a breadwinner.  
 
Labour Supporting Marriage? 
Attempting to distance his own policies from those of the previous government, Blair 
stated: 
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“I have no desire to return to the age of Victorian hypocrisy about sex, to 
women’s place being only in the kitchen, to homophobia or to preaching to 
people about their private lives as the ill-fated ‘back to basics’ campaign by the 
Conservatives attempted to do”.179  
Despite this, the rhetoric of the Labour manifesto was not dissimilar to that of the 
Conservative government with regard to the family. Statements such as their intent to 
“uphold family life” and the notion that “families are the core of our society” following 
on with concerns that “the breakdown of family life damages the fabric of our 
society”.180 However, this was supplemented by statements such as “The clock should 
not be turned back. As many women who want to work should be able to do so”.181 
Indicating a change of step from the attitude of the government(s) which proceeded 
them. 
 
Despite the fact that 22% of children were born to cohabiting parents and 15% were 
born to lone mothers the government continued to focus on protecting marriage.182 The 
Supporting Families Green Paper included numerous suggestions which aimed to 
‘support marriage’. One element was that couples planning to marry would be given 
written guidance as to their rights and responsibilities and those who wished to divorce 
would be expected to attend meetings to establish if the marriage could be saved and 
how it might best be handled if this was not the case. Indeed, the intention of 
“strengthening marriage” 183  formed the title of the fourth chapter and mentioned 
numerous times throughout the paper. It did however, recognise that “strong and 
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mutually supportive families and relationships outside marriage” and that “many 
unmarried couples remain together… and raise their children every bit as successfully 
as married parents”.184  Despite this being a tokenistic reference, the remainder of the 
document made little mention of unmarried couples and provided no means of 
‘strengthening’ such relationships. Overall, the paper was merely a document detailing 
“The Government’s make ’em marry crusade”.185 Meaning that, though there was an 
increased recognition of the existence, and validity of different family forms, there was 
little action to support anything that was not a legal marriage.  
 
Part II of the Family Law Act 1996, which was to be implemented in 2000, incorporated 
the elements of the Green Paper discussed above and the inclusion of no-fault divorce. 
It echoed the same idea that the “institution of marriage” is to be “supported” and that 
where a marriage “may” have broken down that the parties should be “encouraged to 
take all practicable steps”186 in order to save the marriage. Again, this saw divorce 
provisions “situated within a piece of legislation that explicitly declared its support for 
marriage, and which imposed a framework of mechanisms designed to encourage 
couples to stay together”.187 Despite that the provisions in Part II, including no fault 
divorce, were not implemented and were subsequently repealed, the government stated 
that they were still committed to “saving saveable marriages”.188 
 
The supposed support labour had for marriage was called into question when the 
Married Couple’s Allowance was abolished in 2000 which was the only remaining 
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“relic” of the joint taxation system.189 A result of which was a reduction in the tax 
benefits derived from marriage. The only remaining difference between unmarried and 
married couples (within this context) were for married couples which remained 
childless whose income tax was only marginally less. 190  As a result of which the 
traditionalists in the opposition made claims that “the Government have attacked 
marriage”.191 
 
Similarly, the expectation that a Labour government would support the plight of single 
mothers rather than castigate them seemed to be short lived when in one of their first 
acts they removed the extra allowances for lone parents.192 This caused controversy not 
only publicly but within the party itself as many MPs had opposed the proposal when it 
had been introduced by the conservatives  
“The way to get lone mothers out of poverty and cut spending on benefits for 
them is not by cutting the amount on which they have to live year by year and 
plunging them further into poverty”.193 
What was seen as most problematic was that the cuts to benefits preceded the measures 
which “make work pay” or in some cases, “make work possible”.194 These measures 
include the changes to the welfare system such as the introduction of WFTC and the 
increased provision of childcare, and the New Deal for Lone Parents.195 The New Deal 
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sought to move lone parents into the labour market in order to increase employment 
levels, reduce expenditure on welfare and improve the economic situation of women, 
though the latter is usually framed within the context of children. This was done through 
inviting those with school age children to their local job centre and offering help and 
advice on jobs, training and childcare.196 However there were concerns that due to what 
Duncan and Edwards term “gendered moral rationalities”,197 which refers the cultural 
attitudes about gender and parenting roles which are thought to have more influence on 
employment decisions than economic factors. Meaning that some women, will feel 
morally obliged to remain in the home, rather than work due to the historical gendered 
division of parenting roles and the backlash faced by mothers who ‘abandon’ their 
children. 
 
This links to the social resentment towards many of the policies within this decade, and 
in places lack of success of some of the family law legislation in the 1990s as it was 
imposed “from the top down” rather than enacted in response to social pressure, “from 
the bottom up”.198 This can be seen in the attempts to mould social practices, and uphold 
marriage as the ideal conception of the family despite increasing social changes. Some 
of this discontent can be seen with regard to the changes to divorce with headlines such 
as “Divorce: A Law Nobody Wants”.199 However, in reality “legal marriage, while still 
an important institution bringing real advantages to many, is no longer essential to the 
legal concept of a family”. 200  Instead what was becoming more important was 
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199 Smithers, R., ‘Divorce: A Law Nobody Wants’ The Guardian (18 June 1996). 
200 Hale B., ‘The 8th ESRC Annual Lecture 1997 Private lives and public duties: What is family law for?’ 
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parenthood. In “witnessing a renewed emphasis on the family as the one institution 
which should not change… it is taken for granted that everything else around the family 
is changing radically”.201 Despite the changing nature of the family, overall successive 
governments “appear to stick to an unrevised family ideology – i.e. unchanged relations 
between generations – as if nothing had happened in the world around us”.202 Upholding 
marriage in their rhetoric, and in their legislative action.   
 
6.6 Cohabitation: An Overview 
The economic turbulence of the 1980s and 1990s and increasing house prices meant 
that again, cohabitation was on the rise. Although there were some rights afforded to 
those who “live together as man and wife”, and to “common law wives” within some 
legislative acts, these still did not extend to property ownership.203 The increased levels 
of cohabitation began to be discussed in parliament, yet this did not lead to any policy 
change, despite it being apparent that the courts approach was confused and 
inconsistent.204 Where cohabitants, and their growing numbers were discussed, it was 
done so to induce alarm. This sat alongside a re-emergence of the demonization of 
cohabitation as the source of increasing “mental cruelty and abuse”,205 and that such 
couples are unemployed and turn to “mugging, robbery or burglary”.206 As such, though 
the number of cohabitants were increasing, and there was a generation of people who, 
for the most part, accepted the practice, this was clearly polarised with those who held 
views like those above. Coinciding with the resurgence of such views, and the 
                                                          
201 Smart C., ‘Wishful Thinking and Harmful Tinkering? Sociological Reflections on Family Policy’ 
(1997) 26(3) Journal of Social Policy 301, 302. 
202 Qvortrup J., ‘Childhood and modern society: a paradoxical relationship?’ in Brannen J. & O’Brien 
M., (eds.), Childhood and Parenthood, (London: Institute of Education, 1995), 194.  
203 See for example: Housing Act 1980 s50(3)(b); Social Security Act 1980, s5.  
204 See for example: HL Deb 8 March 1982, vol 428, col 42; HL Deb 30 March 1982, vol 428. Col 1282. 
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retirement of Lord Denning who was well known for supporting the plight of cohabiting 
women, the courts began to undo the progress which had been made. 207  This, in 
combination with the pressure to conform to housewifery and the lack of well-paid work 
for women left many female cohabitants in a problematic position where their 
relationship broke down. 
 
During this 1990s, where efforts were made to give protection to those outside of the 
institution of marriage, even within the context of domestic violence, they were faced 
with cries from the press, accusing them of ‘sabotaging’ marriage.208 Despite Labour’s 
promise of a departure from the Conservative approach to the family, their attempts to 
“uphold family life” though more liberal and accepting towards single mothers and 
‘different’ forms of the family, were not the overwhelming re-haul of the system that 
some had predicted. The dominance of the treasury meant that when considering 
changes to family policy, the need for the recognition of cohabitants relationships would 
be measured against the financial cost, with the latter carrying considerably more 
weight. 209  Given that there had already been significant family policy changes, 
incurring considerable cost, cohabitants were once again, ignored.   
 
6.7 Right to Buy  
The “Right to Buy” scheme, introduced in the Housing Act 1980, seemed to be giving 
people an opportunity which they would otherwise be unable to afford, providing a 
generous discount to council tenants who wished to purchase their home. Enabling 
people to own their own home fit with the Conservative ideology of independence and 
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208 Dougherty S., ‘Anger at Bill to “sabotage” marriage’ Daily Mail (23 October 1995), 8. 
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the non-intervention/distancing of the State in the lives of individuals which was been 
propagated at the time. Reasserting the idea of individual self enhancement, seeing “the 
attitudes of independence and self-reliance that are the bedrock of a free society”.210 
 
However, despite the theoretical merits of increasing homeownership, in practice the 
provisions merely added to the raft of legislation which was making the distinction 
between the deserving and undeserving poor ever clearer. The ideology behind the 
“Right to Buy successfully obscured knowledge of persistent market failure and 
structural inequalities within housing”.211 There was no real acknowledgement of the 
risks associated with the scheme, or with the fact that the poorest in society would still 
be unable to purchase their own homes. “The important point made is that those who 
fail to become effective consumers are the new socially excluded”.212 
 
The economic incentives which fuelled the Act, was prompted by the intentions to 
reduce the number of those living in council housing, posing this as a restriction on 
liberty and self-determination. The true concern was that the spread of council housing 
was seen as a risk to the private market. The ‘risks’ were instead shifted onto those 
individuals who were only just able to afford to buy their homes under this scheme. This 
is due to the fact that those who became owner-occupiers under the Right to Buy scheme 
were more likely to be marginal than those who would usually purchase property. As 
such the insecurities involved in home ownership, particularly in times of recession are 
greater for such a group of people.213 
                                                          
210 HC Deb 15 January 1980, vol 976, col 1445. 
211 Carr H., ‘The Right to Buy, the Leaseholder, and the Impoverishment of Ownership’ (2011) 38(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 519, 523. 
212 ibid, 520. 




6.8 Case Analysis 
The first element of this section examines three of the central cases which allows for 
the courts return to the formal approach first identified in Gissing and Pettitt to be 
traced.214 This section ends with a consideration of economic dependency in the light 
of the restrictive finance based approach which resulted from the cases of Burns v Burns 
and Lloyds Bank v Rosset.215 This is then followed by a discussion of the key issues 
which have arisen due to the requirement for the non-owning party to rely on express 
agreements which focusses on the cases of Hammond v Mitchell and Coombes v 
Smith.216 Finally, the re-emergence of a fairness based approach which more closely 
reflects the adoption of a difference approach to equality is then considered with 
particular reference to Hammond and Midland Bank v Cooke.217  
 
6.8.1 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 
The flexible interpretation of the CICT developed by Lord Denning during the 1970s 
was departed from in the case of Burns v Burns, signalling a return to an increasingly 
formal approach to equality within this context. Under Burns, in the absence of an 
express agreement, common intention could only be inferred from financial 
contributions to the property rendering feminine contributions worthless.  
 
                                                          
214 As discussed in [5.7]. 
215 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, hereafter Burns; Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1990] 1 AC 107, hereafter 
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As the property was registered in Mr Burns’ sole name, Mrs Burns sought to make a 
claim based on the contributions she had made to the property.218 She had contributed 
to the family by way of her role as mother and ‘wife’ and had purchased commercial 
goods, furniture and wallpapered parts of the property. 219 However, she “made no 
financial contribution; she had nothing to contribute”.220 Rather than acknowledge the 
value of the contributions she had made, and the impact of her inability to contribute 
financially, the court instead reverted to the orthodoxy of Gissing and Pettitt, with a 
renewed focus on direct/indirect payments. 221  The lack of masculine financial 
contributions led Fox LJ to conclude that there was “nothing at all to indicate that the 
claimant should have any interest in the property”.222  
 
Directly addressing the lack of ‘value’ which feminine contributions were deemed to 
have, the court stated that 
“no doubt, that she would do housekeeping and look after the children. But those 
facts do not carry with them any implication of a common intention that the 
plaintiff should have an interest in the house”.223 
The execution of ‘wifely duties’ which she would ‘no doubt’ perform is deemed 
insufficient. This same sentiment can be seen when Fox LJ states that 
“the mere fact that parties live together and do the ordinary domestic tasks is, in 
my view, no indication at all that they thereby intended to alter the existing 
                                                          
218 Note that though referred to and known as Mrs Burns the couple were unmarried. Valarie Burns 
provides an example of those women who during the 1960s-1970s seeking to hide the ‘illegitimacy’ of 
their relationship changed their name (in this case by deed-poll) so as to appear married. This is discussed 
[5.4.3].  
219 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 320.  
220 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 327.  
221 See [5.7]. 
222 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 327. 
223 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 327.  
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property rights of either of them”.224 
Though the consideration of the ‘ordinary domestic tasks’ here echoes their use by Lord 
Denning, the result of their consideration is not one underpinned by motives of fairness 
or justice.  
 
The gendered construction of the different contributions which men and women would, 
in the courts view, typically make can be identified in the hypothetical scenario 
discussed by May LJ: 
“that the husband may spend his weekends redecorating or laying a patio is 
neither here nor there, nor is the fact the woman has spent so much of her time 
looking after the house, doing the cooking and bringing up the family”.225 
This discussion of masculine and feminine contributions echoes the continuation of the 
breadwinner/housewife construction of the family by the courts, despite its increasing 
inaccuracy in society.226 In ignoring contributions which are considered feminine and 
instead focussing purely on financial contributions the courts returned to a sameness 
approach. However, this fails to acknowledge is that financial contributions are not a 
gender-neutral basis on which to consider intentions concerning a property. The male-
bias inherent in the formal approach, which refuses to acknowledge the disproportionate 
impact which supposedly neutral rules often have on women, and ignores the different 
position society has placed women who subscribe to gender norms in, does not result in 
equality in practice.227 During this period, the focus on financial contributions proved 
particularly problematic in that it “perform[ed] the twofold function of establishing the 
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common intention and showing that the claimant has acted upon it”.228 
 
Summing up May LJ states that  
“when the house is taken in the man's name alone, if the woman makes no ‘real’ or 
‘substantial’ financial contribution towards either the purchase price, deposit or 
mortgage instalments… then she is not entitled to any share in the beneficial interest 
in that home even though over a very substantial number of years she may have 
worked just as hard as the man in maintaining the family in the sense of keeping the 
house, giving birth to and looking after and helping to bring up the children of the 
union”.229 
Though seeming to acknowledge the feminine contributions made by Mrs Burns, they 
are deemed not to be ‘real’ or ‘substantial’ reflecting the lack of worth attributed to 
‘women’s work’ in the home.  
 
6.8.2 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 
Despite the attempts to return to a more restrictive financial approach in Burns, the 
approach of Lord Denning in Eves was still considered “a sure foundation for a just 
decision”230  in Grant v Edwards.231 As such, elements of Lord Denning’s difference 
based approach survived the restrictive approach in Burns. At the outset it is important 
to note that in Grant the absence of ‘relevant’ financial contributions not defeat Mrs 
Grants claim. She was awarded ½ of the beneficial interest based on inferred common 
intention. The lies Mr Edwards told Mrs Grant, which formed the basis of this 
                                                          
228 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, 647.  
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‘common’ intention, concerned the reasons which were given for not registering the 
property in joint names.232 
 
Due to the influence of Eves on Nourse LJs decision in Grant, the judgment contains a 
number of gendered constructions of contributions. When discussing conduct which can 
be considered evidence of detriment it was determined that: 
 “it must be conduct on which the woman could not reasonably have been 
expected to embark unless she was to have an interest in the house… she could 
reasonably be expected to go and live with her lover, but not, for example, to 
wield a 14-lb. sledge hammer in the front garden. In adopting the latter kind of 
conduct she is seen to act to her detriment on the faith of the common 
intention”.233  
The use of ‘reasonable’ here is premised on gendered assumptions about what a man or 
woman would generally contribute, drawing on masculine act of “wielding a 14-lb 
sledgehammer”234 in Eves as an example of going beyond what might reasonably be 
expected from a woman. However, when applying this to the Facts in Grant, Nourse LJ 
instead considered the 
“very substantial contribution which the plaintiff made out of her earnings… to 
the housekeeping and to the feeding and to the bringing up of the children 
enabled the defendant to keep down the instalments payable under both 
                                                          
232 Regarding the lies see Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, 649 this issue is discussed in detail below; 
Regarding quantification of ½ see Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, 651. Reflecting the approach in 
Eves as discussed in the previous chapter. The use of lies in this time period is discussed in more detail 
in [6.8.5].  
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mortgages out of his own income and, moreover, that he could not have done 
that if he had had to bear the whole of the other expenses as well”.235 
as evidence of detriment. ‘Housekeeping’ and ‘feeding and bringing up the children’ 
are usually categorised as feminine acts. However, the fact that they were fulfilled 
through financial means, rather than the act of for example childcare, meant that they 
were considered to have facilitated Mr Edwards payment of the mortgage instalments. 
This transformed the acts from irrelevant feminine contributions, to the equivalent of a 
masculine financial contributions.  
 
Providing further recognition of feminine contributions, Sir Browne-Wilkinson referred 
to the fact that “contributions by way of labour or other unquantifiable actions”236 are 
relevant even where such acts are not directly referable to the acquisition of the 
property. Thereby giving the courts broad scope in cases involving express agreements 
when it comes to the determination of acts which constitute detrimental reliance. Yet, 
this did not go so far as to give them the same weight as financial contributions in 
establishing common intention, which continues to be a significant hurdle for 
economically vulnerable claimants. As such, elements of Lord Denning’s difference 
approach were preserved, albeit in the limited context of detrimental reliance in cases 
involving express agreement.  
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6.8.3 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1990] 1 AC 107 
The law remained unclear and unsettled after Burns. This incentivised the judges in 
Rosset to “circumscribe the ambit”237  of those contributions which could be taken into 
consideration. The resultant focus on financial contributions and express intention 
rendered non-financial and indirect contributions invalid, thus re-establishing the 
formal approach in Gissing and Pettitt while making the criteria even more restrictive. 
Rosset concerned a wife who was attempting to defeat the claim of the third-party 
creditor by means of an overriding interest.238 To do so she was required to show that 
she had beneficial interest in the family home which was registered in the sole name of 
her husband, which she sought to establish on the basis of a CICT.  
 
The unwillingness of the court to accept that “the conversations between the parties 
concerning into whose name the property was to be transferred and the nature of the 
joint venture and the purpose of purchasing” 239  the property indicated a common 
intention between the parties, meant that the focus of proceedings turned to the nature 
of Mrs Rosset’s other contributions. Particular emphasis was placed on the  
“defendant's special skills in painting and decorating over and above those of 
the average housewife and her indirect contribution to reducing the cost of 
renovation of the farmhouse by carrying out certain painting and decorating 
herself”.240 
                                                          
237 Tee L., ‘Co-ownership and Trust’ in Tee L., (ed) Land Law, Issues, Debates, Policy (Willian 
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At first instance the emphasis placed on how Mrs Rosset had gone beyond those acts 
performed by ‘the average housewife’, adopting the gendered discourse(s) prevalent in 
Lord Denning’s difference approach.241 In contrast, the House of Lords were unwilling 
to see those acts as anything more than “the most natural thing in the world for any wife, 
in the absence of her husband… quite irrespective of any expectation she might have of 
enjoying a beneficial interest in the property”.242 Under Rosset, feminine contributions 
are considered as directly “referable to the mutual love and affection of the parties”243 
rather than an evidencing an intention to share property. The courts had not yet done 
away with gender stereotypes, Mrs Rosset’s contributions were still judged against what 
is to be expected of a ‘housewife’. However, rather than use the performance of acts 
which go beyond the gendered expectations as evidence from which to identify 
detriment, they instead reverted to a focus on gender-neutral financial contributions.   
 
The court expressed their narrow finance-based approach as follows: in the absence of 
express agreement  
“direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is not the legal 
owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily 
justify the inference necessary to the creation of a constructive trust… it is at 
least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do”.244 
This almost exclusive reliance on direct financial contributions though seemingly 
gender-neutral, only provides security for the breadwinner and completely ignores the 
housewife role traditionally assigned to women. In practice, treating men and women 
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the same under this formal equality approach, leads to injustice for those who ascribe 
to those traditional gender roles. It proves particularly problematic for women given 
that it was, and to some extent still is, common for men in relationships to pay for the 
home due to the structures of “household economies”245 which have been built on the 
construction of men as providers. It works on the basis of an (inaccurate) assumption 
that women and men have the same ability to contribute to the acquisition of property, 
the same balance of power in a relationship so as to allow them to ensure that they 
secure an express agreement regarding their interest. It ignores that in some 
circumstances women have been prevented from contributing financially to the property 
when they have had the ability to do so and that some women still remain unable to do 
so, either by virtue of their lack of employment, low earnings or due to the fact that the 
property is already owned by their partner.  
 
6.8.4 Economic Dependency 
Despite the increasing frequency at which women were entering the workforce, there 
were still women who found themselves economically dependent on their partner. 
Moreover, in a number of the cases reaching the courts at this time, involved periods of 
cohabitation which had taken place during the 1960s/1970s, in which women’s 
economic dependence on men had been considerably more severe.246 This made the 
strict financial approach adopted in Burns and Rosset increasingly problematic for 
women.  
 
The most frequently drawn upon example of the dependent woman who was left with 
nothing after her 20-year relationship broke down is that of Mrs Burns. Mrs Burns had 
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not been able to take up paid employment between 1961-1975 as “she could not earn 
any money when the children were small”.247 On those occasions where she did earn 
money, as was commonplace during this period, “she was not earning amounts of any 
consequence”.248 The money which she did earn was put towards the family expenses. 
She was economically dependent on Mr Burns who owned the home, paid the bills and 
have her a “generous housekeeping allowance”.249 However, on the breakdown of the 
relationship, this support, and the belief that this would continue is transformed into 
considerable disadvantage. The requirements of the CICT at this time were at odds with 
the nature of women’s employment patterns, (in)ability to contribute and the 
construction of the breadwinner/homemaker family which the courts maintained as a 
base for comparison. As Bottomley notes 
“Not only was she economically disadvantaged by her role as mother, but she 
had also clearly seen herself as, and acted as, an economically dependent ‘wife’ 
who expected to be supported by her partner”.250 
Mrs Burns perception of herself, and lack of awareness of her vulnerable position 
signifies the lack of knowledge which unmarried cohabitants continued to have, further 
problematising the lack of recognition of feminine contributions.251  
 
The economic dependence experienced by women in unmarried cohabiting 
relationships can also be identified in Coombes v Smith.252 That case despite involving 
                                                          
247 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 320.  
248 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 330. Regarding the circumstances surrounding women’s low rate of 
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(2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 181, 190 Belief that such support would continue, and that as a common 
law wife they had an interest can also be seen in Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1127, 1132. “in 
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282 
 
an unsuccessful claim in proprietary estoppel, still provides insight into a number of the 
discourses surrounding the nature of relationships during this period, and as will be 
discussed below, the issue of communication between couples. In Coombes Mr Smith, 
despite only ‘visiting’ the property and never moving in with his ‘mistress’ paid all of 
the household bills and provided her with an allowance.253 After the birth of their child 
in 1975 “she did not look for a job… this was by arrangement with the defendant”.254 
The fact that there was an ‘arrangement’ with this man, who was financially supporting 
her, that she would not work and would instead remain a ‘housewife’ demonstrates the 
extent to which she was completely dependent on this man for her home, and the upkeep 
of herself and her child. Despite acknowledging that there was an ‘agreement’ between 
the couple, this was considered as an insufficient base for her claim. In addition, the 
feminine acts which underpinned the evidence of detrimental reliance: her role as 
mother and housewife, leaving her previous partner, and giving up her employment 
prospects, were also deemed insufficient. As a result Mrs Coombes claim in proprietary 
estoppel failed, giving her no equitable interest in the family home.  
 
The judge goes on to highlight the difficult position that Mrs Coombes finds herself in 
since the relationship has broken down: 
“Since February 1985 the plaintiff has had a job as a part-time school cleaner, 
working two hours a day… In addition, she is in receipt of social security… She 
has no capital assets. She plans to look for a full-time job when Clare is a year 
or two older. She has no qualifications”.255  
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When considered against the socio-economic backdrop provided above, the 
increasingly restrictive approach to state support and the concentration of women in low 
paid, part-time work, the injustice of the courts unwillingness or inability to find 
equitable interest in the property becomes all the more concerning. To make matters 
worse, the judgment closes with a reminder of the precarious position Mrs Coombes 
would find herself in once Clare reached 17, at which time she would lose the right to 
occupy the property.256  
 
6.8.5 Trust and Lies: Express Agreement 
Despite the otherwise restrictive approach in Rosset, the court were still willing to give 
effect to agreements, even if the exact terms of such an agreement were “imprecise” 
and “imperfectly remembered”257 by the parties. As a result, the courts were still willing 
to support cases in which the common intention was founded as a result of an 
‘excuse’. 258  More importantly, it was within these cases that when considering 
detrimental reliance, the courts were keen to recognise not only any indirect financial 
contributions, but also stereotypically feminine contributions. Hammond serves as an 
example of such a case. There, when discussing detrimental reliance, Waite J considered 
“Miss Mitchell's contribution as mother/helper/unpaid assistant and at times financial 
supporter”259 to be of such value that her beneficial interest was determined to be one 
half. However, there remained a series of issues in relation to express agreements.  
 
Hammond provides an example of the issues which arise in relation to the evidential 
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weight which may/may not be attached to such agreements. When discussing the 
evidence which had been given in prior proceedings, Waite J concluded that “neither 
side had the monopoly of truth. Both were prone to exaggeration”.260 This statement 
draws attention to the general difficulties surrounding evidence in this context. Given 
that such agreements relate to family property, the assets of which are most likely being 
considered on breakdown, an individual might, willingly or unwillingly, develop 
malicious hindsight concerning their prior agreements.  
 
The bungalow purchased after the birth of the child was purchased in Mr Hammond’s 
name. He made several excuses for this relating to his divorce proceedings and tax 
reasons, despite this he stated: 
“As soon as I am divorced we will get married… [and] Don't worry about the 
future because when we are married it will be half yours anyway and I'll always 
look after you and [the boy]”.261 
This was consequently considered to support the finding of an express agreement, 
though without the aforementioned ‘excuses’ used in this case, such statements would 
on their own be deemed insufficient.  
 
A further issue which arises is the unlikelihood that a couple will expressly discuss 
either the fact that the property is considered to be jointly owned, nor what their 
respective share ought to be. Even in Rosset, despite its restrictive approach, the court 
recognised that it is unlikely that the court will find that a couple has made an express 
agreement as to how the property is to be ‘divided’, “Spouses living in amity will not 
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normally think it necessary to formulate or define their respective interests in property 
in any precise way”.262 Hammond serves as an example of the way in which couples 
communicate is often incompatible with the form of communication which is deemed 
relevant under the law. It is worth noting that, in that case Miss Mitchell was still able 
to succeed on the basis of the ‘excuses’ made to her by Mr Hammond, Waite J 
recognises that “natural self-respect, that held her back from pressing him on the 
marriage question for the remaining years of their association”.263 
 
Were it not for the fact that Mr Hammond made excuses regarding why the property 
was not placed into joint names, Miss Mitchells understandable reluctance to continue 
asking about marriage, which would have gained her meaningful protection would have 
in all likelihood been the undoing of her claim. It has been stated that after Rosset 
“cohabiting partners must... contemplate and address the unthinkable, namely that their 
relationship will break down and that they will fall out over what they do and do not 
own”.264 However, as Hammond demonstrates, when considering this in practice, it is 
unlikely that it will be pursued. 
   
The final issue raised by the express agreement element of the CICT discussed here is 
the nature of familial trust.265 Coombes provides insight into the way in which a couple 
will often act on the basis of trust, without consideration of the breakdown of their 
relationship. Viewing this from a romantic rather than legalistic perspective, why would 
there be any need to verbalise the existence/quantification of shares when you trust the 
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person who reassures you that “we'll spend the rest of our lives together”.266 Similar 
expressions of trust can be seen in statements such as “I thought it was joint otherwise 
I wouldn't have put my money into it. He said he would put my name on it in about a 
months time. I trusted him completely”267 in Drake v Whipp. 
 
Coombes also serves as an example in which the nature of communication can change 
over the course of a relationship. Early on in the relationship their silence as to 
proprietary interest was indicative of their contentment. When Ms Coombes had asked 
about what would happen to her if something happened to Mr Smith to which he replied 
“Don't worry. I have told you I'll always look after you”.268 This generalised reply is the 
source of one of the key issues with reliance on intention within a familial context. It is 
the phrase upon which proprietary interest so often balances. Clearly Ms Coombes saw 
in this longevity and security, whereas the Mr Smith was merely avoiding the question 
and continuing his previous pattern of deception with regard to his relationships with 
women. A history which was evidenced and referenced within the judgment.269  
 
The second use of silence, when Ms Coombes began to become insecure about her 
position in the relationship was met with a reluctance of Mr Smith to discuss the matter 
as can be seen with his exclamation of “don’t dictate to me”.270 Here silence is at the 
polar opposite of its original usage. Mr Smith uses it to assert his dominance. This two-
fold silence concerning security in the home is problematic given that at the start of a 
relationship, to speak about ownership is stigmatised, it is linked to a foreseeable 
                                                          
266 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, 810. 
267 Drake v Whipp (1996) 28 HLR 531, 535. 
268 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, 811.  
269 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, 812. 
270 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, 812. 
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termination. Yet once the end of a relationship begins to be signalled, a breach of silence 
is met with hostility. This makes express agreements a rarity, and an unreliable and 
unrealistic occurrence for a financially vulnerable party to rely on.  
 
Coombes demonstrates the fluidity of communication within just one relationship. It 
exemplifies the inexact nature of commitment, and the immediate effect happiness can 
have on parties’ thoughts towards property which are exacerbated upon breakdown. It 
may be unreasonable to expect the court to fully analyse the ‘ups and downs’ of a 
cohabiting couples’ relationships, this case serves as an example of the caution 
necessary when looking for intention which is not merely financial. Yet, in saying this, 
I am not condoning the purely financial approach. It has been said that hard cases make 
bad law, a concept which can be identified throughout the development of the CICT. 
 
The disparity amongst couples’ inference from silence can also be identified in Rosset 
in Mrs Rosset’s evidence as to her beneficial interest when she states that:  
“I always understood we were going to share whatever we had, big or little. We 
always discussed it as being ours. The only discussion was in very general 
terms… If you live with someone, you don't 'dissect' it. It was an accepted 
thing”.271 
This paints a realistic picture of a family unit, and an understanding not limited to 
married couples.272 It is the natural way of things that the possibility of relationship 
breakdown is not discussed outright. Although this may seem illogical, it is a social 
convention which should not be ignored by the courts. The reality of the matter is,  
“whilst there may be mutual (?) dreaming about what the couple will do together, there 
                                                          
271Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1989] Ch. 350, 378.  
272 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1131 in support of this statement.  
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is rarely concrete discussion about the practicalities of economic relations, especially 
should the couple separate”.273 Thus, in only providing adequate protection to those 
couples who expressly assert their proprietary interest, or in only providing for financial 
contributions to be considered with any weight the courts are ignoring the reality of 
cohabitating relationships.  
 
6.8.6 Fairness? 
The need to analyse a couple’s beneficial interest in the family home has to be “worked 
out according to their strict entitlements in equity, a process which is anything but 
forward-looking and involves, on the contrary, a painfully detailed retrospect” 274  rather 
than making any consideration of their future needs or fairness.275 However, it has also 
been argued that having to evaluate the variety of circumstances which may give some 
indication of the intention of the parties is “time-consuming and laborious”. 276  In 
contrast, a purely financial approach is presented as a time/cost saving device which 
allows the court to determine the parties true common intention.277 It seems of little 
consequence that this approach is often implemented at the expense of the financially 
vulnerable party, without truly reflecting the intention of the parties.  
 
Despite the supposed benefits of a finance-based approach with regard to expediency, 
even financial contributions are not always easy to ascertain undermining the reasoning 
for relying on them rather than the nature of the relationship. For example, the “chaotic” 
                                                          
273Bottomley A., ‘Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law’ (1993) 20 Journal of 
Law and Society 56, 61.  
274 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1129. 
275 That is in comparison to the position Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s25. 
276 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1130. 
277 How accurate financial contributions are in determining common intention is questionable. This has 
been discussed in detail in [4.3.2].  
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book keeping in Hammond meant that it was difficult to ascertain with any certainty the 
contributions made by, and earnings of, the couple.278 Additionally, in Midland, Waite 
LJ dedicated a large portion of his judgment to the evidence regarding payments to the 
purchase price  
“because it provides a vivid illustration of the difficulties which these cases pose 
for the honest recollections of witnesses and the barrenness of the terrain in 
which the judges… are required to search for the small evidential nuggets on 
which issues as to the existence - or the proportions - of beneficial interest are 
liable to depend”.279 
The fact that the analysis of financial contributions is still liable to misrepresentations, 
remains time consuming and does not truly indicate the parties’ intentions has led to 
some judges to attempt to extend the matters deemed relevant when considering 
acquisition and quantification in order to provide a more just result.280  
 
The reluctance of the courts to adhere to the restrictive approach in Rosset can be 
identified in the continuing willingness for judges to find ‘express’ agreements. This 
was evident even in cases such as Hammond in which by the judges’ own admittance 
the discussion(s) which formed the basis of this finding were “not directed with any 
precision as to proprietary interests”.281 As a result of this Waite J determined that the 
court should “examine the subsequent course of dealing between the parties for 
evidence of conduct detrimental to the party without legal title”.282 Here the non-
financial contributions of the parties were given a role in ascertaining the meaning 
                                                          
278 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1133.  
279 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR. 733, 738. 
280 Not unlike the approach adopted in Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 and discussed above.  
281 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1137. 
282 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1129.  
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behind their express agreement(s). Thus indicating the intention of the courts to consider 
a broader range of factors than those deemed relevant in Rosset.283  
 
The inflexibility of the approach under Rosset, also led some judges to adopt a broad 
approach to quantification. This is particularly identifiable in Midland. When the 
question of quantification arose 
“the judge [in the court below] was in my view in error when he proceeded to 
treat the cash contribution to the purchase price as wholly determinative of the 
issue of the current proportions of beneficial entitlement, without regard to the 
other factors emerging from the whole course of dealing between the husband 
and wife”.284 
He then goes on to discuss a number of factors which he deemed relevant in the 
determination of her shares including her role as a mother and her indirect financial 
contributions (the payment of household bills).285 Similarly to the approach adopted by 
Lord Denning years prior,286 Waite LJ also emphasised the “anxiety and distress”287 Mr 
Cooke had caused her, attempting to demonstrate that to deny her a ‘fair’ share would 
be unjust. The influence of Lord Denning is most identifiable when Waite LJ surmises 
that “one could hardly have a clearer example of a couple who had agreed to share 
everything equally”,288 determining that the couple should share the beneficial interest 
                                                          
283 Compare Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127, 1137 with Lloyds Bank v. Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 
107, 133.  
284 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 747. Not unlike Rosset, Midland in dealing with married 
couples involved the determination of beneficial interest (necessary for establishing an overriding 
interest) on the basis of a CICT due to the involvement of the 3rd party creditor. 
285 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 747. 
286 See [5.7.3] which details Denning’s construction of women as ‘victims’. 
287 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 747.  
288 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 747. 
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in the property equally. This invokes the same kind of considerations of ‘joint 
effort’/’joint lives’ as in the rejected family assets approach.289 
 
The financial contribution by Mrs Cooke was at best minimal, and at worst questionable 
given that this finding was based on a very small proportion of the overall purchase 
price of the property due to a payment made by Mr Cooke’s parents which was deemed 
a ‘wedding gift’ by the court.290 However, Waite LJ’s motivation for the finding such a 
substantial beneficial share in Midland can be seen as an attempt to reinvoke some 
degree of fairness within property law proceedings, indeed he notes that the current law 
is guilty of causing “human heartache as well as public expense”.291 
 
In addition to the recognition which Waite LJ gives to Mrs Cooke’s role as mother as 
discussed above, his attempts to reinstate fairness within CICT proceedings can be 
identified in his recognition of the different abilities for mothers to contribute 
consistently to, for example mortgage repayments. In looking at both the “social 
conditions of today” and the nature of the relationship in the round, holding that the 
shares should be held equally “would be a natural enough common intention of a young 
couple who were both earning when the house was acquired but who contemplated 
having children whose birth and rearing in their infancy would necessarily affect the 
future earning capacity of the wife”.292 In allowing for a consideration of the whole 
course of dealings so as to fully recognise the contributions which had been made by 
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the non-owning party, Midland attempted to reassert fairness in CICT proceeding, albeit 
in a limited capacity.  
 
This approach, motivated by fairness and influenced by the rejected family assets 
approach is further evidence of the determination of some judges, where possible, to 
avoid the application of the harsh Rosset regime. A similar intention can also be 
identified in Grant in the advent of Burns as discussed above. Through recognising the 
value of feminine contributions such as mothering, this could be seen as a re-emergence 
of a difference based approach. However, the application remained unfortunately 
limited due to the ruling in Rosset.  
 
6.9 Conclusion 
The historical overview provided by this chapter has demonstrated the way in which 
“women were the shock-absorbers of the economic and social system”.293 They faced 
eroding maternity rights, cuts to nursery care and were disproportionately impacted by 
a number of changes to employment legislation and the tax system. Provisions were 
enacted which reinforced the idea that women’s place was in the home, particularly 
when she had children. Those who needed/wanted to work were ill supported by the 
government and they were often stuck in jobs which were low paid and did not match 
their level of skill. By the end of the 1980s, the purpose of persisting in the enforcement 
of traditional values against the tide of social change was becoming questionable:  
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“As changes in marital behaviour became more dramatic in the last quarter of 
the century, so policy makers had to decide whether to recognise and work with 
when or whether to try and put back the clock”.294 
Despite this, it seemed that Parliament and the courts settled on turning back the clock. 
 
The continued shift into the public sphere of employment has brought with it both 
progress and problems for women in the 1990s. It has continued to struggle to adapt to 
the development of women’s role as one beyond wife/mother. Despite progress in terms 
of the provision of childcare, maternity provision and the introduction of the minimum 
wage, this remained insufficient. The persistence of the pay gap, in combination with 
the prevalence of women in part-time work have meant that women remain more 
financially vulnerable than men. The gradual “decline of the male-breadwinner 
model”295 having been all but replaced by a duel-earner relationship model has not 
necessarily lead to financial independence for many women. More than that, it certainly 
has not done away with the stereotypes which sprang from this model, given that they 
were still evident in the workplace, and the home, given the continuing distinction 
between the nature and value of ‘women’s work’ as against men’s. The workplace, and 
it’s focus on long hours culture, and long unbroken service being central to promotion 
serve as an example of the way in which employment was still constructed within a 
framework of masculine norms.  
 
The case analysis section of this chapter has demonstrated the overwhelming tendency 
towards a formal approach of the courts, particularly in the cases of Burns and Rosset. 
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In focussing on financial contributions, the gender-neutral criteria of the CICT when 
viewed against the historical context, and in the content of the cases themselves 
demonstrate the extent to which this worked to the detriment of women. Although there 
were elements of a re-emergence of a difference approach in Hammond, Midland and 
Grant, in which the different ability of women to contribute was recognised and 
influenced the decisions made it was difficult for the courts to avoid the hard-line 
approach in Rosset, continuing the detriment suffered by women by virtue of their ‘role’ 
as mothers and their unequal position in society. 
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Chapter 7 - Socio-Legal Changes Influencing Cohabitation in Britain from 2000 
Onwards 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines a number of the central socio-legal and changes which provide 
insight into the treatment of women in society which occurred from 2000 onwards. Like 
the two chapters which precede it, it is arranged thematically, focussing particularly on 
employment and the changing shape of the family. This overview provides the 
necessary socio-legal historical background from which to examine the case analysis 
which follows. Allowing the judgments to be analysed in context. In particular this is 
used to inform the discussion related to the (in)adequacy of the adoption of different 
equality approaches.   
 
The chapter then goes on to analyse the key cases relating to the CICT in this period. 
This section predominantly focusses on the increasing willingness of the courts to 
consider ‘fairness’ within their judgments.  Unlike the previous decades examined, the 
purely formal approach is almost absent from consideration. However, this is due to the 
fact that the law in relation to sole-ownership has not truly moved on from Rosset. As 
such the more recent case law examined in this chapter, though signalling potential 
progress for economically vulnerable parties in the context of the CICT only applies in 
cases of joint-ownership. This section also examines a number of the proposals for 
legislation within this period, which provides additional insight into the social and legal 





This section provides an overview of the key legislative changes which have occurred 
in relation to equal pay. It also considers the position of women in relation to 
flexible/part-time working and the continuation of the pay gap. Finally, it examines the 
development of maternity, paternity, and shared parental leave which has attempted to 
redistribute child care responsibility between parents.   
 
7.2.1 Equality Act 2010 
Despite legislative action in the 1970s attempting to address the issue of inequality in 
the workplace, “deep-seated discriminatory structures” 1  have remained intact. The 
introduction of the Equality Act 20102 aimed to harmonise and simplify the provisions 
contained in a plethora of equality legislation. The provisions are based around a series 
of protected characteristics which include sex and pregnancy/maternity.3 The content 
of the Act is wide-ranging, but for the purposes of this chapter, the elements relating to 
employment and gender will be the focus. The EqA has made “very few substantial 
changes”4 in the area of gender equality, having replicated much of the content from 
the legislation which proceeded it.  
 
The failure to extend those rights which were enshrined in the previous legislation has 
meant that many of the issues which contribute to gender inequality in the workplace 
remain unresolved. This includes the replication of the concept of ‘work of equal value’ 
and the inclusion of the material factor defence, which despite dropping the ‘genuine’ 
                                                          
1 Fredman S., Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 6. On the discrimination legislation in this 
period: see [5.2], [5.3]. 
2 Hereafter EqA. 
3 Equality Act 2010, s4. 
4 Hepple B., Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 98.  
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from the name, remains the same in form as its predecessor in the EPA 1970.5 The 
method of enforcement maintains its reliance on a complaints-based model, which 
requires that an individual bring proceedings against an employer.6  
 
The use of this model is a cause for concern for several reasons. First, the cost of 
proceedings as a barrier to pursuing claims remains intact, and the burden of lengthy 
and costly litigation often falls on those who are most vulnerable.7 Much like the 
disproportionate impact on women caused by cuts to legal aid,8 the introduction of 
tribunal fees in 20139 “has had devastating implications for… access to justice”10 for 
women and the low paid. It has also been suggested that relying on this system is “the 
most significant reason why the EqA does not adequately tackle occupational 
segregation”.11 Basing these rights on individual complaints also means that there is 
little obligation placed on employers “to correct the institutional structure which gave 
rise to the discrimination”. 12  Therefore, though it continues to provide some 
recompense to those who are aware of their rights, and who are financially able to 
pursue a claim, it does nothing to promote institutional change, which is essential if 
gender equality is to be embraced within the employment sphere.  
 
                                                          
5 Equality Act 2010, s65(1)(a)1(c) & s69. As discussed at [5.3.3] and [6.2.4].  
6 Employer, previous employer, or prospective employer for those cases which involve discrimination at 
the hiring stage of employment.  
7 Fredman S., ‘Reforming Equal Pay Laws’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 193, 206. 
8 Legal aid cuts were introduced in Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
9 The introduction of tribunal fees is contained in the Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal 
Tribunals Order 2013. 
10  Trades Union Congress., At What Price Justice? The Impact of Tribunal Fees (June 2014), 2: 
<https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/TUC_Report_At_what_price_justice.pdf> accessed: 
20/01/18. 
11 Burton B., ‘Neoliberalism and the Equality Act 2010: A Missed Opportunity for Gender Justice?’ 
(2014) 43(2) Industrial Law Journal 122, 132 
12 Fredman, ‘Reforming Equal Pay Laws’ (n7), 297. 
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The actual comparator requirement remains a feature of the EqA.13 This continues to 
prove problematic due to the persistence of occupational segregation, which means that 
often no actual comparator exists. However, the Act has inserted provisions which allow 
for a hypothetical comparator to be used in certain limited situations.14 Despite this, the 
example given in the explanatory notes raises questions as to the validity of this 
provision:  
“An employer tells a female employee ‘I would pay you more if you were a 
man’… In the absence of any male comparator the woman cannot bring a claim 
for breach of an equality clause but she can bring a claim of direct sex 
discrimination”.15 
It is unlikely that an employer will behave in such an overtly discriminatory manner, 
which despite marking a shift in position from decades prior, restricts the value of the 
addition as it is only applicable to cases of direct discrimination. As a result, the 
inclusion of the hypothetical comparator has limited application and does little to 
counter inequality in the workplace.   
 
In its considerable gestation period, the Bill included provisions which would have 
contributed to the reduction of gender equality regarding the pay gap. This included the 
provision under s78 which required the publication of information relating to the pay of 
employees to determine if there are any differences between the pay for men and women 
in companies which employed 250 or more individuals. This was removed just prior to 
                                                          
13 See [5.3.3], [6.2.4]. 
14 Equality Act 2010, s71. 
15 Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, Para 246. 
299 
 
the enactment of the legislation.16 However, it ought to be noted this section of the Act 
has subsequently been reinstated, and came into force in 2018.17 
 
Given that “the Bill does not establish new procedures for providing arbitration in equal 
pay disputes nor does it impose positive duties on employers to take steps to monitor 
and respond to patterns of pay inequality”,18 it is clear that the Act has fallen short of 
the expectations of many. Positive duties were seen by many as essential in eradicating 
inequality in the workplace particularly those who believe that formal equality is 
inadequate and therefore promote a substantive model.19  As it stands, the current mode 
of enforcement relies on the notion that employers will self-regulate in order to avoid 
proceedings as without individual claims, there are no positive obligations placed on 
employers to insure equality and non-discriminatory practice.20 Overall, it is clear that 
the EqA in and of itself is not enough – it needs to be accompanied by “strategies at the 
level of structures and institutions… in public and private spheres”21 which are still 
lacking. 
 
7.2.2 Pay Gap 
Over this period, the levels of both part-time and full-time employment have increased, 
for women, the current level is at the joint highest since comparable records began in 
                                                          
16 See [7.2.2]. 
17 The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, s2. Discussed in [7.2.2]. 
18 Joint Committee on Human Rights., Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill 26th (HL169/ HC 736, 2008-9), 
para 186. 
19  See for example: O’Cinneide C., ‘Positive Action and the Limits of Existing Law’ (2006) 13 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 351, 354 and Fredman, Discrimination Law 
(n1), 7. 
20 Fredman S. & Sarah Spencer S., ‘Beyond Discrimination: It’s Time for Enforceable Duties on Public 
Bodies to Promote Equality Outcomes’ (2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 598, 599. 
21 Verloo M., ‘Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union’ (2006) 13 European 
Journal of Women’s Studies 211, 215. 
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the 1970s.22 The gender pay gap has shown a general pattern of decline over this period. 
For full-time employees, the current pay gap sits at 9.1%, and when part-time work is 
included the overall pay gap is at 18.4%.23 Interestingly, there is a negative pay gap 
where part-time work is concerned, meaning that women tend to earn more than men 
within this context, this figure sits at -6%.24 This has generally widened since the early 
2000s, though the pattern is less clear than for full-time workers given that there is 
evidence that the part-time gender pay gap has widened in the long-term. 25  
 
The motherhood gap has continued to be one of the most striking gaps in pay. Despite 
it being generally accepted that “women who do decide to become mothers should not 
have to pay a penalty at work”,26 these changes in parliamentary/political rhetoric and 
public opinion have done little to change the reality of working mothers. The 
motherhood gap is identifiable through examining the shift from the minimal gap 
between men and women, which increases from their late 20s onwards. The gap (in full-
time employment) goes from on average 10% to approximately 33% after the birth of 
first child measured over a period of 20 years.27 At the period while “male wages 
continue to increase, especially for the high-educated, while female wages completely 
flatline on average”.28 This is in part due to the gendered division of care, in that women 
are still more likely to be the primary carer for their children, and also for elderly 
relatives and neighbours.29 However, there is also evidence to suggest that, in taking a 
                                                          
22 ONS., Statistical Bulletin UK Labour Market: January 2018 (24 January 2018), 4. 
23 ONS., Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: 2017 provisional and 2016 revised results 2017 (26 
October 2017), 7. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 Banyard K., The Equality Illusion. The Truth About Women and Men Today (London: Faber and Faber, 
2010), 79. 
27 Costa Dias M., Elming W. & Joyce R., The Gender Wage Gap IFS Briefing Note BN186 (IFS 2016), 
12. 
28 ibid, 11.  
29 McGuinness F., Gender Pay Gap Briefing Paper Number 7068, 26 October 2016, 7. 
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break from the labour market, there are “negative views of women’s commitment to 
work after having children and positive views of fathers in the workplace, probably 
associated with the traditional male breadwinner role – are at play too”. 30  This 
demonstrates the continuation of stereotypes which have been identified for a 
considerable time.31 
 
Occupational segregation continues to be a significant contributor to the gender pay 
gap. Most notably, the full-time pay gap is smallest in female dominated industries, and 
the part-time pay gap is largest in the higher paid positions and industries, which 
predominantly employ men.32 A clear pattern emerges, that where a sector is largely 
male, women are underpaid and where women make up the majority of employees, the 
gap is more minimal, or even negative, but so are the earnings. This continues with the 
theme that “women’s work” whether paid or unpaid remains undervalued.33 Although 
the feminisation of work can be perceived as positive, as Harris notes  
“low pay tends to follow where women work. Where men come into 
traditionally feminised sectors, the pay tends to go up; where women move into 
sectors where they have not been before the pay tends to go down”.34 
It seems to be an inescapable cycle as of yet. The concentration of women in the lowest 
paid industries and work is made considerably more problematic given the income gap 
between the highest and lowest paid employees. This is especially the case within the 
                                                          
30 Trades Union Congress., The Motherhood Pay Penalty: Key Findings from the TUC/IPPR Research 
(March 2016), 5:  
<www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/MotherhoodPayPenalty.pdf> accessed: 20/01/2018>. 
31 As identified throughout Chapters 5-6. 
32 Harris S., Written evidence provided for and cited in House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee., Gender Pay Gap (HC 584, 2015-16), para 35. 
33 See [5.2],[6.2]. 
34 Harris (n32), para 35. 
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UK as it has been described as “the outlier within Europe, it is the most grossly unequal 
country”.35 
 
As mentioned above, one the ways in which the government seeks to close the pay gap 
is through the enactment of the provisions relating to the publication of large 
companies’ gender pay gaps.36 Of this, TUC General Secretary Frances O'Grady said: 
“While today's announcement is a step in the right direction, we're disappointed 
that firms won't have to publish their gender pay gap figures until 2018. There 
is no need for such a long delay”.37 
Though it has been questioned as to whether this ‘name and shame’ tactic will have any 
considerable impact given that it relies entirely on the notion that businesses will change 
their behaviour in order to place highly on a league table.38  
 
As part of their commitment to closing the pay gap, as can be seen in both Cameron’s 
promise that, “my one nation government will close the gender pay gap”,39 the national 
living wage was introduced. The thought behind this was that fact that given that they 
are disproportionally concentrated in the lowest paid jobs, “the measure will provide a 
particular boost for women across Britain”.40 Perhaps this will eradicate some of the 
pay inequality in the UK. However, without larger scale societal and institutional 
                                                          
35 Dorling D., ‘Income inequality in the UK: Comparisons with five large Western European countries 
and the USA’ (2015) 61 Applied Geography 24, 27. 
36 See [7.2.1]. 
37 As quoted in Mason R., Gender pay gap reporting for big firms to start in 2018 (The Guardian 12 
February 2016): <www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/12/gender-pay-gap-reporting-big-firms-start-
2018> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
38 As the first public disclosure by companies only occurred in April 2018 there is insufficient data from 
which to draw any concrete conclusions as to its impact on employers’ incentives towards alleviating the 
pay gap at this stage.  
39 Prime Minister’s Office, press release, 14 July 2015. 
40 HM Treasury, Department for Business Innovation and Skills and Osborne G., Today Britain gets a 
pay rise, thanks to the National Living Wage (1 April 2016): <www.gov.uk/government/news/today-
britain-gets-a-pay-rise-thanks-to-the-national-living-wage> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
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change towards the traditional gender roles of women and men, and without the support 
structures needed to facilitate this shift, the pay gap will remain to decline at an 
undesirably slow pace.  
 
7.2.3 Flexible Working/Part-time Work 
Increasing numbers of women work full-time, though this still sits at 40%, which is 
only a 4% increase since 1997.41  The number of women who work part-time still 
outweighs the number of men (41% compared with 12% respectively).42 Despite this 
increase in the number of men working part-time, the notion that such work is ‘women’s 
work’ continues. The issues associated with part-time work have continued.43 It tends 
to be low paid work with little chance of promotion. The part-time workforce is made 
up of numerous individuals working in positions which do not match their level of 
experience/qualifications, a Resolution survey found that “44% of women questioned 
has taken a lower skilled job as they were working part-time”.44  
The move from full-time to part-time work, though affording flexibility, is often 
perceived as ‘career suicide’. It is possible for part-time work to lead to pay increases 
and promotion. However, the dominance of long hours culture has meant that employers 
will often associate the time spent in the office as indicative of commitment and 
productivity.45 The construction of the worker as an individual who works full-time and 
one who does not have the ‘distraction’ of a family (or at least whose family is not 
                                                          
41 ONS., UK Labour Market, October 2016 (19 October 2016), Table EMP01 SA - data at March-May 
as a percentage of women of working age. 
42 ONS., Labour Force Survey, Quarter 2 2016 (11 September 2016), Table EMP04 - as a percentage of 
women/men of working age.  
43 Detailed in [6.3.2]. 




45  Lewis S., ‘Restructuring workplace cultures: the ultimate work-family challenge?’ (2010) 25(5) 
Gender in Management 355, 358. 
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perceived as a distraction because they are cared for by their mother) contributes to the 
continuation the masculine model of employment.46 This is particularly problematic for 
those who work part-time, predominantly women, and those women who take time out 
from employment due to pregnancy, and then maternity leave. These individuals are 
perceived as lacking commitment, and therefore are less likely to progress financially 
at work.  
 
The role(s) often assumed by women, in particular in relation to care giving continues 
to have an impact on their employment. As Paull summarises: 
“the prevalence of women in part-time work continues to be a distinguishing 
feature of female employment. Condemnation for the prevalence of shorter 
hours is often expressed in the ‘part-time pay penalty’ and the notion that part-
time work consists of dead-end jobs in poorly paid occupations, perpetuating 
the weaker position of women in employment positions”.47 
Due to a lack of affordable childcare, and the gendered nature of care (both for children 
and the elderly) means that part-time work is frequently the only option. In a Resolution 
survey of mothers who worked part-time: 
“44 percent specifically cited the lack of affordable quality childcare as a barrier. 
In addition, 43 percent said that it was not financially worth their while to work 
full-time. This is largely because the additional childcare costs that would be 
incurred would leave mothers with little take home pay”.48 
Even with the implementation of a number policy changes and legislative acts 
supposedly aimed at increasing the number of women in the workforce, the reality for 
                                                          
46 As seen in [5.2], [5.3], [6.2], [6.3]. 
47 Paull G., ‘Children and women’s hours of work’ (2008) 118(526) Economic Journal F8, F8. 
48 Alakeson, (n44), 6.  
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working women is that the barriers they face in entering full-time employment are the 
same they have faced for the last fifty years, albeit to a lesser extent.  
 
Despite societal changes, including the fact that only a small minority of people, support 
the gendered separation of roles, the division of labour in the home still frequently 
reflects the breadwinner/caregiver model of the family.49 Alongside the fact that fathers 
want to take a larger role in childrearing, with almost half of fathers stating that they 
“think they currently spend too little time with their children and half think they spend 
too much time at work”.50 The legal and political changes clearly have not adequately 
facilitated such a shift. Without significant institutional change and the provision of 
affordable and adequate childcare, employment structures remain unyielding. Thus 
meaning that the issues faced by women historically in contributing financially to the 
home, either at all or to the same extent as their partner, continues.51 
 
7.2.4 Maternity, Paternity and Shared Leave 
Over this period maternity pay, allowance and leave have all been gradually extended 
through a series of legislative acts.52 The period of unconditional maternity leave has 
been increased by the gradual reduction in the qualification criteria, meaning that all 
women who have a contract of employment are now eligible for 52 weeks maternity 
leave regardless of their hours of work or length of service.53 This is still however, split 
into the distinction between Ordinary Maternity Leave and Additional Maternity Leave. 
                                                          
49 13% of the public support the gendered separation of roles: Scott J. & Clery E., ‘Gender Roles’ in Park 
A. (et al) (eds)., British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report (London: NatCen Social Research, 2013).  
50 Ellison G. (et al)., Work and care: a study of modern parents 15th report (Manchester: Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2009), 10.   
51 This of course having considerable consequences in cases concerning the CICT as discussed in [4.3.2], 
[5.7], [6.8], [7.4]. 
52 Employment Act 2002; Work and Families Act 2006. 
53 Work and Families Act 2006 repealed the qualifying period of 26 weeks; Maternity and Parental Leave 
etc Regulations 1999, reg 7(4). 
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The key distinction between these forms of leave lies in the nature of the protection 
provided for each 26 week period of leave and the non-accrual of pension contributions 
during the unpaid period. During Additional Maternity Leave the right to return is 
subject to the “reasonable practicable”54 clause.  
 
The length of Statutory Maternity Pay and Maternity Allowance (for those who do not 
qualify for statutory pay) have also been extended from 26 to 39 weeks.55 The way in 
which payments are fixed has remined relatively unchanged since 2007, except for 
adjusting the flat rates in line with the consumer price index. Although the increased 
maternity rights both with regard to pay and leave signify progress, a number of issues 
still remain. In particular, the fact that the length of pay still does not match the length 
of leave, meaning that many cannot afford to take full advantage of the 52 weeks of 
entitlement. In addition the payments made are still at a low level, again meaning that 
in order to take lengthy leave there must usually be another earner in the household. As 
a result, financial necessity has been identified as one of the key reasons women return 
to work early from maternity leave is due to financial necessity. As James states, 
“piecemeal increases in the length of Statutory Maternity Leave are a safe way of 
appearing to be family-friendly whilst, in practice, failing to address the real needs of 
families in 21st Century Britain”.56 Finally, the lower level of protection associated with 
Additional Maternity Leave still has the capacity for misuse by employers, and the 
pension restrictions has longer term negative implications for women.  
 
                                                          
54 Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999, reg 18(2) – for AML and 18(1) OML.  
55 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, s116 and Working Families Act 2006, s2.  
56 James G., ‘The Work and Families Act 2006: Legislation to Improve Choice and Flexibility?’ (2006) 
35(3) Industrial Law Journal 272, 273. 
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There have been significant changes to the rights of the father/partners with regard to 
leave and pay. The introduction of paternity leave in 2003 meant that, where the 
qualification criteria was met, the father, or partner of the mother were entitled to paid 
leave for the first time.57  The length of leave was set at two weeks and the level of pay 
was either 90% of their average weekly earnings or a flat rate, whichever was lower.  
These rights were further extended in 2011 with the introduction of additional paternity 
leave and pay.58 This meant that fathers/partners were entitled to up to 26 weeks of 
leave if the mother returned to work before exhausting her 52 weeks statutory maternity 
leave. However, this would only be paid if the mother had returned to work before the 
39 weeks of statutory maternity pay. As a result additional paternity leave relied on the 
early return of mothers. It also became clear that “few fathers can afford to take time 
off on statutory pay… [though it was seen as] a step in the right direction”.59  
 
Despite the improvements which had been made it was suggested that  
“The current system of maternity and paternity leave and pay is rigid and 
restrictive. It dictates to families and employers how leave and pay must be 
taken. Allocating a long period of maternity leave to a woman that is lost 
irrevocably if she returns to work early is restrictive and makes it difficult for 
working couples who want to share the baby’s care to do so”.60 
The restrictive nature of paternity leave has meant that little progress had been made 
towards the aims of increasing fathers roles in childcare, alleviating some of the 
                                                          
57 Employment Act 2002, s1 &2, SI 2002/2788 and SI 2002/2822. 
58 First posed in the Work and Families Act 2006, implemented through Additional Paternity Leave 
Regulations 2010 AI 2010/1055 (introduced as of 2011).  
59  Rutherford S., Women’s Work, Men’s Cultures: Overcoming Resistance and Challenging 
Organizational Cultures (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 106.  
60 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills., Consultation on Modern Workplaces – Government 




gendered division of care, lessening the impact of motherhood on women’s careers. The 
low level of statutory payment was seen as “pitiful”61 given that was set at less than the 
minimum wage. This dissuaded many fathers from taking leave, especially if they are 
the main breadwinner. It was clear that more needed to be done. There needed to be 
increased flexibility, choice and equality between parents.  
 
With this in mind, the provisions relating to additional paternity leave and pay were 
replaced in 2015 with Shared Parental Leave (SPL).62 Maternity leave, and the two 
weeks of paternity leave remain intact. These provisions are considerably more flexible 
and generous than its predecessor. The period of leave can be taken for a period of 50 
weeks, after the first two weeks of maternity leave, and the leave can then be shared in 
a variety of ways, whether it involves both parents taking leave at the same time, or 
dividing the leave between them. The pay sits at 90% of the average weekly wage, or 
the flat rate of statutory parental pay, whichever is lower. This is available for 39 weeks 
minus any weeks of maternity pay, maternity allowance or adoption pay, the remaining 
period of leave, if taken, is unpaid.  
 
Prior to the enactment of SPL, Nick Clegg stated that  
“we have to sweep away those Edwardian rules which still hold back those 
families working hard to juggle their responsibilities at home and work. For 
decades, our parental leave system has been based on the assumption that it’s 
dad who goes out to work while mum cares for the kids”63 
                                                          
61  James G., The Legal Regulation of Pregnancy and Parenting in the Labour Market (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 43. 
62 The Children and Families Act 2014 s. 117, inserting chapter 1B into part 8 of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996. See also Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014.  
63 Clegg N., Speech at the launch of Cityfathers on shared parental leave (April 23 2014). 
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One of the aims of SPL was to undermine traditional gender roles, and the issues which 
they have caused. It was hoped that it would both encourage and enable fathers/partners 
to take a larger role in childcaring, thereby benefitting both themselves, and assisting in 
reducing the impact of pregnancy and childrearing on women’s careers. The fact that 
this will be a slow process has been accepted, with the government stating that they 
 “don’t expect to achieve fully shared childcare from day one. Cultural attitudes 
do not change overnight. But we believe that this new system has the capacity 
to bring about transformative change for parents and businesses, and is a major 
stepping stone towards achieving smart economics in the UK”.64 
The fact that such legislation has been enacted nevertheless signifies an appetite for 
change.  
 
It was predicted that only 2-8% of parents will take up their entitlement to SPL.65 Recent 
statistics found that “less than 1% of men have engaged”66 though it needs to be noted 
that the percentage given is out of all men surveyed and not all eligible men. The reasons 
for the low uptake have suggested that this may be due to the financial burden of taking 
time off. However, “pay is just one factor. Employers need to get used to the idea that 
parenting is a shared experience, and that this is more of a societal change”.67 The fear 
associated with extended leave, and the belief that this will have a negative impact on 
your career will take some time to shift.  
 
                                                          
64 Department for Business Innovation and Skills., Modern Workplaces (n60), 3. 
65 Department for Business Innovation and Skills., Modern Workplaces: Shared Parental Leave and Pay 
Administration Consultation - Impact Assessment (London: HMSO, 2013), 4. 




67 Alan Beazley as quoted in Faragher J., ‘Shared Parental Leave a Labour of Love?’ (2014) (July/August) 
Employers Law 12, 13. 
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One of the issues which remains with SPL, alongside the aforementioned social and 
economic factors is that both parents are required to meet minimum eligibility criteria. 
In contrast, mothers can access maternity leave so long as they have an employment 
contract, as a result “the mother’s caring role… is prioritised”.68 Therefore, despite 
claims that the introduction of SLP was seen as “a crucial step towards reducing the 
gender bias that currently applies to women’s careers”, in reality the inequality between 
the leave given to mothers and fathers/partners (notwithstanding the medically 
necessary two weeks provided for mothers), undermines the progress which has been 
made.69   
 
Overall, though many of the policy and legislative changes over this period have looked 
at improving ‘work-life balance’, this sits in direct contrast with the long-hours culture 
which is evident in much of the employment sphere. It must be acknowledged that 
“work–life balance… ignores the often blurred and ultimately socially constructed 
nature of what counts as work and what does not and tends to mask the large amount of 
reproductive work performed by women in the private sphere”.70 In addition, despite 
attempting to increase mothers’ workplace participation, and encouraging more 
fathers/partners to take SPL and Paternity leave, when parents return to work the 
“provision of affordable and suitable childcare remains inadequate”.71  
 
                                                          
68  The Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014, reg. 33(1); Mitchell G., ‘Encouraging Fathers to Care: 
The Children and Families Act 2014 and Shared Parental Leave’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 123, 
129. 
69 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills., Consultation on Modern Workplaces (n60), 3. 
70 Smith F. (et al)., ‘Women, work-life balance and quality of life: case studies from the United Kingdom 




The low take up of the schemes applicable to fathers has meant that women remain the 
primary caregiver, and continue to face the financial consequences of motherhood 
status. Although this could lead to a cultural shift within the employment sphere, 
helping to deconstruct the stereotypes surrounding work and childcare, this is yet to be 
seen. Until there is a redistribution of labour in the home, women will continue to be at 
a disadvantage in the employment sphere, and therefore less able to contribute 
financially to the acquisition of property.  
 
7.3 Reshaping ‘the Family’ 
For a significant period, successive governments have been reluctant to accept the 
changing nature of the family. From the mid-2000s onwards there has been progress 
towards the recognition of homosexual couples as equal. First, the age of consent for 
homosexual couples was lowered so that it was in line with the age of consent for 
heterosexual couples.72 This was then followed by the introduction of Civil Partnership 
in 2005. 73  This Act extended the legal privileges and obligations, previously only 
enjoyed by married couples, to same sex couples. It has been argued that “a civil 
partnership is a marriage in all but name”.74 However, there are differences in terms of 
the formation and terminology. With regard to the formation of civil partnerships, there 
is a provision which prevents the ceremony from being religious or taking place on 
religious premises, in addition it is formed by signing documents but requires no 
exchange of vows.75 It also provides that the signing of the certificate is done by both 
parents rather than by just the fathers of the parties, which if anything is a welcome 
departure from the martial position. There is also no requirement for consummation, 
                                                          
72 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act (2000), s1.  
73 Civil partnership Act 2004 which came into force in December 2005.  
74 See [7.3]. 
75 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s2 & s6.  
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and upon breakdown adultery is not considered a ground, unlike within opposite sex 
marriage. This will be discussed in more detail below.76 
 
The distinction made between marriage and civil partnership has also been described as 
symbolically different.77 The terminology used attempted to distance itself from marital 
rhetoric, avoiding terms such as husband, wife, spouse(s) and indeed marriage, 
reinforcing the governments claims that they had “no plans to introduce gay 
marriage”.78 This distinction was seen as depriving same sex couples of the “highest 
social status and approval”, 79  through excluding them from both the discourse of 
marriage and the institution itself. However, despite legislative attempts to emphasise 
the difference between civil partnerships and marriage, the public and the media often 
referred to civil partnership as gay marriage.80 Though this was done in both positive 
and negative ways, given that one of the aims of the act was to provide cultural change 
as well as respond to societal attitudes/needs, the affirmative coverage will have assisted 
with this.81 
 
Further progress for the rights of homosexual couples were also seen more recently in 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. Many of the rights and obligations 
contained within this Act again mirror those of opposite sex marriage, it also provided 
                                                          
76 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s44. 
77 Dobson E., ‘Civil Partnership – Marriage in all but name?’ (2005) 155(7163) New Law Journal 203, 
205. 
78 HL Deb 22 April 2004 vol 660, col 405. 
79 Auchmuty R., ‘Same-sex marriage revived: feminist critique and legal strategy’ (2004) 14(1) Feminism 
and Psychology 101, 102. See also Kitzinger C. & Wilkinson S., ‘The re-branding of marriage: why we 
got married instead of registering a civil partnership’ (2004) 14(1) Feminism and Psychology 127, 133. 
80 See for example Frean A., ‘Gay marriage’ for 700 couples The Times (17 December 2005), 26; Peterkin 
T., Lesbians make history with first UK same-sex wedding The Daily Telegraph (19 December 2005), 
19. 
81 Department of Trade and Industry & Women and Equality Unit., Civil Partnership: A framework for 




for civil partnerships to be converted into marriages where couples wished to do so.82 
The aim of the Act was to bring equality between homosexual and heterosexual couples. 
Cameron, writing for Pink News announced that “in Britain it will no longer matter 
whether you are straight or gay – the State will recognise your relationship as equal”.83 
Yet, despite the promise of equality, distinctions have still been made. 
 
The introduction of the Act has alleviated some of the differences between civil 
partnership and marriage. For example, the formation is made using a prescribed form 
of words, the religious exemption has been diminished (albeit not removed), and it is 
the fathers’ names which appear on the certificates. Adultery is considered a ground for 
divorce within a same sex marriage, unlike dissolution within civil partnerships. 
However, adultery is defined as taking place between two people of the opposite sex.84 
It does provide that a same sex marriage can be annulled as voidable if the respondent 
was at the time of the wedding suffering from a ‘venereal disease’, which is not the case 
for civil partners.85  
 
The absence of non-consummation as a ground for annulment remains problematic. 
There have been arguments that consummation should be removed from opposite sex 
marriage for a wide variety of reasons but such proposals have been rejected on 
numerous grounds. While it remains, there is no equality between same and opposite 
sex marriages. With the former being ‘de-sexed’ due to the reliance on a 
                                                          
82 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
83 Cameron D., David Cameron: When people’s love is divided by law, it is the law that needs to change 
(28 March 2014): <www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/03/28/david-cameron/> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
84 The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 inserted a new section 1(6) to the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 giving statutory effect to the common-law position and maintaining the deﬁnition of adultery 
as sexual activity between two persons of different sex. 
85 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, s4 amending Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12.  
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heteronormative construction of sex. Indeed “the omission of consummation (and 
adultery) is a negative gap in the C.P.A., a place where lesbian and gay sexuality is left 
unspoken”.86 Advocating formal equality whilst undermining it with the exclusion of 
the provisions relating to consummation and adultery which, given their explicit 
exclusion within the context of same sex marriage, amounts to discriminatory 
treatment.87 It is an Act which still constructs/supports marriage as heteropatriarchal 
institution despite on the face of it seeming to promote equality.88 Overall, despite same-
sex marriage often being described as promoting equal marriage, “by excluding only 
same sex couples from these provisions the government undermines its commitment to 
truly equal marriage”.89 
 
The introduction of Civil Partnerships and same sex marriage are often seen as markers 
of progress. However, they are not without their critique. This comes not only from 
religious groups and those who wish to promote the sanctity of marriage, but also by 
those who believe marriage should not be the aim given the problematic nature of 
marriage as heteropatriarchal, inherently unequal and that it is not only a social but a 
religious institution. Connected to this, arguments have been raised as to whether 
heterosexual couples should have access to civil partnerships as an alternative to 
marriage. This would be of particular use to those who cohabit, and do not wish to marry 
due to what they perceive as problems with the institution of marriage. Meaning that 
they would be able to gain recognition of their relationship both publicly and privately, 
                                                          
86 Barker N., ‘Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: The future of (non) conjugality’ (2006) 14 Feminist 
Legal Studies 241, 251. 
87  Beresford S., ‘We’re All Same (Sex) Now?: Lesbian (Same) Sex Consummation; Adultery and 
Marriage’ (2016) 12(5) Journal of GLBT Family Studies 468, 47; Equal Rights Trust., Memorandum on 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill (MB 68, 4 March 2013), 61.  
88  Similar critiques have also been made about Civil Partnerships, which have been described as 
“modelled on a conservative ideology of marriage”: Barker N., ‘For Better of For Worse? The Civil 
Partnership Bill [HL] 2004’ (2004) 26(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 313, 321. 
89 O’Donnell J., Memorandum on Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill (MB 08: 15 February 2013), 1. 
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but more importantly, it would give such couples legal rights and obligation which are 
currently lacking.  
 
The Civil Partnership Act explicitly specifies that opposite sex couples are excluded.90 
Which has led to couples leaving the country to enable them to have a civil partnership 
and to legal challenges. 91  Recently, the prohibition was challenged in the courts 
asserting that it constituted a breach of Art 8/14 ECHR.92 Within the Court of Appeal 
judgment it was acknowledged that the couple have  
“deep-rooted and genuine ideological objections to the institution of marriage, 
based upon what they consider to be its historically patriarchal nature. They 
wish, instead, to enter into a civil partnership, a status which they consider 
reflects their values and gives due recognition to the equality of their 
relationship”.93 
This acknowledges some of the reasons couples cohabit rather than marry, that there 
are couples who seek legal recognition and in terms of rights and responsibilities which 
mirror those of marriage. However, it does not change the legal position of opposite sex 
couples who wish to be civil partners. The successful appeal in Steinfeld and Keidan 
before the Supreme Court does raise the possibility that Civil Partnership will be 
extended to include opposite sex couples so as to eliminate breach of Articles 8/14. It 
ought to be noted that the obligations under the case could equally be satisfied by 
removing Civil partnership in its entirety. It is however, beyond the scope of this thesis 
                                                          
90 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s1, s3(1)(a). 
91 Khomami N., First heterosexual UK couple in civil partnership urge government to end ban (The 
Guardian, 21 October 2016): <www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/oct/21/first-heterosexual-uk-
couple-isle-of-man-civil-partnership-urge-government-end-ban> accessed 20/01/2018. 
92 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 and R (on the application of 
Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for the International Development (in substitution for the Home 
Secretary and the Education Secretary) [2018] UKSC 32. 
93 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 [2]. 
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to discuss the possible implications of this case on the current/future cohabitation 
regime in full.  
 
To allow opposite sex couples to have civil partnerships would, according to David 
Cameron would be to “undermine the sanctity of marriage”,94 despite earlier concerns 
having been voiced about civil partnerships in their entirety. Civil Partnerships are an 
attractive option for numerous reasons from the inclusion of both parent’s names on the 
certificate, to freedom from prescribed vows and religious overtones. Most importantly 
“the institution of marriage is still saturated in sexist trappings and traditions that once 
recognised women as less legitimate and less equal to their partners”.95 The extension 
of civil partnerships to heterosexual couples, would then provide an avenue through 
which couples can secure proprietary rights without having to submit to an institution 
which they are inherently opposed to. 
 
7.3.1 Cohabitation Overview 
Cohabitation has continued to grow, and women’s position in the work place and in 
society has continued to evolve. However, “cultural stereotypes still persist as to 
women's maternal role”, and they still face inequality in the employment sphere and the 
“seemingly unbreakable connections between work and home life” 96  continue. 
Cohabitation is no longer seen as ‘morally wrong’ and is no longer hidden from the 
public eye. Despite this clear social shift, the changes in the approach of the courts and 
                                                          
94 Woolf M., ‘No 10 and Clegg Split Over Straight Civil Partnerships’ The Sunday Times (27 March 
2014).  
95 Baxter H., As a straight woman, why shouldn’t I have a civil partnership? (The Guardian 19 April 
2014): 
 <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/29/straight-civil-partnership-marriage-tradition-
women-less-equal> accessed: 20/01/2018. 
96 Banyard, (n26), 1345. 
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the attempts to introduce legislation into parliament, their legal position remains 
stagnant.  
 
It is essential to note that though married/civil partners make up the largest family form, 
cohabitants make up the second largest group.97 Cohabiting couples are the fastest 
growing family form in the UK. It is clear that society now accepts cohabitation as a 
normal social practice and it is increasingly commonplace. Yet, the position goes further 
than this. The “British Social Attitudes Survey in 2009 established that 56% of people 
in general and 59% of different-sex cohabitants in particular believed couples who had 
lived together for some time had a common law marriage giving them the same legal 
rights as married couples”.98 Yet the law refuses to reflect the current social beliefs.  
Many couples now chose to cohabit, not as a pre-requisite to marriage, but as a form of 
commitment in and of itself. As Barlow notes, “cohabitation has itself taken on many 
of the functions of marriage, including the mutual commitment associated with 
marriage”.99 Yet, despite the fact that the overriding consideration of fairness applies to 
those who are married or in civil partnerships, “in stark contrast to cohabiting couples, 
on divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership family assets may be redistributed 
whether or not there are minor children, and largely regardless of the original ownership 
of assets”.100 Cohabitants remain without reliable legal protection. There have been 
numerous failed attempts during this period to introduce legislative protection for 
cohabitants: Cohabitation Bill; Cohabitation Rights Bill, some of which are discussed 
                                                          
97 ONS., Families and Households in the UK 2016 (4 November 2016), 2.  
98 Barlow A., ‘Cohabiting relationships, money and property: The legal backdrop’ (2008) 37 The Journal 
of Socio-Economics 502, 508. 
99Barlow A., ‘Cohabitation Law Reform – Messages from Research’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 
167, 172. 
100Barlow, Cohabiting relationships, money and property (n98), 509. 
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at length elsewhere.101 However, the latest Bill is awaiting a date for its second reading, 
perhaps this attempt will be successful, but that remains to be seen.  
 
7.4 Case and Legislative Analysis 
7.4.1 Overview 
This section provides an overview of the development of the CICT and the attempts to 
legislate for the breakdown of unmarried cohabiting couples relationships. It adopts a 
chronological approach to the case analysis as, unlike in previous decades, the lack of 
distinct themes which run through the judgments would make a thematic approach ill-
fitting. The analysis focusses on three of the central cases in the development of the 
CICT, Oxley v Hiscock, Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott.102 It is essential to note 
that the latter of these two cases involves jointly-owned properties, and as such, though 
seeming to indicate that we have moved away from the strict formal approach in Rosset, 
it remains binding in cases involving sole-ownership.103 This section then also provides 
an in-depth analysis of the second reading of the Cohabitation Rights Bill which 
provides insight into the socio-political perspectives on cohabitation and opinions on 
the approach the law ought to adopt regarding such relationships. 
 
7.4.2 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 
The central issue to be determined by the court in Oxley was regarding how the proceeds 
of the property, registered in Mr Hiscock’s’ sole-name ought to be quantified. The 
purchase of the property was in part funded by the sale of the couple’s previous home. 
                                                          
101 See [7.5]. 
102 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, herafter Oxley; Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 hereafter 
Stack; Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 hereafter Jones. 
103 Even where Rosset has not been applied it has been done so in a restrictive way so that the approach 
mirrors that adopted in Rosset: see [7.4.4]. 
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Ms Oxley had exercised her right to buy that property for a discounted rate under the 
right to buy scheme, and Mr Hiscock provided the funds which resulted from the sale 
of his previous property. The proceeds of sale were combined with an additional sum 
from Mr Hiscock and a mortgage. 104  Mr Hiscock was solely responsible for the 
mortgage over the property. However, the court considered that the couple had both 
contributed towards the mortgage repayments, and the maintenance/improvement of the 
property.  
 
Despite having been received in the media as a case which “changed Lovers’ Law”,105 
the ‘changes’ which occurred as a result of Oxley were in fact minimal. Oxley 
maintained the orthodox approach to acquisition which was restated in Rosset.106 
However, when seeking to clarify the legal position in relation to quantification, it is the 
inclusion of considerations of fairness which are of most interest. When considering the 
question of quantification, Chadwick LJ set out the following: where there is some 
agreement between the parties that the beneficial interest is to be held jointly then when 
it comes to the question of quantification beneficial interest will be determined by 
evidence as to what the parties said/did. 107  Where there is no evidence as to any 
discussion as to the division of shares:   
“the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair 
having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the 
property… [which] includes the arrangements which they make from time to 
time in order to meet the outgoings (for example, mortgage contributions, 
                                                          
104 The relative financial contributions were considered to be 28% Ms Oxley, and 48% Mr Hiscock with 
the remaining sum secured via the mortgage.  
105 Daily Star, (25 May 2005). 
106 As discussed in detail in [4.2], [6.8].  
107 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [69]. 
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council tax and utilities, repairs, insurance and housekeeping) which have to be 
met if they are to live in the property as their home”.108 
The inclusion here of considerations of “fairness having regard to the whole course of 
dealing”, echoed the approach adopted in Grant v Edwards and Midland Bank v Cooke 
as discussed in the previous chapter.109 This confirmation of this more flexible, fairness 
based approach, including feminine acts such as “housekeeping” indicates once again, 
an intention for the courts to maintain an element of the difference based approach 
adopted by Lord Denning.110 It allows for a consideration of the reality of couple’s 
relationships, the different contributions which might be made.  
 
This inclusion of “fairness” enhances the flexibility of the court within the context of 
the quantification of shares by enabling them to more adequately consider a range of 
‘contributions’ to the relationship, not limited to, but still informed by financial 
contributions. Oxley itself demonstrates this in that Mr Hiscock was awarded 60% of 
the beneficial interest which was decided on the basis that despite their general ‘pooling 
of resources’, from which Chadwick LJ would have been satisfied at inferring an 
intention to share the proceeds equally, Mr Hiscock had made the more significant direct 
financial contribution.111  
 
As such, though it was suggested that the affirmation of the relevance of fairness in 
CICT proceedings “may help avoid the injustice that has often befallen non-legal title 
holders, particularly female partners, for whom a share of the property proportionate to 
                                                          
108 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [69]. 
109 See [6.8]. 
110 The difference based approach adopted by Lord Denning was discussed in [5.7].  
111 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [74]. 
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their financial contribution does not amount to a fair result”,112 those sole-owners who 
are unable to pass the first stage of the Rosset-test, namely acquisition determined by 
express agreement or financial contribution, remain vulnerable. 
 
The final point which arises as a result of the Oxley judgment is in relation to the 
‘vulnerability’ of female cohabitants. Although Mrs Oxley cannot be said to be 
economically vulnerable in the same way that Valarie Burns or Janet Eves were, there 
are aspects of the judgment which indicate a different form of vulnerability.113 When 
encouraged by her solicitors to enter into a deed of trust regarding the new property Mrs 
Oxley responded, “I am quite satisfied with the present arrangements, and feel I know 
Mr Hiscock well enough not to need written legal protection in this matter”.114 Despite 
being made aware of the risks of not formalising her arrangements with Mr Hiscock, 
her trust in him was ‘enough’ for her. This feeling of trust and security, was no doubt 
bolstered by the fact that in 1988 he had asked her to marry him, which even when 
unfulfilled (or even unspoken), has been shown to induce a sense of mutual 
commitment.115 
 
As Bottomley points out “what Mrs. Oxley represents is a woman whose vulnerability 
arises from the fact that she believed that the resources within the relationship would be 
pooled”.116 
Although this is not considered in great detail by Chadwick LJ, and thus cannot be 
                                                          
112 Fox L., ‘Trusts of the Family Home: The Impact of Oxley v. Hiscock’ (2005) 56 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 83, 104. 
113 As discussed in [5.7], [6.8].  
114 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [9]. 
115 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [11]. See for example moral judgments in [5.7.3] and the 
discussion of Hammond v Mitchell in [6.8].   
116 Bottomley A., ‘From Mrs Burns to Mrs Oxley: Do cohabiting women (still) need marriage law?’ 
(2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 18, 194.  
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considered to have influenced the judge’s findings, it provides insight into the position 
of unmarried cohabitants, even when they are made aware of the law and the difficulties 
which arise by virtue of the trust inherent in such relationships.117 
 
7.4.3 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17  
Stack concerned the conveyance of a property into the joint names of the couple, without 
an explicit declaration of their beneficial interests. As the property was in joint names, 
the court did not need to consider the question of acquisition (as in sole-name cases), 
instead their role was limited to the determination of shares, quantification. The starting 
point for this is that “equity follows the law”,118  and therefore the shares are assumed 
to be equally distributed. It is for the party arguing against the presumption of equal 
shares to establish why this is the case.  
 
A departure from Rosset? 
Stack was seen to signal a departure from the restrictive approach adopted in Rosset.119 
When considering the emphasis placed on direct financial contributions for the purpose 
of inferring a common intention to share the beneficial interest in the property Lord 
Walker was keen to emphasise that “the law has moved on… [since Rosset] and your 
Lordships should move it a little more in the same direction”.120 This statement seems 
to indicate a departure from the centrality of financial contributions to CICT 
proceedings so that the law more adequately reflects societal change. However, an 
                                                          
117 It is not used in the same way that Lord Denning often used the construction of vulnerable women to 
make a ‘moral’ judgment: see [5.9.3]; Familial trust has been examined in detail at [4.3.1] and [6.8.5], 
and in [6.8]. 
118 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [33]; Confirmed in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [22], [51], 
[61]. See [4.2]. 
119 See [4.2.1] and [6.8.3] for an in depth assessment of the law under Rosset. 
120 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [26]. See also Lady Hale’s comments at [63]. 
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analysis of the judgment finds that Stack fails to adequately address them.  
 
The supposed willingness of the court to consider “many more factors than financial 
contributions may be relevant to divining the parties’ true intentions”121  seems to signal 
a clear departure from the strict financial approach in Rosset. These relevant factors 
included the nature of the couple’s relationship, as well as “the parties’ individual 
characters and personalities”.122 In cases concerning joint-owners the court proposed 
that what was necessary was an examination of context in order to support the inference 
that the beneficial interest of the parties was to be held otherwise than equally. Here, 
“context is supplied by the nature of the parties’ conduct and attitudes towards their 
property and finances”. 123  Despite the seemingly broad criterion which could be 
considered, an examination of Stack reveals that financial contributions remained 
almost determinative of common intention.  
 
It is telling that considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that, on examination of 
the evidence, the couple did not pool their resources “for the common good”.124 Indeed, 
the property under dispute in this case was one of the only things which was held jointly. 
However, though the reason for this, that it was intended to be shared beneficially was 
accepted by Ms Dowden, it was stated that that alone “cannot be conclusive”125 as to in 
what shares it was held.  
 
                                                          
121 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]; an analysis of the issues this had caused women in particular 
both in the original formulation of the finance-based approach (in Gissing and Pettitt) and under Rosset 
has been discussed in detail in the Chapters 5 and 6. 
122  Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
123 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [90]. 
124 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [90]. 
125 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [90]. 
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Lady Hale critiques the approach of the judge at first instance for having: 
 “founded his conclusion on the length and nature of their relationship, which he 
repeatedly referred to as a partnership, despite the fact that they had maintained 
separate finances throughout their time together. With the best will in the world, 
and acknowledging the problems of making more precise findings on many issues 
after this length of time, this is not an adequate answer to the question”.126 
The use of “partnership” by the judge in the court below was seen to signify that the 
couple had led a joint life, and that from this intention to share equally, which was 
considered to be incompatible with the fact that they had maintained separate accounts. 
In contrast to the relationship in Stack, Lady Hale acknowledged that in “cases of real 
domestic partnership”127 then there would be nothing to indicate that the beneficial 
interest should be different from how the property is held at law. When assessing the 
evidence which indicated that the property was not intended to be held in equal shares 
these considerations were dominated by financial considerations. This assumes that the 
way in which couples arrange their finances correlates with their level of commitment, 
which given the diversity of such arrangements between couples is an unsatisfactory 
basis for such a presumption.128  
 
Despite going on to recognise the “pitfalls in an arithmetical approach to ascertaining 
the parties' intentions”,129 the focus of the court regarding the determination of the 
couples intentions remained focused on financial contributions. Lady Hale then went 
                                                          
126 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [86]. 
127 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [87]. 
128 See for example Pahl J., ‘Family Finances, Individualisation, Spending Patterns and Access to Credit’ 
(2008) 37(2) Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Economics 577, 577 on the increasingly 
individualised approach adopted by couples with regard to their finances as discussed at [4.3.2]. This also 
provides another example of the way in which the legal regime does not reflect the reality/diversity of 
unmarried cohabiting couples. 
129 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [89]. 
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on to say that an imbalance of financial contributions can “support the inference of an 
intention to share otherwise than equally”130 yet the court remained silent on factors 
other than financial contributions/arrangements. As such, rather than ‘supporting the 
inference’ that the property was not to be held in equal shares, it is, at least in Stack, 
determinative. 
 
When summing up, the centrality of the couple’s financial arrangements to the court’s 
decision that the beneficial interest was not intended to be shared equally becomes 
increasingly evident: 
“There cannot be many unmarried couples who have lived together for as long 
as this, who have had four children together, and whose affairs have been kept 
as rigidly separate as this couple's affairs were kept. This is all strongly 
indicative that they did not intend their shares… to be equal”.131 
As a result of the lower level of payments made by Mr Stack, the shares were 
determined to be 35/65 with Ms Dowden holding the larger share.  
 
Though the focus on financial arrangements/contributions in Stack may seem to indicate 
that the court had not truly departed from the strict regime in Rosset, there are 
indications that other constrictions, were they present, may be relevant. In particular 
Lady Hale’s ‘list’ of factors which may be relevant in determining the parties’ intentions 
included a number of non-financial (and indirect financial) contributions: 
“any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their 
intentions then; the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names… 
the purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties’ 
                                                          
130 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [89].  
131 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [92].  
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relationship; whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility 
to provide a home… other household expenses… The parties’ individual 
characters and personalities may also be a factor in deciding where their true 
intentions lay”.132 
 However, despite the positive indications that this list of relevant considerations has 
for domestic contributions, their lack of applicability in Stack makes it difficult to 
predict what weight they would have, when such considerations arise. As Lord 
Neuberger notes: 
“Had it been clear that he had undertaken to pay for consumables and child 
minding, it might have been possible to deduce some sort of commitment that 
each would do what they could. But Mr Stack's evidence did not even go as far 
as that”.133  
Indicating that if he paid for, perhaps even performed, feminine contributions then the 
court may have been more amenable to Mr Stack’s claim for an equal share of the 
beneficial interest in the property. This is of course speculative. 
 
The comments made regarding the quantification of beneficial interest also provides 
insight into the centrality of financial arrangements/contributions in CICT proceedings. 
The court maintained that when considering quantification, they are to “take into 
account all the circumstances of their relationship”.134 However, this was followed by 
a caveat, that being that such a consideration “does not mean that all the circumstances 
of the relationship are of primary or equal relevance”.135 Viewing this statement in light 
of the way in which the nature of “their close and loving relationship” was given no real 
                                                          
132 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
133 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [91].  
134 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [132].  
135 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [132].  
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consideration by the court, and the focus on financial contributions in the determination, 
it would seem that the latter remains of “primary”136  relevance.  
 
Two additional issues must also be considered within this context. First, the 
considerations of fairness regarding quantification as reaffirmed in Oxley were limited 
in Stack.137 There the court were keen to emphasise that  
“the search is still for the result which reflects what the parties must, in the light 
of their conduct, be taken to have intended. Second, therefore, it does not enable 
the court to abandon that search in favour of the result which the court itself 
considers fair”.138 
The re-emphasis on the intention of the parties, opposed to a consideration of fairness, 
lessened the ability for the courts to consider those aspects of the relationship which 
have traditionally been restricted under the application of Rosset. Thus, indicating a 
return to orthodoxy, and to formal equality. Finally, as Stack was a case involving joint-
ownership, Rosset would at any rate still arguably be binding in the context of sole-
ownership cases. 
 
Despite these concerns, the Privy Council in Abbott v Abbott sought to emphasise that 
the law has “moved on”139 since Rosset and critiqued the court below for placing “undue 
significance”140 on Rosset in relation to the question of quantification. Despite Abbott 
involving a property which was registered in the sole-name of this husband, the question 
of acquisition did not arise as the parties were in agreement that there was a beneficial 
                                                          
136 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [132].  
137 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 [69] as discussed at [7.4.2].  
138 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [161], see also [60] and [144]. 
139 Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53 [5]-[6]. Hereafter Abbott.  
140 Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53 [19].  
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share, but disputed the extent of that share. Therefore the case more accurately reflected 
a joint rather than sole-ownership case. The case was primarily decided on financial 
contributions, rather than a consideration of feminine contributions. As a result, despite 
the willingness of the courts to apply Stack in lieu of Rosset to sole-ownership cases, 
the impact cannot be said to be too extensive given that the central issue with sole-
ownership usually concerns acquisition. In addition, though this would seem to indicate 
a consistency of approach as regards sole/joint-ownership cases, Abbott was purely 
persuasive, and given that the same Justices appeared in Stack and Abbott, it is unlikely 
that they would suffer from the same confusion as to the intention of their previous 
judgment as the lower courts would.141  
 
As a result, it would seem that despite Lady Hale’s emphasis that it “should not be 
assumed that… [financial arrangements/contributions] always take pride of place over 
natural love and affection”,142 and yet very little consideration is given in Stack as to 
anything other than the respective financial contributions made by the couple. As a 
result of the above analysis, the extent to which Stack was truly a departure from Rosset 
is questionable.  
 
7.4.4 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
Jones was also a joint-ownership case, which involved the court seeking to determine 
the extent of the couple’s individual beneficial shares. In 1985 the couple purchased the 
family home and registered it in their joint names. The £6000 deposit was paid 
exclusively by the proceeds of sale from Ms Jones’s previous home. Both Mr Kernott 
and Ms Jones made repayments towards the £30,000 mortgage. In 1986 the couple 
                                                          
141 See [4.2.3]. 
142 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
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jointly took out an additional £2000 loan to build an extension, Mr Jones having done 
some of the work on this himself. By 1993 their relationship had deteriorated and Mr 
Kernott left the property. From this point he no longer contributed to the property or the 
maintenance of the children. In 1996, after a number of failed attempts at selling the 
family home, Mr Kernott and Ms Jones decided to cash in their life insurance policy. 
They divided the proceeds so as to facilitate Mr Kernott’s purchase of a new property, 
with Ms Jones continuing to live in the property that had originally been the family 
home with the children.  
 
The court considered that the couples’ intention with regard to the property at the time 
of purchase had been that they held it in equal shares. However, having split the 
proceeds of their life insurance policy to facilitate the purchase of Mr Kernott’s new 
home, the court considered that there must have been a change in intention at this 
stage.143 Without the dividends from the insurance policy he would have been unable 
to fund this new purchase if he were still liable to contribute towards the outgoings 
attached to the family home. The couple were seen to have the sole-interest and capital 
gain associated with the two different properties. Ms Jones, in what had been the family 
home, and Mr Kernott in his new property. As a result of these changes Mr Kernott’s 
interest was determined to be 10% based on the 50% of the interest at the value of the 
property in 1993/1995, taking into consideration the huge increase in value that the 
property had undergone since the time of purchase.  
 
                                                          
143 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [48] 
330 
 
Financial contributions or Fairness? 
After the slightly more restrictive approach to fairness in Stack, Jones can be seen to 
more firmly reposition fairness within the CICT regime. The court’s decision to allow 
imputed common intention in the context of the CICT has proved controversial, given 
that it can be seen to undermine the ‘common intention’ element of the doctrine, by 
“attributing to the parties an intention which they did not have”. 144  However, the 
inclusion of imputation is limited and has facilitated the inclusion of fairness within 
proceedings, which is a welcome development.  
 
The court were keen to emphasise that the primary search is to “ascertain the parties’ 
actual shared intentions, whether expressed or to be inferred from their conduct”.145 
There are two exceptions to this general rule, only the latter of which is relevant in this 
context. That is  
“where it is clear that the beneficial interests are to be shared, but it is impossible 
to divine a common intention as to the proportions in which they are to be 
shared… [in such] situations, the court is driven to impute an intention to the 
parties which they may never have had”.146 
It is at this stage that the court must have regard to “fairness” as the “court has a duty to 
come to a conclusion on the dispute put before it”.147 
 
If the parties’ intentions can be discovered then “it is not open to a court to impose a 
solution upon them in contradiction to those intentions, merely because the court 
                                                          
144 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [31]. See also [4.3.1]. 
145 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [31]. 
146 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [31]. 
147 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [47]. 
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considers it fair to do so”.148 Therefore imputation is permissible only when it comes to 
the quantification of shares, the initial intention to share differently from the 
presumption can only be inferred. The court cannot embark on a crusade of 
redistributive justice based on fairness, undermining the common intention of the 
parties.   
 
Despite having been considered “a disappointing development”149 due to the restrictive 
application of fairness, the judgment in Jones does hold some promise for those who 
cannot make financial contributions. The ability for the courts to consider the whole 
course of dealings per Oxley as interpreted widely in Stack widens the scope of 
considerations considered relevant, at least for the purposes of quantification, to include 
feminine contributions.150 
 
“Adapting old principles to new situations”?151  
In cases involving joint-ownership, there is a presumption of beneficial joint tenancy, 
that is that the beneficial interest will be equally divided.152 In Jones, the discussion as 
to the reasoning behind this presumption, and why attempts to rebut the presumption 
are “not to be lightly embarked on”153 raises two interrelated points. First, it illuminates 
the increasing consideration which the courts are giving to the social reality of 
cohabiting relationships. Secondly the issues raised with regard to evidence in the 
context of the CICT. These points will be dealt with below. 
                                                          
148 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [46]. 
149 Garland F., ‘Jones v Kernott’ (2012) 34(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 479, 487.  
150 See Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 as interpreted in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]. 
Discussed at [7.4.2] and [7.4.3] respectively. 
151 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [57]. 
152 See [4.2.2]. 




Concerning this first point, based on the fact that many couples when acquiring a 
property will do so through obtaining a mortgage for which they are jointly liable, the 
court considered that such acts provide “a strong indication of emotional and economic 
commitment to a joint enterprise”.154 The inclusion of joint enterprise within this echoes 
the family assets approach, formulated by Lord Denning with the aim of producing 
fairness, again emphasising that the court intended to consider a wider range of factors 
than those which were purely financial.155  In addition, the recognition of both the 
emotional and economic commitment between couples, though informed here by a joint 
commitment to a financial obligation, indicates a willingness to consider the nature of 
the parties relationship more broadly than in decades prior.156  
 
The way in which this may indicate emotional/economic commitment was recognised 
even where it is not expressed by the couples. Citing Midland Bank v Cooke as evidence 
of this point:  
“Equity has traditionally been a system which matches established principle to 
the demands of social change… When people… agree to share their lives in 
joint homes they do so on a basis of mutual trust and in the expectation that their 
relationship will endure… There will inevitably be numerous couples, married 
or unmarried, who have no discussion about ownership”.157 
                                                          
154 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [19]. 
155 As discussed at [5.7.1] and as also echoed in Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733 as discussed 
at [6.8.6]. 
156 Note this emotional commitment in the context of the discussion of emotional vulnerability concerning 
Mrs Oxley above at [7.4.2]. 
157 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 575 as cited in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [20]. 
See [6.8] for a more detailed analysis of Midland. 
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The restatement of Midland is also testament to the courts willingness to recognise the 
reality of communication within relationships, in that it is unlikely that they will 
expressly discuss their beneficial shares, a point which will be examined further below. 
 
In Jones the court took the opportunity to make clear that there is no presumption in 
favour of a resulting trust in those cases involving married/unmarried couples.158 In 
justifying the step away from resulting trusts as a possible mechanism in assessing 
proprietary interest it is justified by the change in social and economic circumstances 
which it would have been better suited to.159 Resulting trusts, are quantified based on a 
“solid tug of money”,160 as a result the beneficial interest in the property proportionate 
to the size of the financial contribution to the acquisition of the property. In expressly 
removing the resulting trust from the context of disputes concerning the family home, 
property disputes between couples are less likely to work to the detriment of those who 
have been unable to contribute/unable to contribute significantly as although financial 
contributions remain relevant in the context of the CICT they are not determinative. 
 
Finally, when discussing the issue which arise due to the nature of the evidence in the 
context of the CICT the court stated: 
“the task of seeking to show that the parties intended their beneficial interests to 
be different from their legal interests was not to be ‘lightly embarked upon. In 
family disputes, strong feelings are aroused when couples split up. These often 
lead the parties, honestly but mistakenly, to reinterpret the past in self-
exculpatory or vengeful terms...”.161 
                                                          
158 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [ [23]-[25], [53] and [60]. 
159 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [24].  
160 Hofman v Hofman [1965] NZLR 795, 800. 
161 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [12] citing Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [68] and [33].  
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Here, the reality of the human nature of the parties to the case is directly recognised in 
the judgment. The fact that, in hindsight, particularly if the breakdown of the 
relationship was unpleasant then events which happened may become tainted with 
malice, whether purposefully or subconsciously. Herein lies the difficulty of evidence 
which is not purely economic, given that even economic contributions become tainted 
with emotion. However, this is not an adequate justification to allow for the context of 
the relationship itself to be disregarded particularly given the injustice which arises 
when financial contributions are considered to equate to commitment. 
 
Sole Owners After Jones v Kernott 
Despite the progress towards a more fairness based approach with regard to joint-
ownership cases, and the obiter in Stack and Jones indicating that there was one regime 
for sole/joint-ownership cases under the CICT, until a sole-ownership case reaches the 
Supreme Court, Rosset remains binding.162 There have been instances in which the 
courts have applied Stack/Jones. Yet, the restrictive interpretation of these cases has 
meant that on application the approach differs little from that of Rosset, which remains 
‘good’ law despite the courts seeming unwillingness to apply it. The issues raised as a 
result of the Rosset approach have been discussed elsewhere in this thesis, however, the 
following section uses the case of Graham-York v York to demonstrate the injustice 
which has continued in relation to sole-ownership cases post-Jones.163  
 
                                                          
162 Per Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [56] and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [51]-[51]. However,  
there has been inconsistency in the approach adopted by the lower courts. In some instances they have 
chosen to apply Rosset, and in others they have applied Jones/Stack. For a detailed overview of the 
treatment of sole-owners post-Jones see Sloan B., ‘Keeping up with the Jones Case: Establishing 
Constructive Trusts in ‘Sole Legal Owner’ Scenarios’ (2015) 35(2) Legal Studies 226. See also [4.2.3].  
163 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26. 
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In Graham-York, the couple had cohabited from 1976 until the man’s death in 2009 
in a property registered in the man's sole name. From 1976 to 1985 Miss Graham-
York worked as a singer, during which time her earnings were given to Mr York, 
after 1985 her income was limited, as such any contribution that she did make was 
minimal. After Mr York’s death the woman continued to live in the property. As a 
result of the large mortgage arrears which had accumulated, due to Miss Graham-
York’s insignificant income, the bank issued proceedings and in response she 
claimed to have an overriding interest. In order to demonstrate this interest, she relied 
on establishing a CICT. On the evidence at first instance the judge determined that 
there was no express agreement between the couple giving rise to the inference of 
common intention, and so instead relied on her financial contributions to make that 
finding. Awarding her 25% which was considered a “fair reflection” 164  of her 
financial and non-financial contributions during the relevant period of cohabitation. 
In the CoA the quantification of her share became the central issue.  
 
Tomlinson LJ in his judgment placed emphasis on the whole course of dealings in 
relation to the property.165 Despite suggestions from Miss Graham-York’s council 
that the judge at first instance ought to have taken into account that Miss Graham-
York had “contributed ‘as much to the household as she reasonably could’”166 and 
therefore should have been awarded 50%, Tomlinson was unwilling to consider the 
context of the couples’ relationship. The violence suffered at the hands of her partner, 
and the controlling nature of the relationship in fact worked against a finding in 
favour of Miss Graham-York: 
                                                          
164 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26, 536.  
165 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26, 543.  
166 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26, 539-40.  
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“it is not easy to reconcile the judge’s findings as to Norton York’s controlling 
and threatening nature with the suggestion of a ready inference of a common 
intention as to equality of interests”.167 
Not only was Miss Graham-York’s lower earning capacity not considered, the fact that 
Mr York took ownership of her earnings also held no weight. The judge directly asserted 
that in deciding what is fair, the court is not concerned with redistributive justice: 
“it is irrelevant that it may be thought a ‘fair’ outcome for a woman who has 
endured years of abusive conduct by her partner to be allotted a substantial 
interest in his property on his death. The plight of Miss Graham-York attracts 
sympathy, but it does not enable the court to redistribute property interest in a 
manner which right-minded people might think amounts to appropriate 
compensation”.168 
Though attracting ‘sympathy’ this was not used in order to construct a ‘moral’ judgment 
in the style of Lord Denning.169 Instead it had no impact on the quantification of shares. 
As a result of the strict application of the fairness element of the CICT, the approach of 
the court in this sole-ownership case, focussing on financial contributions with no 
consideration of the reality of the relationship more accurately reflects the orthodox 
Rosset approach, putting to rest the hopes of a more holistic approach even with regard 
to quantification.  
 
7.5 Recommendations and Legislative Proposals  
The following section examines two of the key proposals for reform made by the Law 
Commission and the most recent attempt at legislating for the breakdown of unmarried 
                                                          
167 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26, 540.  
168 Graham-York v York [2015] HLR 26, 543.  
169 See [5.7.3].   
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cohabitation to get to the second reading stage of Parliamentary proceedings, the 
Cohabitation Rights Bill. This examination seeks to evaluate the extent to which the 
proposals would adequately address the injustices which currently arise under the 
CICT.170 However the examination of the second reading of the Cohabitation Bill also 
allows for the multiplicity of discourses which arose during the debate to be analysed. 
Thus providing additional insight into the differing opinions as to how the law ought to 
treat cohabitants, and how such relationships are perceived.  
 
7.5.1 Law Commission  
Much of the literature on cohabitation focuses on the stance of the Law Commission 
previous to its 2007 paper.171 Having acknowledged this, the merits of the 2002 paper 
can still be seen in that many of the proposals made then, are still evident in the 2007 
paper, as such the literature surrounding this can still be seen to have merit.  
 
The proposed scheme made clear that it is not intended to be applicable to all 
cohabitants, again referring to the diverse nature of this large group of people.172 They 
list the relevant criteria which should be considered when assessing whether financial 
award should be made. These are listed in summary as depending on whether: 
“the couple satisfied certain eligibility requirements; the couple had not agreed to 
disapply the scheme; and the applicant had made qualifying contributions to the 
relationship giving rise to certain enduring consequences at the point of 
                                                          
170 Other approaches which might be adopted are discussed at [8.3]. 
171 Law Commission., Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com 
307, 2007). 




Including non-financial contributions as a relevant contribution under the category of 
qualifying contributions, would allow for the consideration of those feminine 
contributions which have traditionally been absent under the CICT to occur. As a result, 
this would alleviate a significant amount of the injustice which has arisen under the 
current approach. 
 
The aims of the Law Commission can be summarised as intending to remove reliance 
on common intention, which would be a welcome development given that common 
intention has proved problematic in practice.174 Alongside this the introduction of a new 
statutory default scheme for determining beneficial ownership was necessary to give 
“greater clarity and consistency”175 in in the treatment of couples on the breakdown of 
cohabiting relationships.   
 
Under the regime proposed by the Law Commission, Greer describes the factors that 
would be considered by the court which include: 
“the financial needs and obligations of the parties; the extent and nature of the 
financial resources which each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable 
future; the welfare of any children who live with, or might reasonably be 
expected to live with, either party; and the conduct of each party”.176 
One of the key issues which the Law Commission raised with regard to treating 
                                                          
173 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown, (n171), 
1.13. Note that the proposal here was an opt-out scheme. This was done as a result of the concerns relating 
to autonomy. See also [2.5.3]. 
174 See [5.7], [6.8], [7.4].  
175 Wong S., ‘The shared home a rational solution through statutory reform’ in Lim H. & Bottomley A., 
eds. Feminist Perspectives on Land Law (2007: Routledge Cavendish, London), 200. 
176 Greer S., ‘Back to the Bad Old Days?’ (2008) 158 New Law Journal 174, 178. 
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cohabitees in a marriage-like manner, is the broad range of cohabitees, not all cohabitees 
are in a marriage-like relationship, some will be cohabitations merely of convenience, 
or based on a care-giving relationship and the like.177 Yet, it seems to me that the 
diversity of cohabitants does not render them a group of people for whom legislation 
would necessarily be too inflexible. For example, it would be possible to create an opt-
in statutory scheme, which used a non-exhaustive list of eligibility criteria to be 
consulted by the courts when determining whether cohabitants were in a marriage-like 
relationship. However, such a proposal would still raise the issue of communication.  
 
For an opt-in scheme to benefit cohabiting couples, they are required to contemplate 
and speak about the breakdown of the relationship. As a result, such a regime would fail 
to protect vulnerable parties, a point recognised by Law Commission.178 Perhaps what 
is truly necessary is for legislation to give more adjustive powers to the judiciary, which 
allow them to consider the relationship in its totality. If such a regime legitimised 
fairness as a consideration, this would likely reaffirm the relevance of feminine 
contributions. Placing such discretion on statutory footing would legitimise the judicial 
flexibility necessary in such cases, without risking the disruption of constitutional 
principles and restrictive precedent.179 It would allow for a substantive approach to be 
taken, one which can embrace the diverse nature of cohabitation relationships and 
address the inequality which has resulted from the unequal construction of women in 
society where necessary.   
 
                                                          
177 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (n171), 
1.10. 
178 ibid, [1.15]. 
179 The constitutional principles referred to here are those which put restrictions on judicial law making, 
namely the separation of powers and the supremacy of Parliament.  
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7.5.2 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second Reading180  
Based on the proposals of the Law Commission in 2007, the Bill suggested that: 
“The starting point is for the applicant to show ‘qualifying contributions’ to the 
parties’ shared lives. These could be financial or they could be in work, in care 
or in kind”.181  
Though it should be noted that they would still be required to demonstrate that they had 
suffered  “economic disadvantage”.182 In some ways this recognises that contribution is 
more than payments towards the purchase price/mortgage. Having been preceded by a 
discussion of contributions which included care-based acts, it can be assumed that 
“economic disadvantage” would not preclude non-financial feminine contributions in 
practice.  
 
Lord Marks, who proposed the Bill noted the current reliance on the “antiquated and 
unwieldy law of trusts”.183 The lack of consistency and focus on financial contributions 
has made the law of trusts an unsound basis for those in a vulnerable position to secure 
proprietary rights. Lord Marks goes on to describe the current position of unmarried 
cohabitants as follows: 
 “On separation, there are no legal rights at all for the woman who has given up 
her career to look after her partner’s children—or their joint children… There 
are no rights for the woman who gives up working to keep house for her family 
and then does so for many years before the relationship breaks down”.184 
                                                          
180 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15). Note that this same Bill was re-introduced 
in 16-17 but did despite passing the first stage did not progress on to its second reading. The same Bill 
has now been introduced again and is currently awaiting a date for second reading.   
181 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), Col 2070-2071. 
182 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), Col 2070-2071. 
183 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), Col 2069. 
184  Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15) col 2069. 
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The reliance on stereotypes here, constructing women as mother/homemaker can be 
seen to adhere to a similar approach to that employed by Lord Denning in constructing 
women as vulnerable in order to manipulate the law for their benefit.185  Here, the 
emotive language used when discussing those women who have “given up” their careers 
for the sake of a relationship is utilized in order to elicit sympathy for those who the law 
has failed to protect, in order to support his proposed Bill.  
 
It is stated that the proposed Bill “aim[s] to address economic unfairness at the end of a 
relationship that has enriched one party and impoverished the other in a way that 
demands redress”. 186  This again attempts to rouse an emotional response which 
attempts to make those hearing the proposition consider the moral implications of the 
law in their current state.  
 
Baroness Butler-Sloss, also speaking in favour of the Bill, did so by discussing the 
groups which the Bill would impact. For the purpose of this thesis, it is the first one, 
cited below, which is of most relevance.  
“Generally it is the woman, but could be the man, who has been living with the 
other partner sometimes for 25 or 30 years… That woman very often either did 
not have a job because her partner was well-to-do and wanted her to stay at 
home, or she had a modest job that was not compatible with her considerable 
abilities. When she is left by that man, who, after 25 or 30 years, looks for a 
younger woman… she is absolutely stuck. She has no house because the house 
is very often in his name and she did not suggest that it should be in both 
names… They are left on their own with the children growing up; they are not 
                                                          
185 See in particular [5.7]. 
186 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2070. 
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required to have maintenance; they are homeless and without a proper job, and 
they have to find something to be able to keep themselves, or live off benefits. 
Of course, they also have no pension”.187 
The ‘typical’ cohabitant constructed by Baroness Butler-Sloss mirrors the experience 
of a number of the claimants who have been examined within this thesis.188 In drawing 
on the human element of these cases, this extract recognises not only the issues which 
arise as a result of the current regime, but also the impact that the wider socio-legal 
context can have on individuals, in particular in relation to employment.189 It also draws 
considerable attention to the consequences that the current regime can have on the party 
who is unable to assert any, or only insubstantial beneficial interest, in that it goes 
beyond the loss of a financial asset.  
 
The central issues which were raised in relation to the passing of the Bill were threefold. 
First, and most expectedly there were arguments as regards the sanctity of marriage.190 
The second argument against the Bill, though not unrelated to the first was that in 
encouraging cohabiting relationships, which would ‘damage’ children due to the 
frequency of breakdown.191 Even those who recognised the issues which face unmarried 
cohabitants on breakdown used the issues family breakdown can cause children as a 
reason against the Bill progressing. Lord Farmer focussed on the way in which lone 
parents (though focusing particularly on mothers as they make up the largest percentage 
of single parent families) “struggle to provide adequately for their children, both 
                                                          
187 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), Cols 2079-80. 
188 In [5.7], [6.8], [7.4]. 
189 A link which has been drawn out throughout this thesis.  
190 See for example Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2074. This has been 
discussed in detail at [4.3.3] and is a theme which has emerged Chapters 5-7.  
191 See for example Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2073. See also [5.2] 
and [6.5.1] for similar arguments raised in relation to lone mothers.  
343 
 
financially and in terms of the time and attention they need to thrive”.192 This was 
further problematised through casing the issue in terms of the economic costs to the tax 
payer, a tactic which has historically been used when arguing against issues attempting 
to address various inequalities.193 This is despite the fact that if this Bill were to be 
implemented, it would make “the bad men pay instead of us as taxpayers” 194  by 
providing security (financial or property based) for the economically vulnerable party 
on breakdown. 
 
Finally, the Bill was met with claims of “paternalism”. 195  To provide rights on 
breakdown to those who had specifically chosen not to marry was presented as an 
“attack on the liberty”.196  
The “corner of freedom where couples may escape family law”,197 that is unmarried 
cohabitation. This “liberty” which Baroness Deech and other proponents of the Bill 
wish to protect in fact leaves couples trapped by patriarchal property law, which has 
traditionally only protected breadwinners and made the economically vulnerable, more 
vulnerable. As Baroness Butler-Sloss emphasises, “the freedom that is talked about is 
very often a freedom for one cohabitant but a sentence for the other, who is left on an 
inadequate income to cope with the children”.198 
 
An interesting point was raised by the Lord Bishop of Sheffield. Having acknowledged 
the “inequities and hardships”199 which can arise at the end of cohabiting relationships, 
                                                          
192 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2075. 
193 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2075.  
194  Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), 2081. 
195 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2073. Such a claim has interesting links 
with the material discussed at [2.5.3] and [2.5.6]. 
196 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2073 2073. 
197 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2075. 
198 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2079. 
199 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2078. 
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he considered that they should “be addressed where necessary on a case-by-case 
basis”.200 Similar to the proposals made in the previous Cohabitation Bill, which would, 
if enacted have given the courts a wider discretion to do what is “just and equitable”201 
having regard to all the circumstances. Such an approach has merit. However, what 
must be considered is the courts current unwillingness to take the law further than they 
already have, in particular in relation to considerations of fairness within the CICT. The 
courts have sought parliamentary action on this matter due to the restrictions which are 
placed on their own law-making abilities. It is possible that even if the legislation 
surrounding the rights of unmarried cohabitants were not to take the form of the Bill 
outlined above, and instead merely legitimised judicial flexibility, that such a scheme 
could emerge. This would enable the courts to address issues based on the 
circumstances of the parties concerned, avoiding the need for gender stereotypes to be 
invoked, but without risking a return to a purely formal approach which is in practice, 
inherently patriarchal.  
  
7.6 Conclusion 
The historical analysis sections of this chapter have demonstrated the ongoing issues in 
relation to women’s position in society. Despite increasing numbers of women in full 
and part-time employment, the public sphere is still dominated by masculine norms 
which prevent the fulfilment of equality in practice. This had provided the necessary 
socio-legal backdrop from which to analyse the case law. That is, that due to the 
continuing difference in the treatment and position of women in society, how ill-fitting 
a purely formal approach would be.  
 
                                                          
200 Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL] Second reading (2014/15), col 2078. 
201 HL Deb, 13 March 2008 vol 699 cols 1413-1443. 
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The case/legislative analysis has provided additional insight into the treatment of 
cohabitants, and the public perception of such relationships. It has demonstrated that, 
although the courts showed the promise of developing an equality in difference 
approach when they included considerations of fairness, this was left unfulfilled. 
Fairness, within the context of the CICT ought not to be limited to quantification, but 
instead should be an overriding consideration. The acquisition stage of the CICT, 
particularly for sole-owners remains purely formal, resting on financial contributions 
and express agreements in a way which though seemingly gender-neutral, has worked 
to the detriment of women who cohabit.202 Although the supposed willingness of the 
courts to consider quantification more holistically seemed to indicate a shift in approach, 
in practice this has also been limited to financial contributions.  
 
To adopt an equality in difference approach, would be to provide a scheme not unlike 
that proposed in the Cohabitation Rights Bill where the “starting point is for the 
applicant to show ‘qualifying contributions’ to the parties’ shared lives. These could be 
financial or they could be in work, in care or in kind”.203 Taking into consideration both 
financial contributions, and feminine contributions would recognise the difference in 
the ability for those who perform a feminine role/whose income, and therefore ability 
to contribute financially due to childcaring responsibilities. If this were then 
underpinned by fairness as regards quantification, looking at the relationship in the 
round, and considering future needs this would alleviate the issues which have arisen as 
a result of the strict property law regime which has undue focus on financial 
contributions. This would be particularly useful in counteracting the injustice which 
results from the purely formal approach adopted in cases concerning sole-owners.  
                                                          
202 As shown in [5.7], [6.8], [7.4]. 




Due to the courts reluctance to develop the ‘fairness’ element of the current scheme 
further without the consent of Parliament, what is needed, in summary, is a statutory 
provision in which the courts are given a wide discretionary power to impute common 
intention based on fairness. A regime which is not limited to the consideration of 
financial contributions, but those which are indicative of the relationship as a whole, 
including feminine contributions. Failing that, the use of a gains/losses type model such 
as that seen in Scotland would act as a satisfactory compromise.204 Under that model on 
the breakdown of a cohabiting relationship a number of factors can be taken into 
consideration when determining the economic disadvantage suffered by one party by 
virtue of their relationship, including those feminine acts which are often excluded under 
the CICT regime.205 Of particular importance is the degree of flexibility that such 
legislation provides the judiciary, in relation to both the degree of the monetary award, 
and the factors which can be considered as contributing to “economic disadvantage”. 
This combination of judicial flexibility and the recognition of feminine contributions 
would allow for the full development of an equality in difference approach without the 
limitations currently placed on the judiciary by virtue of precedent and an unwillingness 
to embark on covert judicial law making as Lord Denning did in decades prior.206 
Although “it is… wrong to say that existing law ignores cohabitants altogether”207 
merely because there is a lack of a statutory scheme, it is ‘wrong’ to say that the current 
scheme adequately addresses the issues raised on the breakdown of cohabiting 
                                                          
204Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s28. As demonstrated in Gow v Grant [2012] UKSC 29.  
205 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s28(9) “contributions” are considered to include indirect and non-
financial contributions, including childcare. “Economic advantage” includes gains in capital, income and 
earning capacity. This is in turn used to determine “economic disadvantage”.  
206 See [5.7]. 








Chapter 8 – Thesis Conclusion 
8.1 Analysis Overview 
This thesis has explored the extent to which a formal approach to equality, as adopted 
by the courts within the context of the common intention constructive trust (CICT), has 
proved an inadequate tool for the distribution of property rights on the breakdown of 
unmarried cohabiting relationships. Having analysed the development of the relevant 
case law, it has been demonstrated that the application of a formal approach to equality 
is inherently flawed, and rather than resulting in equality in practice, has instead 
produced significant injustice. The consequences of the application of formal equality 
have a considerable impact, predominantly on women. 
 
The gendered impact of the application of formal equality within the context of the 
CICT arises due to a number of factors. First, the historical placement of women in the 
private sphere, and the way in which the feminine has been associated with the lesser-
half of a series of liberal dichotomies.1 As a result of this, the contributions made by 
women have continued to be undervalued, and women’s position in the public realm 
has been persistently lesser than that of men. This has proved problematic when 
considering the focus on financial contributions in the acquisition and quantification of 
beneficial interest in the family home. Such contributions have been presented as though 
they were gender neutral, without recognising the way in which the socio-legal 
construction of women has continued to present women as different from men.2 
 
                                                          
1 As explored in Chapter 3.  
2 The way in which women have continued to be constructed as lesser is examined in Chapters 5-7. 
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Secondly, the refusal to acknowledge the biological and socially constructed differences 
between men and women under the formal equality approach, have meant that 
substantive inequalities have been allowed to persist. Those issues which contribute to 
the inability for women to contribute in the same way as men are multi-faceted and 
interrelated, and have been discussed thematically within Chapters 5-7 of this thesis. 
The biological difference between men and women, referring only to the capacity to 
give birth to and suckle a child, has not been distanced from socially constructed 
motherhood.3 That has positioned women as the primary-care giver, a private role 
which is persistently undervalued. The consequences of motherhood (whether a reality 
for the individual woman or a presumption of motherhood) have continued to have 
implications on the attainment of equal pay. 4  This has in turn reinforced the 
breadwinner/housewife construction of the family which has for a considerable time 
been pushed by political and legal regimes as either an ideal or a necessity. 
 
In addition, notwithstanding the issues relating to motherhood, employment practices 
and norms have worked to the detriment of women. The classification of ‘women’s 
work’ as of less value, occupational segregation and discriminatory practices have all 
negatively impacted women’s ability to contribute to the acquisition of property, and 
fostered the requirement that a woman remain financially dependent on her 
breadwinning partner. 5  Moreover, the perceptions of normative behaviours in 
relationships has reduced the likelihood that women would succeed in their claim for 
beneficial interest in the family home. The lower level of pay and the staying-power of 
                                                          
3 See [2.3], [2.4] and [3.3.4]. 
4 The continuation of the pay gap has been examined at [7.2.2]. 
5 See [5.2], [5.3],[6.2],[6.3] and [7.2]. 
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the connection between masculinity and man’s role as provider has, in a number of 
cases, prevented women from making contributions.6 
 
Further, the way in which the CICT has been formulated does not reflect the reality of 
cohabiting relationships. The gendered construction of common intention and 
detrimental reliance have, for the most part, refused to acknowledge feminine 
contributions.7 Instead, the doctrine has relied on express common intention. Express 
common intention relies on the unrealistic notion that a couple will discuss what is to 
happen to the property on the breakdown of their relationship. This fails to take account 
of the reality that couples are unlikely to discuss such matters. This is made more 
problematic when considering the emotional vulnerability of some of the claimants and 
the centrality of familial trust in such cases has meant that there will be individuals who 
are unwilling to ask their partner about their interest, or even if they are made aware of 
their lack of rights on breakdown, they will be unwilling to consider the end of their 
relationship even if it is to ensure that they are adequately protected. In addition, the 
way in which different communications or even silence will be interpreted not only by 
the involved parties, but by the court leaves room for individuals to feel as if they were 
protected but end up with nothing. 
 
In the absence of such agreements, the courts have relied on gender-neutral financial 
contributions in order to infer common intention, which as explored above, are 
masculine in practice. As such, these contributions have been more easily fulfilled by 
men. The unwillingness to consider contributions towards the family or indirect 
contributions towards the property has reinforced the notion that ‘women’s work’ in the 
                                                          
6 See the excuse cases discussed at [5.7.3] and [6.8.5] and at [4.3.1]. 
7 See [4.3.2], [5.7], [6.8] and [7.4]. 
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home is of no economic value. Despite the courts supposed widening of such criteria in 
Stack/Jones, those cases were still decided on the basis of financial contributions 
without any consideration of the other contributions the parties might have made. In 
those same cases it was also emphasised that not all forms of contribution will 
necessarily hold the same value, and given the historical tendency to undervalue 
feminine contributions, this is a concerning admission. The position of sole-owners 
being one of uncertainty means that either under Rosset or under the joint-ownership 
regime, they remain likely to have to attempt to assert their interest on the basis of 
financial contributions. 
 
The requirement that a claimant must also demonstrate detrimental reliance has also 
proved considerably problematic. First, financial contributions often play a dual role, in 
that where financial constrictions demonstrate common intention, they are 
simultaneously used to satisfy the detrimental reliance requirement. Further, where 
detrimental reliance has been demonstrated by virtue of acts which are considered non-
financial, the construction has been both inconsistent and inherently gendered. The way 
in which detrimental reliance has been constructed as gendered has meant that in many 
cases, it is only where a claimant has gone beyond those acts deemed ‘normal’ for a 
woman/man. Where such acts have been performed this has assisted in the finding of 
common intention. However, it has had a role in both reinforcing the law’s perception 
of gender roles in the family (breadwinner/housewife) and further indicated the 
devaluation of traditionally feminine acts. Indeed, where women have not been 
successful, this has generally been due to the way in which their contributions are 
considered to have arisen as a result of love and affection rather than on the basis that 
there was a common intention that she ought to have beneficial interest in the property. 
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To summarise, the refusal to acknowledge the socially constructed and biological 
differences between men and women has meant that the neutral requirements of the 
CICT, applied under a formal equality approach, do not alleviate inequality in practice, 
but rather work to the detriment of women.  
 
8.2 Demonstrating the Inadequacy of the Formal Approach 
The chronological review of the case law, within their socio-legal and historical context 
has allowed for the development of formal and substantive approaches to be reviewed 
against the position which society has placed women in. This can be categorised as 
occurring in three waves. First, the 60/70s constitutes a predominantly formal approach. 
Second, the 80/90s marked the strict restatement of formal equality, after attempts had 
been made to undermine it, particularly stemming from the Court of Appeal. Finally, 
the third period examined in this thesis, 2000 onwards, marks a supposed departure 
from formal equality, having integrated a number of substantive factors into the 
considerations which the courts are at liberty to make. 
 
The first period explored in this thesis was 60s-70s, in which the formal approach under 
the orthodox CICT took precedence.8 This formal approach is most readily identifiable 
in Gissing and Pettitt which emphasised that common intention could only be 
established though express agreement or direct financial contributions. 9  The 
restatement of property law principles in those cases put an end to the emergence of 
considerations of fairness which had been occurring in cases prior. In restricting the 
scope of the contributions deemed relevant when attempting to uncover the intentions 
of the parties the House of Lords adopted a neutral criterion, financial contributions, 
                                                          
8 See [5.7]. 
9 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777. See [5.7.2]. 
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which does not make any consideration of the substantive inequalities that the parties 
involved may face and instead assumes the sameness of all individuals. Sameness 
within the context of the CICT refers mainly to the ability to contribute financially, 
which having been examined in its socio-legal context throughout Chapters 5-7 of this 
thesis, is an inaccurate reflection of the inequality suffered by women, particularly in 
regards the capacity to contribute financially. 
 
Despite the formal construction of this rule, purportedly ignoring any differences 
between the parties, the discussion in regard to non-financial contributions used gender 
stereotypes as a measure against which the behaviour of the claimants ought to be 
judged. ‘DIY’ having been considered to be typical behaviour for a man, and the care 
of the children and acts generally performed by ‘housewives’ seen as typical for a 
woman. As is commonplace under the formal approach to equality, where difference is 
recognised, it is not seen to undermine the purportedly neutral rule, but instead is seen 
to result from either natural difference or the decision made by autonomous individuals. 
This natural difference, has proved particularly problematic for women, given that the 
usual default option of the law in formal schemes is masculine. Despite the ‘equality of 
outcome’ in Pettitt and Gissing, in that both the claimants were unsuccessful, this arose 
as a result of the courts unwillingness to consider the gender-typical behaviour of the 
male/female claimants in those cases. Despite the findings in Gissing/Pettitt indicating 
that there is no greater impact on women, when viewed against the socio-historical 
background in which these cases took place, the rarity of the wife being the sole owner 




Due to the potential for injustice under the orthodox approach in Gissing and Pettitt, the 
Court of Appeal in Eves and Cooke sought to avoid the formal construction of the CICT, 
instead attempting to reassert the considerations of fairness which had been embodied 
in the rejected doctrine of family assets.10 In those cases, the out-performance of gender 
roles was considered to evidence detrimental reliance. The way in which difference is 
expressed in these cases is at best, questionable. However, the emergence of a 
substantive approach to equality in this context was a welcome development. The 
manipulation of common intention to include ‘excuses’ allowed for non-financial acts 
to be considered as evidence of detriment. Although these non-financial acts were 
constructed in a gendered way, it did allow for non-financial contributions to be 
considered where they were considered invalid under a formal approach. 
 
Within those cases, the need to make judgments which can be considered ‘fair’ also 
emerges. These considerations of fairness arose as a result of the ‘moral judgements’ 
constructed by Lord Denning. Again, though the construction of men/women as 
villain/victim in these cases is not without its issues, the sense of legitimacy this gave 
to the end result, with beneficial interest having been found for women who would 
otherwise have been denied it, demonstrates the benefits of a more substantive 
approach, even if this was done in a flawed manner. 
 
The 80s/90s was dominated by the re-emergence of the formal approach. The return to 
orthodoxy put an end to the adoption of elements of substantive equality which had 
enabled the courts to recognise, albeit in a haphazard and at times problematic way, the 
contributions made by women. The cases of Burns and Rosset demonstrate the injustice 
                                                          




which arises as a result of an unwillingness to recognise difference in the context of the 
CICT. 11  The focus on purely financial contributions in the absence of express 
agreement, ignoring the socio-legal factors which impacted women’s ability to 
contribute in the same way as men, meant that injustice arose for women who were 
unable to meet this neutral criteria. 
 
In both of those cases, Mrs Rosset and Valarie Burns were left with nothing, despite 
having made significant non-financial and indirect financial contributions. The figure 
of Mrs Burns has been frequently invoked in the literature to signify the injustice which 
has arisen as a result of the CICT, and in particular, to emphasise that this is a gendered 
issue. Mrs Burns had, for significant periods during the relationship been unable to work 
due to her role as primary caregiver for their two children, and when she did work, her 
money was used to purchase items for the family and to pay for household expenses. 
The court’s unwillingness to attribute any value to the feminine contributions Mrs Burns 
had made, and their reluctance to accommodate the way in which her difference from 
the male-norm had impacted her ability to contribute, she was deemed to have no 
beneficial interest in her home. Despite the court’s acknowledgement that she “had 
nothing to contribute”, 12  under a formal approach such differences are given no 
credence. The feminine acts that she had performed were determined to be acts which 
she would inevitably perform by virtue of her pseudo-wife status.13 Indeed the use of 
gender stereotypes in Burns was rife, and applied to both men and women. However, 
particularly during the period in which the case, and the cohabitation took place, it was 
more likely that an unwillingness to give weight to gender-typical behaviour would 
                                                          
11 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1990] 1 AC 107; Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, 327. See [6.8.1] and [6.8.3]. 
12 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 237. 
13 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 235. 
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work to the disadvantage of women, as they would be less likely to be able to contribute, 
and less likely to be the sole-name registered. Despite the detriment that her economic 
dependency on her partner would inevitably cause her, such detriment is not seen to be 
a valid consideration under the CICT. 
 
After the harsh return to formal equality in Burns, the Court of Appeal in Grant again 
sought to preserve elements of the approach adopted by Lord Denning in Eves and 
Cooke.14 In attempting to ensure a that a “just decision”15 was made, the courts relied 
on the ‘excuses’ which had been made by Mr Edwards as to why the property had not 
been register in joint-names in order to find common intention between the parties. The 
considerations of detrimental reliance were again based on the notion that this ought to 
be demonstrated by acts which could not be reasonable expected from a ‘wife’, in this 
case her feminine contributions were considered sufficient, and she was as a result 
deemed to have ½ of the beneficial interest in the home. However, these acts were 
underpinned by the fact that the housekeeping and feeding/caring for the children were 
from her “earnings”16 rather than the performance of the acts. This was seen to allow 
Mr Edwards to make mortgage instalments, and as such this was still underpinned by 
financial contributions, albeit more liberally than under the orthodox or Rosset 
approach. Yet, the same argument could be made about the economic value of the acts 
involved in motherhood, though whether these would have been deemed sufficient, 
even before the court of appeal, in this period is doubtful. Although Grant maintains 
elements of the substantive approach adopted by Lord Denning, and despite the 
                                                          
14 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638: see [6.8.2]. 
15 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 650, 649. 
16 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 650, 649.  
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reformulation of formality in Burns, it was only by virtue of the courts ability to find an 
excuse, that the strict finance-based approach was avoided. 
 
In Rosset the court, in the absence of an express agreement, were presented with an 
opportunity to clarify what acts would be sufficient to demonstrate common intention 
and detrimental reliance. The strict financial approach which was subsequently 
developed, which restricted ‘relevant’ contributions to the gender-neutral criterium of 
direct payments to the purchase price. When considering those contributions that Mrs 
Rosset had made, the House of Lords deemed that work she had performed on the 
property, by way of painting and decorating were again categorised as acts ‘naturally’ 
performed by a wife and echoed the sentiment expressed in Burns before it, that such 
contributions are ‘worthless’. In the absence of financial contributions, the claimants 
had to rely on some form of express agreement which does not adequately reflect the 
way in which couples deal with property when in a relationship, they often, 
unsurprisingly, do not contemplate breakdown when embarking on their joint lives 
together. 
 
In Burns and Rosset, despite the recognition of the social reality of such relationships, 
in relation to the unlikelihood that they will form express intention, and the barriers 
which exist, preventing women from contributing to the acquisition of property, they 
nevertheless sought to clarify the law and do away with the inconsistent application. 
However, in seeking consistency, relying on a formal approach, and adopting the 
supposedly neutral criteria of financial contributions, treating men and women the same, 




Despite the considerably restrictive restatement of the CICT in Burns and Rosset, the 
Court of Appeal, where possible, refused to adopt a purely formal approach. Hammond 
v Mitchell demonstrated the willingness of the courts to recognise stereotypically 
feminine contributions, namely her role as mother/unpaid assistant and indirect 
financial contributions.17 This was again supported by the presence of express common 
intention. Without finding an excuse, the courts were often unable to facilitate a 
substantive approach in the period in the advent of Rosset. That is with the exception of 
Midland Bank v Cooke, in which the court was reluctant to consider financial 
contributions as determinative of the issue of quantification. Instead, what the courts 
ought to examine was the whole course of dealing between the couple, an approach 
which saw fairness reinstated, at least to some extent within the context of 
quantification. However, it ought to be noted that in that case there were financial 
contributions by way of a marriage gift which equated less than 7% of the purchase 
price. This was therefore consistent with Rosset and the formal approach, but it was 
only when stretching the law and adding considerations of fairness to quantification, 
which indicates a covert substantive approach, that the court were able to afford Mrs 
Cooke 50% beneficial interest. Indeed, the courts sympathy towards her, and their 
dissatisfaction with the strict approach of the law was expressed outright, with reference 
to “human heartache”.18 
 
The final period examined in this thesis is the one which can most accurately be 
described as indicating a shift away from the formal approach which had dominated 
CICT proceedings prior. Under the joint-ownership regime, this departure is more 
pronounced. The approach to joint-ownership cases under Stack/Jones has facilitated 
                                                          
17 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127: see [6.8.5]. 
18 Midland Bank v Cooke (1995) 27 HLR 733, 736. See also [6.8.6]. 
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the ability for the courts to consider the course of dealing of the parties, the context 
which allows for the differences in contributions, and different abilities of the parties to 
contribute to be considered. In combination with the, albeit limited, inclusion of fairness 
within the regime, it is for this reason that it is the period which most reflects a 
substantive approach. 19  However, the uncertain approach to sole-ownership cases 
continues to be problematic. The issues relating to sole-ownership cases are twofold. 
First, if Rosset remains binding then the significant critique which has thus far been 
waged against a formal finance-based approach applies, and the CICT continues to work 
to the detriment of women who are financially vulnerable. Second, even under the more 
holistic approach typified in Stack/Jones, the different starting point for sole/joint 
owners proves problematic. If the presumption that there is no beneficial interest for the 
non-legal owner is as difficult a presumption to shift as it has been under the joint-
ownership regime, then this would act as a significant barrier for those seeking to 
establish said interest.   This is of additional concern given that under Stack/Jones the 
presumption has only been displaced on the consideration of financial contributions. As 
a result, the scheme would be of little use to cohabitants who would have been unable 
to demonstrate the necessary criteria under Rosset, as both maintain a focus on financial 
criteria. 
 
It was in the sole-ownership case Oxley that the need to consider fairness within the 
CICT was restated, developing on from Midland Bank v Cooke.20 This signalled the 
inclusion of an element of substantive equality in sole-ownership cases, though this was 
                                                          
19 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53. See [7.4.3] and [7.4.4]. 




limited to the quantification stage. The inclusion of fairness and the wider 
considerations of context in Oxley were subsequently given consideration in Stack.  
 
Stack supposedly signalled a departure from Rosset, and brought with it the potential 
for the development of a substantive approach. Particularly the inclusion of the list of 
factors which can be considered when attempting to ascertain the common intention of 
the parties, which explicitly included feminine contributions. However, the application 
of Stack raises a number of concerns in that the way in which the presumption in favour 
of equal shares in that case, was displaced on the basis of financial considerations. Such 
arrangements, it is argued, do not necessarily reflect the reality of cohabiting 
relationships, and work to the detriment of the economically vulnerable party. 
 
The criteria suggested by Lady Hale has the potential to give rise to a substantive form 
of equality in practice, in that it recognises the different ability for individuals to 
contribute and the different forms of acts which can be considered as a valid 
contribution. Yet, the fact such contributions were not considered in Stack, raises 
concerns how much weight such contributions would be given on application. In Stack 
the fact that not all forms of contributions would have the equal weight is raised by the 
court. This proves troublesome given that feminine contributions have historically been 
considered as less than those deemed masculine, and if the law were to make those same 
assumptions, then little will have changed since Rosset. Perhaps some hope can be taken 
from Lord Neuberger’s statement that he may have considered financial contributions 
to childcare if there had been any from Mr Stack, which may indicate that the 




Jones firmly repositioned fairness within the context of the CICT, again providing an 
indication that the courts are willing to abandon the formal approach typified by Rosset, 
Despite indicating a shift in approach, the inclusion of fairness was limited in scope. 
Fairness would only form part of the court’s considerations. Those circumstances been 
where it was impossible to divine the intentions of the parties, and therefore the court 
would then impute a common intention based on the conduct of the parties, “deduced 
objectively from conduct”. However, objective considerations have traditionally 
focussed on masculine contributions for some time, as such it would depend on the 
weight given to different kinds of contributions developed in Stack as to whether that 
trend continues. 
 
It must be noted that where there was evidence of a common intention between the 
parties, the restatement of fairness did not go so far as to allow the courts to put such 
intention aside and instead decide on the basis of what was fair. The redistributive CICT 
as used in other jurisdictions has not been adopted by the English courts. Despite this, 
it is possible that the inclusion of fairness in those circumstances where it is used further 
indicates a shift towards the adoption of a substantive approach. 
 
Attempts to rebut the presumption in favour of equal shares are “not to be lightly 
embarked upon”,21  suggesting that it is difficult to establish that a jointly-owned family 
home is merely a commercial asset which is to be decided on the basis of financial 
contributions. The inclusion of this burden in joint-ownership cases reflects the reality 
of cohabiting relationships in which the home is a family asset which has more 
significance than a mere financial investment. However, Stack and Jones both avoid the 
                                                          
21 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 [57]. 
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presumption on the basis of financial contributions. Which again, could prove 
problematic for the financially vulnerable party in sole-ownership cases. 
 
It must be noted the fact that it was Mr Stack and Mr Kernott who fared worse under 
the CICT in Jones and Stack does not undermine the critique(s) which have been waged 
against the doctrine. Those cases were decided on the basis that their partners had made 
larger financial contributions than they had, rather than on the basis of a renewed focus 
on feminine contributions. The law still refuses to acknowledge the contributions of 
those women who are financially/emotionally vulnerable particularly in sole-ownership 
cases. In those cases involving joint-owners it remains to be seen whether feminine 
contributions will be given sufficient value, though it is hoped that the indications of 
the emergence of a substantive approach and the recognition of difference within the 
judgments indicates that this is the case. 
 
8.3 A Solution? 
Clearly the CICT as underpinned by formal equality is unfit for purpose. It does not 
adequately reflect the nature of cohabiting relationships and has persistently acted to 
the detriment of women. The purpose of this thesis has not been to provide the solution 
to the CICT, but rather to examine the consequences of the differing forms of equality 
in this context and in particular demonstrate the inadequacy of the formal approach. 
There are however a number of considerations which ought to be borne in mind if/when 





First, it ought to be noted that the inequality suffered by women under the CICT does 
not entirely lie with the CICT. Rather, the socio-legal construction of women as 
other/lesser, has given rise to the continuation of gender inequality. 22  Under such 
conditions, formal equality, ignoring the consequences of both biological and socially 
constructed differences, cannot facilitate equality in practice. 23  To alleviate these 
inequalities requires a herculean task of deconstruction, so as to alleviate the 
hierarchical construction of the binary parings which have been used to construct 
society.24 While society remains an environment defined by a series of inter-related 
inequalities, a formal approach will continue to privilege those who adhere to the 
masculine norm. The adoption of a formal approach which re-emphasises difference 
without addressing the substantive causes of the unequal status which has been tied to 
that difference. Without the implementation of an approach to equality which 
recognises that these differences have an impact on those individuals to which they are 
assigned, and which attempts to alleviate them, gender inequality is merely replicated. 
 
One possible solution would be the adoption of a reformulated ‘family assets’ approach. 
The doctrine of ‘family assets’ had, prior to its rejection, been used to afford 
considerable discretion to the courts on the breakdown of relationships. 25  The 
distributive powers this afforded the courts was based on the notion that where a couple 
had through their “joint efforts” acquired a property which has been intended to form 
part of their “joint lives”,26 that the interest in said property ought to be equal. A number 
                                                          
22 Based on the series of gendered hierarchical dichotomies which have been explored in this thesis 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
23 The impact of such differences has been examined in Chapters 5-6.  
24 The need to deconstruct each of the dichotomies discussed in this thesis, due to their interrelated 
construction/function is discussed at [3.5.2]. 
25 See [5.7.1] and [5.7.3]; rejected in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, 899-900. 
26 Gissing v Gissing [1969] 2 Ch 85, 93. 
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of points must be made concerning how this doctrine ought to be reconceived. First, the 
“joint efforts” of the couple must include more than purely financial contributions as it 
did in its original form. The list of considerations proposed by the Supreme Court in 
relation to acts from which the burden of equality of shares might be displaced, which 
has included a variety of non-financial contributions has tended to instead be decided 
on the basis of financial criteria.27 It is unclear as to whether this is due to the nature of 
those specific cases, or due to the unequal weighting of feminine/financial 
contributions. It is for this reason that the criteria must not give precedence to financial 
contributions.  
 
Secondly, the assumption related to ownership of the property ought to arise from the 
nature of the parties’ relationship rather than on legal ownership. Using the notion of 
the couples “joint efforts”/“joint lives” in this way would allow for the law to recognise 
that, in cohabiting relationships legal ownership is unlikely to be determinative of the 
couples commitment, or their intentions towards the property. Although the court in 
Jones did consider the notion of “joint enterprise”, this was limited to the assumptions 
drawn from the basis of a couple being joint and severally liable for a mortgage, again 
relying on financial contributions. 28  Distancing beneficial interest from legal 
ownership, instead assuming that the interest is jointly held, would alleviate the risks 
posed to sole-owners under both Rosset and Jones/Stack, and would more adequately 
reflect the nature of cohabiting relationships. When combined with the need to consider 
more than purely financial contributions, this would prevent the main source of injustice 
in the current CICT regime. 
                                                          
27 The list of considerations refers to Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [69]; Jones and Stack both having 
been decided on financial criteria.  




The final point to be made regarding a possible family assets approach is that the 
doctrine was underpinned by fairness. The Supreme Court have, albeit to a limited 
extent, firmly repositioned considerations of fairness within the CICT. However, it is 
argued that expanding the scope for such considerations beyond situations involving 
imputation, and instead positioning it as an overriding consideration would allow for 
the courts to depart from the assumption of equal shares, where it is required. The 
flexibility this would afford the judiciary would allow for the weighing up of 
contributions made, and future need, ensuring the difference in the nature of individuals 
and relationships can be adequately dealt with.  
 
The second approach would be to reformulate the current CICT in a way which reflects 
an equality in difference approach. The examination of the case law in this thesis has 
demonstrated that the recognition of difference within substantive approaches can have 
considerable benefits.29 However, those cases in which difference has been used to 
effect equality in practice have had a role in replicating gender stereotypes. Whilst the 
ends may be said to justify the means, the means can be improved.30 That is, difference 
can and should be recognised within the CICT.  
 
Under an equality in difference approach, the formal basis for deciding how beneficial 
interest is to be determined, at least in the way it is formulated under Stack/Jones can 
remain.31 That is, legal ownership being indicative of beneficial interest or ‘the burden’. 
                                                          
29 As identified in the Denning judgments: see [5.7.3]. 
30 The ‘means’ used refers to the use of gender stereotypes and patronising language.   
31 The formal approach under Rosset, based on financial contributions would continue to cause significant 
issues for economically vulnerable parties and as such is not considered a reasonable basis for the formal 
element of an equality in difference approach.  
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It is at this stage that in considering whether the burden can be surmounted that factors 
which have influenced/impacted how the property is held, and the contributions of the 
parties to the “whole course of dealings” in relation to the property could then be 
implemented. 
 
Under this approach, only two changes to the current approach of the CICT are 
necessary. First, is that the burden should not be a difficult one to surmount but should 
instead be departed from where it is considered fair, having regard to all the 
circumstances. Secondly, those circumstances ought to be divined from factors which 
have impacted the ability to contribute financially, as well as financial contributions. 
That is, they need to recognise traditionally feminine contributions, without the 
indication that not all contributions will have equal weight, indicating that financial 
contributions will take precedence. Despite this supposedly being possible in the current 
regime, this cannot be done with the consideration of fairness. Through more firmly 
positioning fairness within the CICT doctrine, would allow for judicial flexibility, so 
that the law might adapt to the facts of each individual case, and to the changing needs 
of society.  
 
The possible approaches above are underpinned by three central factors which, it is 
proposed, any reform which occurs in relation to the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships, ought to include. First, is the need to recognise non-financial 
contributions. However, such a recognition needs to move away from the assumptions 
which have been made regarding the reasons that women perform certain acts. The way 
in which the law has constructed the contributions made by women as regards the home 
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and family a “natural outpouring”32 of love and affection has meant that women’s 
contributions have been persistently undervalued or constructed in a way which relies 
on the use of gender stereotypes.33 
 
Secondly, any such reform cannot be allowed to continue the devaluation of that which 
has been traditionally considered women’s work merely because it has historically been 
constructed as if it had no (financial) value. Such considerations have been used in the 
context of marital law, see for example in White v White where the contributions are 
considered in such a way: “[i]f, in their different spheres, each [spouse] contributed 
equally to the family, then in principle it matters not which of them earned the money 
and built up the assets”.34  However, such considerations remain absent within the 
context of cohabiting relationships.35 As Newnham notes: “greater judicial sensitivity 
to non-financial contributions is likely to achieve a better fit between the CICT and 
couples’ thinking on the matter. It is also likely to produce fewer unfair outcomes”.36 
In validating feminine contributions in this context, such reform would have a role in 
undermining the traditional distinction which has been drawn between men’s work and 
women’s work. Thus, reducing detriment faced by whichever partner it is who has 
assumed the role of homemaker/caregiver.  
 
Finally, judicial discretion and flexibility is necessary so that any remedy provided for 
cohabitants is able to adequately react to changing societal norms and the specific 
                                                          
32 Tronto J., Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993), 
111.  
33 Chapters 5-7 consider the construction of women’s contributions against their ability to contribute. 
34 White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, 605. 
35 On the distinction which has been drawn between the property law and family law approaches: see 
[4.3.3]. 
36 Newnham A., ‘Common intention constructive trusts: a way forward’ [2013] Family Law 718, 719.  
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context of the cases before them. This flexibility should allow for the consideration of 
fairness to a wider extent than is currently adopted in relation to the CICT. Under the 
current approach  
“For all the talk of ‘fairness’… it is clear that the circumstances in which an 
interest may be acquired in the family home remain limited, and the 
quantification of interests by the courts appears to reflect the financial 
contributions of the parties rather than any broad-brush analysis based on the 
whole relationship of the parties”.37 
 However, it may be that such flexibility requires state intervention. The courts have 
been unwilling to adapt the law relating to the breakdown of cohabiting relationships 
further than they have so far. This is despite being aware of its shortcomings.38 The 
preferable approach would be for the such a regime to place judicial flexibility on 
legislative footing so as to avoid the concerns of the courts relating to undermining 
constitutional principles, while ensuring that such cases are not based on a list of criteria 
which are forever fixed on the statue book, undermining the flexibility necessary for the 
law to adapt to the ever changing social context. 
 
If this broad range of factors were to be included in the approach adopted on the 
breakdown of cohabiting relationships, it would avoid the injustices which have arisen 
as a result of attempting to apply a legal regime which does not adequately recognise 
the reality of cohabiting relationships, and the focus on financial contributions which 
has worked to the significant detriment of women.  
  
                                                          
37 Probert R., ‘Cohabitation: contributions and sacrifices’ [2006] Family Law 1060, 1062. 
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